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Interior Minister delivers an invitation to the President of Djibouti to attend the Arab Summit politics +A -A Baghdad-INA Interior Minister Abdul Amir Al-Shammari delivered on Saturday, an official invitation to the Republic of Djibouti to attend the Arab Summit. The Interior Minister's media office stated in a statement received by the Iraqi News Agency (INA), "Interior Minister Abdul Amir Al-Shammari delivered an official invitation from the President of the Republic of Iraq, Abdul Latif Jamal Rashid, to his Djiboutian counterpart, Ismail Omar Guelleh." The statement noted that "during the meeting between the two ministers, the overall bilateral relations between the two countries, particularly in the security field, were discussed." According to the statement, the minister stressed "the importance of participating in the Arab Summit scheduled to be held on May 17 in the capital, Baghdad." Yesterday, 11:36

Qamishli Conference: 400+ Kurdish leaders convene on Syrian unity KurdistansyriakurdsMasoud BarzaniSDFQamishliMazloum AbdiKurdish Unity Conference 2025-04-26 19:35 Share font Shafaq News/ On Saturday, the Kurdish Unity Conference opened in the northeastern Syrian city of Qamishli, bringing together more than 400 political and independent figures from Kurdish parties across Syria, Iraq’s Kurdistan Region, and Turkiye, alongside religious leaders and independent personalities. Delegates arrived early at the Qamishlo Hall in Azadi Park, where the conference commenced with a speech by General Mazloum Abdi, Commander-in-Chief of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Abdi emphasized that Kurdish unity does not threaten Syria’s territorial integrity but rather strengthens it, underscoring the Kurdish people's longstanding struggle for a united Syria. "The strength of the Kurds is the strength of Syria," Abdi said, stressing that Syria's future constitution should be decentralized and guarantee the rights of all its communities, including Kurds. Following Abdi’s remarks, Hameed Darbandi, head of the Syrian dossier at Iraq’s Kurdistan Region Presidency, read a letter from Kurdish leader Masoud Barzani. In his message, Barzani thanked Abdi for his role in facilitating the conference, expressing full support for any effort aimed at bridging Kurdish political divides in Syria. Barzani reaffirmed that Syrian Kurds have long suffered from oppression and denial and called for a new Syria that secures rights for all its components. He described the formation of a unified Kurdish delegation as a vital step toward safeguarding Kurdish entitlements and urged stronger ties with other Syrian communities to promote national unity. Additional speeches were delivered by representatives of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), the Peoples' Equality and Democracy Party (DEM Party), and the Kurdistan National Congress (KNK), all highlighting the critical need for Kurdish solidarity amid escalating regional and international challenges. The conference is led by a presidium composed of Mohammad Ismail, head of the Kurdish National Council (ENKS); Ilham Ahmed, head of external relations for the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES); and Berwin Youssef, co-chair of the Democratic Union Party (PYD). At noon, the conference was closed to media coverage as participants entered closed-door sessions to discuss a draft political vision, which is expected to be ratified by the end of the meeting.

President Barzani backs PM al-Sudani KurdistanbreakingNechirvan BarzaniMohammed Shia al-SudaniAl-Furatayn Movement 2025-04-26 23:25 Share font Shafaq News/ On Saturday, Kurdish President Nechirvan Barzani congratulated Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani after his bloc renewed its confidence in him as its Secretary-General. In a post on X, Barzani wrote, "I congratulate my dear brother [al-Sudani] on the renewal of the Al-Furatayn bloc’s confidence in him," describing the move as a reflection of "public appreciation for his approach, experience, and influential national presence." Barzani also praised al-Sudani’s role in the Kurdistan Region, expressing hope for "continued fruitful cooperation for the good and stability of Iraq."

Blink-182's Mark Hoppus claims US forces followed his advice to capture Saddam Hussein The pop-punk star made a wild claim that he helped the US Army to capture Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein - but Blink 182's Mark Hoppus' story actually adds up Comments1 3am Amelia Ward 17:13, 26 Apr 2025 Blink-182's Mark Hoppus claims he gave US Army tips on how to capture Saddam Hussein(Image: Getty Images,) Blink-182's Mark Hoppus has claimed he helped the US military to capture Saddam Hussein by coming up with a plan to track him down. The former Iraqi president was caught by coalition forces in 2003 and was convicted of crimes against humanity by the Iraqi High Tribunal, before being sentenced to death by hanging. He was executed in December 2006. But Blink bassist Mark Hoppus claims the brutal regime was toppled after he gave the US Army admiral a few top tips on how to capture the elusive dictator. Writing in his new memoir, Fahrenheit-182, Hoppus, 53, explained how he believes he helped the military to locate Hussein, who had been in hiding. Mark Hoppus claimed to have hatched a plan to find the former Iraqi dictator(Image: HO/AFP via Getty Images) Hoppus then said that the frequencies could be used to triangulate the former president's location when he released his video messages while in hiding. The musician suggested that if Hussein released a video, the time code could be captured to allow authorities to locate him. He told the admiral: "Sir, what about having drones fly all over the region in carpeting patterns, broadcasting time codes above the level of human hearing but at the level that a video recording would catch it." He went on: "Then, the next time he releases one of his videos, you can listen to it, pull the ultrasonic data, and triangulate the drones you have flying all over." Hoppus remembered the admiral was "genuinely taken aback" by his plan, saying he could pitch it to the Chiefs of Staff. Hoppus wrote: "Four months later, Saddam was located and captured in Iraq. So, you're welcome everyone." It's not the first time the bassist has referenced the bizarre exchange, having spoken to a Twitter follower about it in 2018. When asked to reveal the "least plausible story about himself that's true", Hoppus told his story to his social media followers. He explained that while he was "on an aircraft carrier in the Persian Gulf, I told a Navy Admiral on his way to meet with the Joint Chiefs of Staff my ideas on how to capture Saddam Hussein." Adding credibility to his story, Blink 182 played for US troops on the USS Nimitz in 2003. Mark has spoken about his apparent military acumen before(Image: GC Images) Meanwhile, band mate Tom Delonge has also been of use to the US military, having teamed up with the Army to collaborate on the study of "exotic" metals. The guitarist's To The Stars Academy was reported to have signed a contract with the military, which committed to donating $750,000 to the organisation's research for a five-year collaboration. The contract states: "Government shall: Perform assessments, testing, and characterization of Collaborator-provided technologies. The Government is interested in a variety of the Collaborator’s technologies, such as, but not limited to inertial mass reduction, mechanical/structural meta materials, electromagnetic meta material wave guides, quantum physics, quantum communications, and beamed energy propulsion." Kari DeLonge, TTSA chief content officer and Tom’s sister, told Vice: "TTSA has acquired material from various sources and does not comment on the specifics of each sample."

Syrian President Ahmad Al Shara, centre, receives the head of the Iraqi intelligence service, Hamid Al Shatri. Photo: Sana News MENA Syria’s Al Shara meets Iraqi delegation in Damascus after controversy over summit invitation Syrian President's potential participation in Arab talks is opposed by Iran-aligned factions in Iraq The National April 26, 2025 Syrian President Ahmad Al Shara met an Iraqi delegation in Damascus on Friday to discuss reviving an oil pipeline through Syria to Mediterranean ports, Iraq's state news agency reported. The delegation, led by the head of Iraq’s National Intelligence Service, Hamid Al Shatri, also discussed counter-terrorism co-operation, border security and the expansion of trade ties, Syria’s state-run Sana news agency reported. Mr Al Shatri delivered a letter from Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia Al Sudani inviting Mr Al Shara to attend the Arab summit in Baghdad on May 17, Sana added. Mr Al Sudani’s decision to invite Mr Al Shara to the talks caused political controversy in Iraq. Mr Al Shara has not yet confirmed plans to attend. His past affiliations with Al Qaeda have raised concerns in Iraq, mainly among Iran-aligned Shiite factions and influential militias that supported former Syrian president Bashar Al Assad during the civil war. These groups have voiced opposition to Mr Al Shara's attendance and have referred to an outstanding Iraqi arrest warrant for terrorism-related charges. Formerly known by his nom de guerre Abu Mohammed Al Jawlani, Mr Al Shara joined Al Qaeda’s ranks in Iraq after the US-led invasion in 2003. He severed ties with the group entirely in 2016. Iran – Mr Al Assad’s main ally during the war and a country that used Syrian territory for arms transfers to Hezbollah in Lebanon – is widely considered to be the primary regional loser after the Assad regime was overthrown in December. Mr Al Sudani this month held talks with Mr Al Shara in Qatar, their first meeting since the downfall of Mr Al Assad after more than 13 years of civil war. Meanwhile, the first shipment of wheat provided by the Iraqi government arrived in Syria on Friday, through Al Bukamal border crossing. About 55 lorries loaded with wheat entered Syria as part of the humanitarian co-operation between the two countries, Sana reported. Iraq will ship 220,000 tonnes of wheat as “a gift", Syrian media said on Friday, quoting the director of the General Organisation for Grains, adding that the first batch has already arrived in Syria's Deir El Zor. Last month, Syria procured about 100,000 tonnes of wheat in what is believed to be the first large-scale purchase tender since the new government took power in Damascus.

Iraq and Lebanon: Shared interests drive practical cooperation ReportiraqHezbollahLebanonPMFcooperationJoseph Aoun 2025-04-27 00:10 Share font Shafaq News/ When Lebanese President Joseph Aoun publicly ruled out integrating Hezbollah into the national army, many in the region saw it as a direct dismissal of the model adopted in Iraq with the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). His words were sharp: “There will be no Popular Mobilization in Lebanon.” The statement, made in a sensitive regional climate, immediately stirred unease in Baghdad. But the reaction wasn’t solely about the words. For many Iraqis, it touched a nerve, especially in a country where the PMF is not just a military entity but also a political force woven into the state’s post-ISIS security framework. In Baghdad, the interpretation quickly tilted toward a perceived slight. Was Lebanon rejecting Iraq’s model as flawed or illegitimate? Iraqi officials wasted no time. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs summoned Lebanon’s ambassador to Baghdad, demanding clarification. The response from Beirut came swiftly: President Aoun’s remarks had been misunderstood, and his comment was never meant to disparage Iraq’s path. What followed was a crucial phone call between Aoun and Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani, a gesture that helped clear the air. Both leaders reaffirmed the strong bond between their nations and acknowledged the complexities each country faces when it comes to balancing armed groups, sovereignty, and foreign influence. Parallel Pressures While a recent diplomatic incident between Iraq and Lebanon was swiftly resolved, the exchange brought into sharper focus long-standing political dilemmas in both countries. Beyond the headlines, Baghdad and Beirut remain under mounting international pressure to reduce the influence of powerful armed groups—Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) in Iraq—that have become deeply embedded in national politics and governance. Western governments, particularly the United States, have urged both states to strengthen centralized authority and assert control over military forces operating outside formal security structures. Lebanese authorities continue to face demands to curtail Hezbollah’s military capabilities and reduce its regional activities. Similarly, the Iraqi government has come under sustained pressure to limit the PMF’s political reach and dismantle its “militia” structure. However, disbanding or sidelining these groups is far from straightforward. Both Hezbollah and the PMF emerged during periods of institutional collapse and foreign intervention, positioning themselves as defenders of national sovereignty and community survival. Their legitimacy, in the eyes of many supporters, is rooted in their role during past crises rather than current political circumstances. Hezbollah has gradually evolved from a resistance movement formed in the 1980s to a multifaceted organization with a significant social, economic, and political presence. In addition to its armed wing, the group operates hospitals, schools, and welfare programs that serve large segments of Lebanon’s Shiite population. A 2020 report by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) underscored the broad reach of these services, which support tens of thousands of families annually. The PMF’s trajectory has followed a similar pattern. Established in 2014 amid the threat posed by ISIS, the group initially acted as a volunteer force before being officially incorporated into the Iraqi state under Law No. 40 (2016). With an estimated 150,000 fighters, the PMF now holds sway not only in security affairs but also across border crossings, customs, construction, and trade-related sectors. Their institutional roles, however, have generated growing scrutiny, particularly among younger populations disillusioned by persistent corruption and deteriorating public services. While Lebanon’s collapse has drawn more international attention, Iraq faces many of the same structural vulnerabilities. Lebanon’s economic crisis remains one of the most severe globally in modern times. The World Bank has described the country’s financial collapse as among the worst since the 1850s. The Lebanese pound has lost over 98 percent of its value, GDP fell from more than $55 billion in 2018 to roughly $21.8 billion in 2022, and more than 80 percent of the population now lives in poverty, according to the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA). Emigration has accelerated, with waves of professionals, doctors, engineers, and teachers leaving the country. Iraq, despite oil revenues surpassing $115 billion in 2022 and its status as OPEC’s second-largest producer, continues to face chronic shortages in electricity, clean water, and healthcare. Youth unemployment remains close to 30 percent, and widespread dissatisfaction persists. Transparency International’s 2023 Corruption Perceptions Index ranked Iraq 157th out of 180 countries, assigning it a score of 23 out of 100. Although the country approved a record 198.9 trillion dinar ($153 billion) three-year budget in 2023 with significant allocations for infrastructure and public hiring, the risk of misappropriation remains high. Public anger over political stagnation, sectarian governance, and economic hardship reached a boiling point in 2019. Mass protests swept both countries, with demonstrators demanding systemic reform and an end to elite impunity. In Beirut, rallies extended across regions, including traditionally pro-Hezbollah areas, challenging the party’s position within the ruling system. In Iraq, hundreds of thousands took to the streets, rejecting foreign interference, both Iranian and American, and calling for accountability. The chant “No to America, No to Iran” became a recurring slogan. The Iraqi protests resulted in more than 600 deaths, with several incidents involving armed groups affiliated with the PMF. In Lebanon, the uprising prompted a wave of arrests, clashes, and media campaigns targeting activists. In both cases, the protest movements signaled a generational rift, led by youth who came of age in a post-conflict era but saw little improvement in governance or opportunity. Since those protests, criticism of armed political actors has grown, particularly within civil society and independent media. A 2022 survey by the Al-Bayan Center in Baghdad revealed that 61 percent of respondents favored reducing the PMF’s influence in politics. In Lebanon, while public opinion polling is more fragmented, there has been a noticeable increase in criticism, even within regions where Hezbollah has long maintained support. Both countries also face significant pressures from displacement. Lebanon hosts approximately 1.5 million Syrian refugees, making it the country with the highest number of refugees per capita worldwide. Iraq, meanwhile, continues to shelter more than 1.2 million internally displaced persons. These demographic pressures strain already fragile infrastructure and public services, compounding existing political and economic challenges. International financial institutions have attempted to assist, but progress remains uneven. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has engaged with both countries, offering support in exchange for broad structural reforms. In Lebanon, however, negotiations with the IMF have repeatedly stalled due to resistance from entrenched political and financial interests. Proposed reforms have included exchange rate unification, financial sector restructuring, and a forensic audit of the Central Bank, a few of which have advanced. Iraq’s cooperation with the IMF has been more functional, and its recent budget indicates a more proactive fiscal approach. Still, skepticism remains about whether the state can implement its plans transparently and equitably. Critics warn that without stronger oversight, large-scale allocations could be absorbed by the same networks of patronage that sparked protests in the first place. A Foundation of Cooperation Beyond diplomatic headlines and political tensions, Iraq and Lebanon have, over the past fifteen years, steadily cultivated a partnership marked by pragmatic cooperation and mutual benefit. Their collaboration has grown across key sectors, energy, health, education, and culture, offering both countries lifelines during times of internal crisis. Few gestures captured this spirit more vividly than Iraq’s emergency fuel deliveries to Lebanon between 2021 and 2024. With Beirut’s power stations barely operational and nationwide blackouts becoming the norm, Baghdad stepped in with over 600,000 tons of heavy fuel oil. These shipments kept hospitals, water stations, and public infrastructure from grinding to a halt, offering a temporary yet vital cushion to Lebanon’s deteriorating power grid. But this assistance wasn’t offered for free. Lebanon responded with an oil-for-service arrangement, a workaround designed to bypass its dollar shortage while drawing on its professional expertise. Under this deal, Lebanese doctors, technicians, and engineers provided services in Iraq’s medical and technical sectors. The formula was unconventional but effective, and it established a framework of reciprocal support rooted in real-world needs. In Iraqi hospitals, Lebanese medical missions have brought not only skilled hands but also strategic insight. Specialists in oncology, cardiovascular surgery, and critical care have helped treat complex cases, train Iraqi teams, and introduce new protocols. Between 2021 and 2025 alone, more than 52 delegations of Lebanese medical professionals visited hospitals in Baghdad, Najaf, Basra, and Erbil. Many helped launch surgical programs that continued after their departure. The health sector collaboration deepened during the COVID-19 pandemic when both countries faced severe pressure on their healthcare systems. Joint humanitarian initiatives emerged: mobile oxygen units were dispatched, PPE was coordinated between Red Crescent branches, and field clinics were established in underserved Iraqi areas. These efforts didn’t just address urgent needs—they laid the groundwork for sustained medical cooperation in telemedicine and infectious disease response. Meanwhile, educational links have flourished quietly but significantly. Each year, more than 1,500 Iraqi students travel to Lebanon for university studies. Institutions like the American University of Beirut, Lebanese University, and Beirut Arab University draw Iraqis interested in medicine, engineering, international affairs, and law. Lebanese universities, prized for their multilingual programs and academic rigor, have become regional hubs for higher education. Those academic ties extend beyond the classroom. Faculty exchange programs, collaborative conferences, and joint research initiatives have created enduring bonds between professors and scholars. Lebanese institutions offer scholarships for Iraqi students, while Iraqi universities host Lebanese lecturers in guest capacities. These academic exchanges have been instrumental in forging long-term people-to-people connections that go well beyond institutional protocols. Religious and cultural bonds, especially between the Shia communities of both countries, add another dimension to this relationship. The clerical establishment in Najaf has sustained decades-long relationships with Lebanese Shia scholars, marked by theological dialogue, educational exchange, and mutual visits. These ties have shaped both religious thought and social policy, influencing discourse across borders. One of the most visible expressions of this connection emerges during al-Arbaeen. In 2024, more than 140,000 Lebanese pilgrims traveled to Iraq, according to the Border Crossings Authority. Their journey to Karbala, while deeply spiritual, also fuels economic activity in shrine cities. Hotels, transport companies, and food vendors in Najaf and Karbala rely heavily on this seasonal influx, which has grown steadily over the past decade. In a region often defined by division and distrust, the evolving relationship between Iraq and Lebanon offers a rare example of pragmatic cooperation grounded in shared hardship and mutual respect. While political tensions may flare, the foundation of their partnership runs deeper, built not on rhetoric but on tangible acts of solidarity and collaboration.

Three lists, one goal: Iraq’s CF bets on split to win majority IraqbreakingShiiteparliamentary electionsCoordination Framework 2025-04-27 01:05 Share font Shafaq News/ Iraq’s Shiite Coordination Framework (CF) announced, on Saturday, plans to contest the upcoming parliamentary elections, scheduled for November 11, with three separate electoral lists to maximize its chances of securing a parliamentary majority. Alaa Nima al-Bandawi, a member of the Parliamentary Security and Defense Committee within CF told Shafaq News that the Framework’s main factions agreed to distribute their candidates across different constituencies to secure more seats and ease the process of forming the next government. “The approach aims to enhance the Framework’s parliamentary strength, and a formal coalition would likely be formed after the election results are announced to reflect each faction’s electoral weight and popular base,” he explained. Commenting on reports of defections from the alliance, al-Bandawi said recent developments were "protest withdrawals" rather than formal exits, sparked by discontent over Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani’s secret meeting with Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa in Qatar. He emphasized the Framework's cohesion and expressed optimism that it would remain intact beyond the elections, crediting it with supporting the current government and securing a large bloc in parliament. Al-Bandawi ruled out amendments to the Electoral Law ahead of the vote, warning that changes could delay the election and burden the government with additional costs. Tensions within the Coordination Framework surfaced earlier this week during a meeting marred by the absence of some leaders and disputes over internal and external policies. Sources told Shafaq News that Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq leader Qais al-Khazali skipped the meeting, while State of Law Coalition leader Nouri al-Maliki left early due to disagreements, particularly regarding Iraq's growing ties with Syria. A planned electoral alliance within the Coordination Framework, known as Tahaluf al-Qarar (Decision Alliance), appeared to falter even before its official launch. Efforts to form the new united front were reportedly derailed by disputes between al-Sudani and Hadi al-Amiri, head of the Badr Organization. Negotiations also broke down with Ahmad al-Asadi, leader of the Sanad Bloc, over disagreements concerning the leadership of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) and the proposed PMF law, which was recently withdrawn from parliament. Sources previously told Shafaq News that the Decision Alliance aimed to bring together al-Sudani’s Al-Furatain Movement, al-Amiri’s Badr Organization, and Falih al-Fayyadh, the head of the PMF. Talks were also underway to include al-Asadi, Abu Alaa al-Wala’i of the Sayyid al-Shuhada Brigades, and the Huqooq Movement, affiliated with Kata'ib Hezbollah. While these factions once formed the backbone of the Coordination Framework, widening rifts have pushed groups like the State of Law Coalition, Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, and the National Wisdom Movement (al-Hikma) to consider running independently in the upcoming elections, with the possibility of regrouping after the results.

Minister Georg Georgiev Holds Talks with Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Fuad Hussein 17 April 2025News Today, Minister Georg Georgiev held a telephone conversation with the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iraq, Fuad Hussein. This was the first contact between the heads of the diplomatic services of the two countries. During the discussion, a number of topics on the bilateral agenda were addressed, with a particular focus on the untapped potential for trade and economic cooperation between Bulgaria and Iraq. Georg Georgiev emphasised the longstanding tradition of friendship between the Bulgarian and Iraqi people, built on mutual respect and trust. He expressed his conviction that these positive traditions should be revived and further developed in the interest of both countries, and he extended an invitation to his Iraqi counterpart to visit Bulgaria, during which the opportunities for accelerating cooperation in areas of mutual interest could be further explored. In turn, Minister Hussein also extended an invitation for an official visit to Iraq. A key point of discussion was the upcoming 26th Session of the Bulgarian-Iraqi Joint Intergovernmental Commission for Trade, Economic and Technical Cooperation, which is to be held in Baghdad. The energy sector was highlighted as a priority area for mutually beneficial partnership, with further discussions planned to explore concrete forms of collaboration. The two also discussed the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding on the conduct of regular bilateral political consultations between the foreign ministries of the two countries. Minister Georgiev and Minister Hussein agreed to maintain an active dialogue and to map out a pragmatic framework for the sustainable development of bilateral relations.

Iranians targeting Iraqi market due to economic sanctions Iraq AFP April 12, 2025 627 8 min The Iraqi Minister of Foreign Affairs, Fuad Hussein, and the Caretaker Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ali Bagheri Kani, during a joint press conference in Baghdad, Iraq. Photo: INA Basra – Every Friday, Alawi crosses the border from Iran into Iraq to sell his produce in the markets of Basra, which serve as a haven for Iranians grappling with economic sanctions. He is just one of many Iranian pedlars who endure the arduous journey into southern Iraq through the Chalamja border crossing. They bring essential goods such as chicken, eggs, cooking oil and household items to sell at low prices, hoping for a profit that would be unimaginable back home due to sharp currency depreciation and soaring inflation. “The situation is difficult due to the embargo,” Alawi said, referring to Western sanctions against Iran. Asking to withhold his surname for fear of repercussions back home, the 36-year-old said he had not given up easily on his country, and had tried to sell his produce in a market there. “There were no customers, and the products would spoil, so we had to throw them away and end up losing” money, he told AFP. Instead, for the past seven years, he has been travelling to Iraq where he sells okra in summer and dates in winter, earning between $30 and $50 a day –- much more than he could make at home. “When we exchange Iraqi money” for Iranian rials, “it’s a lot,” the father of two said. “We can spend it in five days or even a week,” he added. After a brief period of relief from sanctions in exchange for curbs on Iran’s nuclear programme, US President Donald Trump reimposed the biting measures during his first term in 2018. Ever since, the value of the Iranian rial has plunged, fuelling high inflation and unemployment. Prices soared last month by more than 32 percent compared to March the previous year, according to official figures. All manner of goods are available from Iranian vendors at Basra’s old market Photo: Hussein FALEH Trump announced this week that his administration would restart negotiations with Iran over its nuclear programme, with talks to take place in Oman on Saturday. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi has said his country’s chief aim is for US sanctions to be lifted. In the meantime, Basra’s markets continue to bustle with Iranian vendors. At the Friday market, bags of rice were stacked on plastic crates next to bottles of detergent. While some vendors chatted with customers, others dozed off beside their shopping bags, rubbing off the weariness of a long journey. Hayder al-Shakeri of the London-based Chatham House think-tank’s Middle East and North Africa programme said informal cross-border trade “has expanded significantly over the past decade as sanctions on Iran have increasingly impacted everyday life.” Basra’s proximity to Iran’s Khuzestan province, where many residents speak Arabic and share cultural values with Iraq, makes it a primary target for mostly working-class Iranian vendors, Shakeri said. Among them are women and elderly men whose livelihoods have been severely impacted by inflation, he said, calling the cross-border trade “a vital lifeline”. “Earning in more stable currencies like the Iraqi dinar or even US dollars provides a financial buffer” against the devaluated rial, he added. Iran wields considerable political influence in Iraq and is a major trade partner for the country, the second-largest importer of non-oil Iranian goods. Trade between the two countries amounts to tens of billions of dollars. Milad, 17, and his mother have been selling household essentials in Basra for the past two years. Fearing a worsening situation back home, they recently rented a small shop. In Iran, “finding work is hard, and the currency is weak,” said curly-haired Milad, who declined to give his last name, adding that his cousin has been looking for a job since he graduated. Iraqi maths professor Abu Ahmad, 55, strolls to the market every Friday, looking for fresh Iranian goods. Iraqis flock to the market because they say the quality of goods available from Iranian vendors is better Photo: Hussein FALEH “Their geymar is better than ours,” he said, referring to the cream Iraqis have with honey for breakfast. It is also cheaper. “They sell it for 12,000 dinars ($8)” compared to an Iraqi price of 16,000, he added. Shakeri from Chatham House warned that local vendors “resent the competition”, and Iraqi security forces sometimes remove Iranians, though they know they will eventually return. Umm Mansur, a 47-year-old Iranian mother of five, has had a bitter experience since she joined other pedlars six months ago. At the border, “they insult and mistreat us,” she said. Other pedlars have described similar experiences, saying they were held up for hours at the crossing. Umm Mansur said she is willing to overlook the mistreatment to earn four times what she would at home. “In Iran, there is no way to make a living,” she said.

Crown Prince receives invitation from Iraqi Deputy PM April 22, 2025 07:40 p.m Share KUWAIT: His Highness the Crown Prince Sheikh Sabah Al-Khaled Al-Hamad Al-Sabah received on Tuesday an official invitation from Iraqi President Dr Abdullatif Rashid, addressed to His Highness the Amir Sheikh Meshal Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah, to attend the 34th Arab Summit and the 5th Arab Economic and Social Development Summit, scheduled to be held in Baghdad on May 17. The invitation was delivered during a meeting at Bayan Palace by Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Dr Fuad Hussein. The meeting was attended by Kuwait’s Foreign Minister Abdullah Ali Al-Yahya, Lieutenant General (retired) Jamal Mohammad Al-Dhiyab, Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs at the Crown Prince Diwan Mazen Issa Al-Issa, and Iraqi Ambassador to Kuwait Manhal Al-Safi. — KUNA photos

Cornerstone of stability: France reaffirms deep ties with Iraq IraqbreakingFranceFuad HusseinBaghdad ConferenceJean-Noël Barrot 2025-04-23 17:40 Share font Shafaq News/ On Wednesday, Iraq and France reaffirmed their commitment to deepening bilateral cooperation across security, economic, and diplomatic fronts. At a joint press conference in Baghdad, Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein and his French counterpart Jean-Noël Barrot underscored the need for a comprehensive and democratic solution to the Syrian crisis. “Our discussions today included the importance of supporting stability in Syria and moving toward a political process that ensures the rights of all communities,” Hussein said. The two ministers also addressed the indirect negotiations between Washington and Tehran to revive nuclear diplomacy. “Iraq fully supports the US-Iran negotiations,” Hussein stated. “They are the only viable path to prevent conflict and reach positive outcomes for the region.” In turn, Barrot reaffirmed France’s commitment to Iraq’s sovereignty, describing the country as “a cornerstone for stability in the Middle East.” He cited the Strategic Partnership Agreement signed in January 2023 between President Emmanuel Macron and Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani as a reflection of France’s “deep political commitment” to Iraq’s future. Barrot also highlighted France’s consistent support for the Baghdad Conference, a regional forum that brings Iraq together with neighboring countries—including Iran and Turkiye—as well as regional organizations to promote dialogue and cooperation. He confirmed that preparations are underway for the next round of talks. On the economic front, Barrot stressed his country’s continued support for Iraq’s efforts to diversify its economy and stimulate industrial growth. “Iraq’s stability and the creative potential of its youth present real opportunities for economic development,” he said, urging French companies to re-engage with the Iraqi market. He also reaffirmed France’s commitment to security cooperation, including military assistance, as well as training programs for judges, civil security forces, and police—measures aimed at enhancing Iraq’s institutional capabilities and rule of law.

Iran officials: No casualties from reported Tehran explosion Worldiranexplosion 2021-07-10 19:06 Share font Shafaq News/ Iranian police said a reported explosion early Saturday at a public park near state TV headquarters in the capital Tehran caused no casualties or damage, the official IRNA news agency reported. Tehran deputy police chief Gen. Hamid Hodavand said the case was under investigation and details would be provided later. He accused foreign media outlets of exaggerating the reported blast. At 12:52 a.m. Iranian media reported an explosion in northern Tehran followed by dozens of posts from individuals on social media. Later, state TV showed deputy Tehran Gov. Ali Reza Goudarzi in front of Mellat Park saying rescue teams, firefighters and police found no sign of an explosion, fire or damage in the area. Occasionally, Iranian media have reported on flash-bang grenades exploding without giving details. Those grenades are designed to emit a loud sound and a flash of light without causing serious damage. The 34-hectare (84-acre) park is located on the southern side of the 120 hectare (295-acre) site of the state broadcasting company, which includes several buildings.

Gas pipeline explodes southwest Iran Worldiranexplosion 2021-12-10 00:13 Share font Shafaq News / A 10-inch gas condensate pipeline, at the Parsian Gas Refinery Company, in southwestern Iran, exploded today, Fars news agency reported. The agency said there were no casualties, and rescue and operations forces are currently at the scene, after an excavator hit the pipeline.

As supplies deplete, Iraqi farmers turn to groundwater to boost desert yield Iraq cultivated 775,000 hectares this winter using groundwater, modern irrigation systems April 26, 2025 07:42 p.m Share NAJAF, Iraq: Farmer Hadi Saheb cannot wait to see his wheat fields flourish in the heart of the desert after he tapped into groundwater reserves in water-starved Iraq. He is just one of many Iraqis who have turned to drilling wells in the desert to help sustain the country’s agriculture. It is a risky move that threatens to deplete the groundwater in a nation already battered by frequent drought and scarce rainfall. Although Iraq’s fertile plains traditionally stretch along the once-mighty Tigris and Euphrates — the two rivers whose levels have plummeted — Saheb’s vast lands lie in the heart of the southern Najaf desert. “Year after year the drought worsens, and the desertification intensifies,” said the 46-year-old, dressed in a white abaya as a duststorm swept through the area. So he has turned to groundwater, taking advantage of a government initiative. This leases desert land to farmers at a symbolic price of one dollar per dunum (0.25 hectares in Iraq’s measurement), provides subsidized irrigation systems, and buys their harvest at a preferential rate. Now that he doesn’t have to rely solely on rainfall, Saheb said he cultivates 20 times more land than before, and his harvest has increased to 250 tons. “It would be impossible to continue without groundwater, which we cannot extract without drilling wells,” he said. Like many other farmers, Saheb has upgraded his irrigation techniques. ‘Strategic reserve’ He now relies on a centre-pivot method involving equipment rotating in a circle to water crops through sprinklers. This uses at least 50 percent less water than flooding — the vastly more wasteful traditional way used for millennia, during which the land is submerged. According to the agriculture ministry, Iraq cultivated 3.1 million dunums (775,000 hectares) this winter using groundwater and modern irrigation systems, while the rivers watered only two million dunums. In Najaf, desert farming has expanded significantly. According to Moneim Shahid from Najaf’s agriculture authorities, crop yields have been boosted by new irrigation methods, tougher seeds and fertilizers suitable for arid soils. Shahid said he expects a harvest in Najaf this year of at least 1.7 tons of wheat per dunum in the desert, compared with 1.3 tons in areas irrigated by rivers. Last year Iraq had a very good harvest, exceeding self-sufficiency with a production of 6.4 million tons of wheat, according to agriculture ministry figures. Religious institutions such as the Imam Hussein Shrine in the holy city of Karbala back the authorities and also support desert farming. Qahtan Awaz from the shrine’s agriculture department said the institution, which employs families to farm desert areas, is cultivating 1,000 hectares and aims to more than triple that amount. Today, groundwater reservoirs help mitigate agricultural losses caused by drought, an already frequent phenomenon in Iraq that is worsened by a warming planet. But preserving those resources is proving to be a challenge. Shahid from Najaf’s agriculture authorities, said “we should be vigilant” in protecting groundwater, calling it “a strategic reserve for future generations”. Its use “should be rationed ... and sprinklers could help regulate consumption”, he said. Depleting supplies The Najaf desert lies above the Umm el-Radhuma and the Dammam aquifers, which Iraq shares with neighboring Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Water levels in both aquifers have declined, according to the United Nations which has also voiced caution that aquifers worldwide are depleting faster than they can be replenished naturally. A 2023 UN report warned that Saudi Arabia used much of its groundwater to grow wheat in the desert, depleting more than 80 percent of its resources and forcing authorities to stop cultivating wheat after 2016. Sameh Al-Muqdadi, a water politics and climate security expert, warned that Iraq’s groundwater levels have already dropped. Water used to be found 50 or 100 meters deep (165-330 feet), but today wells are dug 300 meters deep, he said. “People believe that these resources will stay forever... which is not true,” Muqdadi warned. Authorities have no estimates for Iraq’s groundwater, and the most recent figures date back to the 1970s, he said. “If you don’t have any estimation, you cannot manage your resources.” “Groundwater is a contingency measure, and it should be used only in urgent cases” such as droughts “to sustain food security only”, not to expand farmland for commercial purposes, Muqdadi said. But unfortunately, “this is what we have nowadays”. — AFP LAST UPDATE: April 26, 2025 07:42 5

Ready to assist: Iraq offers Iran support after deadly blast Iraqiranexplosioncondolences 2025-04-27 02:15 Share font Shafaq News/ Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani on Saturday directed the delivery of urgent assistance to Iran following the explosion in Bandar Abbas. Al-Sudani’s media office said in a statement that he instructed Interior Minister Abdul Amir al-Shammari to contact his Iranian counterpart "to assess the situation and extend possible support." Separately, Iraq’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed solidarity with Iran in the wake of the explosion, extending condolences to the Iranian government and people. In a statement, the ministry reaffirmed Iraq’s readiness "to provide any possible support to help mitigate the impact of this tragedy," and emphasized "the need to strengthen regional and international cooperation to confront emerging challenges." The explosion at Shahid Rajaee Port killed four people and injured more than 516 others, according to Iranian media. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian has ordered a comprehensive investigation into the circumstances and causes of the explosion, as the country awaits the results of the final inquiries.

Iraq Stock Exchange joins Abu Dhabi’s Tabadul digital trading platform Iraq Jawad Al-Samarraie April 26, 2025 317 2 min Signing ceremony of MoU between ISX, ISC, and ADX for Tabadul platform Photo by: INA Baghdad/Abu Dhabi (IraqiNews.com) – The Iraq Stock Exchange (ISX) and the Iraq Securities Commission (ISC) signed a strategic Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Abu Dhabi Securities Exchange (ADX) on Wednesday, April 23, 2025, marking Iraq’s official entry into the regional “Tabadul” digital trading platform. Iraq becomes the ninth market to join the ADX-led initiative. The agreement, signed at ADX headquarters, facilitates seamless cross-border trading and investment between Iraq, Abu Dhabi, and other Tabadul member markets. It allows brokers remote access and enables investors to participate in cross-market IPOs. ISC Chairman Faisal Al-Haimus hailed the move as a “qualitative leap” for Iraq’s financial infrastructure, boosting regional integration and digital transformation. ISX CEO Taha Ahmed Abdul Salam added that joining Tabadul aligns with government efforts to enhance economic growth and openness. ADX Group CEO Abdulla Salem Alnuaimi stated the collaboration enhances ISX’s regional standing and provides investors with diverse opportunities. Tabadul connects markets with over 490 listed companies and access for over 7.5 million investors. This integration signifies a major step in modernizing Iraq’s capital market and connecting it more closely with regional financial hubs.

Iraq’s Kirkuk Initiative: Arabs to unite under single list for elections IraqKirkuk2025 parliamentary elections 2025-04-27 04:47 Share font Shafaq News/ Arab political forces in Kirkuk should engage in comprehensive dialogue and form a unified electoral list ahead of Iraq’s parliamentary elections in November 2025, a local lawmaker said. MP Wasfi al-Asi told Shafaq News that his initiative comes in response to the demands of the Arabs in Kirkuk, noting he repeatedly urged Arab forces to unite under one list and announced his readiness to relinquish any personal position. "Uniting Arabs under a single list would contribute to achieving strong and unexpected results," he said, stressing that rallying around a joint project would enable Arabs to secure the highest share of votes and seats in the provincial council. Kirkuk, an oil-rich and ethnically diverse province in northern Iraq, has long been a focal point of political contention. The province is home to Arabs, Kurds, Turkmen, and other minorities, and its governance has been a subject of dispute between the Iraqi central government and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). According to the Independent High Electoral Commission, about 29 million Iraqis are eligible to vote in the next parliamentary elections.

Visit Kurdistan: Explore the timeless majesty of Halgurd Mountain KurdistanerbiltourismNatureHalgurd Mountain 2025-04-27 06:13 Share font Shafaq News/ In the northeastern edge of Iraq, where the Kurdish mountains lean into the Iranian border, Halgurd rises into the Zagros range. At 3,607 meters, it is the country’s highest peak—but its true significance can’t be measured in altitude alone. The mountain exudes a presence that doesn’t announce itself, yet lingers, timeless and unshaken. Where Time Rests Halgurd belongs to a realm untouched by convenience or commercialism. It is part of the Halgurd-Sakran National Park, a sanctuary of ecological richness and cultural depth. Valleys carved by ancient glaciers thread between wildflower-covered slopes, while its ridgelines, dusted in snow long after the lowlands bloom, stand as markers of endurance. The road to Halgurd begins in Erbil, the capital of the Kurdistan Region, and winds northeast through Shaqlawa, Soran, and finally Choman—a journey of about three and a half hours. As the terrain shifts from city edges to alpine curves, the landscape prepares you for something elemental. In Choman, the final town before the ascent, simple lodgings and warm, rooted hospitality await. Beyond Choman, the trail narrows and guidance becomes essential—especially in winter or early spring when snow masks the land. But the path is more than physical. It demands a different pace, one shaped by observation and stillness, inviting visitors into a deeper awareness of place and self. The Mountain’s Breath Halgurd transforms quietly with the seasons. Spring climbs the slopes with bursts of wildflowers, while the upper peaks cling to their snow. In summer, the air clears, revealing distant horizons even as the rest of Iraq swelters. Autumn cloaks the land in gold and rust before winter veils it in snow and silence. These changes arrive without spectacle. They move through the landscape without seeking attention. The mountain’s allure lies not in grandeur, but in the steadiness of its rhythm. The best trekking conditions span from May to September, when trails are more accessible. Winter, though harsh, offers unmatched clarity and solitude for the prepared—an experience of earth distilled to rock, snow, and sky. A Journey Inward Climbing Halgurd is more than a test of strength. It is a quiet unfolding. The route passes cold springs, windblown grasslands, and the occasional shepherd tracing paths shaped by generations. There are no distractions here—just the raw essence of movement and breath. The ascent is not a performance. It builds slowly, layer by layer—of height, of quiet, of awareness. At the summit, the horizon stretches beyond borders, but the real reward is inward: the sense of having passed through something unshaped by urgency. What remains, long after the descent, is not just the view—but the echo of stillness. A Cultural Symbol Etched in Stone For the Kurdish people, Halgurd is more than a geographic marker. It carries memory, identity, and resilience. It lives in poetry, in oral traditions, and in the footsteps of those who’ve returned to it across generations—not for sport, but for reconnection. The mountain has offered shelter in times of turmoil, inspiration in times of reflection. Its significance is not symbolic alone—it is lived, remembered, and passed on. A Future That Protects the Past With growing interest in Halgurd, the balance between access and preservation is becoming critical. The Kurdistan Regional Government has acknowledged the importance of safeguarding this heritage. Initiatives are underway to establish marked trails, sustainable camping zones, and environmental protections that will allow visitors to engage without diminishing what makes the mountain sacred.

IMF anticipates Iraq’s inflation rate to drop in 2025 Iraq Amr Salem April 23, 2025 404 2 min The International Monetary Fund. Photo: AP Baghdad (IraqiNews.com) – Iraq’s inflation rate is projected to slightly drop in 2025, according to a recent study published by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which forecasted inflation rates for Arab countries. In 2024, Iraq’s annual inflation rate was 2.6 percent, down from 4.4 percent in 2023 and 5 percent in 2022, Shafaq News reported. According to IMF projections, Iraq’s inflation rate would drop somewhat to 2.5 percent in 2025, increase to 2.7 percent in 2026, and reach three percent in 2030. In 2025, Bahrain is predicted to have the lowest inflation rate among Arab countries, at one percent, while Sudan is predicted to have the highest, at 100 percent. Early in March, the Central Bank of Iraq (CBI) reported that the country’s total annual inflation rate had dropped to 2.8 percent. According to the CBI, Iraq’s annual inflation rate decreased from four percent in the fourth quarter of 2023 to 2.8 percent in the same period of 2024. Furthermore, during the fourth quarter of 2024, core inflation decreased from 4.5 percent in 2023 to 2.5 percent. According to the CBI, price stability and the success of Iraq’s monetary policies are demonstrated by the fact that both core inflation and inflation in general are still within control. As determined by the Consumer Price Index (CPI), inflation is often defined as the gradual rise in prices for goods and services; however, core inflation is part of inflation that does not include the CPI’s uncertain components, such as the cost of food and energy.

From growth to contraction: IMF's stark outlook for Iraq's economy EconomybreakingoilIraqi FinanceIMF 2025-04-23 00:58 Share font Shafaq News/ Iraq’s economy, once projected to grow, is now on course to shrink by 1.5% in 2025—a sharp reversal driven by falling oil prices and waning global demand, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) revealed Tuesday. The IMF expects, however, a modest rebound in 2026, with growth forecast at 1.4%, according to its April World Economic Outlook. This marks a steep downgrade from October 2024, when the Fund had projected 4.1% growth for Iraq in 2025. Oil the Culprit Oil generates over 90% of Iraq’s state revenue, leaving the country highly exposed to market volatility. Brent crude recently sank to a four-year low, as trade tensions between the United States and its partners stirred fears of declining global demand. Compounding the pressure, OPEC+ announced a production increase of 411,000 barrels per day in May, consolidating three months of planned hikes. Iraq plans to cut exports by 100,000 barrels per day in response to calls for quota compliance, bringing the average to 3.2 million, Bloomberg reported, citing an unnamed official. The IMF estimates Iraq needs oil to average $92 per barrel this year to meet its budget needs, yet Brent is currently trading near $65. Prices are projected to average $66.9 per barrel in 2025—down 15.5% from last year—and fall further to $62.4 in 2026.

Government Advisor: Development Indicators Place Iraq on the Threshold of a New Economic Era Economy +A -A Baghdad-INA The Prime Minister's Advisor for Financial Affairs, Mudhar Mohammed Salih, confirmed on Wednesday that development indicators place Iraq on the threshold of a new economic era, noting that the gross domestic product (GDP) is pushing Iraq toward sustainable development faster than expected. Salıh told the Iraqi News Agency (INA): "Iraq's position as the third-largest economic power in West Asia among Arab countries in terms of GDP, after Saudi Arabia and the UAE, is an indicator that extends in two directions. The first is the accelerated ability to achieve significant progress in development, confirming the unprecedented speed and development of our country in imposing the significant economic and political stability that Iraq has achieved." He added, "The second relates to the GDP, and it also confirms, on the domestic level, that our country is an effective economic force in attracting investment opportunities in development fields. The great stability provided by the environment in recent years has helped support sustainable development at a faster pace than expected." He continued: "The urban renaissance and the launch of infrastructure and service programs are among the most important activities in the government's policy and economic program. Their success has not stopped, as they have proven to be successful in accelerating progress, so that our country can assume its geo-economic position as a promising path, indicated by high rates of economic growth." 23-04-2025, 17:22

Iraq’s 7 Million bpd Oil Production Goal Draws Swift Response from Chinese Firms By Simon Watkins - Apr 10, 2025, 5:00 PM CDT Iraq's Oil Ministry recently reiterated its 7 million barrels per day production target. As it stands, more than a third of all Iraq’s proven oil and gas reserves and over two-thirds of its current production are managed by Beijing’s companies. The latest in the very long line of Beijing’s firms to benefit from its ongoing stealthy takeover of Iraq’s huge oil and gas assets is China Huanqiu Contracting & Engineering Company. The recent reiteration by Iraq Oil Ministry of a 7 million barrels per day (bpd) oil production target within the next five years has spurred activity among Chinese firms that continue to dominate the country’s oil and gas sector. As it stands, more than a third of all Iraq’s proven oil and gas reserves and over two-thirds of its current production are managed by Beijing’s companies, according to industry figures. This translates into Chinese companies having a combined direct share in around 24 billion barrels of reserves and responsibility for production of around 3.0 million bpd. The latest in the very long line of Beijing’s firms to benefit from its ongoing stealthy takeover of Iraq’s huge oil and gas assets is China Huanqiu Contracting & Engineering Company (HQC), which has signed a huge project management consultancy contract for the supergiant West Qurna 1 oilfield. HQC is also a subsidiary of the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) that took over as the main operator of the massive oil field from ExxonMobil. All in all, this latest contract award is a prime example of China’s thus-far enormously successful strategy for taking over key oil and gas assets in the Middle East, together with key associated infrastructure. West Qurna 1 is located around 65 kilometres from southern Iraq’s principal oil and export hub of Basra and has a considerable portion of the estimated 43 billion barrels of recoverable reserves held in the entire supergiant West Qurna field. Originally West Qurna 1 was thought to have around 9 billion barrels of these reserves, but in 2021 Iraq’s Oil Ministry upgraded this to recoverable reserves of more than 20 billion barrels. At that time the field was producing around 380,000 bpd, although the Oil Ministry also announced plans to increase this to 700,000 bpd by 2026. Enticing for many prospective international oil companies is that West Qurna 1 benefits from the lowest lifting costs in the world -- at around US$1-2 per barrel (pb) operating cost (excluding capital expenditure) -- on a par with the best fields in Saudi Arabia and Iran. That said, according to the Chinese firms involved, although it is one of the world’s largest oilfields it suffers from low water content and a consequently reduced recovery rate. Despite this, September last year saw another Chinese contractor -- China Petroleum Engineering & Construction Company (CPECC) – start engineering work on West Qurna aimed at increasing production from the then-550,000 bpd to 800,000 bpd. Some of this was related to the two water injection packages it was awarded in 2022, each worth US$250 million, to improve the pressure at the field. In January, Chen Mingzhuo, general manager of PetroChina West Qurna Company, said that the firm plans to increase production to 1.2 million bpd by 2035. It remains to be seen whether any of these big targets will be hit, as several major oil field development contracts awarded by Iraq (and neighbouring Iran, which shares several of its oil reservoirs) have been withdrawn from Chinese firms over the years due to lack of progress. Related: Mubadala Makes Its American Gas Debut – Finally That said, securing oil and gas flows is only one positive aspect for China of building out its presence across Iraq. Oil and gas development contracts carry with them the legal right to fully secure the development sites through whatever means the developer firms think necessary. These include the stationing of unlimited numbers of security personnel in and around the immediate sites, expansive road and rail networks connected to bigger infrastructure hubs with links across the Middle East, and the right for the Chinese military to use selected Iraqi military and civilian seaports and airports. The more of these operations that are laid out across the Iraqi and Iranian heart of the Middle East the better it is for China’s plans to lengthen and widen its ‘Belt & Road Initiative’ (BRI) global power-grab project. The groundwork for all future developments by China in Iraq was laid out in the wide-ranging ‘Oil for Reconstruction and Investment’ agreement signed between China and Iraq in 2019. The basic template for this agreement – which includes priority on new field contracts for Chinese firms and substantial discounts for them on oil and gas recovered, among others – was the ‘Iran-China 25-Year Comprehensive Cooperation Agreement’ first revealed anywhere in the world in my 3 September 2019 article on the subject, and analysed in full in my latest book on the new global oil market order. The 2019 China-Iraq deal was then substantially broadened and deepened into the ‘Iraq-China Framework Agreement’ of 2021. Part of this featured even bigger discounts given to Chinese firms on oil and gas discovered in Iraq (up to 30%, depending on the field). The U.S. and its allies are perfectly cognisant of what Beijing wants to achieve through this network, which is why significant pressure has been brought to bear at various times against China and Iraq to curtail these efforts. In 2018, then-U.S. President Donald Trump signalled that he was taking the Trade War with China very seriously, and its corollary efforts to exploit the power vacuum in the Middle East left after the U.S.’s unilateral withdrawal from the ‘nuclear deal’ with Iran, as also detailed in my latest book. At that point, China shifted its land- and asset-grab strategy in Iraq to avoid being seen to make the sort of high-profile exploration and development contracts that were widely reported in the oil industry media and often beyond that. Instead, it utilised a myriad of little-known companies that were granted ‘contract-only’ work for some anodyne-sounding work programme. Soon after this, two peculiar types of low-key announcements started to appear regarding new developments in Iraq (and Iran). The first of these involved extremely high-cost projects announced in Iraq and Iran -- bewildering given that both were in dire financial straits -- and the second cited new ‘contract-only’ involvement by various firms, all of which were Chinese. These included the US$121 million engineering contract to CPECC to upgrade the facilities that were used to extract gas during crude oil production at West Qurna 1. Exactly the same ‘contract-only’ model was used in Iraq’s massive Majnoon oil field too. Here, two major new ‘drilling-only’ contracts were signed: one with China’s Hilong Oil Service & Engineering Company to drill 80 wells at a cost of US$54 million, and the other with the Iraq Drilling Company to drill 43 wells at a cost of US$255 million. Having said this, Iraq does not look completely lost to the West, whose firms have seen a recent resurgence there. France’s TotalEnergies has a US$27 billion four-pronged programme at play, centred around the Common Seawater Supply Project, which is vital for Iraq in achieving any meaningful oil production increase in the next few years. BP also recently signed a US$25 billion deal to develop the Kirkuk oil fields of Baba and Avana, and the neighbouring sites of Bai Hassan, Jumboor and Khabaz. The UK’s Shell also already has substantial business in Iraq through its Basra Gas Company (BGC) joint venture, which captures and utilises flared gas from fields like Rumaila and Zubair. Crucial from this point for both the West and the East will be how Iraq reacts to the U.S.’s removal of its waiver to keep importing gas and electricity from Iran, together with a campaign of maximum pressure against Tehran.

Iraq's NOC hits highest output since 2014 EconomyiraqbreakingKirkukoil productionNOC 2025-04-21 01:02 Share font Shafaq News/ Iraq’s North Oil Company (NOC) has raised its daily crude output to over 430,000 barrels—its highest level since 2014—following a 100,000 bpd increase over the past six months, a company official said on Sunday. The official told Shafaq News that the increase comes as the firm works toward a year-end target of 500,000 bpd, supported by the Oil Ministry, the federal government, and internal management efforts. A recently signed contract with BP is expected to add up to 150,000 bpd, pending the completion of ongoing technical and geological surveys. Economic analyst Abbas Mahmoud described the rise as a “major breakthrough” for the state-run producer, crediting engineering teams for sustained progress despite operational challenges. The developments mark a step forward in restoring production capacity at Kirkuk’s oilfields and align with Iraq’s broader goals to boost revenues and enhance its role in global energy markets. Earlier this week, an NOC official reported that the company had successfully raised production at Kirkuk’s Jambur oil field to more than 65,000 barrels per day (bpd), following the completion of critical well activation operations.

Development Road project turns Iraq into open state Iraq Amr Salem September 17, 2024 3486 3 min A map showing the path of the Development Road in Iraq. Photo: The New Region Baghdad (IraqiNews.com) – The Iraqi Prime Minister, Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani, confirmed on Saturday that the strategic project of the Development Road will turn Iraq into an open state. During a symposium held in Baghdad on the investment opportunities related to the project, Al-Sudani explained that Iraq depends solely on oil to pay its expenses, which have started to rise, noting that other industries must be considered in order to support the oil sectors, according to the Iraqi News Agency (INA). The Iraqi government initiated discussions with the World Bank to start implementing the project, which will need five years to be completed, according to Al-Sudani. Iraq’s $17 billion Development Road project will connect the Al-Faw Grand Port in southern Iraq to the border with Turkey by extending a railway and road network. Many Arab, regional, and European countries have expressed their willingness to participate in Iraq’s Development Road project, either by pumping in investments or taking part in the construction works, as it constitutes an important link between Asia and Europe. Iraq, Turkey, the UAE, and Qatar signed last April a quadripartite agreement on Iraq’s Development Road project under the auspices of the Iraqi Prime Minister and the Turkish President, Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The agreement aims to enhance cooperation regarding Iraq’s Development Road, as the four countries will develop the necessary frameworks to carry out the project. Since the Development Road will accomplish economic integration and sustainability between East and West, it is anticipated that this strategic initiative will promote economic growth and foster regional and worldwide cooperative links. The project aims to compete with Egypt’s Suez Canal by making Iraq a transit hub by reducing the time it takes to go from Asia to Europe. A railway for the movement of goods is part of the project, as Al-Sudani previously mentioned. The railway’s capacity will be 3.5 million tons in the first phase and 7.5 million tons in the second. Together with the Al-Faw Grand Port and the industrial city, the project will also feature pipelines for the transportation of energy and a highway for land transportation.

Iraq’s Development Road Project: A Path to Prosperity or Instability? Issue Brief, October 2024 Ranj Alaaldin Fellow October 31, 2024 download Key Takeaways A Key Opportunity for Regional Cooperation: Iraq’s Development Road Project provides a driver for economic prosperity that could benefit the entire region, tapping into synergies and connectivity with existing ports and infrastructure. Iraq’s Disorderly Politics Present Challenges: For it to work, Türkiye and the Project’s Gulf signatories need to ensure that Iraq can get its political house in order. The exclusion of the Kurdistan region from the Development Road does not bode well for its sustainability. GCC’s Existing Investments are a Litmus Test: Iraq is enjoying improved relations with the GCC and there is a trend in the region toward mutual cooperation, but the Gulf states’ pre-existing economic commitments in Iraq will function as a litmus test for their involvement in the Project. Coordination can Enhance the Project’s Resilience: Türkiye, the UAE, and Qatar should coordinate their involvement in the Development Road to give them strategic depth and ensure the Project is resilient to Iraq’s volatile political environment. Introduction Iraq’s Development Road Project constitutes a bold and much-needed initiative for a country that has been plagued by decades of civil war, ethnic and religious conflict, and geopolitical tensions. The $17 billion Development Road Project (hereafter referred to as Development Road or the Project) aims to transform Iraq into a transport hub by connecting its southern hinterlands to the Turkish border in the north,1 and act as a major driver of economic prosperity in both Iraq and the wider region. The Development Road forms part of a wider trend of regional economic integration initiatives that have played an important role in de-escalating regional tensions. Iraq, Türkiye, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) are all stakeholders and signatories to the Project. The involvement of both Doha and Abu Dhabi is notable, because it highlights the warming of ties within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) since the 2017 crisis between Qatar and its neighbors came to an end in 2021.2 It also highlights Baghdad’s deepening economic and geopolitical ties with the Gulf states in recent years.3 There are a multitude of geopolitical layers that will be central to the Project’s success, in addition to navigating a volatile political environment in Iraq and the country’s potential for conflict relapse. While Türkiye shares wide-ranging economic and security interests with Iraq, and is playing a leading role in the Project, Ankara’s role in the Development Road will not be without challenges. Turkish bases have come under attack by the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Force (PMF) and Türkiye is currently conducting a military campaign against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in northern Iraq.4 Iran, which is not included in the Project, has also expressed concerns over the Project and has the potential to undermine the Development Road through its allies in Iraq. Against this backdrop, this issue brief outlines the challenges facing the Development Road. Although Qatar and the UAE will be important enablers of the Project as geostrategic partners and economic powerhouses, the pathway to success will be predominantly determined by Türkiye and Iraq. Türkiye’s long-term involvement will be crucial to securing Qatar and the UAE as economically vested partners. Türkiye is also a powerful actor within the Iraqi political and economic landscape and provides the linkage between Asia and Europe, which is a fundamental component of the Project. Although Türkiye harbors concerns toward the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC),5 which intends to bypass its territory, Ankara’s leading role in the Development Road will determine whether the latter will rival or supplement IMEC. Türkiye’s role will also determine the extent to which the Development Road will augment and enable China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).6 These dynamics highlight the geopolitical significance of the Development Road. This issue brief also warns of several other geopolitical and domestic dynamics that must be addressed for the Project to succeed. This includes the contentious status of the PKK’s presence in Iraq, tensions between Erbil and Baghdad, and the potential spoiler role that the PMF could play, in addition to wider geopolitical concerns, since the Project could undermine the economic and geostrategic interests of Iran and Kuwait. Linking Asia to Europe The Development Road aims to shorten the travel time between Asia and Europe, by linking Basra, Iraq, to Ovaköy, Türkiye, and joins the BRI and IMEC as a major regional economic integration initiative.7 These ambitious projects have received much media attention but have lacked details. However, the Development Road is strongly positioned to come to fruition because it forms an essential part of Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani’s domestic and geopolitical agenda, as well as constituting an amalgamation and consolidation of several infrastructure projects that are already in progress.8 This includes logistics hubs, industrial complexes, and the integration of oil and gas pipelines.9 Unlike the BRI and the IMEC, which are rival global initiatives, the Development Road is an Iraq-centric undertaking, focused on existing infrastructure projects and aimed at turning Iraq into a major transit country and infrastructure hub to enhance its strategic and economic position.10 The realization of its objectives and ambitions are, therefore, more realistic. Moreover, while the Development Road could require Qatar and the UAE as committed investors, it ultimately relies on the leadership of Iraq and Türkiye rather than a whole host of governments, as is the case with the IMEC –– whose stakeholders have not taken ownership over its implementation. The Development Road could be an enabler of both the BRI and IMEC, since it is centered on Iraq’s geographic position, its geopolitical relations, and its ongoing infrastructure development. The most crucial component of the Development Road is the Grand Faw Port, which will enhance Iraq’s ability to receive larger container ships and reduce its dependency on the nearby Umm Qasr port. Announced in 2010 and launched in 2013, the Grand Faw Port project constitutes the southern terminal of the Development Road and is expected to be concluded in 2028 –– the first of the Project’s three phases. The 1,200-kilometer road and rail Development Road would connect Faw in Basra to Faysh Khabur on the border between Iraq and Türkiye, before connecting to Türkiye’s rail and road network.11 The venture is meant to provide access to the Mediterranean Sea via the Turkish port of Mersin and reach Europe by road via Istanbul.12 The Project as a whole is scheduled for completion by 2050.13 Faw port, which was delayed as a result of financial challenges and the war on the Islamic State,14 will be able to receive the world’s largest container ships, with an expected 99 berths, making it the largest port in the Middle East.15 By 2028, the port is expected to handle 36 million tons of containerized freight and 22 million tons of dry bulk, unpackaged goods that are transported in large standardized containers. The plan is to further increase these numbers by 2038.16 Iraq Development Road – Map 17 Succeeding where Others have Failed? Under Sudani, the Faw Port and Development Road have been identified as national priorities. However, the Project is riddled with significant challenges. Iraq’s previous prime ministers have attempted to develop ports and other large infrastructure projects which have envisioned large-scale changes to Iraq’s transport infrastructure, but progress has slowed and stalled because of conflict and political volatility.18 Outside of Turkish and Iraqi enthusiasm, there has been a cautious posture from Qatar and the UAE.19 Indeed, it is up to Baghdad and Ankara to prove the Project will not succumb to domestic and regional pressures like those before it. Several factors work in Baghdad’s favor. Regionally, there is a trend toward cooperation and de-escalation. There is also a greater appetite among the Gulf states to become proactive players in Iraq. The UAE is expanding its footprint through Dana Gas and Crescent Petroleum by securing contracts to develop gas fields in the south, building on its long-standing presence in the Kurdistan region.20 Saudi Arabia is making inroads by investing in Anbar and a number of other projects, including an electricity link with Iraq as part of the GCC Interconnection Authority (GCCIA).21 Qatar has a 25% stake in the $27 billion Gas Growth Integrated Project (GGIP).22 Estithmar Holding has also committed $7 billion to real estate and tourism development in Baghdad.23 Iraq is thus renewing its relations with Türkiye and the Gulf countries. Türkiye has an impressive, multi-layered network in Iraq, with significant influence in the Kurdistan region, the Arab Sunni north, and patches of Baghdad and the south. In 2023, Türkiye’s bilateral trade with Iraq totaled $19.9 billion.24 During the first three months of 2024, Turkish exports to Iraq also grew by 24.5%.25 In March, Iraq and Türkiye agreed to establish a joint operations center aimed at combatting the PKK,26 an unprecedented move since it effectively means Iraq and Türkiye would be working to expel the group from Iraqi territory. Domestically, Iraq is enjoying a period of stability. Sudani has managed to placate the PMF and has improved Baghdad’s relations with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), despite numerous outstanding issues between them.27 Sudani has also balanced Baghdad’s ties with both Washington and Tehran, despite the violent ramifications of the war in Gaza. Furthermore, a Gallup poll indicated Iraqis’ increasing faith in their political and national institutions, including a record 56% who expressed trust in the Sudani government.28 Yet, this calm could be short-lived, given Iraq’s potential for a relapse into conflict, regional tensions, and the possible return of populist cleric Muqtada al-Sadr to the political fray.29 What could also undermine the Development Road is Iraq’s dependency on oil and lack of economic diversification. Iraq’s foreign reserves are at a record level due to high oil prices, but are vulnerable to oil price shocks and U.S. sanctions.30 Qatar and the UAE could be the Project’s most important investors, but Iraq’s vulnerability to oil prices and failure to dedicate its own resources will limit the scope and scale of investment from Abu Dhabi and Doha, who may first need to see Iraq prove its own commitment through deeds, and not just words. The dependency on oil also has direct implications for socio-political stability. Iraq’s population is rapidly growing: it has surged from 27 million in 2003 to 40 million today, with projections suggesting it could top 50 million within the next 10 years.31 This will exert strain on the government’s ability to expand the public sector and employ the 700,000 Iraqis that graduate each year.32 Iraq’s youth bulge risks adding to an increasingly discontented and disenfranchised population. These socio-political dynamics will shape the political and security climate in the years to come and could, therefore, determine the fate of the Development Road. The rivalry between powerful factions of the Shiite political class adds an additional hurdle. Foreign companies have had to manage such rivalries, as in the case of South Korea’s Daewoo, which was awarded the contract to develop the Grand Faw Project but had to stave off pushback from Asaib Ahl al-Haq, which was in favor of a Chinese company.33 These tensions warrant attention, since economic prominence translates into patronage networks and political influence. Iraq’s southern ports are rife with corruption and the dominance of Iran-aligned groups. These groups dominate the customs department, supervise the security of the area and divert billions of dollars away from Iraq’s coffers.34 Given the scale of the Development Road, there is likely to be an escalation in factional disputes if a long-term settlement is not reached.35 The Turkish Lynchpin: Managing Disruptions In theory, Iraq’s security challenges should not prevent the Project from coming to fruition. While both the PKK and the PMF have a track record of sabotaging infrastructure and commerce,36 much like ISIS and its ilk,37 Iraq can manage and contain these challenges. For example, attacks on hydrocarbons infrastructure can be mitigated with security controls, including pipeline fortification methods and the deployment of security personnel. This explains why such attacks have been intermittent and of limited consequence.38 This bodes well for encouraging foreign investment, which is also helped by the ongoing support Iraq receives from the United States in combatting terrorism. International investors have not been completely deterred from operating in a frontier market, which has the world’s fifth-largest proven oil reserves,39 and are encouraged by the fact that Iraq continues to receive support from Washington.40 Moreover, despite security challenges, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE are also increasing their economic footprint in Iraq. Similarly, China’s direct investments in Iraq amounted to $34 billion in 2023, making it the largest investor in Iraq.41 These are encouraging indicators for a country that has suffered two civil wars over the past decade. That said, there are other contextual challenges. Attacks on Turkish bases and personnel have escalated in response to Ankara’s incursions into northern Iraq against the PKK. The PKK has established affiliates and has ambitions to turn the territory it controls into a self-governing canton, which represents a direct threat to Türkiye’s national security interests. Moreover, Türkiye has been accused by Iraq of weaponizing water supplies.42 The Project’s infrastructure could also be vulnerable in Faysh Khabur, which straddles the Türkiye-Iraq-Syria border and is regularly shelled by Türkiye.43 The area constitutes a strategic crossing for the PKK and, to complicate matters, U.S. forces stationed in north-eastern Syria depend on a ground supply line via the area.44 Tensions between Baghdad and the KRG, which controls Faysh Khabur, also have implications for Türkiye’s long-term involvement in the Project. Apart for the last 15 kilometers near the border with Türkiye, the Development Road lies outside of the Kurdistan region.45 The exclusion of the KRG has prompted Erbil to revive its efforts to build a railway that would connect Iran and Türkiye through territory it governs, which is unfolding against the backdrop of improved ties between the KRG and both Iran and Türkiye.46 Despite Erbil-Baghdad tensions, this could serve as a win-win for both governments, augmenting the Development Road by establishing an additional economic integration initiative that includes two regional heavyweights. Iraq could bank on Türkiye’s willingness to bypass the KRG. However, such a move would be a gamble. Türkiye has a historic relationship with the KRG that renders the latter an important pillar of Ankara’s regional geopolitical and security interests. Türkiye has historically drawn on this relationship to enhance its influence and leverage in Iraq. This included a historic 50-year accord in 2014 that has been central to the economic empowerment and autonomy of the KRG and to the KRG’s emergence as a pillar of Türkiye’s geostrategic interests.47 Although the Kurdish independence referendum in 2017 strained relations between Türkiye and Iraq, they have since been repaired.48 Iraq must appreciate that Türkiye’s national security imperatives are intertwined with the long-term political standing of the KRG and its ability to contain the PKK on both Kurdish and Iraqi territory. That, in turn, creates interdependence and interconnectivity between Türkiye’s ongoing tensions with Baghdad––including over water and the PKK—and Baghdad’s relations and disputes with the KRG. Although there are a number of challenges facing Türkiye and Iraq, these are manageable and can be mitigated. However, rather than merely papering the cracks, it is important that they are addressed to ensure there are no consequential implications for the Project. The GCC & The Iranian Elephant in the Room There has been a marked improvement in Iraq’s relations with the GCC. The Gulf states have sizeable investments and commitments in Iraq and these ties could become a litmus test for their involvement in the Development Road. It is inconceivable that Doha or Abu Dhabi would fulfil their commitments to the Project unless their pre-existing economic engagements in Iraq live up to their expectations. For the foreseeable future, the Gulf signatories to the Project, as well as Türkiye, will keep a close eye on whether Iraq is able to get its house in order. In addition to Erbil-Baghdad relations, that also requires improved relations between Baghdad’s Shiite ruling elite and the Arab Sunni community, including its political leaders, such as Mohammed al-Halbousi and Khamis al-Khanjar. Cross-sectarian coalition-building efforts have helped improve these relations and, therefore, Iraq’s ties to Türkiye and the Gulf states.49 Khanjar and Halbousi have strong ties to the UAE, Qatar, and Türkiye.50 Geopolitically, the state of relations between the Arab Sunni political elite and the ruling Shiite political class will likely shape the scope and scale of GCC involvement in the Project, in much the same way as GCC engagement with Iraq was shaped (and limited) by the sectarian policies of previous Iraqi administrations.51 In the same vein, Iran has not been included in the Project, but it is inconceivable that Tehran and its allies in Iraq would play no role, which could challenge the materialization of the Development Road. While the Project has strategic importance for Iraq and its partners, it is premised on long-term regional cooperation. Iran and its allies will be watching closely to assess whether the initiative threatens to change the balance of power in Iraq and may move to prevent the Project from coming to fruition to ensure there are no second and third-order effects that undermine Tehran’s influence. Iranian officials have already expressed concerns that the development of port infrastructure presents a geostrategic and commercial threat.52 The development of both Umm Qasr and Faw, and the wider geostrategic aspirations of the Project, could diminish Iran’s own economic standing since Iran’s ports are already competing with the UAE’s Fujairah and Jebel Ali.53 In the long term, Iran will keep one eye on ensuring the ports do not serve as a base for hostile foreign forces. Tehran may see the Project as one large step toward enabling a Türkiye and GCC-aligned sphere of influence, including the emergence of an autonomous Sunni region.54 Iran has a proven ability and willingness to use its political strength in Iraq to push back against strategically significant initiatives and could use its influence within the Iraqi parliament and Supreme Court to torpedo the Development Road.55 It is precisely in this context that Türkiye will have to take on the mantle of regional leadership, rather than leaving the fate of the Project to long-running geopolitical tensions. This includes reassuring its GCC allies that the Project can succeed, working with its partners and allies in Iraq to address Iran’s concerns, and building a national consensus around the Project. However, it is not just Iran that could see the Project as a threat. Iraq and Kuwait were previously embroiled in a dispute over the construction of the Mubarak Al-Kabeer Port on Bubiyan Island, just kilometers away from the Iraqi coast, which Baghdad fears could undermine the Umm Qasr and al-Faw ports.56 Construction of the Kuwaiti port had been paused for ten years until it was revived earlier this year, with some suggesting this was partly motivated by Iraq’s plans to build Faw and the wider Development Road.57 Conclusion Several challenges lie in the way of the Development Road. Iraq suffers from widespread corruption, the risk of conflict relapse, and the dominance of armed groups that have an outsized say over the future of major infrastructure projects. The ambitious scope and scale of the Project stands out because it relies on the cooperation and support of Iraq’s neighbors. As a result, a number of geopolitical and domestic dynamics must work in Iraq’s favor for the Project to materialize. The onus is on Iraq to spearhead the successful implementation of the Project. However, Türkiye’s involvement as a leading partner can help mitigate the geopolitical challenges the Project faces. Türkiye’s credibility as a regional power will be tested, as will Iraq’s ability to assuage the concerns of its neighbors. Prime Minister Sudani will need to continue to placate the PMF and Iran without undermining the Project or alienating its regional stakeholders. This will also require clearly communicating the role of the Gulf states in the Project, identifying key areas of contention or red lines, and establishing consensus amongst rival groups such as Asaib ahl al-Haq and the Sadrists. Iraq could use the Project as an arena for mutual regional cooperation, as well as for balancing its relations with the United States, China, and other powers by finding synergies and connectivity between the Project and existing regional infrastructure. For the United States, the Development Road provides alternative trade and supply routes in a region where such conduits are under increasing pressure, as highlighted by Houthi attacks on shipping in the Red Sea. For China, the Project could enhance, rather than undermine, the BRI. To ameliorate Kuwait and Iran’s concerns, a plausible case can be made for the Development Road as a complement to Kuwaiti and Iranian ports and infrastructure. The Development Road would enable an integrated and efficient network that improves trade flows, opens up opportunities for collaborative initiatives among regional private and public sector entities, reduces bottlenecks, and enhances the resilience of regional trade. Türkiye, Qatar, and the UAE could also develop back-channel dispute resolution mechanisms to ensure their investments in the Project are protected by arbitration clauses and bilateral investment treaties. This means creating dedicated channels to both the Prime Minister and the PMF to ensure the Project progresses smoothly, and to mitigate challenges if and when they arise. The Gulf states have pre-existing economic commitments in Iraq that will function as litmus tests for the GCC’s involvement in the Project. Securing deliverables on the GCC’s investments will therefore add regional momentum to the Project. Moreover, Türkiye, the UAE, and Qatar should coordinate their involvement in the Project to avoid confliction, unify their messaging, and secure the Project’s viability in the long run. Although militias dominate key strategic infrastructure in Iraq, the dominance of armed groups at the ports is tied to the rivalry between the Sadrists and Asaib ahl al-Haq. The challenge for Baghdad is to manage this rivalry and find a settlement that allows the Development Road to materialize. In this context, the exclusion of the KRG from the Project does not bode well for the Project’s sustainability. Kurdistan is a key geopolitical intersection and a key player in Iraq. That means the exclusion of the KRG will at best diminish support and investments from the GCC and Türkiye, and at worst derail the Project completely. Türkiye, Qatar, and the UAE should condition their commitment to the Project on the inclusion of the KRG. Similarly, genuine commitments are needed from Baghdad that the Project will not unduly empower and prioritize businesses, local investors, and communities that have strong ties to the Shiite political class and powerful Shiite armed groups, lest the Project succumbs to Iraq’s long-running sectarian divisions and tensions or marginalizes and alienates minority communities.