nemesis760

Is it possible for Iraq to force the official currency to be the Dinar, and enforce its use only? Could this create the confidence required?

Awesome!!

This is what i have come up with, PLEASE correct me if I am wrong (I do that at least once a week, unless you ask my wife, then maybe once a breath) Tax Rate on Short-Term Capital Gains Capital gain income from assets held one year or less is taxed at the ordinary income tax rates in effect for the year, ranging from 10% to 35%. Tax Rate on Long-Term Capital Gains Capital gain income from assets held longer than one year are generally taxed at a special long-term capital gains rate. The rate that applies depends on which ordinary income tax bracket you fall under. So, it depends on how long you have had it and your tax bracket. Ordinary tax Rate || % taxed on long term capitol Gains 10% || 0% 15% || 0% 25% || 15% 28% || 15% 33% || 15% 35% || 15% 39.6% || 20% You can also defer payments if you intend to invest, allowing a greater amount to invest, I think Capital gains tax can be deferred or reduced if a seller uses the proper sales method and/or deferral technique. The IRS allows for individuals to defer capital gains taxes with tax planning strategies such as the structured sale (ensured installment sale), charitable trust (CRT), installment sale, private annuity trust (no longer valid), and a 1031 exchange.[28] Deferred sales trust – Allows the seller of property to defer capital gains tax due at the time of sale over a period of time. 1031 exchange – Defer tax by exchanging for "like kind" property. Capital gains can be deferred forever by buying a replacement real estate by a business, but not for personal real estate. Structured sale annuity (aka Ensured Installment Sale) – Defer and reduce capital gains tax while gaining safety and a stream of guaranteed income. Charitable trust – Defer and reduce capital gains by giving equity to a charity. Self-directed installment sale (SDIS) – Allows for the deferral of capital gains taxes while removing the risks from buyer default under a traditional installment sale.

Jesters, Jester Okie, Jester 'fill-in-name'... Here for your entertainment...

Agreed, dude has strong opinions, he can just be... well, rude is a good way to put it. I know i am an a**hole in my everyday life, so I know when i am pushing someone, but I do it anyway, like Keepm does here.. Best put him on ignore, pretty sure thats what my employees have done to me

So they are no longer considered an SDN. I found that definition if that helps anybody else: As part of its enforcement efforts, OFAC publishes a list of individuals and companies owned or controlled by, or acting for or on behalf of, targeted countries. It also lists individuals, groups, and entities, such as terrorists and narcotics traffickers designated under programs that are not country-specific. Collectively, such individuals and companies are called "Specially Designated Nationals" or "SDNs." Their assets are blocked and U.S. persons are generally prohibited from dealing with them. Click here for more information on Treasury's Sanctions Programs. http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/SDN-List/Pages/default.aspx Almost seems that they are saying that these people, or companies, are no longer owned or controlled by Iraq, or are no longer considered narcotics traffickers or terrorists or other "Non-Country specific" threats. EUROMAC EUROPEAN MANUFACTURER CENTER SRL, Via Ampere 5, Monza 20052, Italy [iRAQ2]. SPECKMAN, Jeanine, United Kingdom (individual) [iRAQ2].

They cant just say, "Moved to Saturday. Tonight: Bingo in the main hall"

No timeline... dammit... Its like the car adverts showing a pinto flying and driving at 200mph, then the fine print comes up stating that this is not real...

If I read this right, it was a joint Press Conference, and Ban Ki-Moon was present when these statements were made. Does that count for anything?

If China only allowed its currency to appreciate, the global economy would rebalance and stabilise – or so the argument goes. This column studies the historical record of large exchange-rate revaluations. It supports the idea that currency appreciations have an impact on the current account but argues that this can come at a cost – the reduction in exports risks putting the brakes on global growth. Over the past decade, several emerging market economies – China in particular – have run substantial and persistent current-account surpluses. Loose monetary policy in the US could now result in higher domestic inflation within these emerging economies and lead to the sort of real currency appreciation that many countries want to avoid (Bergsten 2010 and Huang 2010). It is well known that countries must choose between capital mobility, monetary policy autonomy, and exchange-rate stability but cannot pursue all three objectives at the same time. Clearly, China’s authorities are increasingly forced to consider currency appreciation as they fear the social ramifications of rising prices. From a global perspective, current-account imbalances and reserve accumulation may have contributed to the mispricing of risk and helped create the macroeconomic backdrop for the recent financial crisis. Currency appreciations in surplus countries could be a policy tool in reducing imbalances (Ferguson and Schularick 2011). Yet currency appreciation remains a controversial policy choice among economists. In recent research (Kappler et al. 2011), we use a large cross-country dataset covering almost 50 years of international economic history between 1960 and 2008 to study the empirical record of large exchange-rate appreciation and revaluation episodes. Some of these episodes are regularly referred to in the debate about global rebalancing in the wake of the recent financial crisis, e.g. in Germany and in Japan.1 The main points of disagreement about the effects of exchange-rate changes on the macroeconomy relate to two central issues. First, how effective would currency revaluation be in reducing current-account surpluses in Asia and deficits in the US? Unless structural saving and investment determinants change, there will be no change in current-account imbalances (Qiao 2007). Second, is there reason to believe that appreciation would come with the negative side effect of reducing growth in developing countries? Appreciation might put a successful export-led growth model at risk. This model was centred on a competitive real exchange rate and positive externalities from investment in the tradable goods sector. Some economists fear that exchange-rate adjustment might be all too effective – but mainly in reducing the growth rate of the Chinese as well as other developing economies because China has become a locomotive for developing country growth in the 2000s (Garroway et al. 2010). Digging up the historical evidence While these questions open up a number of different conceptual issues, they are to some degree open to a joint empirical treatment. We define large exchange-rate events as a 10% (or larger) appreciation of the nominal effective exchange rate over a two-year window (or less), leading to sustained real effective appreciation of the same magnitude, sustained in real terms over at least five years. From 1960, we identify 25 episodes of large nominal and real appreciations and revaluations in a sample of 128 countries of developing and advanced economies. Studying the institutional context of each individual episode in detail, we find 14 cases of appreciation shocks that occurred not as a result of discretionary policy action, but were linked to the appreciation of the anchor currency under pegged exchange rates. These cases represent exogenous appreciation shocks that can be used to estimate the macroeconomic impact of large appreciations and assess the robustness of estimates based on a wider definition of appreciation and revaluation events. We use a dummy-augmented autoregressive panel model (as in Cerra and Saxena 2008) to show that such large appreciations episodes have strong macroeconomic effects. The estimated effects of appreciation shocks on key macroeconomic variables are shown in the appendix. Four key stylised facts emerge that may well prove useful in the ongoing debate about the role of exchange-rate adjustment for global rebalancing. First, the current-account balance typically falls strongly in response to large exchange-rate revaluations. Three years after the revaluation, the current account balance deteriorates by about 3 percentage points relative to GDP. This is due to a reduction in aggregate savings without a concomitant fall in investment. The effect on the current-account balance is statistically significant and robust to variation in the country sample and the definition of appreciation events. Second, the effects on output seem limited. The point estimates suggest a negative effect of output growth, albeit of relatively small magnitude. On average, the aggregate level effect on output amounts to about 1% after six years. However, the output effects are statistically not significant. Third, while aggregate output is not strongly affected, export growth falls significantly after appreciation shocks. Import growth remains by and large unchanged resulting in the observed deterioration in external balances. As aggregate economic growth is much less affected, these results point to a positive domestic demand response following appreciation episodes. Fourth, the effects seem to be more pronounced in developing countries. The sensitivity of the current-account balance to revaluation shocks is higher. The effect reaches almost 4 percentage points of GDP after three years and is statistically significant. But also the potentially negative effects on output are larger, pointing to a loss in output of 2% over 10 years, albeit with wide confidence intervals. Conclusion The historical record of large exchange-rate revaluations that we have studied lends support to the idea that they have an impact on the current account as they lead to marked changes of savings and investment within countries. Appreciation shocks impact external balances, but this effect potentially comes at the cost of a reduction of dynamism in exports. While the domestic economy seems to pick up some of the external slack, leaving overall growth relatively unaffected, the prospect of sharp decelerations in export growth will remain a concern for policymakers and warrants careful attention especially in the context of developing countries.

If you would like a better understanding of the last 50 years of large exchange rate increases, and currency revaluations, try here: http://www.oecd.org/development/perspectivesonglobaldevelopment/47213150.pdf Here is a small sample: If China only allowed its currency to appreciate, the global economy would rebalance and stabilise – or so the argument goes. This column studies the historical record of large exchange-rate revaluations. It supports the idea that currency appreciations have an impact on the current account but argues that this can come at a cost – the reduction in exports risks putting the brakes on global growth. Over the past decade, several emerging market economies – China in particular – have run substantial and persistent current-account surpluses. Loose monetary policy in the US could now result in higher domestic inflation within these emerging economies and lead to the sort of real currency appreciation that many countries want to avoid (Bergsten 2010 and Huang 2010). It is well known that countries must choose between capital mobility, monetary policy autonomy, and exchange-rate stability but cannot pursue all three objectives at the same time. Clearly, China’s authorities are increasingly forced to consider currency appreciation as they fear the social ramifications of rising prices. From a global perspective, current-account imbalances and reserve accumulation may have contributed to the mispricing of risk and helped create the macroeconomic backdrop for the recent financial crisis. Currency appreciations in surplus countries could be a policy tool in reducing imbalances (Ferguson and Schularick 2011). Yet currency appreciation remains a controversial policy choice among economists. In recent research (Kappler et al. 2011), we use a large cross-country dataset covering almost 50 years of international economic history between 1960 and 2008 to study the empirical record of large exchange-rate appreciation and revaluation episodes. Some of these episodes are regularly referred to in the debate about global rebalancing in the wake of the recent financial crisis, e.g. in Germany and in Japan.1 The main points of disagreement about the effects of exchange-rate changes on the macroeconomy relate to two central issues. First, how effective would currency revaluation be in reducing current-account surpluses in Asia and deficits in the US? Unless structural saving and investment determinants change, there will be no change in current-account imbalances (Qiao 2007). Second, is there reason to believe that appreciation would come with the negative side effect of reducing growth in developing countries? Appreciation might put a successful export-led growth model at risk. This model was centred on a competitive real exchange rate and positive externalities from investment in the tradable goods sector. Some economists fear that exchange-rate adjustment might be all too effective – but mainly in reducing the growth rate of the Chinese as well as other developing economies because China has become a locomotive for developing country growth in the 2000s (Garroway et al. 2010). Digging up the historical evidence While these questions open up a number of different conceptual issues, they are to some degree open to a joint empirical treatment. We define large exchange-rate events as a 10% (or larger) appreciation of the nominal effective exchange rate over a two-year window (or less), leading to sustained real effective appreciation of the same magnitude, sustained in real terms over at least five years. From 1960, we identify 25 episodes of large nominal and real appreciations and revaluations in a sample of 128 countries of developing and advanced economies. Studying the institutional context of each individual episode in detail, we find 14 cases of appreciation shocks that occurred not as a result of discretionary policy action, but were linked to the appreciation of the anchor currency under pegged exchange rates. These cases represent exogenous appreciation shocks that can be used to estimate the macroeconomic impact of large appreciations and assess the robustness of estimates based on a wider definition of appreciation and revaluation events. We use a dummy-augmented autoregressive panel model (as in Cerra and Saxena 2008) to show that such large appreciations episodes have strong macroeconomic effects. The estimated effects of appreciation shocks on key macroeconomic variables are shown in the appendix. Four key stylised facts emerge that may well prove useful in the ongoing debate about the role of exchange-rate adjustment for global rebalancing. First, the current-account balance typically falls strongly in response to large exchange-rate revaluations. Three years after the revaluation, the current account balance deteriorates by about 3 percentage points relative to GDP. This is due to a reduction in aggregate savings without a concomitant fall in investment. The effect on the current-account balance is statistically significant and robust to variation in the country sample and the definition of appreciation events. Second, the effects on output seem limited. The point estimates suggest a negative effect of output growth, albeit of relatively small magnitude. On average, the aggregate level effect on output amounts to about 1% after six years. However, the output effects are statistically not significant. Third, while aggregate output is not strongly affected, export growth falls significantly after appreciation shocks. Import growth remains by and large unchanged resulting in the observed deterioration in external balances. As aggregate economic growth is much less affected, these results point to a positive domestic demand response following appreciation episodes. Fourth, the effects seem to be more pronounced in developing countries. The sensitivity of the current-account balance to revaluation shocks is higher. The effect reaches almost 4 percentage points of GDP after three years and is statistically significant. But also the potentially negative effects on output are larger, pointing to a loss in output of 2% over 10 years, albeit with wide confidence intervals. Conclusion The historical record of large exchange-rate revaluations that we have studied lends support to the idea that they have an impact on the current account as they lead to marked changes of savings and investment within countries. Appreciation shocks impact external balances, but this effect potentially comes at the cost of a reduction of dynamism in exports. While the domestic economy seems to pick up some of the external slack, leaving overall growth relatively unaffected, the prospect of sharp decelerations in export growth will remain a concern for policymakers and warrants careful attention especially in the context of developing countries.

Thanks Sandyf!

Can anyone answer these for me: Ist the ISX public already? What is the difference between this and what they currently have??

"Good news fans, the GOI is showing signs of Life!" "I dunno, I think Mulla may be carrying his left a little low, this could hurt him in the later rounds..."

Just a thought, could the Budget be drawn up without using the zeros in the budget's math. Essentially the figures would be calculated in the budget as if they are already at an .86 rate. Maybe thats what they mean when they say that the budget will not include the zeros?? Just a question/thought...

1 more reading!

4. The ObamaCare Surtax on Investment Income Under current law, the capital gains tax rate for all Americans rises from 15 to 20 percent in 2013, while the top dividend rate rises from 15 to 39.6 percent. The new ObamaCare surtax takes the top capital gains rate to 23.8 percent and top dividend rate to 43.4 percent. The tax will take a minimum of $123 billion out of taxpayer pockets over the next ten years. Read more: http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2012/07/05/five-major-obamacare-taxes-that-will-hit-your-wallet-in-2013/#ixzz2CmJlK3GK Looks like our taxes would go from 15-20, seeing as this is capital gains, not dividends income.

pointed out that once carried Iraq this obligations Does this mean we have to wait for them to actually carry out the obligation?

Followed the link, says April 1, 2007 hoover digest » 2007 no. 2 » iraq Am i missing something?

Honestly I believe that there are keywords that seem to overtake the readers mind when we read this, the word Dinar. The thing i had to read twice to make sure i understood was the fact that the charges were Conspiracy to commit wire fraud, wire fraud and money laundering. These are the samethings a mob or cartel banker would get. These charges, I am 99% certain pertain strictly to the fraudulant hedge funds. The fact that these men participated in the selling of the risky Dinar speculation was brought up to degrade their morale character. To further prove that what they were doing was in no way unintentional. Probably sounded something like "..these men knew exactly what they were doing to the hedge fund investors when conning them out of their money. They are pushing other high risk quote/unqoute investments such as the Iraqi Dinar..." and then goes on to explain exactly what is in her inditement. I have been in my fair share of trouble in the past and have looked at my charges in complete disbelief, and had my attorney tell me that they will throw every charge and every possible character flaw out to try and get the highest possible conviction. As much as an attorney doesn't want to admit, it does come down to stats, W vs L.

That line kind of bursted my bubble... not ruling out something major this week though.

THey jack up their dates they read DD/MM/YYYY instead of the american MM/DD/YYYY so that is actually 8/1/2012.

True power struggle there!!!! :lol:

$0.72 if i am not mistaken.

Awesome! Thanks for posting!