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Western opinion: a "fatal" political blow to Al-Sadr in Iraq 2022-10-14 03:06 Shafaq News/ The American newspaper "Washington Post" sheds light on the Iraqi issue, in light of the election of the Iraqi parliament as a new president who immediately ordered the formation of a government, after a full year of political paralysis in the country after the parliamentary elections last October. This came after Abdul Latif Rashid, a veteran Kurdish politician and former water minister, won the second round of voting for outgoing President Barham Salih. He quickly appointed Muhammad al-Sudani as prime minister, giving him 30 days to form a government. Al-Sudani, 52, is part of the largest Shiite bloc in parliament and is a close ally of former Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki. The newspaper said that Iraq has been witnessing a political crisis since last year, amid hostility between the Sadrist movement, led by prominent cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, and the "Coordination Framework", an alliance that includes al-Maliki's party and other Shiite factions more closely linked to Iran. The Iraqi presidency, traditionally held by a Kurd, is a largely ceremonial position, but the vote for Rashid, 78, was a major step toward forming a new government, which politicians have failed to do since the election. The dispute, which prevented the election of a president or the formation of a government, escalated in July as supporters of the two sides took to the streets and inaugurated competing sit-ins in central Baghdad, sparking memories of the civil war. In this regard, the newspaper quoted Muhammad Jassim, an Iraqi political analyst residing in Baghdad, as saying: "I think what happened today is a fatal blow to Muqtada al-Sadr politically. With the victory of the members of the coordination framework over Muqtada al-Sadr, the way is completely paved for them to pass their candidate (the prime minister). ) and government formation. Jassim considered that the victory of the "coordinating framework" is also a victory for Iran and a setback for US interests in the region. He added: "They will do everything in their power to eliminate any American presence in the country and put obstacles in the way of any economic cooperation with the United States...all for the benefit of Iran." For its part, the British newspaper "Financial Times" quoted analysts warning that the victory of the Iranian-backed coalition would be a setback for Washington, which has been tacitly supporting a government led by al-Sadr. And the newspaper said, in a report, that Al-Sudani's supporters claim that his proven record in local and federal government means that he can form an efficient government capable of tackling some of the problems of oil-rich Iraq, foremost among which is rampant corruption and dilapidated public infrastructure. On the other hand, she added, others warn that Al-Sudani's candidacy is a "name only" breakthrough. The newspaper quoted Renad Mansour, director of the Iraq Initiative at Chatham House, as saying that assigning Al-Sudani to form the government cannot address the deep political tensions in the country. He added: "It does not address the deep sense of alienation of the Iraqi people from the political elite," criticizing the political system in Iraq. Mansour continued, "Today it is heralded as a breakthrough in the deadlock. But we still see the same figures who have dominated the political scene since 2003, who stifled reform and encouraged political corruption that harms Iraqis every day."

Two foreign powers make kings in Iraq and decide who will sit on the "big chair" 2021-10-14 06:30 Shafaq News/ The American newspaper "Washington Post" saw today, Thursday, that Iraqis are paying the price of elections "imposed on them" since 2003, while noting that two foreign powers make kings in Iraq and decide who will sit on the "big chair". And according to a report of the newspaper, seen by Shafak News Agency, since the United States led the international "coalition of the willing" to impose military regime change in Iraq in 2003, Iraqis have been invited to vote in their fledgling democracy six times, indicating that Iraqis have never obtained the democracy that they were promised out. According to the "Washington Post", "Despite the low turnout, which does not indicate a broad popular mandate to rule, a coalition government will now be formed with effort, and the blocs with the largest number of seats will divide the spoils among themselves, led by Muqtada al-Sadr." She added, "Since the 2005 elections, the quota system that divides power along ethnic and sectarian lines has tightened the noose around Iraqis, which has polarized society and created a sectarian environment." With the political elites bickering over who would get the ministry and, more importantly, the ministerial budgets, they sought foreign sponsors to back their ploys, adding, "of course, the main foreign mediators were the United States and Iran." And as if the sectarian civil war of 2006-2008 that ripped societies nearly irreparably apart wasn't enough, the country has also become a battleground between Washington and Tehran to fight or settle their differences. As a result, and speaking to the newspaper, “most of the election results were imposed. The quota system created a series of weak governments, and ensured that only the prime minister was Shiite, the president was Kurdish, and the parliament speaker was Sunni, and no one could win an absolute majority either, and thus the parties would coalesce around Alliances based on interests are always directed by either the United States or Iran, and the two foreign powers can then act as kingmakers and decide who will sit in the big chair. The newspaper added, “This system allowed the leader of the Shiite Islamic Dawa Party, Nuri al-Maliki, to remain in his high positions as prime minister or vice president for almost the entire period between 2006 and 2018, and al-Maliki was blamed as one of the primary instigators of sectarianism in Iraq, so it is not surprising A protest movement calling for an end to sectarianism, corruption and foreign interference took to the streets in 2019. It has remained in the squares sporadically since then, despite the Corona pandemic. The newspaper stated, “The brutal treatment of this popular movement led to a mass boycott of this week’s unpopular elections, at least 600 protesters were killed, and this violence had the greatest impact, as it forced people to work underground; many reported that they are now relying on blockchain technologies. and decentralized VPNs to stay hidden and secure while they regroup.” Very few Iraqis believe in democracy now, certainly “not the democracy that was imposed on us at gunpoint by the United States and its allies in 2003,” one said, adding, “These elections simply serve to define what we already know, which is Our vote will be used to justify the mirage of democracy, while a hand-picked group of elites will continue to profit while we suffer." And the "Washington Post" concludes, saying: Amidst these deep systemic and structural problems, and with the continuing lack of justice, Iraqi politics is doomed to continue on its current path.

Virginia Politics What hunting Bigfoot taught a Republican congressman about politics Outgoing Rep. Denver Riggleman (R-Va.) stands in his barrel barn, where he ages spirits from the Silverback Distillery, which he co-owns with his wife, Christine. (John McDonnell/The Washington Post) By Meagan Flynn November 26, 2020 at 12:20 p.m. EST AFTON, Va. — There was a time in Denver Riggleman's life when he sat on the banks of a creek that reeked of dead fish and peered through night-vision goggles into the thick of the Olympic National Forest. He was looking for Bigfoot. Or at least, others in his group were. Riggleman, a nonbeliever who was then a National Security Agency defense contractor, had come along for the ride, paying thousands of dollars in 2004 to indulge a lifelong fascination: Why do people — what kind of people — believe in Bigfoot? Now in one of his last acts as a Republican congressman from Virginia, Riggleman is asking the same questions of supporters of QAnon and deniers of President-elect Joe Biden’s victory. Months after his ouster by Rep.-elect Bob Good (R) in a contentious GOP convention, Riggleman has become one of the loudest voices in Congress warning of the infiltration of conspiracy theories into political discourse. And he is surely the only voice to have made the point after self-publishing a book about Bigfoot beliefs. To Riggleman, the book, “Bigfoot . . . It’s Complicated,” mirrors the way pockets of the country are falling into conspiracy wormholes — everything from extremist fringe groups such as QAnon and the “boogaloo” movement to President Trump’s claims of widespread voter fraud. Like the Bigfoot hunters in the Olympic National Forest, they see what they want to see. “I always say the [Bigfoot] expedition leader and Rudy Giuliani are very similar people,” Riggleman said of Trump’s conspiracy-theory-spinning lawyer, during a recent interview at his distillery in Afton, Va. Bigfoot believers have plenty in common with political extremists on both the far right and the far left, Riggleman said, lambasting a political ecosystem where, oftentimes, “facts don’t matter.” “They’re all bat---- crazy. Right?” he said, not really joking. “All of them ascribe to a team mythology that might or might not be true. And they stay on that team regardless. And that is what’s so dangerous about politics today. That’s what I’ve been trying to say.” Riggleman walks his land in Afton, Va. (John McDonnell/The Washington Post) A 'lark' turns into a book Riggleman’s Bigfoot story begins in 1980, when he was 10. Something his grandfather described only as “mighty peculiar” chased them in the West Virginia woods back to his grandfather’s trailer. Was it Bigfoot? Probably not, Riggleman now knows. But it gave him his own sense of how a kernel of suspicion could snowball into an unshakable conviction. Years later, his fascination with belief systems was cemented halfway across the world. After graduating from the University of Virginia with a degree in Eastern European foreign affairs, Riggleman became an Air Force intelligence officer and ended up stationed on the Serbian-Romanian border during the Kosovo War in the late 1990s. “There was religious violence, ethnic strife. But what really touched me there was the way the Romanians treated the Roma, or the gypsies,” Riggleman said. “It was subhuman. What I saw was belief systems that thought the other belief system was wrong, based on no evidence whatsoever.” He finished out his counterterrorism career as a defense contractor with the National Security Agency before starting his own contracting company, Analyst Warehouse, and later working as a consultant at the Pentagon. All the while, he dabbled in Bigfoot beliefs as a personal hobby. In 2004, he flew to Washington state with his wife, Christine, and his best friend, a Michigan state trooper, to go on a Bigfoot-hunting expedition, the first of several he would take over the years for his book. At the time it was only a lark, basically a prank vacation. He had told his wife they were going on an “exotic” hiking trip for their anniversary. “It was not the greatest thing I’ve ever done,” he says now. In the woods, they listened to Bigfoot-believing women sing nursery rhymes, banking on the widely held theory that women’s singing voices would lure the hairy, behemoth forest dweller from the shadows. Around a campfire, they humored other group members’ stories of Bigfoot sightings. Some attendees debated, with almost religion-like conviction, whether Bigfoot had a gluten allergy, or questioned how big his penis was. (Yep, that’s in the book. And if it sounds vaguely familiar, it’s because Riggleman’s Democratic opponent in 2018 accused him of being a “devotee of Bigfoot erotica”; Riggleman had joked online about Bigfoot genitalia and “why women want” him.) By the end of the trip, Riggleman, and especially his wife, couldn’t believe he had dropped more than $5,000 — much of which he paid to the expedition leader. As he recalls the expense today, Riggleman said it doesn’t feel much different from Trump’s allies seeking donations from fervent Trump voters to help his campaign’s legal challenge of the election results. “If you look at the Giulianis or the Sidney Powells of the world, they’re making money off the grift because they’re asking for donations to help in a mythological quest of things that can’t be proven,” he said, referring to a former member of Trump’s legal team. “I saw it with Bigfoot. I’m seeing it with QAnon. It’s about money. And sometimes crazy and money live in the same space.” Riggleman pauses as he walks his land at dusk. He has self-published a book about the mythical creature Bigfoot, whose followers he compares to devotees of political conspiracy theories. (John McDonnell/The Washington Post) 'Ideological purity test' It’s dusk on Riggleman’s back porch in Afton, overlooking the Rockfish River at the foot of the Blue Ridge Mountains — the kind of night when Riggleman typically pours a glass of bourbon, has a cigar, sits outside and feels kind of happy to be leaving Washington. Spirits age in a barrel barn at the Silverback Distillery in Afton. (John McDonnell/The Washington Post) He lives walking distance from Silverback Distillery, which he and Christine founded in 2013 and Christine now runs with their daughter. On a tour of the grounds, he stops at their barrel warehouse and points to a bench at the top of a hill. “That’s where Stephen Colbert made fun of me,” he said, referring to Colbert’s 2018 late-night spoof of Riggleman’s “Bigfoot erotica” campaign controversy, which featured Riggleman looking pensive on his picturesque bench. Upheaval opens door for Republican outsider in Virginia congressional race Rep. Guy Reschenthaler (R-Pa.) said the controversy largely fizzled after Riggleman got to work in Congress, in part because Riggleman “embraced” his unusual hobby. He wore Bigfoot socks. He put Bigfoot figurines in his office. And he proved himself a “live-and-let-live Republican” unafraid to speak his mind, said Reschenthaler, who has purchased copies of Riggleman’s Bigfoot book to give to friends. Riggleman’s mentor, Rep. Drew Ferguson (R-Ga.), who is chief deputy whip, described the one-term lawmaker’s voting record as among the most conservative in Congress but said his mind-set was always “wrapped in a Libertarian wrapper.” He said Riggleman “built a reputation as an honest broker,” someone he could trust to reach out to members across the political spectrum to whip votes. Riggleman worked with Rep. Abigail Spanberger (D-Va.) on rural broadband access, and with Rep. David Trone (D-Md.) — “my hero,” Riggleman said — to pass $9 billion opioid addiction legislation, an issue personal to each of them after both lost a relative to an overdose. “Denver has empathy,” Trone said. “But he also has this bigger-than-life personality and this inquisitive mind. And he’s not afraid to challenge the status quo. . . . Others just lack the courage; they’re concerned about reelection.” That trait didn’t always go over well with factions of the Republican Party in Virginia’s 5th Congressional District, however — an experience that has left Riggleman cynical about the two-party political system and questioning whether he has a home in the GOP. He landed in hot water with social conservatives after officiating a same-sex wedding between two of his campaign staffers and supporting increases in visas for foreign workers. During the Republican primary campaign, Good, a religious conservative, lashed Riggleman for voting to condemn the Trump administration’s lawsuit seeking a full repeal of the Affordable Care Act. Rep. Denver Riggleman (R-Va.), center in dark suit, presides over the wedding of two campaign staffers at King Family Vineyards in Crozet, Va., on July 14, 2019. (Christine Riggleman) Conservative GOP congressman presides at same-sex wedding in Virginia Riggleman said he didn’t want to “play the game” — or ascribe to a team mythology — to get reelected. “I think what you have is this ideological purity test I refuse to meet for the GOP in Virginia,” he said. In the months after his loss, he co-led a House resolution condemning QAnon and, later, went after Trump on cable news for promoting a QAnon conspiracy on Twitter about an Osama bin Laden body double. He openly flirted with not voting for Trump’s reelection bid and says he’ll never tell whom he did vote for. Since the election, he has blasted the president’s unfounded claims of widespread voter fraud — saying there is probably “more proof of alien abductions” than of fantastical theories about rigged voting machines, Venezuelan influence or plotting by Democratic operatives to fix mail-in voting for Biden. John Fredericks, chairman of Trump’s Virginia convention delegation, said Riggleman’s comments attacking Trump on live television amounted to a betrayal of the president’s 2 million Virginia supporters — and Trump’s previous support for the congressman. Fredericks said he will never back Riggleman in politics again because of it. Riggleman said he doesn’t care about the political consequences of his comments. He has tossed around the possibility of running as an independent for governor — about as convincingly as someone who will “maybe” attend your Zoom networking event next Tuesday night. But he has his sights set on other opportunities, too. His outspokenness on extremism caught the eye of the Network Contagion Research Institute, which maps the online spread of disinformation and coded language used by extremist groups, including antifa, the Proud Boys and more. Joel Finkelstein, the institute’s founder, said Riggleman’s background as an intelligence officer and his passion for rooting out conspiracy theories made him “the guy we’ve been waiting for.” A few months ago, Finkelstein met the congressman in Washington. They talked about his book on Bigfoot, about QAnon, about his time on the Serbian-Romanian border. Finkelstein offered him an advisory role and a chance to co-write upcoming papers. Riggleman accepted. “This is what I’ve done my whole life,” he said. https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/virginia-politics/denver-riggleman-bigfoot-qanon/2020/11/26/d8de7274-2dbf-11eb-bae0-50bb17126614_story.html GO RV, then BV

Iraq: Another turning point? Demonstrators support Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi reforms in Baghdad mid-August. (Karim Kadim/AP) By Zalmay Khalilzad September 9 Zalmay Khalilzad was the U.S. ambassador to Iraq from 2005 to 2007. The reform campaign announced last month by Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi represents a potential turning point for Iraq. Indeed, the outcome of this campaign will shape the future of a country central to the global fight against the Islamic State and to the stabilization of the Middle East. The United States must focus on Iraq’s newest struggle and assist Abadi’s reform effort. Abadi is rushing his reforms because of pressure from a nonsectarian movement, which includes many civil society groups, that has taken to the streets for several weeks. The role of Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, who encouraged Abadi to be courageous and embrace reform, has been critical. Abadi’s reforms include fighting corruption and establishing a meritocracy in government employment in place of party patronage and sectarianism. The protesters also want national reconciliation and reform of the judiciary, including the replacement of top judge Midhat al-Mahmoud, who was a key enabler of the unconstitutional actions by Abadi’s predecessor, Nouri al-Maliki. Sectarianism has been a cancer on Iraqi politics. The last large-scale expression of nonsectarian politics came during the 2010 elections, when an improved security environment briefly reduced the potency of identity politics. But sectarianism surged again when security deteriorated after the U.S. military withdrawal. Today’s events offer a rare second chance for Iraq. Abadi’s reform effort faces three key challenges: First, it has divided the Shiites, producing a political confrontation that Sistani aide Ahmed al-Safi has described as an “existential battle.” The reforms are opposed by militia leaders, including the Badr Organization’s Hadi al-Amiri and Kataib Hezbollah’s Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, as well as a number of political parties that support the political patronage system. Militia leaders have threatened reformers, targeting protesters with violence and kidnapping and even engaging in a deadly skirmish with security forces in Baghdad last week. They have also issued statements opposing national reconciliation in defiance of the prime minister and met with Mahmoud to express support for him. Second, while the prime minister’s goals are laudable and ambitious, the means available to him to implement them are limited. Given lower oil prices, Abadi has far fewer financial resources than his predecessor. Complicating matters is the fact that, in the war against the Islamic State, he needs the support of the very militias opposed to his reforms. Many senior government officials hold their positions because of patronage and are unlikely to help his agenda succeed. And Abadi’s relations with the Kurds are strained by disputes over oil exports and the budget, among other issues. Abadi’s most important assets are support from Sistani and popular demands for reform. Third, it appears that Iran wants the militias to dominate the Iraqi security sector and render it loyal to Tehran’s hard-liners. Abadi wants these militias and volunteer forces to be regulated and reorganized in a National Guard force under state control. It’s likely that Iran hopes the prime minister will fail and either simply abandon the reform program to work more closely with Iran or be replaced by someone who will side with the militias. Maliki began his first term as an independent leader, but as conditions changed and put his political survival at risk, he embraced Iran. Abadi’s reform agenda and Iran’s response to it have produced a nationalist Iraqi backlash against Iran. Sistani, Abadi and other reform leaders want good relations with Iran, but they resent Quds Force leader Maj. Gen. Qasem Soleimani’s effort to turn Iraq into a satellite state. There is much at stake for Iraq in this struggle. The reform program is not comprehensive — it does not address the problems of the Kurdish region. Nevertheless, its success could lead to more effective governance, reconciliation and a reduction in sectarian tension. Sectarianism and discrimination against Sunnis have fueled extremism and terror in parts of the Sunni Arab community. Greater independence from Iran can also have a positive effect on Iraq’s regional relations and reduce Sunni Arab states’ incentives to support Sunni insurgents and terrorists. Greater emphasis on competence and the rule of law can reduce corruption and improve services for the Iraqi people — and even attract investment to Iraq. The United States has an interest in the success of reform. To help tip the political balance of power in Abadi’s favor, policymakers should focus on understanding the nature of Iraq’s reform movement and identify ways to bolster and support it. Washington should also continue to provide robust military assistance. The U.S. effort to rebuild the Iraqi army is crucial to provide Abadi with loyal security forces and a strong formal chain of command. This security relationship and our operations against the Islamic State are vital for Abadi. Without them, Iran’s leverage grows. We should also respond positively to Abadi’s appeal for help, and help him with implementing the reform agenda by providing technical advice to turn objectives into actionable plans and during the execution phase in areas such as fiscal policy, ministerial restructuring, tax reforms and electricity generation and distribution. We should also help Abadi refine the scope and pace of reform to make sure he doesn’t overreach. Finally, this is a perfect time to redouble our diplomatic support by encouraging Iraq’s Sunni neighbors to constructively engage with Abadi. The reform campaign is evidence that he is moving away from the sectarian policies of his predecessor. The United States should emphasize to Iraq’s neighbors that successful reforms can help with national reconciliation and rebalance Iraq’s relations with its neighbors, positively affecting the broader region. This struggle for political, economic and national security reform in Iraq is likely to be a long one, and success is not inevitable. Prime Minister Abadi faces major domestic and Iranian pressures, and he needs our help to make progress. We need to act quickly. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/iraq-another-turning-point/2015/09/09/3c5e8e3e-566f-11e5-8bb1-b488d231bba2_story.html?wprss=rss_opinions

Premature excitement about Iraq’s new government reforms By Zaid Al-Ali August 14 at 2:00 PM Following more than a decade of decrepit government performance and spurred by popular protests in many parts of the country, Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi proposed a reform plan on Aug. 8, which was then expanded and approved unanimously by parliament on Aug. 11. The plan was met with widespread approval within Iraq and abroad: Protesters carried signs saying that they were “delegating” the prime minister to reform the government; the Shiite religious establishment in Najaf offered its full support; Iraqi and international commentators were also quick to praise the plan. However, having reviewed it in detail and having followed developments in Iraq’s governance structure for the past 10 years, I felt deeply depressed after reading Abadi’s plan. Had I been given an opportunity to do so, I would have voted against it. Those who have offered their support ignore a number of key aspects of the plan, including the historical context. The fact is that, in 2006, 2010 and 2014, after each of Iraq’s three post-constitution governments were formed, “programs” were drafted and approved by parliament, each of which look almost exactly like Abadi’s reform program. They all promised to “revitalize the anti-corruption agencies,” broaden Iraq’s tax base and improve services. And, just like Abadi’s plan, they were totally silent on how these objectives would be achieved. What’s more, following Iraq’s previous round of national protests in 2011 after the outbreak of the Arab spring, then-Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki canceled all ministries of state, stated he would establish new anti-corruption measures and that ministries should merge to streamline the state bureaucracy. If most of Abadi’s plan sounds familiar to longtime Iraq watchers, it is because it has indeed almost all been said before. Some enthusiasts have argued that, this time, the pressure to reform from the street and from the religious establishment will be too great to ignore, but those exact sentiments were expressed following the 2009 and 2010 elections and the 2011 protests. As of yet, Abadi’s supporters have been unable to articulate exactly why government will have to get its act together this time, most probably because we have in fact not reached the critical point of no return just yet. The political context is also hard to ignore. Abadi’s plan was conceived in the midst of an ongoing power struggle among Shiite political circles. It is no secret that Vice President al-Maliki has been vying to undermine his former colleague since he was ousted from the prime minister’s position last year. What is less well known is that he and several other political forces (all of which are closely aligned to Iran) have been mounting a serious challenge to Abadi’s authority over the past few weeks. In that context, the key proposal to dissolve the vice-presidents’ positions is not so much an attempt to cut down on government bureaucracy, as it is to weaken a political rival. And while few will dispute that al-Maliki should be sidelined, it is worth noting that al-Abadi’s own record is not particularly inspiring either. During al-Maliki’s entire tenure as prime minister, al-Abadi never appeared to differ from his party colleague on any important policy matter. He also does not have any major accomplishments to his name from his own eight-year tenure in parliament. Finally, his performance as prime minister over the past year has not been particularly impressive. Those who followed Abadi’s parliamentary career clearly prefer him to al-Maliki, but they are equally reluctant to celebrate Abadi as the hero of modern Iraq (just yet). In addition, the constitutional context in which the reform plan was written is not particularly reassuring. Although Abadi claims to want to reform the constitution, that text makes it clear that the only way in which it can be amended is through a referendum, which would take years to organize in the current security climate. This means that any major reforms passed in the current context will either have conform with Iraq’s current decrepit constitution, or they will necessarily open the door to an even more lawless environment than the one we are living in now, in which any sitting prime minister can change the constitution at will. And that is why the proposal to cancel the vice president’s position is so problematic: Contrary to what some commentators have written, several constitutional provisions actually require for there to be a vice-president. Furthermore, Iraqi law actually provides that it is the president’s prerogative to nominate his or her vice-president; the prime minister should not have any authority on the matter. The plan will be challenged legally and politically and has put the entire constitutional system of government in doubt, all for changes that will not make much difference in practice. Finally, the issue that Abadi’s supporters appear to ignore the most is the plan’s actual content. Its proposals are minor, hopelessly vague, dangerous in their tendency to concentrate power in the PM’s hands or impossible to implement. Most commentary on its substantive provisions focuses on the elimination of certain offices, including the vice president and the deputy prime minister positions and the revoking of their security detail among other privileges. While these are all welcome measures, on their own, they will not make an important difference. Compared to the amount of money that has been stolen from the state since 2003, the funds that will be saved through these measures is actually very low. They will also not make the state more effective, given that those offices had little impact on the state to begin with. The suggestion by some international observers that this measure risks alienating Sunnis by depriving their leaders from senior positions is completely misplaced given how unpopular and irrelevant these leaders have become in recent years. The plan also calls to eliminate the system through which government portfolios are distributed on a sectarian basis in favor of a more meritocratic system. It would be generous to describe this proposed measure as part of a “plan” given that it does not include any detail whatsoever on how this particular objective will be met. The political parties that populate parliament and control government (including and perhaps even especially Abadi’s own Dawa party) have treated ministries like private treasure-troves that they can plunder at will since 2003. That is a privilege that they will be unwilling to surrender without a fight. Parliament may have voted in favor of the general principle, but the real challenge will be to develop a plan that eases the parties out of all levels of the state’s bureaucracy, ends partisan abuse of government offices and ensures that parliament will accept a plan that will deprive them of their cash cow. Until such a plan is developed, there is nothing to discuss; this proposal has been on the table with the same lack of detail for years now. Just as unrealistic is the plan’s time frame, which requires for a huge number of senior officials to be confirmed by parliament in the next few weeks. If actually carried through, there is no way that more than a small number of these individuals will be properly vetted before parliament makes its decision, opening the doors wide for yet more political appointments and abuse. Even more worrying is the way in which the plan concentrates power in Abadi’s hands. The plan grants the prime minister the authority to dismiss governors and even directly elected local officials, in case of “poor performance, violating the law or corruption.” There are so many problems with this provision that they are difficult to count. First, there is no reason to believe that the prime minister will be a good judge of who needs to be dismissed, particularly given how loyal he has been to his own political party over the years. Will the prime minister be just as willing to dismiss a political ally as he is an official from a rival party? If so, that will probably be a first in world politics. Second, the measure goes completely against the constitution’s decentralizing features and the increasing tendency among many of Iraq’s provinces toward greater autonomy, instead concentrating power not just in Baghdad but directly in the prime minister’s hands. In that respect, Abadi’s plan has taken its cues from a long and disastrous Iraqi tradition of centralism and clearly illustrates his incapacity to seek modern solutions to Iraq’s long-standing problems. The third reason why this particular measure is so worrying is its overt contempt for institutional safeguards. In any constitutional system, the courts are supposed to judge whether officials should be sanctioned for acts of corruption. Systems of government cannot function properly without oversight from an independent judiciary, and this plan has usurped that authority by granting Abadi the authority to judge members of the political class. As a result, Abadi’s plan is actually a lucid illustration of how little Iraq’s political elites understand about governance. Iraq’s court system is known to be rife with corruption. Report after report has detailed how executive abuses have been totally ignored by judges since 2003. There is a desperate need to reform the judiciary, in order to provide an independent and credible check against executive abuses, and yet the only mention of the issue in Abadi’s proposal is a requirement that the judiciary submit a reform plan of its own. This is not only an admission that the government does not have an opinion of its own on this issue, despite the fact that it has been pressing for years; but it is also a serious error of judgment to consult a judiciary that is corrupt to the bone on the matter of its own reform. Worse still, the plan calls for the courts and anti-corruption agencies to be “activated” and corruption cases sent to them “immediately.” Rather than establish institutional mechanisms that will ensure that no act of corruption, when discovered, will go unpunished, the plan relies on the prime minister’s discretion to allow for outstanding cases to move forward, which will always be politicized. In so doing, Abadi has failed in exactly the same way that his three predecessors (Allawi, Jafari and Maliki) did and which I document in detail in my book, “The Struggle for Iraq’s Future.” One analyst commented that were the plan to be successful, Abadi could become the “Mandela of Iraq.” However, one of the South African transition’s most important legacies was the establishment of an independent and progressive constitutional court and strengthened rule of law. Abadi, and anyone who is interested in genuinely improving Iraqi governance should pay close attention to that lesson. Abadi’s failure to take this issue seriously is evidence of the poverty of ideas and the absence of capacity at the highest levels of Iraq’s government. Even if Abadi manages to satisfy the narrow political objective of sidelining his political rivals, governance in Iraq is extremely unlikely to improve without significantly more effort than has been offered thus far. A few sacrificial lambs may be cast out of the political system to appease protesters, until the weather improves and demand for electricity declines, in the hope that the numbers of demonstrators will also recede. However, unless the current plan is seriously reconsidered, the political parties will be impossible to uproot from government departments given the absence of an effective police force and an independent court system. Policy formation and implementation will remain as weak as it is today, and the country will continue to drift into an economic morass from which it may not recover. Barring a surge in oil prices and/or production sometime over the next two years, Iraq is heading for a crisis that will lead to even worse services and even more popular anger at the political elite. The outcome of ever increasing popular anger without any genuine hope of improvement is likely to be very painful. Some more cautious analysts have described Abadi’s plan as a “step in the right direction.” In fact, on its own, the plan does almost nothing and has all been said before. If Abadi really wants to impress and offer some genuine hope for our country, he has a lot more work to do. Zaid Al-Ali is a lawyer specializing in comparative constitutional law and was a legal adviser to the United Nations in Iraq from 2005 to 2010. He is the author of “The Struggle for Iraq’s future: How Corruption, Incompetence and Sectarianism Have Undermined Democracy.” (Yale University Press, 2014) http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2015/08/14/premature-excitement-about-iraqs-new-government-reforms/