Why Iraq Is More Stable Than You Think !

[DinarThug]

CNN. Broadcasting Why Iraq Is More Of A 'Camel Stable' Than You Think !

 

 

 

Why Iraq Is More Stable Than You Think
By DOUGLAS A. OLLIVANT
July 09, 2014

The news from Iraq is bad. Four distinct yet intertwined problems—the rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), the dysfunctional politics of Iraq, the utter collapse of the Syrian state and the larger cold war between Saudi Arabia and Iran—have combined to disrupt the fragile stability gained by the Iraqis in the wake of the 2006-2008 civil war. Iraq is, once again, the paragon of a “wicked problem.”

There are, however, a number of rash conclusions being arrived at in the wake of the bad news. One does not have to read very far to find a series of assumptions being made about Iraq’s future—that Baghdad is about to fall, that Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s days are numbered, that Kurdistan’s independence is imminent and that oil production is at risk. None of these are certain and some are extremely unlikely. Let’s cover them one by one.

1. Baghdad is about to fall.

This is very, very unlikely. Although comparisons between the 1975 fall of Saigon and the fall of Baghdad have (predictably) emerged, Baghdad is a city of six million people. Six million. It has had a Shia majority since at least 2007, after a wave of ethnic cleansing drove out much of the Sunni population. Iraq’s security forces, the majority of them Shia, will likely fight with much more dedication then they did in northern Iraq. Further, the Kadhamiya Shrine, one of the most revered sites in Shiite Islam, is on the northern fringe of Baghdad. We can expect fanatical dedication to protect this monument from advancing ISIL columns, particularly on the part of newly mobilized Shia militias.

And indeed, the battle lines already beginning to stabilize to the north of Baghdad and Samarra, a mixed city with another important Shiite shrine, the Askariya Mosque. This is happening even before any appreciable amount of airpower—whether U.S., Iranian, Syrian, Russian or Iraqi (via newly acquired aircraft)—has been brought to bear. If the northern front stabilizes and ISIL can hide in defensive positions and cities, then airpower may be of limited utility. 

If ISIL begins to move en masse toward Baghdad, then the group could present quite attractive targets for airpower.

This is not to say that Baghdad will not be contested. We should be concerned about two possibilities in particular. The first is Baghdad International Airport (BGW), the capital’s primary link to the outside world and a major resupply node for Iraqi forces. BGW sits on the western edge of Baghdad province and is bordered by the majority-Sunni suburbs of Abu Ghraib and Ameriya to the north and east, respectively. The western side of BGW is open desert that leads to Anbar province. It is in a uniquely vulnerable piece of geography.

Second, we should not be surprised to find “fifth columns” of volunteers recruited from among the Sunni citizens of Baghdad. The neighborhoods of Ghazaliya, Doura, Abu Ghraib, Ameriya and Adhamiya could all see a return, or remobilization, of nationalist militias loosely aligned with ISIL (or just ISIL cells) in the coming weeks. I suspect that ISIL’s plan is to use these internal forces to create vulnerabilities that can exploited by their more traditional military units from the north. I don’t think anyone believes that the ISIL forces are capable of further significant moves southward, but this does not mean that we will not see skirmishes in the streets of Baghdad regardless. So, will we see increased violence, much of it sectarian? Yes, quite possibly. Baghdad falling? Utterly improbable.

2. Maliki will be leaving soon.

This is possible, but far from certain. First, barring his early demise, Maliki will only leave through the legitimate process of forming a new government, or so he insists. It is not clear exactly what those who are urging Maliki to leave mean. Under what constitutional mechanism would he “go,” and how would his successor be selected? Nor is it clear what is meant by a “national unity” government—simply ignore the results of the earlier election? One does wish that some of Maliki’s critics read the Iraqi constitution.

The process of forming a new government will be long and complicated—as the results of the first Iraqi Parliament sessions of July 1 and 8 indicated. The parliament met just long enough to clarify that there was no consensus among Iraq’s Sunni as to who should be the next speaker of parliament (traditionally a Sunni post, and constitutionally the first to be designated). The Kurdish and Shia parties, of course, responded that they won’t even talk about who will be president and prime minister until there is a speaker, so expect a long summer. (The parliament initially went into recess until August, but international pressure forced lawmakers to reschedule for July 13.)

When it comes to forming a government, Maliki remains in a dominant position, at least numerically, if not psychologically. His bloc—bolstered in no small part by his personal popularity among his own constituents—won about 28 percent (92 of 328) of the seats in a contest with (arguably) nine major parties. In this system, 28% is a major statement. Recall that the Sunni citizens of Iraq are only about 20 percent of the population (+/- 5 percent—there has been no census in decades), and their vote share reflects that, with the three major Sunni parties combined winning only 59 seats, or just short of 18 percent. These are the electoral realities. For all Maliki’s failings, it will be very important in the coming days not to give the impression to those who have put their faith in the ballot box that the Sunni minority can overthrow that verdict by force of arms. This would be a tragic precedent.


Read more: http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/07/why-iraq-is-more-stable-than-you-think-108708.html#ixzz374lkb5Q7

[calkid11]

Thank you

[gymrat76541]

My take on this whole dang thing is: The Sunni population is unhappy with the Shiite PM.

 

They are tired to being short changed & treated like second class citizens. They want fair & equal treatment.

 

The Kurds are all about getting paid & their slice of the pie! They have taken advantage of this incident to take back much that they lost previously.

 

Once this "Maliki" situation is resolved we should see some good old national unity & these roaches from Syria will be sent packing back into Syria where they belong!

Edited July 10, 2014 by gymrat76541

[sandfly]

THANKS