INTERSTING TAKE ON THE KURDISH REFERENDUM

[KristiD]

from Zero Hedge:  http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2017-09-28/dangerous-move-masoud-barzani-either-burned-or-paved-way-syrian-kurds

I hope his conclusions (at the end in red) are correct and that because it does not seem like the international community will support the secession, they'll just accept the small victory of winning the vote and take no further action.  If so, things should hopefully get back on track with the RV. 

 

"A Dangerous Move": Masoud Barzani Either Burned Or Paved The Way For The Syrian Kurds

 

 

by Tyler Durden

Sep 28, 2017 7:35 PM

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Submitted by Elijah Magnier, Middle East based chief international war correspondent for Al Rai Media

 

The decision of Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) leader Masoud Barzani to hold a referendum for Kurdistan independence will define the future of the Kurds in north-east Syria. The international community (headed by the US with numerous military bases in Syria) is directly concerned with the reactions, verbal threats, and measures announced by the countries with a Kurdish majority and bordering Iraqi Kurdistan, i.e. Turkey, Iran, Syria and Iraq.

 

So far Tehran, Ankara and Baghdad have reacted harshly to the Iraqi Kurds’ unilateral wish to divide the country, but Iraq and Iran took the first measure by closing their air space to all flights from and to Erbil. Iraq asked all airlines to stop flying over the country and to cease using Erbil airport. Lebanon abided by the Iraqi central government request and halted all flights in and out of Erbil (flights scheduled daily in the normal situation). Egypt and the Emirtes followed Lebanon’s step. Turkey is increasing its threats (“the Kurds will go hungry”) but did not take any practical steps: scheduled flights from Turkey to Erbil are landing and taking off despite what Turkish officials otherwise declared, but above all, its trucks are still travelling backward and forward into the Kurdish territory.

Kurdistan President Masoud Barzani (left) and Iraq PM Haider al-Abadi (right)

Baghdad went a lot further when its Prime Minister Haidar Abadi was given full power by the government and the Parliament to take “all necessary measures”, including the use of military force, to ensure the unity of the country. This is what encouraged Haidar Abadi to give an ultimatum to Erbil to deliver the control of all airports and border crossings to the Federal Police, as stated by the constitution. This means that the central government is expected to increase sanctions against Kurdistan by this coming Friday and may use military force to impose control over all contested areas in the north, north-west and east of the country. Any such move will inevitably spark violence in the country and an immediate revelation of the International community’s real intention towards Erbil and Baghdad. The US and Europe have large business, oil, and military intelligence bases in Kurdistan and would be directly concerned.

 

A delegation from Kurdistan visited Baghdad a few days before the announcement of the referendum. Iraqi Sources in Baghdad who participated in the meeting reveal to me “the Kurds came with three clear intentions: 1. To show the world the Kurds are trying to find a way out before the referendum. 2. It is important to continue the dialogue and avoid any repressive measures after the referendum.” 3. And most importantly, “the delegation was trying to find out what would be the measures Baghdad may adopt as retaliation for the referendum”. The source believes “there was no attempt to postpone or renounce the call for the referendum: Barzani has decided and is confident of his step”.

 

So the decision has been made and Barzani was aware of the consequences: personal representatives of the Kurdish leader visited various capitals (Beirut, Tehran, Ankara, Tel Aviv, Baghdad…) to understand what would be the reaction. Kurdish representatives I met were particularly concerned about the position of Hashd al-Sha’bi (the Popular Mobilisation Units – PMU) and their possible intervention. It seems the PMU are the main source of concern because of their reputation (track record) and because they include the battalions of Nineveh (who are involved in the referendum but who reject it).

The following step Baghdad is planning is to ask Erbil to present all its accounts in all official matters and expenses related to Oil Revenue (900,000 barrels per day pumped under KRG of which 600,000 b/d exported via Turkey) and also with reference to Communication Revenue (Erbil’s established Communication Company is under investigation and international arbitration for refusing to pay the Iraqi Ministry of Communication billions of dollars due for 3 years). Baghdad will certainly send forces to all disputed areas to protect these cities and prevent Kurdish forces (Peshmerga) from imposing their control over contested cities. In this state of insecurity for Erbil, the Peshmerga will be on continuous alert on all borders with the rest of Iraq, exhausting Erbil’s already strenuous and indebted finance.

 

Abadi won’t attack the city of Erbil but will limit the Kurds to a confined territory and will ask the international community to fulfil its commitment to reject the independence of Kurdistan, halting all economic cooperation.

 

Barzani masked the deterioration of his popularity and the critical financial situation of Kurdistan (due to the corruption of its leaders) and replaced it with a controversial referendum: he managed to brush away from Baghdad the oil and all other revenues already disposed of, and brought most of the Kurds under his umbrella by tickling their dream of an independent state, boosting again his popularity. But the price seems very high.

 

The Syrian Kurds of the Democratic Union Party (PYD) and its military branch, the People’s Protection Units (YPG and YPJ) will stand beside Erbil and will open their “borders” with Iraq: this in turn will violate the sovereignty of Damascus. But how this would help Erbil or “Rojava”, the “Kurdistan Syria”? Already the Syrian Kurds, in their situation, occupy an embattled position due to their accepting the position of US proxies. And they can’t open sea or air access to Erbil to boost Kurdistan’s economy, let alone compete with what the central government in Baghdad can offer.

 

The Syrian Kurds are waiting to see how the world will react to Iraqi Kurdistan to draw conclusions about their own next move. The US will have to think carefully what to do with Iraqi Kurdistan before taking any irrevocable step, since all decisions will have repercussions on its tenure in Syria and the occupation of north-east Bilad al-Sham.

 

Barzani’s only solution – if Turkey abides by its threat and the international community retreats from its previous position in favour of the central government in Baghdad – is to enjoy the referendum and its result: and do nothing at all. However if the Kurdish leader has received enough promises of protection from the international community and Turkey he, in this case, only needs to wait for few more weeks before making a final decision.

[Synopsis]

21 minutes ago, KristiD said:

However if the Kurdish leader has received enough promises of protection from the international community and Turkey he, in this case, only needs to wait for few more weeks before making a final decision.

 

Thank You, KristiD, for posting! 

 

Looks like brinkmanship is playing itself out. The "has received enough promises of protection from the international community" has appeared before. I suspect the full considerations for "promises" or "protection" or a few other unstated goodies are all at play here. End of day, things are stirred up enough with more dire implications - like Civil War, that this chip or card being played may tip things in favor of achieving Security and Stability post ISIS with the implications of, potentially, applying Article 140, implementing the HCL, and getting a few other necessary matters structurally resolved.

 

The "few more weeks" before "making a final decision" seems to be ambiguous but could mean resolution with the subsequent implementation before the end of 2017. In my mind, the resolution and subsequent implementation would need to proceed eruptions of sectarian violence leading to Civil War not necessarily associated with the Iraqi Kurdish Referendum. Once ISIS controlled areas are fully taken in Iraq, I suspect the timing for implementation of what ever it takes to stave off foreign instilled and home grown insecurity and instability is imperatively imminent. My opinion is the opiate of prosperity for the Iraqi people within a reasonably structured environment to provide for necessary reconstruction and greatly improving the Iraqi citizen's standard of living is a potent elixir and needs to be administered copiously with the ensuing development of a vast sector of economic venues to utilize the natural resources of Iraq for the Iraqi citizen's benefit.

 

Just my opinion and 

 

Go Moola Nova!

[Laid Back]

Strategic inplications for the referendum of Iraqi Kurdistan 

 

On Semptember25, the Kurdistan region of Iraq held a non – binding referendum on secession from Iraq, not only in the areas controlled by the Kurdistan government , but also spread to other disputed areas such as Kirkuk ‘s oil – rich province, and the international and regional stances represent an important shift under which the idea of the independence of the Kurdistan Region from the Iraqi state was put forward , and they play an important role in identifying opportunities to conduct the independence or not , as will determine the strategic implications of the referendum if it is done .

The international position.
There is an international consensus in opposing the referendum that the international powers : Washington, London, France, and international institutions: the United Nations, and the Security Council are rejecting the idea of a referendum considering the conditions surrounding the area , and the fight against “organization Daesh” do not provide an appropriate environment for the project of separation, along with the consequences from a state of conflict between the Kurds and the central government in Baghdad, as well as the rejection of the regional powers to the idea of the referendum and the independence of the region , but this rejection carries with it the tacit approval of some powers, specifically the United States, on the whole idea of independence; noting that the rejection is linked to emergency factors and thus is linked to the timing, and the objection does not stem from the essence of the separation process in principle, given that in the event of the completion of emergency factors such as the defeat of the organization “ISIS” the international powers will support a negotiated path between the two parties on the idea of independence for the region along the lines of South Sudan region.

Regional Position.
The Iranian , Turkish and Arab position comes at the forefront of regional positions, as Turkey and Iran reject the referendum process and separation completely , and the rejection is associated with fears that independence of Kurds of Iraq will constitute an incentive for Kurds in both countries to demand secession or autonomy, and that forms a ground for cooperation between Tehran and Ankara and coordinate efforts in steps to counter Kurdish aspirations.

The Arab position was united in the Arab League’s decision to reject the referendum, and the Arab position stems from the principle of the unity of Iraq, and the impact of separation on the unity of Syria in the future, where it will encourage Syrian Kurds to demand autonomy along the lines of ”the Kurdistan region.”

Strategic implications.
1. The declaration of an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq raises nationalism among Kurds in Turkey and Iran, and encourage them to demand secession, or at least to seek autonomy and demand more rights, including affect stability in both countries and limits their regional ambitions.
2. The new Kurdish state undermines Iran’s ambition to establish “a Shiite crescent” stretching from Tehran to Baghdad, Damascus and Beirut, on the grounds that the Kurdish state may enjoy better relations with the Sunni partners in the region instead of Iran.
3. Kurdish referendum will strengthen joint cooperation between Ankara and Tehran because of their concerns about the Kurdish gains in Syria and Iraq, and both sides will work to avoid their differences to oppose the Kurdish geopolitical aspirations in both countries, and this will push the Kurds to seek to link relations with Arab countries, especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
4. Exacerbate the differences between the central government in Baghdad and the Kurdistan government on the disputed areas between the two parties “Kirkuk”, with the possibility that Iran will move Shiite forces to attack the Kurds.
5. a referendum constitutes a milestone in the phase of the disintegration of the Iraqi regime, it may lead to the another separation where the Sunnis might think about to establish their own region, and thus move toward the final disintegration of Iraq on the ethnic and sectarian basis: Acentral Sunni Arab state and Kurdish state in the north, an Arab Shiite State in the south.
6. It is possible that the Kurdistan government is facing a severe economic crisis, if Turkey decided to close the port of Ceyhan to the export of Kurdish oil, especially in the accumulated debt on it, which amounted to ($ 20 billion), and the end of the US aid program.
7. Allows for the United States to use the independent Kurdish state as a starting point to change the regime in Tehran, or at least to weaken its regional position.

Conclusion
The referendum will not have immediate administrative effects, such as the re demarcation of border or separation, but it gives legitimacy and political influence for the Kurdish government as a preparation to negotiations with the central government in Baghdad, on more autonomy or independence.

The establishment of a Kurdish state in northern Iraq poses challenges to Iran and Turkey, in particular that it might encourage nationalism amid the Kurds in both countries, and the limits of regional ambitions, and cut the Shiite crescent, in this context, it is possible that Iran is working to incite Shiite militias against the Kurds, but that will leave its negative consequences on it where it will lead to a move Kurds of Iran against it.
The response of major powers , Iraq, Turkey and Iran will be no more than an act of condemnation and denunciation of the referendum process because of the failure to formulate effective threats and promises to force the Kurds to abandon their project , but the international , Iranian, Turkish and Iraqi threats against the Kurds are not expected to go into effect , on the grounds that Turkey and Iran will be affected by any sanctions imposed on Kurdistan, and that Russia and Israel have declared their readiness to stand by the Kurds, and thus Moscow and Tel Aviv will be the alternative in the event of any boycott against Kurdistan.

Dr.Salim M.Al Zanoon

Iraqi Studies Unit
 

 

 

[brob]

Thanks for bringing this over KristiD, interesting read. For me there’s  one part that stands out:  

 

“Barzani masked the deterioration of his popularity and the critical financial situation of Kurdistan (due to the corruption of its leaders) and replaced it with a controversial referendum: he managed to brush away from Baghdad the oil and all other revenues already disposed of, and brought most of the Kurds under his umbrella by tickling their dream of an independent state, boosting again his popularity. But the price seems very high.”

 

 

Barzani has gotten fat and rich off the oil he’s been stealing and that train is coming to the end of the line. So he causes one huge distraction to take the focus off his thieving. In the end what all corrupt/dictators/authoritarians/ want is a deal. IMO he is trying to work out a let me keep my money/stay in power/no jail deal 

 

Edited September 30, 2017 by brob