njacobs

What do we look for now? The budget is done...does that mean it has been put into law?? Also, what else are they supposed to be working on over there today? This is all still confusing to me.

I thought Adam said that some of them blacked out some dates this week but didn't know why....why would they do that if they were just going to take the rest of the week of anyhow?

Honestly, I can't say for sure...it said it was live but maybe it's just a replay of today's happening's. It's supposed to be a live feed. Sorry if I gave incorrect information. Is this where he allegedly may have asked for an immediate reevaluation??

http://albaghdadia.com/livehigh

I am not trying to be negative but why would they release the date of the rv prior to it rv-ing? Isn't that a little like insider trading. I mean if this were true everybody would be buying up dinar like crazy. I am not saying I believe it or don't believe it but it does make me skeptical. Please do not bash....I am just trying to figure out how all of this works myself. If someone could give me insight as to why they would give a heads up I'd like to know.

Has anyone on this forum seen the video they played today??

When will this announcement take place??

let's make it an even $3.00

I would hope that if they new something they would let us know too.

Yes, Mongo, I am the yellow ball But I want to be sure I'm a well informed wise yellow ball.....lol Thanks everyone for all your input...much appreciated

I've read a million times over that we all need to do our own homework. But when it comes to cashing in it gets very confusing. Banks won't talk because we are talking about dinar which they don't handle. My fear is that this will RV and I will think I know what to do but really have no idea and in the end miss out on a great opportunity. I read a post that talked about it taking months to cash in and there is talk of there being a time frame to cash in and if that is true then what happens to those of us who may end up having to wait months for an appointment to cash in?? Will our dinar then be worthless because we couldn't get an appointment in time???? And yes I've read the cash in guide several times.......

It's about time

Bears game...not so hot tonight

It was meant to be funny but it seems was lost in translation

same news different day...gggrrrr

"sigh" finally another step in the right direction thnx

Not sure if this site is reliable...I am new...don't kill me please!!!!! http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/10/01/meet_the_new_boss_same_as_the_old_boss Meet the new boss, same as the old boss Posted By Michael Wahid Hanna Friday, October 1, 2010 - 2:42 PM Share It was always unlikely that ‘Ayad ‘Allawi would be Iraq's next Prime Minister. This now has been definitively confirmed and, ironically, on a day when Iraq's government formation process became the world's longest exercise in political stalemate. With the announcement of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's selection as the post-electoral Shiite alliance's nominee to be Prime Minister, the action now will shift to divvying up posts in what almost certainly will be a broad-based national unity government. This in itself is no easy task, but at least this announcement gives the process clear direction and will provide a framework for the negotiations to come. Despite his electoral slate's surprisingly strong showing in last March's parliamentary elections, ‘Allawi's immediate political future was inherently limited due to the sectarian dynamics that continue to shape political discourse in post-Saddam Hussein Iraqi politics. It is certainly true that the ‘Iraqiyya list garnered a respectable nationwide level of cross-sectarian support. However, the dominant political factions in today's Iraq represent points within a spectrum of Shiite Islamist consensus. Unsurprisingly, after years of disenfranchisement and repression, this segment of the political class is hugely defensive of its entitlement to rule the country. The political courtship of ‘Allawi by various figures from the Shiite establishment was more about negotiating leverage within the intra-Shiite contest for power than about real cross-sectarian outreach. Maliki himself always has been the issue that framed these more narrow coalition negotiations. His emergence in recent years as a strong central authority took many of his peers by surprise, as he originally was selected as a compromise candidate to break the stalemate following the parliamentary elections of January, 2005. With no independent militia backing or power base, Maliki was an acceptable and unthreatening choice when he was launched into the unenviable task of leading a war-stricken country on the eve of a sectarian bloodletting. While by his political rivals' concern over his centralizing tendencies and their unvarnished hostility to his continued rule have been recurring leitmotifs of these coalition negotiations, prior to his launch of the Basra offensive in March, 2008, Maliki was viewed as weak and ineffectual. Stephen Hadley, then President Bush's National Security Advisor, wrote a November, 2006 classified assessment of Maliki that suggested that he was "either ignorant of what is going on, misrepresenting his intentions, or that his capabilities are not yet sufficient to turn his good intentions into action." While the circumstances of Maliki's rise were particularly unlikely, it is questions of trust and fear associated with his increasingly strong grip on power that shaped the laborious and protracted negotiations. Paradoxically, the chaos of Maliki's first term and his initial weakness set the stage for the ad hoc and extra-legal measures taken to shore up his personal power and the stability of his government. Many of these measures, such as the establishment of alternate chains of command running directly to the prime minister, the cultivation of loyalist military units, and selective use of detention, had no legal or constitutional grounding and emerged at a time when the country was consumed by violence. With the security situation stabilizing and the bulk of U.S forces having withdrawn, the incoming government will have a huge role in fortifying the institutional frameworks that will guide Iraq's long-term future. As such, these negotiations have not simply been a reflection of a venal and self-interested political class, which is certainly part of the discussion, but also have included serious deliberations of checks and balances of centralized authority. The outcome of this more technical and legalistic process will be an important marker in the country's political development as its institutions and nascent traditions begin to take on the air of permanence. The torturous course of this process also should lay to rest the notion of a supine Iraq subject to the predatory designs of its neighbors. Iraq is a weak country and will be for years to come; this inevitably will attract unwanted and meddlesome attention from the region and beyond. While Iran has reaped immense strategic gains from the overthrow of its primary nemesis and its replacement by a friendly government, cheap talk of grand Iranian designs and a defenseless Iraqi puppet no longer should be understood as anything more than political agitprop in connection with the larger and unfolding regional and global conflict over Iran. The variable, and at times conflicting, outside agendas brought to bear on the Iraqis never were able to dictate the course of the government formation process. It should be clear at this juncture that the wishes of its neighbors and other interested parties, primarily the United States, will not be determinative of Iraqi outcomes. While the eventual U.S.-Iranian-Syrian convergence on Maliki's return boasted his stock and eased his path to nomination, regional actors and the United States responded to Iraqi cues throughout this ongoing process. As such, while outside support will play an important role in shaping outcomes and amplifying existing trends, it will not do so in a fashion that contradicts the core perceived interests of Iraqi actors. Interestingly, despite isolated reports of fears of a power vacuum as a result of the country's extended stalemate, violence has remained at horrific yet acceptable levels, within the context of contemporary Iraq. While the initial post-electoral optimism has faded, Iraq's relative stability, in spite of further U.S. troop reductions, has not been threatened by the continuing violence and terrorism that is likely to remain a constant factor for years to come. Instead, the government has continued to function consistently, albeit at a dismal level of service provision, but one that is not at all distinct from the preceding pre-election period. Aside from the intra-Shiite division of spoils, the next stage of the government formation process will hinge on Kurdish demands for inclusion and negotiation of ‘Iraqiyya's role in the incoming government. In some quarters, this type of national unity arrangement has been tarred as unwieldy and ideologically incoherent. However, its manifest drawbacks are outweighed by the destabilizing effects that might be associated with locking out any major political faction from the government. While crude ethno-sectarian paradigms are insufficient categories by which to judge Iraqi politics, the country's recent history certainly has brought such associations to the fore, and questions of political inclusion are often understood in such reductionist terms. No major Iraqi political current or faction as of yet is reconciled to the prospect of sitting in the honorable opposition outside the machinery of ministry patronage. In any event, the major political questions that divide the country do not necessarily break down cleanly and consistently, and their resolution will require tactical parliamentary alliances in any case. During this transitional period, Iraq's government obviously was not in a position to take on these looming political questions that still divide the country and will determine its long-term future. Resolution of these fundamental questions regarding power, resources, and territory will be the key factor in Iraq's future trajectory and the course of the country's stillborn process of political reconciliation. While these issues will endure, today's announcement is a welcome first step toward forming an Iraqi government to steer the country beyond the present period of outside intervention. Michael Wahid Hanna is a fellow and program officer at the Century Foundation.

OK...I had heard that for the first 4 to 6 hrs because of high cash in demand there would be huge fluctuation's in the rate and then it would stabilize. I'm calm Just trying to be prepared as much as possible. maximus answered that above

Got it...perfect!!! Thanks a lot!!!!

finger's crossed

sorry about that. So, your confident that if you see the rate go to whatever rate you are happy to cash in at, that it will still be available for you by the time you get to the bank and physically hand over your dinar. I guess I was under the impression that it would fluctuate so quickly that if you weren't right there handing the dinar over at the exact time you saw the rate you wanted, that it may not be available for you. And thank you for the link!!! Ok and here's a stupid question but I think I know the answer. I checked out the link but did not see the rate of exchange for the usd and dinar. Is that because it's not on there yet?? Or am I not looking at it right. Sorry, I am really new at this. thnx

OK so I am going to be using my local bank to cash in when this RV's. I have seen here that a lot of people are talking about the potential of being able to cash in at a very high rate for a short period of time when this RV's initially. Those of you who are going to be using your local bank can you explain to me your plan in taking advantage of this potential high cash in rate?? How will you know when it's likely at its peek?? What chart do you view to see where it's at?? What is the web address?? Will you just sit at the bank until you see the cash in rate you want and then hand over your dinar?? Do you all ready have an account set up, at the bank, specifically for the RV, so when this RV's you can cash in?? There are some really smart people on this site that have been planning for year's & I would love to hear your game plan. Thnx

FINE I'LL RELAX ALL READY!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! nightzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz

YAY!!!!!!!!!!

I know there is no guarantee as to when and what day but is it like or possible for it to RV in the middle of the night since it is daytime there now???