U.N. Chapter 7 Charter......

[goldengoose]

Maliki asks United Nations to support political process and end to file related to Iraq development (CH 7)Posted: June 12, 2011 by THE CURRENCY NEWSHOUND - Just Hopin in Iraqi Dinar/Politics

Tags: Abbas al-Bayati, Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, Iraq, Iraqi government, Maliki, Politics of Iraq, prime minister, United Nation 0After that its role was merely indicative .. Prime Minister ask the United Nations to support the political process!

After the United Nations expressed concern at the deterioration of human rights and the status of religious minorities and the protection of women and freedom of expression and called in a statement that the Iraqi government to take strong action to protect civilians ..

We went out MP Abbas al-Bayati, speaking on behalf of the State law in order to criticize the United Nations expressed its indicative only and is not entitled to interfere in Iraqi affairs!!! (Forgetting that Iraq is still at the mercy of Chapter VII and is not the Maliki government succeed, remove it from the neck of Iraq).

Saying, “The role of the United Nations is to provide advice and guidance only and is not entitled to intervene in the internal affairs of Iraq.”

And leave us today, Mr. Prime Minister in a statement contradictory to what is said MP Abbas al-Bayati, during the meeting held with the Under-Secretary-General Lynn Pascoe, United Nations, where a statement issued by the Prime Minister that:

“Maliki and Pascoe discussed the outstanding issues relating to Iraq at the United Nations and with other countries.

And he had asked Pascoe UN support for Iraq and the political process and contribute significantly to the end of a file related to the development of Iraq also discussed the political situation and the role of the United Nations. “

http://wp.me/pZC7o-8A

http://another site.wordpress.com/2011/06/12/maliki-asks-united-nations-to-support-political-process-and-end-to-file-related-to-iraq-development-ch-7/

[k98nights]

Currency Newshound has no credibility... it's not a bonafide news site.

[RVDinar4MyFamily]

http://www.ninanews.com/English/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=FGLFKH

[HawaiianGal]

I looked at the top links and they don't work. I looked at the nina news link above and there is no reference to Chapter 7.

Maliki, UN officials discuss activating cooperation

05/06/2011 16:11:00

Baghdad (NINA) – Prime Minister, Nouri Al Maliki, discussed today with Representative of UN Secretary General in Iraq, Ad Melkert, and the Representative of the Food and Agriculture Organization FAO in Iraq, Edward Kalon, the efforts presented by FAO in fields of supporting the food ration card and activating the cooperation with the UN and its bodies.

A statement issued by Maliki’s office quoted him as saying “it is necessary to provide proper food for the poor families all over Iraq,” hailing the humanitarian role carried out by FAO.

For their part, the UN delegation announced the continuation of providing aid and support to the government and Iraqi people as well as supporting the Ministry of Trade and developing its staff. /End/

Here's the link. I'll keep looking, I want to believe...

[jack]

article embellished by currency newshound. Most often links are not provided except one that leads back to there. Articles are often old news and are tweaked a bit to appear like current news

[hurricanewayne]

Currency Newshound has no credibility... it's not a bonafide news site.

I beg to differ here do most of what is on currency news hound comes from other news source like AK news out of Iraq. All you need to do is look on those other sites and find it there I have posted stuff for currency news hound and some else ends up posting similar articles form other news papers.

[Alexyn1006]

I beg to differ here do most of what is on currency news hound comes from other news source like AK news out of Iraq. All you need to do is look on those other sites and find it there I have posted stuff for currency news hound and some else ends up posting similar articles form other news papers.

From my personal experience, I agree with what you say to some degree; that is, that they often times take a skeleton news story with some truth in it (as far as we can tell based on the original Arabic article) and reword it, in at least some cases, to suit what they want to say. I know this, because my son in law is Lebanese and he translates the original/source articles for me.

Edited June 13, 2011 by Alexyn1006

[Dalite]

The politicians have tribal alliances.

The media has tribal alliances.

Which version is considered credible; Allawi's media support, Maliki's media support, Sadr's media support, Barzani's media support, pro socialism, pro democracy...??

For every story, there at least 2 versions; dependent on who's camel is getting gored...

Trying to isolate or endorse one media outlet is like kissing your Teddy bears goodnight - If you kiss one, you better kiss them all.

The end result is no real, unbiased news escapes from Iraq. You just have to try to overlook the juvenile bias and try to extract the truth.

Yesterday, Allawi escaped to Jordan, dug in at Erbil, while in Baghdad to boycott Parliament ...

Were all three articles, factual, outright lies, or drug induced fantasy?

And, there will be seven days per week of the same; repeated 52 times a year...

[Darin]

I always have viewed the situation similar to Republicans, Democrats, and Independents.

I am not sure which side we could credit each group to with the exception of independents. Independents would likely relate better to the Kurds group, because they take a fairly balanced & fair perspective from both sides.

In our own political system, it seems that we have the same issues with people taking forere to move something along. One side pushes, another side pushes back. However, I know that in most cases, when a bill is introduced, it seems that Reps & Dems approve & disapprove when voting. (I.e., a Republican proposed bill may be rejected by some Rep.'s and accepted by some Dem.'s; and vice versa).

We're basically seeing the same thing with the GOI, except, the delays, upset people, and inability to make nearly any decision at all is more prevalent.

In due time, I say, in due time.... The wheels will be in motion.

However, doesn't it appear that the accomplishments have been rather poor? Like a force is holding them back?

I've heard claims that the budget has yet to be opened up -

I've heard claims of over 200 laws that are pending to be reviewed -

And yet, from those two quick examples, the list goes on.

[andy3978]

Come on guys, something of this nature would be a top headline on UN.org. Yet there's no mention of it anywhere

[NWGUY]

I don't think, that they will lift the chapter 7, without an official government, and security in place. JMO! I hope that they do it soon, like Adam says, because without the lifting of the chapter 7 you can't have the RV.

Another reason I don't think they will lift it, is because, I don't believe they have all the issue's resolved with Kuwait yet. Could be wrong, but there were a lot of issue's to resolve there.

Anyway, let's stay positive, and have a awesome RV!!

[Carrello]

Thanks Hawaiian Gal, but notice the date on this:

Maliki, UN officials discuss activating cooperation

05/06/2011 16:11:00

Baghdad (NINA) – Prime Minister, Nouri Al Maliki, discussed today with Representative of UN Secretary General in Iraq, Ad Melkert, and the Representative of the Food and Agriculture Organization FAO in Iraq, Edward Kalon, the efforts presented by FAO in fields of supporting the food ration card and activating the cooperation with the UN and its bodies.

There is no news listed on the UNSC site either.

WAIT ! The original post was June 12, 2011. We are responding to OLD news.

I take back my earlier post to Hawaiian Gal.

[Quietlearner]

Thought this would be of interest.

Skip Main Navigation

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<BR clear=left><BR clear=all>Appointments

• History

Office of the Press Secretary

November 26, 2007

Fact Sheet: U.S.-Iraq Declaration of Principles for Friendship and Cooperation

White House News

The U.S. and Iraqi "Declaration of Principles" is a shared statement of intent that establishes common principles to frame our future relationship. This moves us closer to normalized, bilateral relations between our two countries. With this declaration, leaders of Iraq and the United States commit to begin negotiating the formal arrangements that will govern such a relationship.

• Iraq's leaders have asked for an enduring relationship with America, and we seek an enduring relationship with a democratic Iraq. We are ready to build that relationship in a sustainable way that protects our mutual interests, promotes regional stability, and requires fewer Coalition forces.
• In response, this Declaration is the first step in a three-step process that will normalize U.S.-Iraqi relations in a way which is consistent with Iraq's sovereignty and will help Iraq regain its rightful status in the international community – something both we and the Iraqis seek. The second step is the renewal of the Multinational Force-Iraq's Chapter VII United Nations mandate for a final year, followed by the third step, the negotiation of the detailed arrangements that will codify our bilateral relationship after the Chapter VII mandate expires.
  • The UN Chapter VII resolution that is binding under international law gives the MNFI legal authorization to “take all necessary measures to preserve peace and security”. Both the U.S. and Iraq are committed to Iraq moving beyond an international presence based on a UN Security Council Chapter VII mandate.
  • Iraqis have expressed a desire to move past a Chapter VII MNFI mandate and we are committed to helping them achieve this objective.
  • After the Chapter VII mandate is renewed for one year, we will begin negotiation of a framework that will govern the future of our bilateral relationship.

The Declaration Is A Continuation Of A Commitment That Began This August

The governments of Iraq and the United States are committed to developing a long-term relationship as two fully sovereign and independent states with common interests.

• The August 26 Communiqué signed by the five political leaders – Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki, the three members of the Presidency Council, and Kurdish leader Ma'sud Barzani – on August 26, 2007, and endorsed by President Bush states: "The leaders considered it important to link the renewal of UN Resolution 1723 for another year with a reference to the ending of Iraq's Chapter VII status under the UN Charter and the concomitant resumption of Iraq's normal status as a state with full sovereignty and authorities and the restoration of Iraq's legal international status, namely the status that it had before UN Resolution 661 of 1990. In this context, the leaders affirmed the necessity of reaching a long term relationship with the American side … that is built on common interests and covers the various areas between the Republic of Iraq and the United States of America. This goal should be realized in the near future."
• President Bush endorsed the August 26th communiqué:
  • President Bush: "I welcome and accept the expressed desire of the Iraqi leadership to develop a long-term relationship with the United States based on common interests. The United States is committed to developing this relationship and to strengthening diplomatic, economic, and security ties with the Iraqi government and its people." (President George W. Bush, Remarks, Kirtland AFB, NM, 8/27/07)
  • President Bush: Iraq's leaders "understand that their success will require U.S. political, economic, and security engagement that extends beyond my presidency. These Iraqi leaders have asked for an enduring relationship with America. And we are ready to begin building that relationship – in a way that protects our interests in the region and requires many fewer American troops." (President George W. Bush, Address to the Nation, The White House, 9/13/07)

The Declaration Sets The U.S. And Iraq On A Path Toward Negotiating Agreements That Are Common Throughout The World

The U.S. has security relationships with over 100 countries around the world, including recent agreements with nations such as Afghanistan and former Soviet bloc countries.

The relationship envisioned will include U.S.-Iraqi cooperation in the political, diplomatic, economic and security arenas. The United States and Iraq intend to negotiate arrangements based upon a range of principles:

• Political and Diplomatic: The U.S. and Iraq have committed to strengthening Iraq's democratic institutions, upholding the Iraqi Constitution, supporting Iraqi national reconciliation, and enhancing Iraq's position in regional and international organizations, so that it may play a constructive role in the region.
• Economic: Both countries have agreed to support the development of Iraqi economic institutions and further integration into international financial institutions, to encourage all parties to abide by their commitments made in the International Compact with Iraq, to assist Iraq in its efforts to recover illegally exported funds and properties and to secure debt relief, and to encourage the flow of foreign investments to Iraq.
• Security: To support the Iraqi government in training, equipping, and arming the Iraqi Security Forces so they can provide security and stability to all Iraqis; support the Iraqi government in contributing to the international fight against terrorism by confronting terrorists such as Al-Qaeda, its affiliates, other terrorist groups, as well as all other outlaw groups, such as criminal remnants of the former regime; and to provide security assurances to the Iraqi Government to deter any external aggression and to ensure the integrity of Iraq's territory.

# # #

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[Quietlearner]

http://www.tehrantimes.com/index_View.asp?code=177601

[dalough]

http://www.tehrantimes.com/index_View.asp?code=177601

NO SH*T

[Aqua Dude]

old 2008 article

[Quietlearner]

Saturday, August 7, 2010

Iraq Representative Says Most Important Issue to Relieve ‘Burden of Chapter VII’

<A href="http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/unlogo_blue_sml_en.jpg">4 August 2010

Security Council

SC/10002 Security Council

6368th Meeting (AM)

With Successful Elections, Iraq Has Embarked on ‘Historic Path’ to Shape Future,but Delays Forming Government Real Test for Transition, Security Council Told Mission Head Says Onus on Iraqi Leaders to Ensure Peaceful, Orderly Transition;

Iraq Representative Says Most Important Issue to Relieve ‘Burden of Chapter VIII’

The Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Iraq called on that country’s leaders to show a “higher sense of urgency” in forming a new Government through an inclusive process, while urging continued support for the country from the international community, as he addressed the Security Council this morning.

Ad Melkert told the Council that following the successful completion of parliamentary elections on 7 March 2010, and the certification of election results on 2 June 2010, there were still disagreements over who had the right to form the next Government, contributing to uncertainty and creating conditions that could be exploited by elements opposed to Iraq’s democratic transition. “This process represents a real test for Iraq’s transition to democracy and the commitment of Iraqi leaders to adhere to the country’s Constitution.”

“There is no reason to be pessimistic as yet, for Iraq has embarked on an historic path which will shape the future of the country”, he said, as he introduced the latest report of the Secretary-General (see Background) ahead of the expiration of the mandate of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), which he heads.

“However, the onus is ultimately on Iraqi leaders to ensure an orderly and peaceful transition of power,” said Mr. Melkert, who was joined at the briefing by Hamid al-Bayati, representative of Iraq. “This is owed to the people of Iraq and expected by the international community,” he added, pledging the Mission’s continued commitment to assist Iraqi’s with a range of areas vital for the country’s future.

“I believe that at this stage, Government formation could benefit from the adherence to a specific timeframe, as well as a collective process through which a resolution could be reached”, he said. He pointed to some encouraging signs: the main political blocs had been discussing possible power-sharing arrangements and last week a common understanding seemed to have evolved on the need to consider a “caretaker” government to take care of day-to-day business of governing.

Delays in Government formation, he said, were affecting the country’s basic infrastructure and service and, in turn, the livelihood and well-being of Iraqi citizens, as shown by protests over electricity, the supply of which was at about 67 per cent of peak demand, with periods of blackout still averaging nationally more than nine hours per day.

Political delays and “a less than clear strategic involvement of the international community” also stood in the way of the development agenda, following the signing of the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF). Only 12 per cent of the $187.7 million sought for the 2010 action plan for Iraq had been received. Although Iraq’s national budget should provide the lion’s share for development in the future, time was not on the side of Iraqis, who required support right now, he commented.

Once the Government had been formed, priority concerns to be addressed included Arab-Kurdish relations, particularly in the area of boundaries, revenue-sharing, hydrocarbon legislation, the federal framework and the constitutional revue process, he said. In that regard, the Mission was making serious efforts to promote dialogue in the Ninewa governorate. Among the critical subjects of those talks were security arrangements and ending the boycott of the Provincial Council.

Outlining UNAMI’s efforts to facilitate progress on outstanding issues between Iraq and Kuwait, he said it was also essential for the new Government, once formed, to move quickly to fulfil all Iraq’s remaining obligations under the Council’s Chapter VII resolutions.

He said that in the current climate of “uncertainty and volatility”, the Mission and the United Nations country team continued to provide support to the Government and people that contributed to stability, investment and long-term development.

The practical implications of the United States military drawdown, he said, were now starting to impact operations. In that regard, he pointed to discussions with the Government on the issue and the need for finalization of the United Nations-Iraq Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA), as well as a need for an increase of the United Nations own security and operational capacity encompassing aviation, transport, infrastructure and life support.

He stressed that adequate financial resources from Member States would inevitably be required, and he reminded the Council that a great number of United Nations staff were still operating under challenging working and living conditions. “A clear sign of ongoing commitment and support was critical to all those who are dedicating themselves to helping the Iraqi people build a peaceful and prosperous country,” he said.

Mr. al-Bayati said the year had seen a substantial drop in violence and “manifest” improvement in the security situation, despite some terrorist attacks. Successful legislative elections on 7 March had elicited considerable Arab, regional and international attention, with monitors from UNAMI, the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and the League of Arab States expressing their confidence in the transparency of the event.

Moreover, he said, all major political parties were making extensive contacts in order to hold a fruitful session of the newly elected Council of Representatives, in which the new Speaker would be elected. The President would then ask the new Prime Minister to form a Government, based on the provisions of the constitution, a process he hoped would be undertaken without delay.

In the field of development, the Government launched on 4 July a national development plan for the 2010-2014 period, which included some 2,700 strategic projects in various sectors valued at $186 billion.

The most important issue, however, was to get rid of the burden of Chapter VII, he said, and Iraq would follow two courses. The first dealt with issues concerning the situation in Iraq; the second with issues relating to the situation between Iraq and Kuwait. Because of the importance of the latter, there had been a common understanding to consider that path only after the formation of the new Iraqi Government. “We are keen that the movement on this path will be in consultation and coordination with our Kuwaiti brothers in accordance with the relevant Security Council resolutions,” he said.

He said a letter sent to the Security Council President and Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on 18 January explained steps taken to fulfil all remaining obligations regarding disarmament, weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, and had requested the Council to consider immediately lifting all restrictions imposed under Council resolutions in those areas. Given the positive international response, Iraq had expected the Council to issue a resolution lifting the restrictions. However, that had not happened.

In that regard, he also pointed to Iraq’s plans to adhere to the Optional Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement between Iraq and the Agency, and he said that a national committee of experts had been set up for the liquidation of chemical residues of the former chemical weapons programme, and on 13 July, the Government joined The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation.

He also outlined his Government’s efforts to deal with the remaining contracts from the oil-for-food programme and other financial claims inherited from the former regime, as well as settling its sovereign debts. He said Iraq was serious about disposing its Chapter VII provisions, financial and other burdens that affected its sovereignty. In that regard, he requested the Council to “liberate” Iraq from all restrictions, which would enable the country to exercise its role as an effective member of the global community.

Iraq, he said, looked forward to UNAMI becoming more effective and influential through the return of United Nations specialized agencies, funds and programmes to the country. While reiterating its desire to extend the UNAMI mandate, the Government hoped the mission would provide support and assistance through a specific mechanism with prior approval from the Government.

The meeting began at 10:07 a.m. and ended at 10:40 a.m., at which time the Council immediately went into consultations on Iraq, as previously arranged.

Background

As the Security Council met today, it had before it the Secretary-General’s report pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution 1883 (2009) (document S/2010/406), providing an update on United Nations activities in Iraq since 14 May 2010, on key political developments and on the activities of the Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Iraq.

As Iraq remained an “extremely complex operating environment”, the safety and security of United Nations personnel continued to be a concern, the report says. The planned drawdown of United States forces would inevitably impact the Organization. UNAMI was identifying new and alternative arrangements to ensure and enhance its operational capacity in the future. That would require strong financial support from Member States. The United Nations was committed to implementing its mandate and working in consultation with the Iraqi Government.

While the successful conclusion of the national electoral process on 2 June and convening of the new Council of Representatives on 14 June were key milestones in Iraq’s democratic transition, the report notes that delays in the Government formation process had contributed to a growing sense of uncertainty. That risked undermining confidence in the political process, and elements opposed to democratic transition could try to exploit the situation. Thus, the Secretary-General urged all political bloc leaders to work together through an inclusive and broadly participatory process to end the present impasse.

Once the Government formation process had been completed, it was imperative for the new Government, with the Council of Representatives, make national reconciliation a priority and begin to address the many outstanding political and constitutional challenges, including Arab-Kurdish relations, revenue-sharing, and the adoption of hydrocarbons legislation, among other things. Encouraging compromise in disputed areas would greatly contribute to stability and the Secretary-General was encouraged by progress being made in talks assisted by UNAMI to end the impasse over the boycott of the Ninewa Provincial Council by Kurdish parties.

Another matter requiring attention, the report says, was the need for the new Government to fulfil outstanding obligations under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, notably issues related to Kuwait, as soon as possible. He called on Iraq to confirm its commitment to Security Council resolution 883 (1993), and strongly encouraged Iraq’s neighbours to engage the new Government in addressing issues of mutual concern. To speed the pace of development and reconstruction, the Secretary-General urged commitment by the Government, the United Nations and the international community in the spirit of the Millennium Development Goals. Priorities identified in the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) and continuing humanitarian response programmes would require more resources from international donors.

http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2010/sc10002.doc.htm

Links - Iraq and United Nations Security Council - August 4, 2010 ... Posted by Kel at 8/07/2010 09:04:00 PM Labels: Iraq and UN Security Council August 4

[dalough]

Thought this would be of interest.

Skip Main Navigation

PRESIDENT | VICE PRESIDENT | FIRST LADY | MRS. CHENEY | NEWS

Your Government | History & Tours | Kids | E-mail | En Español

Podcasts RSS Feeds

<BR clear=left><BR clear=all>Appointments

• History

Office of the Press Secretary

November 26, 2007

Fact Sheet: U.S.-Iraq Declaration of Principles for Friendship and Cooperation

White House News

The U.S. and Iraqi "Declaration of Principles" is a shared statement of intent that establishes common principles to frame our future relationship. This moves us closer to normalized, bilateral relations between our two countries. With this declaration, leaders of Iraq and the United States commit to begin negotiating the formal arrangements that will govern such a relationship.

• Iraq's leaders have asked for an enduring relationship with America, and we seek an enduring relationship with a democratic Iraq. We are ready to build that relationship in a sustainable way that protects our mutual interests, promotes regional stability, and requires fewer Coalition forces.
• In response, this Declaration is the first step in a three-step process that will normalize U.S.-Iraqi relations in a way which is consistent with Iraq's sovereignty and will help Iraq regain its rightful status in the international community – something both we and the Iraqis seek. The second step is the renewal of the Multinational Force-Iraq's Chapter VII United Nations mandate for a final year, followed by the third step, the negotiation of the detailed arrangements that will codify our bilateral relationship after the Chapter VII mandate expires.
  • The UN Chapter VII resolution that is binding under international law gives the MNFI legal authorization to “take all necessary measures to preserve peace and security”. Both the U.S. and Iraq are committed to Iraq moving beyond an international presence based on a UN Security Council Chapter VII mandate.
  • Iraqis have expressed a desire to move past a Chapter VII MNFI mandate and we are committed to helping them achieve this objective.
  • After the Chapter VII mandate is renewed for one year, we will begin negotiation of a framework that will govern the future of our bilateral relationship.

The Declaration Is A Continuation Of A Commitment That Began This August

The governments of Iraq and the United States are committed to developing a long-term relationship as two fully sovereign and independent states with common interests.

• The August 26 Communiqué signed by the five political leaders – Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki, the three members of the Presidency Council, and Kurdish leader Ma'sud Barzani – on August 26, 2007, and endorsed by President Bush states: "The leaders considered it important to link the renewal of UN Resolution 1723 for another year with a reference to the ending of Iraq's Chapter VII status under the UN Charter and the concomitant resumption of Iraq's normal status as a state with full sovereignty and authorities and the restoration of Iraq's legal international status, namely the status that it had before UN Resolution 661 of 1990. In this context, the leaders affirmed the necessity of reaching a long term relationship with the American side … that is built on common interests and covers the various areas between the Republic of Iraq and the United States of America. This goal should be realized in the near future."
• President Bush endorsed the August 26th communiqué:
  • President Bush: "I welcome and accept the expressed desire of the Iraqi leadership to develop a long-term relationship with the United States based on common interests. The United States is committed to developing this relationship and to strengthening diplomatic, economic, and security ties with the Iraqi government and its people." (President George W. Bush, Remarks, Kirtland AFB, NM, 8/27/07)
  • President Bush: Iraq's leaders "understand that their success will require U.S. political, economic, and security engagement that extends beyond my presidency. These Iraqi leaders have asked for an enduring relationship with America. And we are ready to begin building that relationship – in a way that protects our interests in the region and requires many fewer American troops." (President George W. Bush, Address to the Nation, The White House, 9/13/07)

The Declaration Sets The U.S. And Iraq On A Path Toward Negotiating Agreements That Are Common Throughout The World

The U.S. has security relationships with over 100 countries around the world, including recent agreements with nations such as Afghanistan and former Soviet bloc countries.

The relationship envisioned will include U.S.-Iraqi cooperation in the political, diplomatic, economic and security arenas. The United States and Iraq intend to negotiate arrangements based upon a range of principles:

• Political and Diplomatic: The U.S. and Iraq have committed to strengthening Iraq's democratic institutions, upholding the Iraqi Constitution, supporting Iraqi national reconciliation, and enhancing Iraq's position in regional and international organizations, so that it may play a constructive role in the region.
• Economic: Both countries have agreed to support the development of Iraqi economic institutions and further integration into international financial institutions, to encourage all parties to abide by their commitments made in the International Compact with Iraq, to assist Iraq in its efforts to recover illegally exported funds and properties and to secure debt relief, and to encourage the flow of foreign investments to Iraq.
• Security: To support the Iraqi government in training, equipping, and arming the Iraqi Security Forces so they can provide security and stability to all Iraqis; support the Iraqi government in contributing to the international fight against terrorism by confronting terrorists such as Al-Qaeda, its affiliates, other terrorist groups, as well as all other outlaw groups, such as criminal remnants of the former regime; and to provide security assurances to the Iraqi Government to deter any external aggression and to ensure the integrity of Iraq's territory.

# # #

Printer-Friendly Version Email This Page

Office of the Press Secretary

November 26, 2007 ????????

[design interrupted]

Thanks Quiet Learner. Your posts are always appreciated.

[design interrupted]

Thanks Quiet Learner. Some of the best insight into this crazy investment comes from history. Keep up the good work.

[BocaLinda]

Thanks for the post. Now will someone pls splain to me, does this mean chap 7 will continue for another year, or is this a dated doc? I read on another site that ch 7 would be adopted and RV would happen on 28th of this month. This is a far cry from what others are saying...anyone know about this article? Thx!

[Quietlearner]

Statement of Professor Michael J. Matheson,

George Washington University Law School

Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs

Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight

February 28, 2008

Status of Forces Agreements and UN Mandates:

What Authorities and Protections Do They Provide to U.S. Personnel?

I have been asked to provide a description of the authorities and protections provided to U.S. personnel by status of forces agreements and UN mandates. I have also been asked to comment specifically on the role and content of the instruments that govern the status of U.S. forces in Afghanistan and Iraq.

In general, U.S. forces have sometimes been deployed pursuant to a UN mandate; but more often they have been deployed either by agreement of the state concerned, or without such agreement in the exercise of U.S. rights under international law. Wherever possible, the United States will typically wish to have some form of agreement or other instrument in place regulating the status of its forces when deployed for a significant period in foreign countries, so as to ensure that they have appropriate privileges and immunities from foreign law and jurisdiction.

UN Mandates

Two different types of armed forces are deployed under UN authority. First are peacekeeping forces under direct UN command, consisting of national units contributed by UN member states. Such forces may be authorized by decision of the Security Council under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, which requires the consent of the state or states into which the force is deployed; or this may be done under Chapter VII of the Charter, pursuant to a decision by the Council that there is a threat to the peace, in which case the consent of the states concerned is not technically required. [1] According to the UN, there are currently 17 such peacekeeping operations. [2]

In the alternative, the Council may act under Chapter VII to authorize states, coalitions or regional organizations to deploy forces under their own command to deal with a threat to the peace. This, for example, was done in the case of the 1990-91 Gulf War, the 1992-93 intervention in Somalia, and the 1994 intervention in Haiti. The UN might exercise little or no control over such an operation once it is authorized. [3]

In either case, when the Security Council authorizes the operation, it will set forth the mandate of the force being authorized. In some cases, this mandate is general and open-ended; for example, the mandate for the Gulf War coalition was “to use all necessary means to uphold and implement” the Council’s previous resolutions on Iraq and to “restore international peace and security in the area.” [4] In other cases, the mandate may be more detailed and restrictive.

Typically, however, the UN mandate will not attempt to spell out the status, privileges and immunities of the force authorized with respect to the law and jurisdiction of the state or states to which it is deployed. That is typically left to separate agreement with the state or states in question, or in the case of a hostile operation where such agreement is not possible, to the international law of belligerent occupation.

Status of Forces Agreements

When U.S. forces are deployed to a foreign country for a significant period – whether under UN authority or not – the United States will typically wish to have in place an instrument making clear the status of U.S. forces and the extent of their immunity from the law and jurisdiction of the state in which they are operating. If the U.S. is acting as an occupying power, this may take the form of an occupation order; otherwise, it will take the form of an agreement with the state in question, either concluded by the U.S. government itself or by the multinational force or coalition of which it is a part. According to the Administration, the United States has such agreements with more than 115 countries. [5]

Although these agreements are generically referred to as Status of Forces Agreements or SOFAs, there is no uniform model or format. The NATO SOFA took the form of a treaty; [6] some SOFAs have been agreements implementing prior mutual defense treaties; [7] but a great many take the form of executive agreements concluded under the President’s own Constitutional authority. If the agreement is limited to giving U.S. forces and personnel exemption from foreign law, the President may conclude it without further Congressional approval.

SOFAs typically have certain common objectives: to give U.S. forces the right to enter, leave and move about the country, wear their uniforms and use their vehicles; to exempt U.S. forces and personnel from some or all taxes and charges of the host country; to regulate claims and contracts; and to exempt U.S. personnel from local criminal and civil jurisdiction in whole or in part. This may be stated in brief and general terms, or it may be complex and detailed. For example, the SOFA concluded in 2002 with East Timor was less than three pages in length, while the Korea SOFA ran to more than 150 pages and was accompanied by a series of agreed understandings.

The terms of these agreements may vary, depending on the needs of the situation and the attitude and demands of the foreign government in question. For example, on the question of foreign criminal jurisdiction over U.S. personnel, some SOFAs allocate criminal jurisdiction between the United States and the host country, depending on whether or not the offenses alleged were committed against other U.S. personnel or in the course of official duty; while other SOFAs give U.S. personnel complete exemption from foreign criminal jurisdiction.

Often the SOFA is only one of a series of agreements with the host country that define and facilitate the overall U.S. security relationship with that country. There may, for example, be agreements for military assistance, arms sales, bases, economic assistance and other matters. There may also be joint declarations or other political documents that describe the overall relationship and the foreign policy objectives of the two countries.

Afghanistan

The current situation in Afghanistan is complicated by the fact that two separate forces are operating in the country: the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), a multinational force under NATO command authorized by the Security Council under Chapter VII; and the Operation Enduring Freedom force under U.S. command that has conducted military operations against Taliban and Al Queda elements since the initial U.S. intervention after 9/11.

ISAF was authorized by the Security Council in 2001 with the mandate “to assist the Afghan Interim Authority in the maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding areas, so that the Afghan Interim Authority as well as the personnel of the United Nations can operate in a secure environment.” [8] This mandate was later expanded to the maintenance of security in other areas of Afghanistan, to the protection of other international civilian personnel, and to providing security assistance to the Afghan government. [9] ISAF was directed to work in close consultation with the Operation Enduring Freedom coalition in the implementation of this mandate. [10]

The status of ISAF and its personnel is governed by a Military Technical Agreement concluded between ISAF and the Afghan government. Among other things, it authorizes ISAF “to do all that the [iSAF] Commander judges necessary and proper, including the use of military force” to protect ISAF and its mission, and guarantees ISAF “complete and unimpeded freedom of movement throughout the territory and airspace of Afghanistan.” Attached to the agreement is an annex that functions as a SOFA for ISAF and, among other things, provides ISAF personnel immunity from Afghan arrest, criminal jurisdiction and taxation. [11]

The Operation Enduring Freedom force is governed by separate instruments. In 2005, Presidents Bush and Karzai signed a Joint Declaration of the United States-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership which describes the overall purposes and goals of the two countries. Among other things, it says that the United States will: “help organize, train, equip and sustain Afghan security forces”; “consult with respect to taking appropriate measures in the event that Afghanistan perceives that its territorial integrity, independence, or security is threatened or at risk”; and “continue to conduct counter-terrorism operations in cooperation with Afghan forces”. It states that “in order to achieve the objectives contained herein,” U.S. forces are to have access to various Afghan facilities and “are to continue to have the freedom of action required to conduct appropriate military operations based on consultations and pre-agreed procedures.” [12]

The status and immunities of this force are governed by an Agreement regarding the Status of United States Military and Civilian Personnel of the U.S. Department of Defense Present in Afghanistan, concluded by an exchange of notes in 2003. Among other things, it gives U.S. personnel the status of administrative and technical staff of the U.S. Embassy (which exempts them from Afghan criminal jurisdiction), and regulates exit and entry, uniforms and driving licenses, fees and inspections, contracts and claims. This agreement says that it is “without prejudice to the conduct of ongoing military operations by the United States”, language which does not actually authorize U.S. forces to conduct such operations, but may suggest the context in which the parties understood those forces would be operating.

Iraq

U.S. forces are present in Iraq as part of the Multinational Force (MNF) authorized by the Security Council under Chapter VII. Security Council Resolution 1511 in October 2003 authorized that force “to take all necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq”, including the security of UN and Iraqi operations and “key humanitarian and economic infrastructure”. This “all necessary measures” language is understood to include freedom of movement and the right to use necessary force to carry out the MNF mission. Subsequent resolutions referred also to “preventing and deterring terrorism and protecting the territory of Iraq”, combat operations against violent groups and internment of their members, humanitarian assistance, civil affairs support, and relief and reconstruction. [13]

This authorization and mandate has been periodically renewed by the Council. In December 2007, the Council extended the mandate until December 31, 2008. It declared that it would terminate that mandate earlier if requested by the Iraqi Government, and noted that Iraq had advised that it would not request a further extension of that mandate. [14] (Of course, the Council still retains the right to extend the mandate if it should wish to do so, and any early termination of the mandate would still require affirmative Council action.)

The status, privileges and immunities of U.S. forces in Iraq are still governed by an order issued in June 2004 by the Coalition Provisional Authority as the occupying authority during the initial period of U.S. operations in Iraq. That order, known as Coalition Provision Authority Order Number 17 or CPA 17, grants immunity to all MNF personnel from Iraqi arrest and criminal jurisdiction, and regulates other matters usually covered by SOFAs, such as contracting, travel, taxes and fees. It differs from typical SOFAs in one significant respect, in that it grants such immunity to civilian contractors with respect to acts performed under their contracts. [15]

Article 126 of the Iraqi Constitution states that “existing laws shall remain in force, unless annulled or amended in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution”, which is apparently understood to mean, among other things, that CPA 17 will continue in force unless specifically rescinded or amended by the Iraqi Parliament. However, CPA 17 does not provide a clear basis for the status of U.S. forces after the termination of the MNF mandate. It only covers U.S. forces as part of the MNF, and it states that it will remain in force for the duration of the MNF mandate under Council resolutions “and shall not terminate until the departure of the final element of the MNF from Iraq”.

While this language might give some room for the continuation of immunities for any U.S. forces that may temporarily remain in Iraq as part of the MNF after December 31, 2008, it would, if possible, be better to clarify the matter in a definitive way. In the event a permanent SOFA is not agreed by that date (which the Administration evidently intends to do), it would seem prudent to take some affirmative step to continue the CPA 17 provisions for a further period while negotiations continue. This might, for example, be done by a temporary extension of the MNF mandate by the Security Council, an exchange of notes between the United States and Iraq temporarily extending CPA 17, or an act of the Iraqi parliament.

Finally, the question arises as to whether any other agreement to be negotiated pursuant to the November 2007 Joint Declaration would in any way define or affect the future mission or status of U.S. forces, perhaps in a way similar to the provisions of the U.S.-Afghan Joint Declaration mentioned above. Secretaries Rice and Gates have stated that the coming negotiations with Iraq will “set the basic parameters for the U.S. presence in Iraq, including the appropriate authorities and jurisdiction necessary to operate effectively and to carry out essential missions” but that nothing to be negotiated will mandate combat missions, set troop levels, provide security commitments or authorize permanent bases in Iraq. [16] It may be worthwhile to clarify what is intended along these lines, and in particular whether anything is intended that would go beyond the traditional scope of SOFAs as described above.

<BR clear=all>[1] In the early years of the UN, forces were sometimes deployed pursuant to authorization by the UN General Assembly (under the so-called Uniting for Peace Resolution), but this practice has long since fallen into disuse, and all peacekeeping forces in recent decades have been authorized by the Security Council. See M. Matheson, Council Unbound: The Growth of UN Decision Making on Conflict and Postconflict Issues after the Cold War (2006), Chapter 4.

[2] See http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/bnote.htm.

[3] See M. Matheson, Council Unbound, note 1 above, Chapter 5.

[4] UN Security Council Resolution 678 (1990).

[5] Condoleezza Rice and Robert Gates, “What We Need Next in Iraq”, Washington Post, February 12, 2008.

[6] North Atlantic Treaty Status of Forces Agreement, 4 UST 1792, June 19, 1951. Since this agreement granted exceptions and immunities from U.S. law to foreign NATO personnel, it had to be done as either a treaty or pursuant to act of Congress.

[7] For example, the Agreement Under Article IV of the Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States of America and the Republic of Korea, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in the Republic of Korea, TIAS 6127, July 9, 1966.

[8] UN Security Council Resolution 1386 (2001).

[9] UN Security Council Resolution 1510 (2003).

[10] UN Security Council Resolution 1563 (2004).

[11] See http://www.operations.mod.uk/isafmta.pdf.

[12] See http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/05/print/20050523-2.html.

[13] See UN Security Council Resolution 1546 (2004) and letters incorporated by reference.

[14] UN Security Council Resolution 1790 (2007).

[15] See http://www.cpa-iraq.org/regulations/20040627_CPAORD_17_Status_of_Coalition__Rev__with_Annex_A.pdf.

[16] See note 5 above.

[Quietlearner]

Iraq: A Strategy for Progress

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Iraq: A Strategy for Progress

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Executive Summary

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Introduction

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Iraq: Strategy for Progress aims to achieve five principal objectives:

• To position the United States to meet the challenges we face in Iraq;

• To establish a clear path for a political transition until Iraqi elections;

• To secure our significant military and financial investments to date;

• To build a strong international coalition; and

• To enlist sustainable and popular support here at home for ongoing operations in Iraq.

As a first and necessary step, President Bush should immediately convene an emergency International Summit on Iraq to enlist support for a strategic shift and to strike concrete agreements with our partners. The Summit would provide an opportunity for the President to confer with other heads of state and to develop consensus on the international architecture for political, security, and economic arrangements in Iraq. The meeting, held outside of the United States, should include representatives from the Arab League, countries currently serving on the United Nations Security Council, major NATO allies, and core coalition partners. The Summit's goal should be to establish an Iraq Contact Group to which authorities in Iraq will report.

The United States must go in with a plan that provides for new international arrangements to manage the political, security and economic aspects of Iraq's transitions, and includes reorienting American policy to reflect those new international arrangements.

The recommendations below constitute a plan of action for dramatically shifting strategic direction. The primary recommendations provide the foundation for specific actions in the areas of political transition, security, and reconstruction. The secondary recommendations spell out targeted policy changes necessary to restore our credibility with international partners and, in turn, to empower the Iraqi people and advance reconstruction.

Primary recommendation

Authorize the creation of an international High Representative for Iraq. The United Nations Security Council, acting under Chapter VII authority of the U.N. Charter, should authorize an international High Representative to take responsibility for enforcing and ensuring the transition from the Iraqi caretaker government proposed by U.N. Special Representative Lakhdar Brahimi. A highly respected diplomat credible in the region, the High Representative should work with Iraqi civil society to facilitate the convening of a national conference and establishment of an Iraqi Consultative Assembly. While the Iraqi caretaker government would assume significant authority over the state of affairs in Iraq, the High Representative would possess emergency powers to veto controversial laws, policies, budgetary items, and government appointments. On a day to day basis, a Governing Authority – consisting of the Prime Minister of the Iraqi caretaker government, the High Representative, and the military commander in charge of security operations – would be responsible for strategic decisions. As an independent international official, the High Representative would report to the Contact Group, not the United Nations.

Secondary recommendations

The United States should formally open the American Embassy in Baghdad prior to June 30. Ambassador John Negroponte should be dispatched immediately to Iraq to begin the process of transferring U.S. authority from the Pentagon to the State Department. The complete transition from the Coalition Provisional Authority to the new embassy should be accomplished by the June 30 deadline rather than initiated at that time. This approach would reduce the risk of critical issues falling through the cracks of the inter-agency transition, and ensure that he is fully operational as the lead U.S. representative on July 1.

The White House should immediately nominate a new U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations. At this critical juncture, the United States needs a new Ambassador to the United Nations to lead efforts to secure a Security Council resolution on Iraq. Replacing Ambassador Negroponte in New York should be addressed with the same urgency as was his Senate confirmation. The appointment of a highly respected and effective diplomat would bolster the Administration's credibility at the United Nations.

The Pentagon should terminate monthly payments to the Iraqi National Congress and its special relationship with Ahmed Chalabi. With the formation of a new caretaker government, there is no credible rationale for direct U.S. support to the Iraqi National Congress (currently $340,000 a month). Continued support for Chalabi fuels Iraqi suspicions and lends credence to allegations of an American political agenda within Iraq.

The new Iraqi caretaker government should repeal the decree on Iraqi press censorship. A vibrant free press is critical for a democratic Iraq and the United States should support open public dialogue, transparency in operations, and accountability at all levels. Any decision to address what might be considered illegal press activity should be undertaken by the Iraqi caretaker government in consultation with the High Representative.

The new Iraqi caretaker government should amend the statute for the current Iraqi Special Tribunal to allow greater U.N. involvement and funding. Following the models of the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Extraordinary Chambers in Cambodia, through an agreement with the U.N. Secretariat, a reconstituted Tribunal would carve out an explicit role for U.N.-endorsed judicial and administrative appointees, generate the necessary funding, and ensure adherence to international standards. Rather than having the U.S. bear the costs alone (estimated at over $75 million) the funding for the tribunal should come from assessments from U.N. member-states, as was the case with the ad hoc tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda.

The Pentagon should take immediate steps to reassure Iraqi citizens and the world that U.S.-controlled prisons in Iraq are in compliance with international standards and treaty obligations. Reports of abuse and humiliation of Iraqi detainees have done great damage in Iraq and throughout the region. Opening up the U.S.-administered prison system in Iraq to international inspection is the only way to restore lost credibility. The Pentagon's internal report on Abu Ghraib should be made public, to the extent possible, to demonstrate that immediate steps were taken to sanction criminal activity. A Permanent Committee for Monitoring Prison Conditions should be established with representatives from the international security force, the Iraqi caretaker government, Iraqi civil society, the International Committee of the Red Crescent and the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights. The new Iraqi Ministry of Interior should establish a citizen's liaison to compile and keep a centralized database of all detainees in Iraqi prisons.

Primary recommendation

Give NATO command of security operations in Iraq. The Administration should request that NATO assume command of security and stabilization operations in Iraq. The core of an adequate NATO force in Iraq already exists. Establishing a formal mission would make larger and more sustainable contributions by both NATO and non-NATO countries possible. Over time, better training of Iraqi forces and broader international participation would allow the United States to reduce its troop presence as the security situation improves.

To meet security needs, the total number of military forces, including American and international troops, should be increased to at least 200,000. This will not only provide greater security in Iraq , but will also allow the borders to be more effectively guarded. Non-member states, particularly from Muslim countries, should be actively encouraged to participate in the operation, as they did in the Balkans. The mission's security mandate should include the following components: countering the insurgency; improving security and controlling borders; and protecting humanitarian and reconstruction efforts. Expanded security forces will also ensure an atmosphere in which U.N. and Iraqi officials can safely administer the upcoming electoral process, and candidates, party activists and voters can freely participate.

General Abizaid should be given provisional NATO command authority as Supreme Allied Commander Middle East with overall responsibility for NATO operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Political guidance should be provided through the North Atlantic Council (NAC). NATO should also consider using this opportunity to develop better political and military relationships in the Middle East. Iraq, for example, could ultimately be offered partnership status through NATO's Mediterranean Initiative.

Secondary recommendations

The United States should increase troop levels to 150,000. The recent U.S. increase to 135,000 was made possible by temporarily delaying the return of selected units for up to three months. For improved security, in the short-term, as Iraq prepares for elections and insurgents can be expected to challenge such progress, the United States must assume greater responsibility. To meet the troop level required, the redeployment of the Third Infantry Division should be moved up from its planned November date, and elements of the Third Marine Expeditionary Force based in Okinawa and the First Brigade of the 25th Infantry Division should be sent ahead of schedule. Force levels can be adjusted downwards only as overall security improves, transition milestones are achieved, greater international troop contributions are realized and Iraqi forces demonstrate an ability to assume greater responsibility.

The United States should work to double international troop participation to at least 50,000. Non-American forces, primarily the British, add roughly 24,000 troops to the current coalition, but this component has shrunk with the recent departure of Spanish and Honduran forces. The United States must work with NATO allies and regional partners to increase long-term international involvement in the multinational force, with particular emphasis on contributions from Muslim countries. In addition to ensuring a troop presence capable of providing security, increased international troop contributions would reduce the need for private security forces, reduce the security and legal complications created by the presence of a large number of private contractors, and free up additional funds for reconstruction.

The NATO mission should establish a dedicated force to protect and operate in and around sacred cities and sites. Comprised of troops from moderate Muslim countries and working under the NATO mission, this small force would advise and participate in security operations in the most culturally sensitive sites. Morocco, Pakistan, and Tunisia are three possible candidates.

The NATO mission should devise a long-term strategy for developing and sustaining professional Iraqi security forces. The existing timetable for training the police and military should be extended to between two and three years to ensure that new Iraqi forces are adequately trained, vetted and able to assume responsibility for Iraq's security. Iraqi forces currently on duty should be re-vetted to avoid potential security problems.

The NATO mission should conditionally allow individual members of militias to participate in new Iraqi security forces. The CPA's decision to bar selected militia from serving in the new Iraqi security forces ostracized them and thus provided them with an incentive to support the insurgency. Instead of polarizing a volatile and hostile segment of Iraqi society, transitional authorities should weaken and co-opt militias by disbanding units and absorbing vetted and separated individuals into programs closely monitored by U.S. authorities. There should be no wholesale incorporation of fixed units.

The United States should conclude the Iraqi Survey Group review and transfer those responsibilities to U.N. weapons inspectors by June 30. Further accounting for Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs should be transitioned back to the U.N. mission (UNMOVIC), consistent with existing U.N. Security Council resolutions. This would send a strong signal to the international community that the United States is ready to share responsibility in Iraq. The U.S. government's work should be completed prior to June 30.

Primary Recommendation

Create the Iraqi Transition and Reconstruction Fund. The activities of the Transition and Reconstruction Fund should have a triple mandate: first, to build and sustain Iraqi capacity in preparation for the ascendance of an elected government; second, to develop, for consideration by the elected Iraqi government, a detailed proposal for an Oil Trust Fund; and third, to ensure that there is no gap in payment of civil service salaries, through the Iraqi national budget, during the transition period. The activities of the Transition and Reconstruction Fund would be closely coordinated with the International Reconstruction Fund Facility established and led by the United Nations and World Bank.

The new Fund, authorized by the U.N. Security Council, would take over responsibility and assets from the Coalition Provisional Authority for the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI). A full accounting of DFI funds expended to date should be completed by the CPA by June 30 at the latest. The existing International Advisory Monitoring Board should be retained and amended to include no fewer than two representatives designated by the Iraqi caretaker government.

The Fund would be managed by an Executive Director named by the international High Representative and approved by the Contact Group. On a day-to-day basis, the Executive Director would report to the High Representative. The High Representative would appoint two Iraqi deputies chosen by the new caretaker government and approved by the Contact Group.

Secondary Recommendations

U.S.-funded reconstruction programs should make job creation and the provision of basic social services top priorities, with specific emphasis on programs for demobilized soldiers. Significant funds should be allocated to create special opportunities for demobilized soldiers. Working with the High Representative, World Bank and other donors, the U.S. should support a demobilization program providing job training and start-up capital. Credits should be provided to companies that hire demobilized soldiers for reconstruction contracts. To reintegrate soldiers from rural backgrounds, the transitional authority should work with local authorities to identify productive opportunities.

All U.S.-funded contracts should be awarded on the basis of open, competitive bidding. The proceedings of contract bidding, award and evaluation should be made available in full detail to the public= Regional and Iraqi firms and non-governmental organizations should be encouraged to compete and, where necessary, Iraqi entities provided with the assistance required to meet U.S. procurement, financial and other legal requirements.

Responsibility for U.S.-funded reconstruction programs should be shifted from the Coalition Provisional Authority to the U.S. Agency for International Development. Congress should give USAID the necessary flexibility to fund critical reconstruction programs with special attention to streamlined approval for funding to Iraqi civil society organizations. The United States should ensure that the Commander's Emergency Response Fund (CERF) remains replenished until civilian management of the reconstruction is fully operational.

The High Representative should work closely with the caretaker Iraqi government to draw up plans for an Iraqi Oil Trust Fund. The fund should be financed by a reasonable percentage of oil profits and governed transparently by a board of representatives comprised of Iraqi governmental and non-governmental representatives. The Trust Fund would use most of its funds for training and seed capital to increase Iraqi capacity to manage and serve the oil industry, as well as to support environmental, social and job-creation programs in oil-producing areas.

U.S.-funded reconstruction efforts should be re-oriented to expand Iraqi involvement and extend the benefits of democratization beyond key urban centers. In particular, efforts should be made to incorporate Iraqi expertise and participation in program design and implementation, including through the more than 200 local councils currently operating around the country. As security improves, concerted efforts should be made to increase the flow of development assistance to rural areas and to expand U.S. engagement with Iraqi institutions and local and international non-governmental organizations.

The United States should actively work to mobilize additional financial support. Former Secretary of State James Baker's current mandate should be broadened to seek greater financial support for the reconstruction efforts in Iraq, particularly from Middle East and Gulf states that will significantly benefit from a more stable Iraq. To support Baker's efforts, the Administration should launch a new initiative on eliminating odious debt at the upcoming G-8 Summit, with the recommendation that Iraq be among the first countries considered for inclusion. The initiative should provide limited debt relief based on an assessment of the legitimacy of the debt incurred during Saddam Hussein's reign. Other countries undergoing major political or security transitions should also be considered in the first round of the initiative.

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