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Theseus

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Theseus last won the day on February 5 2021

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  1. I do believe that "American oligarchs", politicians, and a vast majority of the lamestream media members (not just TV anchors) are considered US citizens, hence the "US Citizens are doing it to ourselves". In addition, it is the people (general population) that are doing the majority of the voting which is putting US Citizens into US Government offices (except in a some cases). There is a long history since before the founding of the United States of people believing in one particular political ideology that has despised the Constitution and this country. Part of this history actually has to do with President George Washington refusing to become King (as those people believe it would be easier to control the masses and make laws through a monarchy than through a Constitutional Republic, citing the Roman Parliament as their main reason at the time of founding) and instead becoming an elected official who only held office for eight years. If you. do not know about the ongoing campaign, to this day, from within and from those who want to destroy what the Founding Fathers built up in the beginning of the United States, you need to read the history of the Federalist Papersand the articles that debated each of the Federalist Paper that was published in the newspaper (of which those Federalist papers describe and explain many things on how the United States Government was founded and run AND the papers make no mention of any particular religion having a part in the founding principles of the country rather they cite former empires like Rome and Greece, to name two, cultures having a larger role in their decisions of writing the US Constitution. Meaning the country was NOT derived from Judaic-Christian principles as many claim And if you want to debate this we can but read the Federalist Papers first.) If you thought today's lamestream media is bad, you should read the politicized articles that accompanied the Federalist Papers and articles around each national election. What people don't see can and does hurt them.
  2. The biggest roadblocks going into Article 8 is the expansion of the non-oil sector and Iraq's MCP (multiple currency practice) which also includes the banking sector. Corruption falls on that list too but no country has ever done away with corruption in the highest offices of the land. S Something worth noting, the White Paper says 3 to 5 years to implement short term goals. That leaves a little glimmer of hope for an RV sooner than later but my bet is on the later (2025). However, if Iraq has not done away with MCP by the end of 2025, don't expect an RV to happen in 2025. The IMF is adamantly, and I do mean very strongly, against MCP for countries in Article 8. There was talk back in 2019/20 about the 2% rule as to removing this aspect for a country going into Article 8 (not currently in). I have not found anything to determine whether or not that rule was still in effect for Iraq. Assume the rule is still in effect. Again I have said it before that the HCL refers to the Kurds and is not the Iraqi Oil and Gas Law. As long as the conclusion of the negotiations of Erbil and Baghdad fall under the purview of the annual Budget, this is not the HCL. The Annual Budget is law only for that year and expires at the end of that year. If an Annual Budget is passed for 2020, on Jan 1 the law is expired and no longer legally binding, which is why Baghdad and Erbil are seemingly always in negotiations on oil. The HCL ends this endless cycle of negotiations whereas the Iraqi Oil and Gas law includes ALL of Iraq, not just the Kurds. RV requires both. One other thing that is not affected by the IMF and those are the sanctions still levied onto Iraq by the UN and other countries. These must be removed as well. Until the IMF is satisfied with the non-oil sector of Iraq and Iraq removes its MCP policies (this includes the banking sector), there will be no RV at a rate higher than a US penny.
  3. The issue with the HCL is that the IMF has continued to stress the importance of improving the non-oil sector of Iraq's economy. And since the IMF is the final arbitrator on whether Iraq can finally go into Article 8, the HCL will not push Iraq to pull the trigger on the RV. Is the HCL still needed? Yes. Will the RV happened after this legislation is passed (HCL is not the same as the Oil and Gas Law)? No, according to the IMF. Why? Too many other factors that will not allow Iraq to gain entry into Article 8, for example MCP and the non-oil sector and banking sector lacking in sustainability according to what the IMF is looking for.
  4. Iraqi government to begin implementation phase of the White Paper for Economic Reform 15 Feb 2021 - 3:55 pm The Iraqi government is preparing to begin the implementation phase of its reform programme known as the White Paper for Economic Reform. This phase will focus on the implementation mechanisms and on the fulfilment of the objectives and the vision outlined by the White Paper. The implementation phase consists of: Putting in place governance, oversight, monitoring and evaluation mechanisms to ensure that the reform process is administrated and managed effectively under the direction and guidance of strong and competent leadership which will have a direct link to the Prime Minister, with the aim of equipping the implementation team with the necessary authority to carry out the reform programme, providing vigorous oversight of the implementation process, and ensuring coordination between different governmental institutions Translating the vision of the White Paper for Economic Reform into a practical programme for delivering 64 projects and for ensuring their implementation in an integrated and coherent manner by specifying detailed procedures for each project, setting a specific timeline for progress and identifying the state entity which will be responsible for carrying out each project The Iraqi government adopted the White Paper for Economic Reform prepared by the Crisis Cell for Financial and Fiscal Reform in October 2020. The White Paper is a comprehensive programme that sets out a clear roadmap to reform the Iraqi economy and address the accumulated, decades-old serious challenges that confront it. The White Paper identified two overarching strategic objectives. The first is to initiate an immediate reform programme to address the budget deficit to create a fiscal space to give time for the process of implementing the other wider reforms over the medium term. The second objective is to put the economy and the federal budget on a sustainable path, after which Iraqis can decide and choose the economic direction of the country. The White Paper anticipates that the short and medium-term objectives and associated reforms will require between 3 to 5 years to implement. The White Paper for Economic reform enjoys the support of the international community as reflected by the establishment of the Iraq Economic Contact Group (IECG) whose mission is to provide the support needed for the economic reform process in Iraq within the framework of the White Paper. The IECG includes, in addition to Iraq, the G7 group of industrialised countries, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the European Union.
  5. The White Paper was implemented in October 2020. From the GOI website: The White Paper for Economic Reforms: vision and key objectives 22 Oct 2020 - 2:50 pm The Iraqi government has formally adopted the White Paper for Economic Reforms prepared by the Crisis Cell for Financial and Fiscal Reform. The White Paper is a comprehensive programme that sets out a clear roadmap to reform the Iraqi economy and address the accumulated, decades-old serious challenges that confront it. Iraq’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, Dr. Ali Allawi said that the White Paper seeks to put Iraq’s economy on a path that allows the state to take appropriate steps in the future to develop it into a diversified, dynamic economy that creates opportunities for citizens to live a decent life. And although the current severe fiscal crisis that Iraq is going through is related to the recent sharp decline in oil prices and to the repercussions of the Coronavirus pandemic, the White Paper makes it clear that the causes of Iraq’s economic and financial woes date back several decades. The roots of the crisis The White Paper provides a detailed outline of the factors that have distorted the Iraqi economy, undermined its capacity to provide a decent life for large number of Iraqis, and its failure to keep pace with the economic developments that the world has witnessed. The expansion of the role of the state The White Paper identifies the expansion of the role of the state and emergence of a command economy in Iraq as a key cause of the crisis. From the nationalisation of vital economic sectors in 1970s, to the commandeering of all economic levers by the state to support the war effort in the 1980s, through the period of sanctions imposed on Iraq in the 1990s, these shocks, as well as the absence of strategic planning, mismanagement, maladministration, patronage and misguided political ideology, all led to an expansion of the role of the state in all aspects of economic life in Iraq. The Iraqi economy continued to be directed by the state after the events of 2003 because of the failure of the new political system to create a free and diversified modern economy as outlined in Iraq’s Constitution, and instead continued to rely on the state as the almost only driver of economic activity in the country. The expansion of the role of the state, and the associated increase in the number of those employed in the public sector and the cost to Iraqi exchequer of their salaries and pensions, came at the expense of the government’s ability to invest in basic infrastructure in Iraq. To illustrate the point, the White Paper points out that from 2004 to 2020, state expenditure on the salaries of civil servants and on public sector pensions increased by 400% in real terms, as the total number of public sector workers during the same period increased by threefold. And between 2006 and 2018, average public sector salaries increased by 134%, more than the increase in labour productivity, which rose by only 12%, or the cost of living, which rose by 28% during the same period. Over the past 17 years, government spending on the salaries of state employees, and on public sector pensions became the fastest growing expenditure item in Iraq’s successive federal budgets during this period. There are currently around 4,500,000 public sector employees and 2,500,000 pensioners. Decline of the private sector The expansion of the state’s role, in addition to the complex administrative system and the state’s weakness in imposing the rule of law, the militarisation of society, and the influence of non-governmental actors in public institutions, led to the decline of the Iraqi private sector. With the exception of a number of small and medium-sized companies operating in the oil and telecommunications sectors, and very small companies operating in the fields of trade, retail, transport, construction, hospitality and textiles, there is almost a complete absence of private sector companies in manufacturing. In addition, most of the larger private sector companies depend on providing services to the state and on government contracts. The White Paper also identified other factors that led to the deteriorating economic situation in Iraq is, most notably: The collapse of oil revenues The impact of Covid-19 Mismanagement and lack of planning The weakness of financial institutions The absence of modern coherent systems for managing state revenues An ineffective and outdated banking sector Complex and antiquated government procedures Destruction of infrastructure and the costs of the war against Daesh terrorists Two strategic goals The White Paper identifies two overarching strategic objectives. The first is to initiate an immediate reform programme to address the budget deficit to create a fiscal space to give time for the process of implementing the other wider reforms over the medium term. The second objective is to put the economy and the federal budget on a sustainable path, after which Iraqis can decide and choose the economic direction of the country. The White Paper anticipates that the short and medium-term objectives and associated reforms will require between 3 to 5 years to implement. The reform pillars The White Paper identified five key pillars for the reform programmes: 1- Achieving sustainable financial stability Key reforms include: Reducing the deficit from 20% to 3% of GDP and expenditure on salaries from 25% to 12.5% of the federal budget Collecting electricity tariffs from all users based on the real price of fuel on global markets Recovering and returning Iraq’s smuggled and stolen money Increasing revenues from customs and taxes Reforming Iraq’s Pensions Fund and move to gradually end federal budget support Reforming financial management systems Reviewing the current exchange rate of the dollar against the dinar 2- Implementing strategic reforms and creating sustainable job opportunities Key reforms include: Modernising and rehabilitating the financial sector Modernising and rehabilitating the banking system, supporting the development of private banks, reforming government banks and introducing and activating the Core Banking System in Al-Rafidain and Rasheed Banks Expediting the development of e-banking services Establishing new trading markets, such as a commodity market and a currency exchange market (Forex) Supporting the sectors that drive the economy, such as agriculture, oil and gas Introducing a private sector support fund, simplifying procedures, and providing other non-financial aid Creating job opportunities in the private sector and supporting small and medium enterprises Adopting a national strategy for education and training that links educational outcomes with the future need for the labour market 3- Improving basic infrastructure Key reforms include: Increasing the effectiveness and improving the performance of all parts of Iraq’s electricity sector Developing Iraq’s digital infrastructure, including the introduction of advanced technology (4G) at the beginning of next year, and preparing for the introduction of (5G) technology Modernising the legal and regulatory framework of the transport sector, and encourage private investment in transport Developing industrial cities and free zones in Iraq 4- Providing basic services and protecting vulnerable groups during and after the reform process Key reforms include: Improving water supply for both drinking and irrigation and complete sanitation projects and networks Building 1,000 new schools during the period of the reform programme Reforming the social security system Establishing a unified and financially sustainable pension system for all Iraqis whether they are working in the public, private, cooperative or mixed sector Completing and implementing the draft health insurance law to ensure that all Iraqis have access to essential health services 5- Improving governance and introducing changes to the legal framework to enable institutions and individuals to implement reforms Reviewing and amending the official guidance in relation to government contracts Introducing e-governance systems to strengthen oversight of government contracting and the collection of taxes and customs Working with specialist investigative international organisations to return the large sums of money smuggled out of Iraq Introducing an electronic governance system in the field of government contracting and tax and customs collection Completing the project establishing the National Information Centre to facilitate the introduction of government e-services to citizens, and automate the procedures for obtaining key documents such nationality and passports and accessing pensions and social security Introducing electronic signature and transactions throughout the public administration system and phasing out paper transactions A detailed implementation plan of White Paper will be published later to outline the required process, identify key stakeholders and establish timelines and monitoring mechanisms.
  6. The quote was said in May 2021 long before everyone else was stating above for 2022. (This quote was laughed at by dinarrock in the original posting.) In May 2021 we find this quote (five months after the exchange rate change in December 2020]: "It was supposed that the new exchange rate will remain for one year, but the agreement of the political forces and the government breached the agreement that said the exchange rate of the dollar remains the same until 2025." the [Iraq’s Parliamentary Economic and Investment] Committee member Nada Shaker Jawdat said. So keep your seat belts fastened and your hands in the car, the ride will not be over in '23 or '24.
  7. When they changed the exchange rate in 2020. I posted an article on this a while back. In the article the individual from the financial committee said that the rate change was initially for one (1) year but powers in government overruled that and it became 5 years. So the idea that the CBI is its own entity and change the exchange rate on its own accord went out the window with this revelation. Secondly, Maliki also stopped the rate from permanently changing in 2012. So the GOI has always had a hand in the exchange rate for awhile now.
  8. And those pesky Martians who work in Iraq are not going to get counted. FYI: @1:14 Marvin has the solution for the Earth's fuel problem!
  9. In 2012 the rate was under 1200. IT was 1166 before going to 1190 then to what it is now.
  10. Too few participated, a lot more should have participated.
  11. Jimmy Carter's Malaise speech: Remember when there was "Global Cooling"? Biden from Jun 17, 2022 Never let a man-made crisis go to waste!
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