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Why does Iraq seem more vulnerable to American targeting and pressure than other countries that deal with Iran? latest news Wednesday, August 26, 2026 Why does Iraq seem more vulnerable to American targeting and pressure than other countries that deal with Iran? Baghdad - One News - 8/26/2026 Although Iraq is not Iran’s largest economic partner, it appears to be one of the countries most exposed to American pressure tactics in the new economic campaign against Tehran, not only because of the volume of trade between the two countries, but also as a result of a more complex equation that combines Iran’s need for the Iraqi market, the Iraqi economy’s connection to the dollar and the American financial system, and the continued entanglement between Baghdad and Tehran in trade, energy, and financial transfers. On August 24, the U.S. Treasury Department launched Operation Economic Paragon, announcing a campaign targeting the networks, facilitators, and financial channels that Iran uses to smuggle oil, circumvent sanctions, and obtain revenue, while expanding the risks of secondary sanctions to foreign entities that continue activities linked to Tehran. Although Washington did not name Iraq as the primary target of the campaign, a Reuters analysis suggested that Iraq could provide a model for how the United States might use its influence to pressure Iran’s trading partners, particularly through the card of access to the dollar-based financial system. Iraq's unique situation lies in the fact that Washington possesses leverage over it that it does not have with many of Iran's major partners. According to Reuters, Iraq holds more than $100 billion of its reserves in the United States, and its dollar oil revenues are primarily channeled through the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, giving Washington significant financial leverage over Baghdad. Herein lies the difference between Iraq's situation and that of China, even though Beijing's oil dealings with Tehran are far more extensive. China possesses a massive economy, broader financial and trade tools, and a greater capacity to absorb pressures, while Iraq relies more heavily on the flow of dollars, its oil revenues, and access to the international financial system. Thus, the fundamental question becomes: Who deals with Iran the most? Rather: Where can American pressure tools have the greatest impact? On the other hand, it is difficult for Iraq to quickly and without internal costs disentangle its economic ties with Iran, as the relationship goes beyond traditional trade to include gas, energy, goods, markets and the movement of funds, which makes any tightening of dealings with Tehran likely to have repercussions on the economy and services within Iraq. Hence the Iraqi dilemma: Baghdad needs to maintain a significant part of its economic relations with Iran, but at the same time it needs to keep its channels open with the global financial system, which is centered on the dollar. The American pressure does not start from scratch. In recent years, Washington has used its financial tools against Iraqi banks that it accused of conducting transactions linked to Iran, in conjunction with tightening procedures for foreign transfers, financial compliance, combating money laundering and dollar smuggling. This precedent means that the United States does not necessarily need to impose sanctions on the entire Iraqi economy in order to exert effective pressure; it can target specific banks, companies, intermediaries and transfer channels, or tighten compliance requirements to make financial dealings with Iran more difficult and costly. Conversely, Iraq's importance to Iran increases as other economic and financial outlets become more limited, due to the long border, the large market, and the volume of trade between the two countries. Herein lies the fundamental paradox: the more Washington restricts Iran’s access, the more Tehran needs Iraq, and the more important Iraq becomes to Iran, the more sensitive Washington becomes to the movement of money, banks, and trade between the two countries. Therefore, Iraq may become one of the main testing grounds for the new economic campaign, not necessarily by targeting the Iraqi state, but by tightening control over banks, transfers, companies and intermediaries that Washington believes provide a lifeline for the Iranian economy. But the United States faces a delicate dilemma: Iraq is not an adversary, but a strategic partner whose economy it does not want to push into a widespread crisis. Reuters notes that Washington, despite its previous actions against Iraqi banks, has avoided steps that could inflict significant damage on the Iraqi economy. Therefore, the most likely scenario, in the event of increased pressure, is to target the points of contact between the Iraqi and Iranian economies rather than targeting the Iraqi economy as a whole. In conclusion, Iraq does not appear to be more vulnerable to pressure because it deals more with Iran, but rather because it is located at a sensitive intersection between two economies: Iran needs it more as its isolation intensifies, and Iraq needs the American financial system no matter how extensive its relations with Tehran become. Therefore, the greatest danger to Baghdad may not lie in comprehensive American sanctions, but rather in the gradual transfer of the economic war on Iran to Iraqi banks, the dollar, remittances, energy, and trade, making Iraq one of Tehran's most vulnerable partners to American pressure tactics. #OneNews #The_First_News_Platform_in_Iraq https://1news-iq.net/لماذا-يبدو-العراق-أكثر-عرضة-للاستهداف/

Extension, Stalemate, or War? The 60-day deadline expires, and Washington and Tehran face five scenarios that will shape the post-de-escalation period Latest News Friday, August 14, 2026 Extension, Stalemate, or War? The 60-day deadline expires, and Washington and Tehran face five scenarios outlining the post-de-escalation era Washington - One News - 8/14/2026 On the eve of the end of the sixty-day deadline between the United States and Iran, attention is turning to the next step in the confrontation between the two countries, amid continued indirect negotiations through the channels of Pakistan and Qatar, and attempts to prevent a return to military escalation after a period characterized by a state of “neither war nor peace”. Despite neither Washington nor Tehran announcing any tangible results from the ongoing talks, the atmosphere surrounding the mediations indicates that contacts are continuing in search of a formula that would allow for an extension of the truce and give the diplomatic track additional time, while the gap between the conditions of the two sides still prevents reaching a final agreement. The first scenario is extending the deadline is emerging as the most likely scenario, as mediators, primarily Pakistan and Qatar, continue to relay messages between the two sides regarding the future of the truce. While Iranian officials have expressed their willingness to extend the existing understandings, the American position remains less clear, especially after President Donald Trump announced the termination of the previous memorandum of understanding. This may lead to a different formula based on extending the sixty-day deadline without necessarily returning to the memorandum in its previous form, thus giving the negotiations a new opportunity, especially in light of indications that the two sides do not want to engage again in a long and costly military confrontation. The second scenario involves a continuation of the stalemate or a later agreement. Currently, the chances of a final agreement do not appear high given the wide gap between the two sides' positions. However, extending the ceasefire could provide additional room for rapprochement, especially considering the difficulty of resolving the conflict militarily and the pressure it is placing on the global economy and energy markets. Conversely, a state of “neither war nor peace” remains a possibility if negotiations fail to achieve a breakthrough, with both sides maintaining channels of communication and mutual deterrence without moving to a comprehensive agreement or returning to open war. The third scenario is the continuation of the mutual maritime blockade, with Iran maintaining its influence over shipping traffic in the Strait of Hormuz, while the United States continues to exert maritime and economic pressure on Tehran and attempts to restrict the movement of ships to and from Iranian coasts. The naval pressure coincides with a US move to tighten the financial noose around Iran, as US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent vowed additional measures aimed at further isolating Tehran economically, in parallel with the continuation of sanctions on individuals and entities that Washington accuses of helping Iran. The fourth scenario is a return to limited military strikes, similar to the escalation round witnessed last July, when the United States resumed its raids on Iran, and Tehran responded by launching missiles and drones towards Arab countries, before the confrontation was contained and prevented from turning into a full-blown war. Washington may again resort to limited strikes aimed at weakening Iranian capabilities related to threatening navigation and pressuring Tehran to lower its demands in negotiations, but the results of this option remain uncertain, especially since the previous round did not lead, according to what was announced, to a political breakthrough that would end the crisis. The fifth and most dangerous scenario remains the outbreak of a wider war, especially in light of continued Israeli pressure to escalate the confrontation with Iran, coinciding with the approach of the Knesset elections next October. In contrast, Trump appears more hesitant to slide into open warfare, given the approaching US midterm elections and the potential for a further rise in energy prices and inflation rates as a result of any broad confrontation, as well as the possible economic repercussions of continued disruption to navigation in the Strait of Hormuz. Between the extension of the deadline, the continuation of the stalemate, the escalation of the blockade, the return to strikes, or the slide into a wider war, the US-Iranian confrontation enters a new phase. Its contours depend on the outcome of the ongoing mediation efforts in the coming hours and days, while diplomacy faces a crucial test in consolidating the truce and finding a new formula for understanding between Washington and Tehran. https://1news-iq.net/تمديد-أم-جمود-أم-حرب؟-مهلة-الـ60-يوماً-تن/

Ziad Al-Hashemi: Iraq has entered a phase of paying the price for mistakes and failures that have accumulated over more than twenty years Latest News Tuesday, August 4, 2026 Ziad Al-Hashemi: Iraq has entered a phase of paying the price for mistakes and failures that have accumulated over more than twenty years Baghdad - One News - 8/04/2026 This article says it all..! Economic expert Ziad al-Hashemi warned that Iraq has entered a phase of "paying the price" as a result of mistakes and failures that have accumulated over more than twenty years, stressing that the responsibility for the current crisis does not fall on successive governments alone, but includes parties, parliament, oversight institutions, and everyone who benefited from the existing system or remained silent about its failures. Al-Hashemi said in a post on the “X” platform that losses, corruption and mismanagement have accumulated over the past years without real treatment, at a time when political forces were preoccupied with sharing influence and gains, while those who were supposed to monitor the government were part of the quota system. He added that the authorities tasked with holding corrupt individuals accountable have often chosen to remain silent, make deals, or be content with slogans, noting that responsibility also extends to a parliament that passed inflated budgets, political forces that treated the state as spoils of war, and oversight institutions that failed to perform their role or colluded with failure. He pointed out that some elites justified the failures, while part of the media was preoccupied with marginal battles, while part of the public accepted having their silence bought through appointments, benefits, and privileges. Al-Hashemi stressed that almost everyone was aware that the situation was heading towards an explosion, but many preferred to postpone the confrontation because reform threatened their interests and privileges, while continuing the wrong approach guaranteed them more influence and money. He pointed out that talk of reform began to escalate after the scarcity of resources and the accumulation of obligations, questioning the reasons for the absence of these calls during the years in which the state had financial surpluses and real opportunities to build a diversified and resilient economy. He stressed that Iraq is not facing a passing liquidity crisis, but rather the harsh consequences of a political and economic system based on power-sharing, corruption, mismanagement, and the buying of loyalties, which squandered one of the biggest financial opportunities in the country’s history. Al-Hashemi warned that continuing to deal with the crisis through stubbornness, temporary solutions, borrowing, and postponing payments will transform the current phase of paying the price from a temporary crisis into long years of decline, the cost of which will be borne by the citizen who has not even received his fair share of his country's wealth. https://1news-iq.net/زياد-الهاشمي-العراق-دخل-مرحلة-دفع-ثمن-أ/

The anti-corruption shockwave has led to the dismissal of deputy prime ministers. A leader in the coordination framework told One News: "The reactivation of the Commander-in-Chief's office stemmed from al-Zaydi's conviction that reaching an agreement soon on the Ministers of Defense and Interior was impossible." HOT: Latest News Wednesday, July 22, 2026 Anti-corruption shockwave topples deputy prime ministers' positions... A leader in the coordination framework for "One News": Reactivating the Commander-in-Chief's office came from Al-Zaydi's conviction that it is impossible to reach an agreement soon on the ministers of defense and interior Baghdad - One News - 7/22/2026 A leader in the coordination framework, who preferred not to mention his name, revealed to “One News” a political agreement stipulating that no new positions for deputy prime ministers will be created during the current phase, in a remarkable shift imposed by the anti-corruption campaign led by the government of Prime Minister Ali al-Zidi, and the wide repercussions it has had within the political scene. The leader said that the anti-corruption campaign has reshuffled the cards of the political forces, and has prompted a number of blocs, especially those with armed wings, to back down from demands that they considered part of their electoral entitlement, most notably the creation of positions for deputy prime ministers and obtaining additional executive positions within the government. He added that this decline does not represent a passing political settlement, but rather reveals the magnitude of the shock caused by anti-corruption measures within forces that were seeking to expand their influence in state institutions, before they were forced to recalculate under the pressure of expanding investigations and escalating possibilities of prosecution. Meanwhile, the leader revealed that the Iraqi government's reactivation of the Office of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, after nearly 12 years of its abolition, came as a result of a conviction that had taken root in Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi that it was impossible to reach a political consensus soon regarding the candidates for the Ministries of Interior and Defense. He explained that assigning former Interior Minister Abdul Amir al-Shammari to the duties of the office director reflects a trend to rearrange the security leadership center, in light of expectations that the two ministries will remain vacant for the coming months due to the continuation of political disputes, the complexity of the nomination conditions, and the failure to reach a final understanding regarding the proposed names. According to the leader, Al-Zaydi is seeking, through reactivating the office of the Commander-in-Chief, to prevent any vacuum in the management of the security establishment, and to concentrate security and military decisions within his office, in order to ensure the continuity of issuing orders, coordinating the work of agencies and forces, and managing sensitive files away from the repercussions of the delay in completing the cabinet. He explained that the delay in deciding on the Ministries of Interior and Defense is due to two main factors: the first is the existence of an American veto on some blocs that are trying to push forward candidates to take over the two security ministries, and the second is the continuation of the conflict between the political forces, especially the Shiite ones, regarding the distribution of portfolios, the names of the candidates, and the limits of influence within the military and security institutions. The leader stressed that reactivating the Commander-in-Chief's office is not a traditional administrative procedure, but rather establishes a broader transformation in the security decision-making structure, by redrawing the leadership pyramid at a highly sensitive stage, and placing the Prime Minister's office at the heart of managing military and security files until the fate of the Ministries of Interior and Defense is decided. https://1news-iq.net/صدمة-مكافحة-الفساد-تُسقط-مناصب-نواب-رئ/

The prime minister's advisor secretly visited Iran last week, coinciding with al-Zaidi's presence in Washington. The National newspaper reports that Iraq could be a gateway for Iran to open up to the West. latest news Wednesday, July 22, 2026 Prime Minister's Advisor Secretly Visited Iran Last Week, Coinciding with Al-Zaidi's Presence in Washington... The National: Iraq Could Be a Gateway for Iran's Opening Up to the West Baghdad - One News - 7/22/2026 The new Iraqi government is seeking to present Baghdad as a bridge for dialogue between the United States and Iran, as part of its attempt to establish balanced relations with both sides, according to a report published by The National newspaper. The newspaper quoted an advisor to the Iraqi prime minister as saying that the government hopes to play a mediating role between Washington and Tehran, taking advantage of Iraq’s intertwined relations and interests with both countries. These efforts coincide with Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi's visit to Tehran, days after his talks with US President Donald Trump in Washington. According to The National, citing the Iraqi News Agency, al-Zaidi, during his visit to Iran, is seeking to pave the way for hosting US-Iranian talks, while local media reports spoke of Baghdad's desire to host those negotiations. The newspaper reported that the Prime Minister's advisor secretly visited Iran last week, coinciding with al-Zaidi's presence in Washington, and held meetings that addressed the importance of maintaining Iraq's relations with both the United States and Iran, and avoiding complete alignment with either side. During his visit to Qom, the Prime Minister's advisor met with Iranian clerics and prominent figures, and discussed with them the Iraqi government's plans to restrict weapons to the state and disarm the Shiite factions that carried out attacks on American bases inside Iraq and energy facilities in the region, with support from Iran, according to the report. The National quoted the Prime Minister's advisor as saying, during a speech at the British think tank Chatham House, that Iraq could represent "a gateway for Iran to open up to the West." He added, according to the newspaper, that during a four-day tour he witnessed the extent of the suffering that Iranians are experiencing as a result of the economic sanctions, noting that they, like the rest of the world’s peoples, are looking forward to peace, stability and security. The newspaper quoted him as saying that what Baghdad’s relationship with Tehran should achieve is to maintain Iraq’s middle ground position between the United States and Iran. He continued, according to The National: “We cannot ignore the importance of the United States as a superpower, nor can we ignore the fact that Iran is a neighboring country with which we have common interests.” But the Prime Minister’s advisor acknowledged, in statements reported by the newspaper, that he does not expect Tehran to show full understanding of the positions announced by al-Zaidi, especially regarding the disarmament of factions and reducing the influence of armed groups within state institutions. Doubts about Baghdad's ability to mediate The National noted that Qatar and Pakistan had previously played mediating roles between the United States and Iran, at a time when doubts are growing about Iraq’s ability to play a similar role, as armed groups continue to launch attacks on US bases and exert influence within state institutions. According to the newspaper, experts fear that the Iraqi government will face an extremely difficult test as the deadline for disarming the factions approaches in October. According to the report, the government may find itself facing a confrontation with groups that refuse to hand over their weapons, or potential US sanctions if Washington believes that Baghdad has not taken sufficient steps to curb armed groups operating outside the framework of accountability. But the prime minister’s adviser said, in remarks reported by The National, that the government’s efforts to disarm these groups should not be limited to security measures, but should take into account the rising hardline tendencies within sectors of Iraq’s Shiite majority, who view the American war on Iran as a “war on Shiites.” The newspaper quoted him as saying that this understanding and mentality have become more prevalent within the Shiite community, and that understanding Iraq’s foreign and security policy requires understanding the complexities of the Shiite environment, its view of war, and the nature of its relationship with the state. Objections to government representation The National also quoted the Prime Minister’s advisor speaking of what he described as an “imbalance” in the representation of hardline Shiite forces within the current government. He explained, according to the newspaper, that parties linked to armed groups obtained about 80 seats out of more than 270 seats in parliament, but they did not obtain representation in the government, which is still working to fill a number of vacant ministerial positions. The National report noted that Iran says its support for Shiite factions in Iraq was part of contributing to the war against ISIS, but these groups face accusations of seizing parts of state institutions, being involved in assassinations, and killing hundreds of protesters during the October 2019 protests. While the al-Zaidi government is banking on Iraq's geographical and political position to open a channel of dialogue between Washington and Tehran, the success of these efforts remains contingent on its ability to extend state authority internally and convince international parties that it is capable of controlling armed groups operating outside official institutions. https://1news-iq.net/مستشار-رئيس-الوزراء-زار-إيران-سراً-الأ/

Axios: Iran pressured al-Zaidi to ensure his first foreign visit after taking office was not to Washington latest news Thursday, July 16, 2026 Axios: Iran pressured al-Zaidi to prevent his first foreign visit after taking office from being to Washington Baghdad - One News - 7/16/2026 According to Axios, citing US officials, Iranian officials pressured Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi and his team to prevent his first foreign visit after taking office from being to Washington, but al-Zaidi insisted on meeting US President Donald Trump. The website added that the White House considered al-Zaidi's visit an indication of the new Iraqi government's move towards strengthening relations with the United States and distancing itself from Iran, while American officials saw his decision as reflecting his adoption of an "Iraq First" policy. The report added that the issue of disarming Iranian-backed factions was among the most prominent issues discussed by al-Zaidi with Trump and US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, amid American hopes that the visit would represent the first practical indication of the implementation of his pledges on this issue. https://1news-iq.net/أكسيوس-إيران-مارست-ضغوطاً-على-الزيدي/

NYT: Iran detains Ahmadinejad under house arrest InternationalbreakingiranIsraelIRGCMossadEspionageMahmoud Ahmadinejad 2026-07-13 / 11:24 Shafaq News- Tehran Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) placed former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad under house arrest after authorities uncovered part of his alleged contacts with Israel, the New York Times (NYT) reported on Monday. According to the NYT, Israel involved a years-long intelligence operation aimed at recruiting Ahmadinejad and later positioning him as a potential leader of Iran in the event of regime change. The effort included attempts to arrange secret meetings between Ahmadinejad and Israeli intelligence officials, including a planned encounter in Budapest in early 2024 under the cover of a climate conference. Quoting former US officials, the NYT noted that Tel Aviv operatives also maintained contacts with Ahmadinejad's spokesman, Ali Akbar Javanfekr, and that former Mossad chief David Barnea personally traveled to Budapest to meet the former Iranian president. Ahmadinejad later disappeared from public view before reappearing at the funeral of the late Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, after which senior Iranian officials said he had been detained and placed under house arrest. The report also cited former Ahmadinejad adviser Abdolreza Davari saying the former president would not have cooperated with Israel for money but could have been motivated by political power. Another associate quoted by the newspaper claimed Ahmadinejad had previously expressed a desire to return to power with foreign backing and had spoken of normalizing relations with Israel through the Abraham Accords if he regained office. To continue reading, click here. https://shafaq.com/en/World/NYT-Iran-detains-Ahmadinejad-under-house-arrest

Iraqi IRI factions prepare to support Iran if the US resumes war... Monte Carlo International: Parties within the Shiite framework seek to pressure al-Zaydi through factions to halt the anti-corruption campaign latest news Monday, July 13, 2026 Baghdad - One News - 7/13/2026 Armed factions in Iraq have escalated their rhetoric against the government of Prime Minister Ali al-Zubaidi, declaring their commitment to their weapons and their refusal to have them included among the weapons outside the authority of the state, in a stance that puts the plan to restrict weapons to a new political and security test. Monte Carlo International Radio reported that a statement issued by one of the armed factions included three main points, the first of which was the refusal to hand over weapons to the Iraqi government, and the emphasis on describing them as “weapons of resistance,” not weapons outside the authority of the state. The radio station added that the statement called on al-Zaydi’s government to “submit to the resistance,” and warned it of the consequences of not supporting the factions and going along with the United States, in a tone that observers considered an indication of the readiness of some factions to confront any attempt to seize their weapons by force. According to the report, this escalation comes despite previous Iraqi announcements that some factions had responded to the plan to restrict weapons to the state and hand over limited quantities of weapons to official security agencies. Monte Carlo International explained that a number of factions expressed a positive stance during meetings with the Prime Minister, while information indicates that a limited number of missiles and drones were handed over to the state. In contrast, other armed factions announced their refusal to hand over weapons, reflecting the continued division over the government's plan to restrict weapons to official institutions. The radio station linked the timing of the escalating statement to three main factors, foremost among them the escalating military tension between Iran and the United States, amid expectations that some factions would prepare to support Tehran in the event of a renewed confrontation with Washington or Israel. The second factor relates to preparations for Prime Minister Ali al-Zubaidi’s visit to Washington and his meeting with US President Donald Trump, amid fears among the factions of the possibility of reaching Iraqi-American security or military understandings aimed at ending the presence of weapons outside the framework of the state. The third factor, according to political readings reported by Monte Carlo International, is the possibility that some parties within the coordination framework might use the factions card to pressure the Al-Zaidi government, with the aim of slowing down or stopping the anti-corruption campaign. Regarding the options available to the government, the report discussed two possible scenarios; the first is internal, based on the use of the Iraqi armed forces, and perhaps the Peshmerga forces, to implement the disarmament plan, while the second scenario depends on requesting American military support or external assistance. However, these scenarios remain within the realm of estimates and analyses, as the Iraqi government has not yet announced the adoption of a military option to disarm the factions, while it continues to emphasize that limiting weapons to the state is a fundamental goal in its program. According to Monte Carlo International, the next phase will determine whether the recent escalation is merely a political message preceding al-Zaidi's visit to Washington, or a prelude to a broader confrontation regarding the future of weapons outside state institutions. https://1news-iq.net/الفصائل-العراقية-تستعد-لدعم-إيران-إذا/

Some fled, some were arrested, and some are awaiting arrest... Reuters recounts the details of the first hours of the largest and boldest anti-corruption campaign in Iraq latest news Sunday, June 28, 2026 Some fled, some were arrested, and some are awaiting arrest... Reuters recounts the details of the first hours of the largest and boldest anti-corruption campaign in Iraq Baghdad - One News - 6/28/2026 In a development that adds a new dimension to the largest campaign of arrests targeting political and parliamentary figures in years, Reuters, citing three security and legal sources, revealed that a number of suspected officials managed to escape minutes before security forces arrived at their homes inside the Green Zone, indicating that the race is no longer just between the state and corruption files, but also between the implementing forces and time. According to the report, elite units of the Counter-Terrorism Service carried out simultaneous raids at dawn on Sunday targeting the homes of politicians and senior officials inside the Green Zone, resulting in the arrest of a number of them. The escape of some of the wanted individuals prompted the authorities to completely close the entrances to the Green Zone and launch a wide search operation to track down the fugitives. These data indicate that the operation has gone beyond the execution of arrest warrants, turning into a continuous security pursuit, while Reuters confirms that the campaign will not stop at what happened today, but is expected to extend during the coming days with the issuance and execution of additional arrest warrants. Closing the Green Zone carries a significance that goes beyond the security dimension; it reflects an attempt to prevent wanted individuals from leaving or facilitating their escape, and indicates that the authorities are dealing with the file as an open process that requires full control over the scene of events until the judicial orders are fully implemented. The fact that some officials were able to escape before the arrival of the forces also raises questions about the possibility of prior information being leaked about the timing of the raids, which may prompt the competent authorities to review the mechanisms for carrying out operations and the confidentiality of the circulation of arrest warrants, if such hypotheses are proven. If the campaign continues at the pace described by Reuters, Iraq could be facing an unprecedented phase, not limited to the arrest of influential figures, but extending to the pursuit of fugitives, expanding the scope of investigations, and opening new cases that could reshape the political and judicial landscape in the coming days. https://1news-iq.net/بينهم-من-فر-وبينهم-من-اعتُقل-وبينهم-من-ي/

REMEMBER, no one really knows what will happen, or when. They're simply stating their opinions based on what they perceive to be happening in Iraq... So, take everything with a grain of salt ... RON 6-16-2026 Terrence [Central Bank/International Bank Regulator] I got into the Iraqi dinar only in 2024. What I saw prior to getting into the dinar was the case for why I think the Iraqi dinar is really on the precipice of being able to revalue very soon. QUESTION: "What made you say okay this is something that has potential? RAFIDAIN BANK..! I regulated them around 2017/2018. What I found was a bank that was dilapidated. It was almost like going back to prehistoric times, a general ledger system which was literally a notebook where debits and credits were entered. I had firsthand knowledge of what dilapidated bank the central bank was in as well. Fast forward to now, there's been all kinds of great, incredible reforms that have been taking place in Iraq, particularly the banking system. Back in 2024 someone approached me about what would the central bank need to do in order to become compliant. [Post 1 of 2] 6-16-2026 Guest Guru Terrence [Central Bank/International Bank Regulator] I assembled this knowledge for him. He was trying to bid for a due diligence contract to identify the gaps that were in the CBI's governance framework which will be used to bring the banking system into compliance. He told me the United States Treasury had given the Central Bank of Iraq a mandate to get your house in order. From what I understood, this was real. Once I started looking at what they were trying to build out and then also looking at the natural resources in the country. If you look at the valuation of the minerals that are in the ground, then the asset value, the price of the Iraqi dinar just doesn't make any sense at all. It's drastically undervalued. But with the banking system being reformed, first you lay the pipes, you learn the rail, then you turn on the water. What I saw happening is all that groundwork, the rails and piping were being put in place. Once that's there it's just a decision when to turn on the spigot. That's what I saw happening, which I think makes the use case for revaluation - hopefully in the near future. [Post 2 of 2] 6-16-2026 Frank26 Z is coming to talk to Trump about investment opportunities. Anyone that thinks we want to invest at 1300 needs to get serious. He's coming to report with numbers and specific words. If he doesn't accomplish that, I feel bad for Iraq. I feel bad for us.

Iraq's weapons debate ensnares the Peshmerga and exposes a constitutional fault line In-DepthbreakingPeshmergaPUKKDPIraqi KurdistanWeapons Under State Control 2026-06-09 / 01:48 Shafaq News The Peshmerga occupied a unique place in the Kurdistan Region's political consciousness long before becoming part of Iraq’s federal framework after 2005. For the vast majority of Kurds, the force represents far more than a military institution. Its name, commonly translated as “those who face death”, emerged from decades of struggle between the Kurdish national movement and central governments in Iraq and the wider region. (under Saddam's oppression) Today, that historical legacy stands at the center of a growing political dispute. As Iraq revisits the issue of restricting weapons to state control, concerns have surfaced over whether the Peshmerga should also fall within the scope of those discussions. The debate has exposed deeper disagreements over federalism, constitutional authority, and the balance of power between Baghdad and Erbil. A Force Rooted in History The origins of the modern Peshmerga trace back to the early twentieth century, before taking shape as a more organized force through successive Kurdish uprisings and political movements that intensified during the 1950s and 1960s. Following the Kurdish uprising of 1991 and the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime in 2003, the Peshmerga gradually evolved into the Kurdistan Region’s official security institution. Their position gained further recognition with the adoption of Iraq’s Constitution in 2005, which established a broader framework acknowledging the Region and its governing institutions, including its security apparatus. For this reason, Kurdish leaders maintain that the Peshmerga cannot be treated as a military force subject to political bargaining. In Kurdish collective memory, the force embodies experiences ranging from the Anfal genocide, chemical attacks, displacement, and internal conflicts to the fight against ISIS, when large sections of Iraq’s defense lines collapsed while the Kurdistan Region remained largely under the protection of its own Peshmerga forces. That symbolism featured prominently in recent remarks by the head of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) leader Masoud Barzani. Widely regarded by many Kurds as a continuation of the Peshmerga’s political and military legacy, Barzani portrayed the force’s weapons as more than a conventional arsenal, underscoring their role as a symbol of sacrifice, dignity, and historical security guarantees for Kurdistan. Read more: Kurdistan’s 10th cabinet: Interlocking alliances and persistent political differences How the Peshmerga Entered the Disarmament Discussion? The backdrop to the current controversy lies in renewed efforts to address the issue of weapons outside direct state control. The debate returned to the forefront as the United States and regional actors intensified pressure on Shiite armed factions allied with Iran. Initially centered on the future of groups operating beyond state institutions, the discussion gradually expanded in some political circles to encompass the position of the Peshmerga. Political figures in Iraq have circulated reports of a proposal attributed to Tom Barrack, the US ambassador to Turkiye and presidential envoy for Iraq and Syria, suggesting that all armed formations, including certain Shiite factions and the Peshmerga, should be brought under the umbrella of Iraq’s armed forces and the authority of Baghdad. The proposal, however, has yet to emerge as an officially declared US position. (Kurdistan has it's own government and should have it's own military, but it can be under the auspices of the GOI & Iraq's military) Nevertheless, the concept gained traction in domestic political discussions. According to official statements and experts interviewed by Shafaq News, some Shiite factions opposed to disarmament, or reluctant to place their military capabilities entirely under Baghdad’s control, have sought to include the Peshmerga in the same framework. Their argument centers on a seemingly straightforward question: if all weapons are to be placed under state authority, why should the Kurdistan Region’s forces be exempt? Kurdish officials, legal specialists, and security experts reject that comparison. They argue that it overlooks the distinction between a regional force whose legitimacy derives from constitutional provisions within a federal system and armed factions that emerged or expanded under exceptional political and security circumstances after 2003 and during the campaign against ISIS. Many of those groups, they note, continue to face scrutiny regarding political loyalties, military chains of command, and links to regional conflicts extending beyond Iraq’s official decision-making structures. Statements issued by some factions have reinforced perceptions that efforts are underway to shift the debate from the dilemma of armed groups to a broader comparison involving both the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) and the Peshmerga. Nazem Al-Saidi, head of the executive council of the US-sanctioned Harakat Al-Nujaba, told Shafaq News that the Iraqi “resistance” does not impose red lines regarding discussions on surrendering weapons. He nonetheless tied any such process to the withdrawal of foreign military bases from Iraq, an end to “financial and economic dependency, and distancing the country from political decisions dictated by the US Embassy.” Al-Saidi further stated that factions which had relinquished their weapons may have chosen to move from the “resistance project” toward participation in the political process, stressing that Harakat Al-Nujaba believes weapons should not be surrendered “except to Imam Mahdi,”* given what he characterized as the dangers and challenges surrounding Iraq. He also questioned why pressure remains concentrated on factional and PMF weapons while, in his view, no equivalent attention is directed toward “the weapons of extremist groups or the Peshmerga forces.” Kurdistan’s Constitutional Position For Kurdish officials, this is precisely where the Peshmerga became part of a debate not initiated by Erbil. They interpret references to the force as an attempt either to broaden the discussion or to portray American and governmental pressure as selective. In Erbil’s view, the comparison deliberately conflates two fundamentally different issues in law, politics, and history. Security expert Jabar Yawar, a former senior official in the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs and a prominent observer of security relations between Baghdad and Erbil, dismissed discussions about dissolving or disarming the Peshmerga as lacking any legal or practical basis. Speaking to Shafaq News, Yawar stated that neither Iraqi nor international officials have issued formal or informal calls for such measures, emphasizing that current discussions focus on specific factions, including Asaib Ahl Al-Haq, Kataib Hezbollah Iraq, Harakat Al-Nujaba, Kataib Sayyid Al-Shuhada, and Kataib Imam Ali— not the Peshmerga. Yawar pointed to Article 121 of the Iraqi Constitution, which grants regions the right to establish and organize internal security forces, including police, security services, and regional guards. On that basis, he argued that the Peshmerga constitute the Kurdistan Region Guard, operating within a constitutional framework rather than outside state authority. Consequently, any attempt to alter the force’s status could not be accomplished through political agreements, external pressure, or arrangements between Baghdad and armed factions. Such a move, according to this interpretation, would require a complex constitutional and legislative process because the Peshmerga are not governed by an ordinary federal law that can be amended in the same manner as legislation regulating other formations. At the legislative level, Iraqi lawmaker Sarwa Mohammed likewise asserted that any effort to dissolve the Peshmerga would violate the Constitution and contradict the principles of Iraq’s federal system, which guarantees the Kurdistan Region the right to maintain its own security institutions. She described the Peshmerga as a constitutional and professional force responsible for protecting the Kurdistan Region’s borders, security, and stability, affirming that it should not be included in debates concerning weapons outside state institutions. “Confusing the Peshmerga with armed factions does not resolve the weapons issue,” Mohammed said, “It opens the door to a constitutional crisis between Baghdad and Erbil.” At the same time, she disclosed the existence of an initiative proposed by the State of Law Coalition, led by Nouri al-Maliki, aimed at addressing the status of certain armed factions through integration into Iraq’s official military and security institutions. Noting the ongoing discussions between the Iraqi government and several factions regarding mechanisms for surrendering weapons or incorporating fighters into formal structures, she stressed concern that armed groups operating outside official institutions do not involve the Peshmerga. Read more: Opinion: KDP, PUK, and the fracturing of Kurdish political partnership in Iraq Washington’s Perspective From Washington, Kurdish affairs and US foreign policy researcher Delovan Barwari said the Peshmerga cannot be viewed as a temporary force or an armed group established outside the state. Instead, he described it as a recognized regional guard force fulfilling an acknowledged security role. In remarks to Shafaq News, Barwari characterized proposals advocating the dissolution of the Peshmerga as both unconstitutional and irrational because they conflict with the constitutional framework through which Iraq recognized the Kurdistan Region and its right to maintain regional security forces within a federal system. He recalled the period following the fall of Saddam Hussein, when the Kurdistan Region preserved a degree of stability while much of Iraq experienced violence and institutional breakdown. Barwari also highlighted the Peshmerga’s role in confronting extremist organizations ranging from Al-Qaeda to ISIS and cooperating with international coalition partners to safeguard Iraq and the broader region. Regarding the American position, Barwari dismissed the notion that decision-makers in Washington are pursuing a serious effort to dismantle the Peshmerga. “I do not see credible evidence of a US effort in that direction,” he said, describing such proposals as political messaging linked to internal Iraqi dynamics that tend to surface during periods of tension between Baghdad and Erbil. Similar assessments have come from American military figures who worked alongside the Peshmerga during the campaign against ISIS. Retired US Army Colonel Myles Caggins, former spokesman for the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, went beyond rejecting calls to dissolve the force, portraying it as a valuable security partner whose capabilities should be strengthened rather than reduced. Caggins, now founder & CEO of Words Warriors, a consulting and government relations firm, described the Peshmerga as “a long-standing security force fully authorized under the Iraqi Constitution.” He emphasized its role in maintaining internal security in the Kurdistan Region and its record as a dependable US partner during key military campaigns, from the period following Saddam Hussein’s fall to the fight against ISIS. He argued that locally established security forces recognized by the federal system reflect Iraq’s geography, history, language, and social realities. Caggins also called on the United States and allied countries to deepen cooperation with the Peshmerga and expand support in areas such as technology, training, and counter-drone capabilities. Political Balancing or State Consolidation? Lahib Higel, Senior Iraq Analyst at the International Crisis Group, rejected suggestions that Washington is actively pressing for the dissolution of the Peshmerga or its integration into federal forces. Instead, she viewed the discussion as a domestic political maneuver linked to Baghdad’s internal balance of power. Speaking to Shafaq News, Higel observed that the proposal may represent an attempt by federal authorities to reassure Iran-aligned factions facing pressure over their weapons by presenting the issue as one affecting all forces operating outside Baghdad’s direct control. She cautioned, however, that such an approach could have significant repercussions for relations between Baghdad and Erbil while also intensifying divisions within Kurdish politics, particularly between the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, given existing disputes over Peshmerga reform and unification. That internal dimension introduces another layer of sensitivity. Some researchers contend that divisions within the Peshmerga’s military structure provide political opponents in Baghdad with additional opportunities to use the issue as leverage. Yasser Kuoti, a Middle East analyst and doctoral student in political science at Boston University, pointed to signs of a broader US inclination toward strengthening the authority of the federal government. At the same time, he stated that the Peshmerga’s organizational structure remains partially influenced by the historic division between the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). (one man's BS position) Although Erbil and its western partners have spent years pursuing reforms aimed at unifying forces under the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs, Kuoti noted that “the issue continues to supply some actors with arguments for bringing the force under federal authority.” He also suggested that calls for integration may stem from pressure exerted by Iraqi political groups seeking a parallel arrangement. In that context, factions facing demands to submit to state authority may insist that any effort to regulate weapons should apply equally to all armed forces. Regional Dynamics and the Weapons Iraqi strategic affairs researcher Kazem Yawar noted that restricting weapons to state control remains one of the key objectives included in the government’s program. While the issue is not new, he said, recent regional developments and the ongoing confrontation involving the United States, Israel, and Iran have pushed it back to the forefront of political and media discourse. According to Yawar, Washington has publicly advocated implementation of the principle that weapons should remain under state authority, prompting extensive discussion across official, media, and public spheres. The issue has also attracted attention from both the United States and Gulf states because of concerns over armed faction activity and its potential impact on American and Gulf interests. Yawar noted that the Kurdistan Parliament enacted the Ministry of Peshmerga Law No. 19 of 2007, and provided a clear legal framework for the Region Guard. He also contrasted the Peshmerga’s legal status with that of the PMF. The PMF emerged under exceptional circumstances and was later regulated through legislation adopted in 2016, a law that can be revised through federal constitutional mechanisms. The Peshmerga, by contrast, derive their status from constitutional provisions and regional authorities, making dissolution or full integration impossible without constitutional amendments or legislation issued by the Kurdistan Parliament. Kurdish Syrian political analyst Shvan Ibrahim remarked that attempts to include the Peshmerga in disarmament initiatives reflect a perception among some actors of Kurds as a permanent adversary or threat to the state. Speaking to Shafaq News, Ibrahim described comparisons between the Peshmerga and factions that he said “spread corruption, destruction, and devastation in Iraq and neighboring countries” as historically and politically unjust. “The Peshmerga did not threaten neighboring states, did not attack Gulf countries, and did not harm civilians or politicians,” he said, adding that “Instead, they protected Kurdistan and millions of displaced people and refugees, including Iraqi and Syrian Arabs who fled ISIS, armed factions, and militias.” He further indicated that the Peshmerga protected Iraqi political leaders during the early stages of the Iraqi Governing Council, the provisional government of Iraq from 13 July 2003 to 1 June 2004, and parliament, contributed to the defense of Mosul and other areas, and played a major role in the war against ISIS. Any effort to dissolve the force, he warned, “would trigger one of Iraq’s most serious national crises by reviving a centralized model of governance that concentrates power in federal institutions and risks reproducing authoritarian practices.” Ibrahim also addressed comparisons with Syria, where debates continue over the future integration of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) into state institutions. In his view, “the parallel is flawed.” The SDF emerged during a civil war and amid the collapse of central authority, whereas the Kurdistan Region of Iraq is a constitutionally recognized federal entity with elected institutions, local legislation, and security forces whose existence is explicitly protected under Iraqi law. Read more: Iraq to place armed factions' weapons under state control: What we know so far A Test of Iraq’s Post-2003 Order The dispute over the Peshmerga’s place in Iraq’s weapons debate extends far beyond technical discussions about security arrangements. It has become a political and constitutional test of the state established after 2003. Efforts to include the Kurdistan Region’s forces in disarmament discussions may appear, on the surface, to be attempts to distribute pressure more evenly or create negotiating balance. Yet such efforts collide with a fundamental distinction between a regional force grounded in constitutional authority and historical experience, and armed formations whose relationship with the state remains contested. As Baghdad seeks to reinforce centralized security decision-making under both domestic and international pressure, Erbil regards any challenge to the Peshmerga as a challenge to the foundations of federal partnership itself. In that sense, many observers believe that any approach failing to recognize this distinction may not advance the goal of regulating weapons. Instead, it could open the door to a new constitutional confrontation between Baghdad and the Kurdistan Region—an outcome few actors appear willing to risk. *In Twelver Shiite doctrine, Imam Al-Mahdi is the hidden twelfth Imam who is believed to remain in occultation until his return at the end of times. His reappearance is expected to usher in an era of justice and righteousness after a period of turmoil and oppression. Written and edited by Shafaq News staff. https://shafaq.com/en/Report/Iraq-s-weapons-debate-ensnares-the-Peshmerga-and-exposes-a-constitutional-fault-line

Al-Zaidi: Exorbitant project costs may amount to theft He's Getting Things Done Right...! latest news Monday, June 8, 2026 Al-Zaidi: Exorbitant project costs may amount to theft Baghdad - One News 6/08/2026 Prime Minister Ali Faleh al-Zaidi affirmed on Monday that the government will continue its efforts to combat corruption and restrict weapons to state institutions, stressing the need to pursue large-scale corruption and not be satisfied with small-time corrupt individuals. This came during his talk about the integration of service and development work between the governorates and the federal government, coinciding with his chairing of the meeting of the Ministerial Council for National Security. Al-Zaydi stressed the importance of addressing the issue of uncontrolled weapons and proceeding to restrict them to state institutions, in order to enhance security, stability and the rule of law. In the fight against corruption, the Prime Minister indicated the need for measures to include the major figures involved, warning against directing actions towards minor corrupt individuals and leaving the higher levels untouched. He directed that the review and auditing processes for projects should begin from the stage of determining estimated costs, and that these procedures should be carried out with integrity and transparency to protect public funds. Al-Zaydi said that there is an unacceptable exaggeration in the estimated costs of some projects, indicating that these increases may amount to theft. On the service side, he affirmed the government’s support for self-financing projects in the governorates, particularly in the electricity sector, with the energy-producing governorate receiving 50 percent of the revenues. He also called for investment in commercial plots, water projects and services in a way that contributes to improving the level of services and maximizing local revenues, stressing the need for revenues from border crossings to be reflected in the development of the concerned governorates. The Prime Minister also stressed the need to respect the rights of the martyrs, the wounded, and their families, stressing that fulfilling these rights is a great responsibility that falls on the state. https://1news-iq.net/الزيدي-كلف-المشاريع-المبالغ-فيها-قد-تص/

Araghchi to Aoun: Lebanon is not a bargaining chip for Iran Middle EastiranIsraelLebanonWar 2026-06-06 / 05:43 Shafaq News- Tehran/ Beirut Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi on Saturday rejected Lebanese President Joseph Aoun's claim that Tehran is using Lebanon as a “bargaining chip” in its negotiations with the United States. (this is very obvious by every statement from negotiators) Responding to remarks Aoun made in an interview with CNN, Araghchi argued that Iran was not responsible for Lebanon's suffering, pointing instead to Israel's military actions in the country. (must watch video clip below) X Seyed Abbas Araghchi @araghchi Based on Mr. Aoun's comments, one would think it's Iran that has occupied 1/5 of Lebanon, displaced 1/4 of Lebanese and bombing his country on daily basis. Had Lebanon been bargaining chip for Iran, we'd have a deal long ago. Save Lebanon from your real foe, Mr. President. X CNN @CNN In an exclusive interview with CNN, Lebanese President Joseph Aoun tells CNN's Christiane Amanpour his message to the IRGC and Iran. Video Link: https://x.com/CNN/status/2062888530200711323/video/1 "Had Lebanon been bargaining chip for Iran, we'd have had a deal long ago. Save Lebanon from your real foe, Mr. President," he added. Tehran has repeatedly maintained that any agreement with Washington must include an end to Israeli hostilities in Lebanon. Aoun on Friday claimed that Iran was using Lebanon as leverage in its talks with the US and that the Lebanese people were paying the price for Tehran's interests. Addressing Iran, he remarked, "You are not trying to help us", and described growing public fatigue with the conflict between Israel and Iran-aligned Hezbollah. https://shafaq.com/en/Middle-East/Araghchi-to-Aoun-Lebanon-is-not-a-bargaining-chip-for-Iran

Ali Al-Zaidi's incomplete cabinet faces Iraqi armed factions test In-DepthbreakingCoordination FrameworkIraqi armed factionsAli Al-Zaidi 2026-05-22 / 02:12 Shafaq News Iraq’s new Prime Minister, Ali al-Zaidi, entered office under the shadow of an incomplete parliamentary mandate after the Iraqi parliament approved only 14 cabinet ministers, leaving nine key sovereign and service portfolios unresolved, including the ministries of Interior, Defense, and Planning. The delay has not been viewed as a routine political dispute over appointments. Instead, it reflects deeper tensions tied to the restructuring of Iraq’s post-2003 political order and the future role of armed Shiite factions within the state apparatus. Vacant ministries encompass some of Iraq’s most critical institutions, overseeing security, administration, and economic planning. The Interior and Defense portfolios, in particular, remain highly contentious because they are directly tied to the issue of weapons control and the influence of armed factions, a file that lies at the heart of both Baghdad’s relationship with Washington and rivalries within the Shiite political camp. Amid a highly sensitive regional and international climate, Baghdad faces increasing US pressure alongside escalating competition among factions within the Coordination Framework. At the same time, Iraqi political forces are attempting to craft a governing arrangement capable of containing external demands without upsetting the country’s fragile internal equilibrium. Read more: Iraq’s armed factions, state authority, and the battle over disarmament Armed Factions and the Post-2003 Order One of the most significant transformations in Iraq since 2003 has been the evolution of armed factions from military actors into influential political stakeholders with direct leverage over state institutions. Many of these groups expanded their influence during the war against ISIS and now maintain substantial parliamentary, political, and economic power that major Iraqi parties can no longer ignore. Political researcher Ramadan Al-Badran told Shafaq News that the issue of armed factions is simultaneously a domestic Iraqi crisis and part of a broader regional confrontation. “The factions’ relationship with Iran makes them part of the wider tension between Tehran and Washington,” Al-Badran said, arguing that the post-2003 political system, particularly during the governments of former Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki between 2006 and 2014, “effectively legitimized the presence of these groups by presenting them as defenders of Iraq’s political order.” He questioned the current calls to limit factional influence, asking why parallel military formations were established outside the traditional army structure in the first place and why they are now being asked to retreat after years of participating in protecting the state. Read more: Ali Al-Zaidi sworn in as Iraq's prime minister with a program already failed A Consensus Prime Minister Observers interviewed by Shafaq News said Al-Zaidi’s selection was less the result of political dominance within the Coordination Framework than a compromise among competing Shiite forces seeking a figure capable of managing internal rivalries. Haitham Hadi Numan, Professor of Political Science at the University of Exeter, noted that Al-Zaidi emerged as a consensus candidate acceptable to the major factions inside the alliance, and the forces within the Coordination Framework now possess relatively balanced influence that prevents any single party from dominating. “Therefore, they chose a figure who can be politically managed.” According to Numan, confrontation with armed factions “remains unlikely” in the current phase. Instead, Iraq’s ruling forces appear more inclined toward the “legal institutionalization” of these groups within state structures. Read more: The Shiite Coordination Framework: Can govern Iraq, but cannot agree on a primeminister Factions Push Back Pillar One of al-Zaidi’s program commits the government to consolidating all weapons under exclusive state authority, meaning no armed group outside the formal military and security structure should operate independently. In most countries, this would be an unremarkable statement, but in Iraq, it is the central unresolved dilemma of the post-2003 political order. Signs of resistance quickly emerged. Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba rejected suggestions that the government’s pledge to limit weapons to state authority applies to what it called “resistance weapons.” The group’s Executive Council chief, Nazem Al-Saadi, stressed that the term “uncontrolled weapons” referred only to illegal arms that create “chaos,” insisting that it did not include weapons held by fighters who “defended Iraq, its holy sites, and its people during the most difficult circumstances.” At the same time, new fractures appear to be emerging within the Coordination Framework itself. A well-informed source revealed to Shafaq News that five influential Shiite leaders are holding advanced discussions to establish a new parliamentary alliance that could significantly reshape Iraq’s ruling coalition landscape. The figures involved include Nouri Al-Maliki, leader of the State of Law Coalition; Hadi Al-Ameri, leader of the Badr Organization and head of the Fatah Alliance; Faleh Al-Fayyad; Humam Hamoudi; and Ahmed al-Asadi. According to the source, the proposed bloc could include between 75 and 100 lawmakers, potentially making it one of the largest organized opposition forces in parliament despite originating from within the Shiite political establishment itself. If formed, the alliance would signal not only dissatisfaction with Al-Zaidi’s government arrangements but also deeper competition over the future leadership of the Coordination Framework and the distribution of influence inside the Shiite camp. Washington Pressure and Baghdad’s Balancing Act In recent months, Washington has intensified sanctions targeting individuals linked to armed factions while repeatedly stressing that restricting weapons to state control remains a prerequisite for deeper bilateral cooperation with Baghdad. Iraqi political sources have also spoken of an undeclared American veto against the participation of armed factions in government institutions. The US Department of State has indicated that its relationship with the new Iraqi government will be judged “by actions, not words,” placing Baghdad in a difficult position. The Iraqi government must preserve the cohesion of its internal alliances while simultaneously avoiding confrontation with Washington, whose support remains critical for Iraq’s economic stability, security cooperation, and international relations. Read more: Ali al-Zaidi named Iraq's prime minister: Easy nomination, harder road ahead Iraq’s Unresolved State Dilemma According to analysts, the troubled birth of Al-Zaidi’s government underscores a structural crisis that extends far beyond cabinet formation or ministerial quotas. At its core, the conflict concerns the nature of the Iraqi state itself: the limits of armed faction influence, the future of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), and Baghdad’s relationship with competing regional and international powers. Caught between American pressure, Iranian calculations, and the internal balance of the Coordination Framework, the new prime minister faces a defining challenge: either engineer a new political settlement capable of reorganizing the relationship between the state and armed factions or enter another prolonged phase of political paralysis. One notable indicator of the current compromise is the absence of any explicit commitment in the government program regarding the future of the PMF or its weapons. That omission raises a central question now dominating Iraq’s political debate: can the PMF become the foundation for a broader political settlement between the state and the factions, or has the issue already moved beyond the limits of purely Iraqi solutions? Read more: Iraq's new political equation: Armed groups' gains put pressure on US https://shafaq.com/en/Report/Iraq-s-Ali-Al-Zaidi-incomplete-government-faces-power-struggle-under-armed-factions-crisis

What does Iraq's new government promise? A guide to Ali Al-Zaidi's ministerial program In-DepthbreakingiranIsraelUSAMiddle Eastnew governmentIraq politicsAli Al-Zaidi 2026-05-17 / 06:25 Shafaq News- Baghdad Iraq has a new prime minister and a new government program. For anyone outside the country trying to understand what Ali Falih Al-Zaidi's administration has actually committed to —and where the obstacles are already visible— the fourteen-pillar document ratified by parliament on May 14 offers a detailed, if carefully worded, set of answers. This is what it says, and what it leaves unresolved. The Hardest Commitment: Weapons and the State Pillar One commits the government to consolidating all weapons under exclusive state authority, meaning no armed group outside the formal military and security structure should operate independently. In most countries, this would be an unremarkable statement, but in Iraq, it is the central unresolved dilemma of the post-2003 political order. The Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), an umbrella of predominantly Shiite armed factions that mobilized against ISIS after 2014, operates under nominal state authority but maintains independent command structures, funding channels, and regional alignments, most significantly with Iran. Read more: Tehran vs. Baghdad: Iraq’s armed factions face a strategic recalculation The Al-Zaidi program does not dissolve the PMF. It commits to enhancing their combat capabilities while formally defining their responsibilities within the military structure according to law. Whether that legal definition materializes, and what it contains, will determine whether this pillar carries any practical weight. Read more: Why Iraq’s PMF disarmament is a different battle from Lebanon’s Hezbollah The deferred cabinet portfolios tell their own story. Nine ministries remained unfilled after the May 14 session, including Defense and Interior, the two posts most directly responsible for implementing a weapons monopoly. The impasse was driven partly by the blocking of Nouri Al-Maliki’s State of Law Coalition candidate Qasim Atta for the Interior Minister post, with lawmakers accusing rival blocs of "injustice, betrayal, and treachery." By convention in Iraq's sectarian power-sharing system, the Defense Ministry goes to a Sunni figure, with competing Sunni alliances —including the Taqaddum party led by former Parliament Speaker Mohammed Al-Halbousi and the Al-Azm alliance— submitting rival candidate lists. Political sources told Shafaq News that Washington's categorical rejection of any names perceived as close to armed factions or directly under the Coordination Framework's influence was the principal obstacle to resolving the sovereign portfolios. Read more: Iraq after the regional ceasefire: US bases and unresolved political questions Foreign Policy: Sovereignty Under Pressure Al-Zaidi's program describes an active foreign policy built on balance: keeping Iraq out of regional and international conflict axes while maintaining productive relationships in every direction. The language is deliberate and familiar from previous Iraqi governments. What is specific is a commitment to activate the Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA) with the United States in a way that guarantees mutual interests. The SFA, signed in 2008 alongside a Status of Forces Agreement that set the original timeline for US troop withdrawal, governs the broader bilateral relationship covering defense, economic, energy, and cultural cooperation. A September 2024 security agreement between Baghdad and Washington called for most US-led coalition forces to relocate from Iraqi bases to the Kurdistan Region by September 2025, with the bulk of remaining troops scheduled to depart by September 2026, leaving the SFA as the framework for whatever security relationship follows. Read more: US-Iraq security agreements keep failing Al-Zaidi's endorsement of the SFA is notable precisely because it arrives under pressure. Days before the confidence vote, the Wall Street Journal reported that Israel had established a secret military base in Iraq's western desert, southwest of Najaf, to support its aerial campaign against Iran, and those Israeli forces launched airstrikes on Iraqi troops who nearly discovered the site in early March, killing one Iraqi soldier. Shafaq News sources learned that the United States blocked an Iraqi investigation into the base. The episode landed directly in the new government's lap: a program committing to the principle that Iraq will not be used as a corridor for attacks on other states, adopted days after evidence emerged that its territory had been used for precisely that, with American awareness. Read more: Israel's secret base in Iraq: what happened in the western desert and why Baghdad couldn't respond Al-Zaidi's program also prioritizes building relations with Gulf states and advancing the Development Road, a major infrastructure corridor intended to link the Arabian Gulf to Turkiye and Europe through Iraqi territory, as well as a commitment to channel all international engagement through official diplomatic channels. Read more: Rentier no more? Baghdad’s $17B gamble on the Development Road The Economy: Ambitious Architecture, Familiar Pressures Three new institutional bodies anchor the economic program. A Supreme Council for Financial and Monetary Stability would coordinate fiscal and monetary policy. A Supreme Investment Council would rebuild the framework for attracting foreign direct investment. A Generations Fund would preserve Iraqi citizens' future share of oil and natural resource revenues —a sovereign wealth mechanism with structural parallels to Norway's Government Pension Fund and several Gulf state models. Banking reform is a stated priority, with explicit reference to anti-money laundering compliance and international banking standards. The framing is directly relevant to Al-Zaidi's own background: he previously served as chairman of Al-Janoob Islamic Bank, which was sanctioned by the United States in 2024 over alleged money laundering on behalf of Iran and Iranian-backed Iraqi Shiite armed groups. While Al-Zaidi is not himself under sanctions, the institution he once led sat at the center of the exact tension he must now navigate as head of government. An investigation by financial crime assessment firm K2 Integrity found no credible evidence linking Al-Zaidi to Iran-linked financial activities, with a source noting the restrictions were imposed for reputational risk rather than proven involvement in money laundering. Beyond Al-Janoob, the broader banking sector has faced sweeping US Treasury measures in recent years, with dozens of Iraqi private banks cut off from dollar-clearing access over compliance failures. The banking reform pillar addresses this directly, though the political will to implement it against the interests of faction-linked financial networks remains the central question. Read more: Sovereignty strain: US sanctions trigger Iraq's liquidity nightmare The program also commits to expanding the role of the insurance sector in the national economy, a commitment that signals awareness of a market that remains underdeveloped relative to Iraq's economic scale. The private sector is positioned as the primary driver of growth and employment, with monopoly prevention and competitive principles written into the framework. Foreign companies operating in Iraq, particularly major oil firms, are promised dedicated security protection. How much of this framework gets built depends substantially on global oil prices, which fund roughly 90 percent of the Iraqi state budget, a dependency the program acknowledges but cannot resolve. Read more: Revitalizing Iraq's private sector: challenges, initiatives, and economic resilience Energy: The Iranian Gas Problem Iraq's electricity crisis is among the most visible failures of post-2003 governance, and the program addresses it in unusual technical detail. But the structural problem runs deeper than the reform agenda acknowledges. The sanctions waiver that had exempted Baghdad from penalties for purchasing Iranian energy expired in March 2025 under the Trump administration, which declined to renew it. At peak supply, Iran was delivering around 30 million cubic meters of gas per day to Iraq, enough to support nearly a third of the country's power generation capacity. Iranian gas flows dropped by roughly 40 percent between April and August 2025 as sanctions enforcement tightened. Iraq now faces peak summer demand of roughly 40 gigawatts against current production of approximately 29 gigawatts, a shortfall that Iranian imports once helped partially bridge and that domestic alternatives have not yet replaced. Read more: Iraq power 2026: war on Iran collapses the grid's last defenses ahead of peak summer The program commits to ending this dependency by accelerating associated gas capture, reducing flaring, and developing domestic gas production on a fixed timeline coordinated with the oil ministry. Iraq simultaneously flares enough natural gas to power millions of homes while importing gas from Iran to keep power plants running —a paradox that successive governments have promised to resolve, and none has fully delivered. The program also commits to legislating the long-stalled Oil and Gas Law, a draft that has remained deadlocked in parliament since 2007 and whose passage would directly affect revenue-sharing arrangements between Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). Read more: Iraq's gas flaring paradox: a wealth of resources, a nation in need The electricity pillar also calls for private sector participation in distribution, transition to smart grid infrastructure, and a tariff review with explicit protection for low-income households. Governance and Corruption: The Recurring Commitment The governance pillar commits to institutional reform across all ministries, digital transformation to reduce bureaucracy, financial investigation mechanisms running parallel to legal proceedings, and decentralization of administrative and financial authority to the provinces. A national anti-corruption framework with clear legal and oversight mechanisms is promised. Read more: Iraq under US financial scrutiny: When corruption meets sovereignty The communications and technology pillar is among the more concrete and ambitious sections of the document. Beyond digital transformation of government services, national digital identity, and a data governance framework, the program commits to establishing national centers for cybersecurity and artificial intelligence and strengthening their institutional and technical capabilities. A national mobile license project in partnership with the Iraqi private sector is named specifically, a significant market reform in a sector currently dominated by a small number of operators under opaque regulatory arrangements. Most notable for an international technology audience is the commitment to position Iraq as an international data transit hub and a regional data exchange center. Iraq sits between three continents and borders six countries, a geographic reality the program proposes to monetize through digital infrastructure investment rather than leaving it underutilized. Regulatory oversight of social media content to enhance societal stability is also committed to, sitting in direct tension with the program's own guarantee of press freedom and freedom of opinion in the same pillar. Read more: Silenced voices: The treacherous reality for journalists in Iraq The two positions occupy the same government document: one promising to regulate online content, the other pledging to protect media freedom. How the government resolves that contradiction in practice will be an early indicator of its governance character, and one that international press freedom organizations are already positioned to monitor. Read more: Brainpower and bytes: Iraq's race for AI supremacy Human Capital: Education, Health, and Social Protection The education pillar commits to raising standards across public and private schools, continuing a school construction program funded through the Iraq-China framework agreement, launching a national literacy program, and expanding university specializations in modern fields. Support for study abroad scholarships in priority disciplines and scientific research centers is included. Read more: Iraq's education crisis: millions of children denied access to education Health commitments center on expanding insurance coverage, completing stalled hospital projects, and modernizing public hospitals, with a specific focus on rare medical specializations and pharmaceutical research and development. Read more: Iraq’s healthcare system nears collapse: Doctors leave, hospitals overflow The social protection pillar proposes a gradual shift from welfare dependency to economic empowerment, moving beneficiaries from cash assistance toward small and medium enterprise support, microfinance, and vocational training. Read more: The rentier trap: Iraq’s existential reform race Culture, Youth, and the National Identity Question A full pillar is devoted to culture, tourism, and archaeology, committing to revive Iraq's civilizational heritage in domestic and international forums, develop museums, including virtual ones, recover looted artifacts, and build cultural tourism into a source of budget revenue. Read more: Iraq: 250K graduates annually amid 20% youth unemployment A cultural security project is named explicitly, framing culture as a defense of national identity. In a country where sectarian and ethnic divisions remain politically operative, and where the government's own coalition reflects those divisions, the framing carries weight beyond its surface meaning. Read more: Faith and finances: Religious tourism fuels Iraq’s economy The youth and sports pillar calls for institutional empowerment of young Iraqis in decision-making, digital platforms for youth engagement, and funding models allowing sports clubs to sustain themselves from their own revenues rather than state dependency. Read more: Gold, silver, and growth: Iraq's sports sweep 2025 podium Human Rights, Women, and Civil Society Pillar Twelve addresses human rights, women, and children, and for international observers, it is among the more closely watched sections of any Iraqi government program. The commitments include combating all forms of violence and discrimination against women and children through legislation against domestic violence, accountability in cases of abuse, and embedding a human rights culture across state institutions. Leadership training programs for women in government and political work are specifically named, alongside a commitment to treat women as active and fundamental partners in development and decision-making. Read more: From Canvas to Courtroom: Iraq’s dual battle for women’s safety The pillar also commits to strengthening the role of local and international civil society organizations in human rights protection, and to establishing an independent body for civil society affairs with a long-term plan to support, empower, and evaluate their social role. Whether the institutional calculus to implement them follows is a separate issue. Iraq ranked 132nd out of 146 countries in the World Economic Forum's 2024 Global Gender Gap Index, and civil society organizations have operated under increasing legal and political pressure in recent years. Industry: Restoring a Neglected Sector Iraq's industrial sector, once a meaningful contributor to the national economy, has contracted sharply over decades of conflict, sanctions, and oil dependency. Pillar Five commits to reversing that trajectory through legislative and regulatory reform, with the stated goal of increasing the industry's share of gross domestic product and reducing reliance on oil revenues. The program identifies strategic industries —food processing, pharmaceuticals, and construction materials— as priority sectors, and commits to reactivating stalled state-owned factories through partnerships with strategic investors from inside and outside Iraq. Export-oriented industries and those with high local employment intensity receive preferential treatment under the framework, alongside environmentally-friendly projects. The development of industrial cities is named as a structural goal, alongside streamlining the administrative procedures and licensing processes that have long deterred private industrial investment. An export support fund and a policy of protecting domestic products against dumping are also committed to, measures that signal an intent to use trade policy actively rather than leaving local manufacturers exposed to cheaper imports. How much of this translates into functioning industrial policy depends heavily on the investment climate reforms promised in the economic pillar and on the security guarantees the government can credibly offer to private and foreign investors. Read more: Can "Made in Iraq" rise again? Challenges and hopes for local manufacturing Agriculture, Water, and Food Security Iraq sits at the downstream end of the Tigris and Euphrates river system, with Turkiye and Iran controlling significant upstream flow through dam construction and diversion projects that have reduced Iraqi river levels dramatically over the past two decades. Against that backdrop, Pillar Six commits to restoring agricultural production as a vital economic sector, adopting modern irrigation techniques, and pursuing food security as an explicit policy goal. The program commits to leveraging Iraq's political and economic relationships with upstream countries to secure maximum water benefit, directing those relationships specifically toward agricultural development. Livestock production, reduction of food imports, local and foreign agricultural investment, and water conservation across all sectors are also addressed. The UN has identified Iraq as one of the five countries most vulnerable to climate change and water scarcity, an urgency the document itself does not fully convey. Read more: Iraq's agricultural landscape: Overcoming challenges amid water scarcity What the Program Does Not Resolve Similar commitments appeared in the programs of both of Al-Zaidi's immediate predecessors, Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani and Mustafa Al-Kadhimi. According to a Shafaq News analysis comparing the programs of Al-Zaidi and his two immediate predecessors, the vast majority of core commitments appeared verbatim in one or both previous programs without having been resolved. The program does not name specific cases, frozen assets, or institutional targets, standard for a program document, but limiting for any observer trying to identify measurable commitments. However, Al-Zaidi's ministerial program is more technically specific than many of its predecessors in several areas, particularly banking reform, energy, and digital governance. The nine unfilled cabinet posts —Defense, Interior, Planning, Culture, Reconstruction and Housing, Higher Education, Labor, Migration and Displacement, and Youth and Sports— will be negotiated in a subsequent parliamentary session after the Eid al-Adha holiday. The outcomes, particularly for Defense and Interior, will signal more about the direction of this government than any written commitment. Three structural realities sit outside the document's pages. The armed factions' question is the load-bearing issue: the program commits to a state weapons monopoly, while the political system that produced this government includes actors with direct interests in preventing that monopoly from becoming real. The Israeli base episode and the US sanctions pressure over banking and armed factions' inclusion have narrowed Al-Zaidi's room to maneuver before his government has fully formed. Iraq's budget remains overwhelmingly dependent on oil. Every reform ambition in this document: the Generations Fund, the investment councils, the hospital projects, the school construction, is downstream of a commodity price set in markets Baghdad does not control. The post-Eid parliamentary session is the first measurable test of whether the commitments in this document have the political backing to survive contact with reality. Read more: Failure or feat? A bold assessment of PM Al-Sudani's tenure Written and edited by Shafaq News Staff. https://shafaq.com/en/Report/What-does-Iraq-s-new-government-promise-A-guide-to-Ali-Al-Zaidi-s-ministerial-program

A Najafi source: Al-Sadr's contact with Al-Zaydi constitutes a "shock" within the Coordination Framework forces, and there are fears of support for Al-Hanana latest news Monday, May 18, 2026 Al-Sadr's contact with Al-Zaydi constitutes a "shock" within the Coordination Framework forces, and there are fears of support for Al-Hanana Najaf – One News 5/18/2026 A source in Najaf revealed that the phone call made by the leader of the Shiite National Movement, Muqtada al-Sadr, to Prime Minister Ali al-Zidi constituted a “shock” within the forces of the Coordination Framework, in light of what he described as growing fears about the repercussions of al-Sadr’s support for al-Zaidi on the balance of political power. The source said that al-Sadr’s support for al-Zaydi “will put him in a stronger position against the interventions of some of the cadre leaders”, noting that al-Sadr sees in al-Zaydi “a figure who possesses the necessary determination to correct the course of the political process and save the country”, as he put it. He added that al-Sadr supports the government's approach to combating corruption, and believes that the current stage requires giving the Prime Minister more space to implement real reforms away from political pressures and partisan rivalries. The source indicated that the atmosphere of concern within the coordination framework escalated after the contact, amid estimates that any rapprochement between Al-Sadr and Al-Zaydi could redraw political alliances during the next stage. https://1news-iq.net/مصدر-نجفي-اتصال-الصدربالزيديشكّل-صدم/

Ahmed Al-Basheer ridicules Iraq’s political system as Al-Zaidi nomination fuels criticism PoliticsiraqAli Al-ZaidiAhmed Al-Basheer 2026-05-13 / 15:49 Shafaq News- Washington Iraqi political satirist Ahmed Al-Basheer on Wednesday delivered a public critique of Iraq’s post-2003 political order, mocking the opaque rise of businessman Ali Al-Zaidi toward the premiership and arguing that elections in Iraq have become little more than a ceremonial exercise overshadowed by elite bargaining and foreign influence. Speaking during a session hosted by the Atlantic Council, Al-Basheer said Iraqis were introduced to Al-Zaidi’s candidacy with almost no public understanding of who he was politically. “We woke up one morning to headlines saying Ali Al-Zaidi would become the next prime minister,” he said. “Honestly, I had never heard of him as a politician. I only knew him as a businessman whose food products I personally buy abroad.” The comedian then turned the discussion into a broader indictment of Iraq’s political culture. “We know nothing about this man,” he continued. “Is he Islamist? Liberal? Atheist? Nobody knows because he has never even given an interview. We are dealing with a ghost prime minister. We do not even know what his voice sounds like. The voice we eventually hear could literally be AI.” Read more: Who is Ali Al-Zaidi? The businessman tapped for Iraq's premiership Drawing laughter from the audience, Al-Basheer mocked the media image circulated of Al-Zaidi, saying he had expected “the traditional Iraqi political figure with a thick moustache and an old-fashioned suit,” only to find someone who “looks more like your friend from a café smoking shisha than the man expected to run a country drowning in crises.” But the sharpest part of Al-Basheer’s remarks targeted the political system itself rather than Al-Zaidi personally. He argued that Iraqi elections have steadily lost meaning because real power lies in closed-door negotiations among party leaders and regional actors. “Since 2005, Iraqis vote in one direction and America or Iran pushes things in another,” he said. “We exhaust ourselves with purple ink [elections] while nine political leaders sit in a room deciding who comes next. Why continue this game at all?” Al-Basheer described parliament as a “gold mine” for comedy, portraying lawmakers as figures driven less by policy conviction than by instructions from party leadership. “Our MPs suddenly become guardians of morality when a woman wearing a short skirt appears on television,” he said sarcastically. “But on oil, corruption, and stolen money, they turn into puppets waiting for WhatsApp instructions.” The Iraqi presenter also painted a bleak picture of media freedom inside the country, arguing that most television channels operate as extensions of political factions rather than independent institutions. “Yes, Iraq has hundreds of channels,” he said. “But they function exactly like our democracy. Every outlet attacks the rival side only until political deals are reached. Once agreements happen, the ‘freedom of expression’ disappears overnight.” He added that his ability to criticize political figures openly was tied largely to the fact that he lives outside Iraq. Still, Al-Basheer surprised some attendees by saying that the era of former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki witnessed broader tolerance toward media criticism than later periods. “I criticized al-Maliki relentlessly and he never pursued me legally,” he said. Despite his criticism, Al-Basheer ended on a more hopeful note, saying meaningful change in Iraq would ultimately come from society itself rather than from outside intervention. He also recalled receiving a phone call from former Prime Minister Haider Al-Abadi after Al-Abadi left office, during which Al-Abadi thanked him for exposing “the snakes” surrounding his administration, despite years of criticism directed at him on the show. “I once believed one sentence could change the country overnight,” he said. “Now I believe change takes time. Iraqis will eventually reclaim their country from corruption and militias, just as the October protest movement surprised all of us. No Iron Man is coming to save Iraq —Iraqis will have to do it themselves.” https://www.shafaq.com/en/Iraq/Ahmed-Al-Basheer-ridicules-Iraq-s-political-system-as-Al-Zaidi-nomination-fuels-criticism

The mediator in the room: President Barzani comes to Baghdad with more than Erbil's demands In-DepthBaghdadNechirvan BarzaniKurdistan regionvisit 2026-05-05 / 03:58 Shafaq News In Baghdad, governments are not born from ballot boxes alone; they emerge from a long chain of understandings, guarantees, and mutual anxieties, and it was into this chain that Kurdistan Region President Nechirvan Barzani pressed his weight during a two-day visit to the capital that, in its timing and the breadth of its meetings, amounted to something more deliberate than protocol. On the surface, the visit followed a familiar pattern: a Kurdish leader arrives in Baghdad ahead of a new government cycle, reaffirms constitutional principles, and returns to Erbil. But the political moment it landed in was anything but routine. Iraq's government formation process is unfolding under simultaneous pressure from an unresolved regional conflict, Washington's recalibrating posture toward Baghdad, Tehran's calculations about the next Iraqi cabinet, and a set of Erbil-Baghdad disputes —oil, salaries, budget allocations, the status of disputed territories under Article 140— that have not left the negotiating table in years. Within the first hours of his arrival, Barzani met with leaders of the Shiite ruling Coordination Framework, including State of Law head, Nouri al-Maliki, caretaker Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, al-Hikma (Wisdom) Movement leader Ammar al-Hakim, then with prime minister-designate Ali Falah al-Zaidi, and leaders of the Sunni National Political Council. Read more: Who is Ali Al-Zaidi? The businessman tapped for Iraq's premiership The agenda moved from government formation to oil revenue sharing, salary arrears, the federal budget, and the necessity of insulating Iraq from regional escalation —a range that reflected not a courtesy call but a substantive attempt to shape the parameters of what comes next. Official statements from the meetings emphasized the need for a government "commensurate with the challenges of the current phase," capable of meeting the demands of Iraq's constituent communities while resolving outstanding Erbil-Baghdad disputes on a constitutional basis. (Oil & Gas Law/HCL) Barzani also reaffirmed Kurdistan's readiness to support the new government's formation. Read more: Ali al-Zaidi named Iraq's prime minister: Easy nomination, harder road ahead Testing the Ground Kurdish politician Abd al-Salam Barwari described the visit as "a new positive development for breaking the tensions that accompanied the post-presidential election phase" —tensions that had been building since the KDP staked a claim to the Iraqi presidency as a matter of established political entitlement, only to find Sunni and Shiite coalition leaders divided between rival Kurdish candidates, with some backing the PUK's nominee, Nizar Amedi, over Fuad Hussein, one of the KDP's most senior figures. Barwari was careful to characterize Barzani's meetings as exploratory rather than conclusive— closer to preliminary consultations for testing positions and exchanging views before the moment of decision than to a finalized political settlement. Speaking to Shafaq News, Barwari pointed to al-Zaidi's recent visit to Erbil, where the prime minister-designate met separately with Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) leader Masoud Barzani, President Nechirvan Barzani, PM Masrour Barzani, and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan head, Bafel Talabani, as evidence that the Kurdistan Region's position is being treated as a structural variable in the government formation calculus, not an afterthought. The KDP's weight in that calculus is concrete: the party secured over one million votes in November's parliamentary elections, the highest total of any single party nationwide, translating into 26 seats in parliament, making it a bloc no government formation can ignore mathematically. Political circles in Baghdad read that visit as an attempt to avoid repeating the crises that plagued previous governments' relationships with the Region from the outset. Researcher in political affairs Suhad al-Shammari offered a broader frame, noting that the current government formation is unfolding in conditions meaningfully different from previous cycles, with a prime minister-designate navigating simultaneously between rebuilding trust among political forces, managing divisions within each community, and arranging a working relationship with the Kurdistan Region that does not begin in confrontation. Barzani's visit, in her assessment, signals Kurdistan's readiness to “engage constructively,” though she stopped short of predicting specific outcomes, describing the visit's likely contribution as “bringing positions closer rather than resolving the underlying disputes.” That picture from the meetings said more than any statement. In one session with leaders of the Sunni National Political Council, Barzani sat at the center flanked by prominent Sunni figures, including rivals Khamis al-Khanjar and Mohammed al-Halbousi, a composition that appeared to summarize the visit's function. He was not present solely as Erbil's representative but as someone operating in the grey space between adversaries, attempting to anchor a proposition: that the next government cannot be born from an internal Shiite understanding alone, nor from an isolated distribution of positions, but from a broader equilibrium that includes Kurds, Sunnis, and Shiites within a single political architecture. Both sides agreed that the new government must prioritize services and reconstruction, and that dialogue among political forces must be the entry point for resolving crises rather than a formality that follows them. Files That Never Leave the Table Political analyst Ali al-Baydar situated the visit within a structural argument, telling Shafaq News that the issue is less about individual political figures than about the prevailing political culture, and that the next government will largely be a continuation of the Coordination Framework's internal balances, with the variable being how Baghdad manages its relationship with Erbil rather than whether that relationship changes fundamentally. Al-Baydar assessed al-Zaidi as someone disinclined toward escalation with the Region or toward unilateral decisions against it, suggesting the new prime minister-designate may offer more room for addressing outstanding files within constitutional frameworks than his predecessors, while leaving open whether that room translates into resolved disputes. Hussein al-Kinani, head of al-Hadaf Center for Studies, noted to Shafaq News that Barzani's meetings with al-Zaidi fall within the standard pattern of coalition-building that precedes every new government cycle, but that their substantive content centers on concrete unresolved files: the federal budget, oil exports, oil and non-oil revenues, and the degree to which both Erbil and Baghdad have honored previous agreements. Those files carry weight beyond the political. Salaries in the Kurdistan Region have become a recurring living crisis for the population. Oil has become the permanent headline of the constitutional and financial dispute between Erbil and Baghdad, a dispute sharpened in 2023 when the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris ruled that Turkiye must pay Iraq approximately $1.5 billion for breaching the Iraq-Turkiye Pipeline agreement by allowing unauthorized Kurdish oil exports, halting loading, and export operations through the pipeline, and significantly impacting the Region's revenues. The budget, renegotiated in cycles, has exposed the fragility of arrangements that both sides treat as temporary. Taken together, they make Barzani's visit an early test of whether the incoming government intends to manage these crises as it finds them or move toward closing them, a distinction that matters more to the Region's population than to the political class on either side. Read more: Into 2026, Baghdad and Erbil face the same disputes—with higher stakes Al-Zaidi is operating under time pressure, constitutionally required to present his cabinet within 30 days, and aware that passing the government will require more than a numerical parliamentary majority; it will require understandings that ensure Kurdish and Sunni participation within an arrangement that no party feels excluded from. Barzani's visit, in this reading, functions as an attempt to produce a dual political guarantee: an assurance to Erbil that the incoming Baghdad will not revert to the language of financial pressure and punitive measures, and an assurance to Baghdad that the Region will be a source of governmental stability rather than a recurring source of tension. The details of ministerial portfolios and the distribution of positions also remain subject to ongoing negotiation. What Barzani's visit makes visible is that the contest over the next government is not only about who enters the cabinet, but about the shape of the state that cabinet will manage, the boundaries of the relationship between center and Region, and Iraq's capacity to hold its internal arrangements together in a region changing faster than its political class is moving to keep pace. The Bill Comes Due Three baseline conditions Barzani wanted to stress before the new government takes shape: genuine partnership in decision-making, constitutional rather than provisional solutions to the outstanding files, and Iraq's insulation from the currents of regional escalation. Whether those conditions become structurally embedded in the next government or remain aspirational language in post-meeting statements is the question the visit leaves open. Written and edited by Shafaq News staff. https://www.shafaq.com/en/Report/The-mediator-in-the-room-President-Barzani-comes-to-Baghdad-with-more-than-Erbil-s-demands

Ali al-Zaidi's nomination tests Iraq’s 2003 order as consensus system holds PoliticsiraqbreakingPrime ministerAli Al-Zaidi 2026-04-30 / 08:47 Shafaq News – Baghdad Iraq’s nomination of Prime Minister-designate Ali al-Zaidi is being presented by political actors as a potential shift from the post-2003 governing model, while others point to the continuation of the same consensus-based system that has shaped successive governments. Since 2003, executive authority has passed through successive leaders under varying internal and external conditions, from Iyad Allawi’s interim government to Ibrahim al-Jaafari, Nouri al-Maliki’s two terms, Haider al-Abadi during the war against ISIS, Adel Abdul Mahdi, Mustafa al-Kadhimi, and most recently Mohammed Shia al-Sudani. This trajectory reflects a pattern in which governments are formed through political settlements aimed at managing crises rather than advancing long-term reform agendas. Within this context, Fahd al-Jubouri, a senior figure in al-Hikma (Wisdom) Movement led by Ammar al-Hakim, described the nomination as a departure from the established framework, stating it “falls outside the political system that has governed since 2003” and could mark “the beginning of a new phase in governance.” At the same time, the broader context of the nomination and the forces backing it point to the persistence of the same consensus mechanisms, indicating that any change will depend on implementation rather than political framing. Support for al-Zaidi has also come from other political actors. Ali al-Ahmad of the Taqaddum party, led by Mohammed al-Halbousi, confirmed backing for the Coordination Framework’s choice after “a prolonged period of negotiations.” He described the candidate as non-sectarian and capable of managing the next phase, while outlining priorities including political balance, resolving displacement, facilitating the return of residents to areas such as Jurf al-Sakhar -due to a combination of displacement, armed factions' control, and unresolved governance disputes- and maintaining balanced relations with neighboring states. Read more: Who is Ali Al-Zaidi? The businessman tapped for Iraq's premiership Al-Ahmad emphasized that the agreement reflects both political consensus and expectations tied to the government’s performance, effectively setting conditions for the next administration. Armed factions also remain influential in shaping the political environment. Kazem al-Fartousi, spokesperson for Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada, stated that “the premiership in Iraq is a constitutional entitlement representing the Shiite component,” linking the selection process to the Shiite Coordination Framework’s role, which holds about 162 of parliament’s 329 seats, as a representative of voters. He added that factions expect “real investment in the political process” and that the government program must prioritize “achieving full Iraqi sovereignty.” These positions reflect the role of armed groups within the governing structure, where their expectations intersect with political decision-making and shape the operating environment for the prime minister-designate. Economic conditions remain a central challenge as Iraq continues to rely heavily on oil revenues, with limited diversification, rising unemployment, and persistent administrative and financial corruption. Al-Jubouri described these pressures as “existing and cannot be denied,” underscoring the constraints facing any incoming government. These conditions point to the need for structural reforms, including economic reorganization, activation of productive sectors, and stronger oversight of public resources, although such measures often face resistance from entrenched interests. Relations between the federal government and the Kurdistan Region remain another key issue. Former Kurdistan parliament member Abdul Salam Barwari stated that tensions are “not the result of personal disputes” but stem from differing visions of the state. Barwari indicated that the Kurdistan Region adheres to the constitution on which the Iraqi state was established, while arguing that some actors in Baghdad continue to favor a centralized model, contributing to ongoing misunderstandings. Read more: Ali al-Zaidi named Iraq's prime minister: Easy nomination, harder road ahead https://www.shafaq.com/en/Iraq/Ali-al-Zaidi-s-nomination-tests-Iraq-s-2003-order-as-consensus-system-holds

Twenty-three years on: Iraq got what the 2003 invasion produced In-Depthiraq2003 invasion 2026-04-24 / 08:16 Shafaq News- Baghdad On April 9, 2003, American tanks rolled into the heart of Baghdad, and Saddam Hussein's statue fell. What followed —twenty-three years of political turbulence, economic dependency, sectarian fracture, and institutional fragility— is often described as a failure of reconstruction. The first and most consequential decision came within weeks of the invasion. US Administrator Paul Bremer (contrary to what Bush had intended) dissolved the Iraqi Army, dismissed the ministries of Defense and Interior, and put approximately 400,000 trained soldiers on the street without income, purpose, or a state to serve. Military expert Ali al-Maamari, speaking to Shafaq News, does not reach for diplomatic language to describe what followed. Bremer's decision, he says, "was unjust" —it left Iraq in a state of security anxiety and instability, directly enabling the rise of armed groups, sectarian terror, and ethnic fragmentation. The vacuum did not stay empty as Al-Qaeda and ISIS filled it. The competition, rather than cohesion, replaced the old order, fracturing it along the deepest available fault lines. Fahd al-Jubouri, a senior figure in the Al-Hikma Movement led by Ammar al-Hakim and a member of the Shiite Coordination Framework (CF), the dominant bloc in Iraqi politics, describes the post-2003 transition as moving from "a repressive dictatorial system to an unregulated democracy" that generated continuous crises. Over six electoral cycles, Iraqis chose their representatives. But the act of voting did not dissolve the divisions the new system had organized itself around —it institutionalized them. Read more: New era of control: Can Iraq's free press survive its politically-tainted rulers? Al-Jubouri puts it plainly: a portion of the Iraqi people lost their national identity. In its place rose sectarian, ethnic, and partisan identities, visible everywhere, and nowhere more toxically than on social media, where political disagreement collapsed into accusation. One person is dismissed as a nationalist, while another is labeled a traitor or a foreign agent. The vocabulary of national debate became the vocabulary of mutual delegitimization. "We are now in the middle of the road, trying to write the basic equation: a state that sponsors and takes responsibility for every detail," al-Jubouri says. Whether that equation gets written depends, he argues, on whether forces that benefit from a weak state can be contained. The economy followed its own version of the same logic. Economist Mustafa al-Faraj describes the post-2003 transition as a move from one form of dependency to another. Iraq exchanged the constraints of international embargo for near-total reliance on oil, which now accounts for roughly 90 percent of government revenue and 95 percent of exports, according to World Bank and IMF estimates. Youth unemployment approaches 30 percent. Public sector salaries and pensions consume more than half of national spending —a pattern the World Bank has repeatedly flagged as unsustainable. Read more: Youth in despair, no jobs to share: Iraq’s workforce hanging in the air The import liberalization that followed the invasion compounded the problem in ways that receive less attention than they deserve. Al-Faraj considered that opening the market "whetted the appetite of traders and neighboring countries at the expense of the local producer." With the agriculture hollowed out and the industry stalled, the public sector expanded to absorb labor that a productive economy would have generated differently. Iraq sits on some of the world's largest proven oil reserves and cannot reliably power its own cities, having spent more than $80 billion on electricity infrastructure since 2003, according to the Ministry of Electricity, with daily shortages still the norm. The media landscape underwent its own transformation, expansive in form, contested in substance. Media academic Haidar Shallal describes the shift from a single state broadcaster to a fragmented ecosystem of more than 100 satellite channels and hundreds of radio outlets as genuine but incomplete. The technology created space; professional and regulatory frameworks did not keep pace. The new emergence, Shallal argues, became "an arena of conflict between political, religious, and social forces" rather than a public sphere. Iraq now ranks 155th globally in press freedom, according to Reporters Without Borders, which has recorded more than 340 journalist deaths in the country over three decades —the highest of any city worldwide for Baghdad. Shallal's prescription is spare and pointed: Iraq needs media that "calms souls rather than terrifies them." Zooming out from the domestic, political science professor Issam al-Feyli of Al-Mustansiriya University places 2003 within a longer geopolitical rupture. The fall of Saddam Hussein's regime, he pointed out, was "the beginning of the New Middle East project" —one whose consequences extended far beyond Iraq's borders, contributing to the peaceful collapse of other regional governments, enabling expanded Israeli diplomatic presence across the Arab world, and draining the economic capacity of states through sustained internal conflict. Al-Feyli draws the comparison explicitly: what 2003 set in motion rivals the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 in its reordering of the regional map. Twenty-three years on, Iraq is neither collapsed nor consolidated. Its institutions function under strain. Its politics are active and divided, while its oil wealth is real and insufficient to substitute for a functioning economy. The events of April 2003 did remove a dictator, but also removed the architecture of a state and replaced it with conditions that produced, reliably and logically, everything that followed. Iraq, understood on its own terms, raises a harder question: given those conditions, what could realistically have succeeded? Written and edited by Shafaq News staff. https://shafaq.com/en/Report/Twenty-three-years-on-Iraq-got-what-the-2003-invasion-produced

The Shiite Coordination Framework: Can govern Iraq, but cannot agree on a prime minister In-DepthiraqbreakingPrime ministerCoordination Farmework 2026-04-22 / 12:55 Shafaq News Four days before a constitutional deadline that could tip Iraq's government formation into legal crisis, the Shiite Coordination Framework —the largest bloc in the country's 329-seat parliament— has failed repeatedly to agree on a candidate for prime minister. The meetings were derailed by numbers that look decisive on paper and are paralyzed in practice. The Framework holds 162 seats, nearly half of parliament, enough to claim the premiership designation under Iraq's post-2003 power-sharing system. Under that system, the prime minister is not elected by parliament but designated by whichever coalition can credibly claim the status of largest bloc, making the CF's internal selection process the real decision, and the subsequent parliamentary confidence vote its ratification. In practice, those 162 seats are distributed across two internally competing power centers whose interests diverge sharply enough that no combination of arguments, incentives, or face-saving formulas has yet produced a majority willing to commit to a single name. That ratification, however, is not guaranteed. A designated prime minister still requires the support of Sunni and Kurdish blocs to secure a parliamentary confidence vote. A candidate who arrives at that threshold without cross-community backing, regardless of how he was designated, cannot form a government. The internal CF contest and the broader parliamentary landscape are therefore inseparable, and the numbers across both arenas matter. Under Article 76 of the Iraqi constitution, the Framework has until April 26 to formally present its nominee to President Nizar Amedi, who was elected by parliament on April 11. The nominee then has 30 days to form a government and secure parliamentary confidence. Each day the Framework spends in a failed session is a day subtracted from that window, and a signal to Iraq's partners, creditors, and regional neighbors that the caretaker government of Mohammed Shia al-Sudani may be managing the country's affairs for considerably longer than anyone formally acknowledges. The 162-Seat Fiction The Framework declared itself the largest parliamentary bloc following the November 2025 elections and claimed the premiership designation on that basis. The declaration was procedurally correct. What it obscured is that the 162 seats it claimed are not a unified political force, but an institutional label applied to two categories of parties whose common ground begins and ends with Shiite identity. The first category, parties with active armed wings inside the Popular Mobilization Forces, accounts for 59 of those seats. Asaib Ahl al-Haq, the Iran-aligned paramilitary force that has since entered formal politics through its Sadiqoon movement, holds 27. The Badr Organization of Hadi al-Amiri holds 21. Kataib Hezbollah's political wing, Hoqooq, and Kataib Imam Ali's Khadamat movement add six and five, respectively. These blocs operate under a dual logic —parliamentary presence and armed capability— that gives them leverage inside the CF disproportionate to their seat count alone. The second category, CF members without armed wings, holds the Framework's numerical majority at 103 seats. Caretaker Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani's Reconstruction and Development coalition, the election's largest single winner with 46 seats, anchors this group. Nouri al-Maliki's State of Law coalition, which holds 29 seats and carries the Framework's formal nomination for the premiership, sits alongside Ammar al-Hakim's Al-Hikma Alliance with 18, and two smaller parties —Tasmeem and Abshir Ya Iraq— with six and four seats respectively. The distinction between these two categories matters more than the CF's aggregate figure suggests. The “civilian majority” within the Framework is theoretically dominant. It is also the most fractured half, because civilian parties calculate in terms of governance costs, international legitimacy, and cabinet portfolios, while the armed-wing blocs calculate in terms of PMF autonomy and institutional control of the security sector. Read more: Iraq’s next Prime Minister held hostage by US-Iran standoff The Calculus Of Deadlock The Framework formally nominated al-Maliki on January 24 by majority vote, not by the consensus that had governed previous nomination rounds. That procedural fracture signaled from the outset that his bid lacked the internal cohesion a confidence vote would eventually require. Four days later, US President Donald Trump publicly rejected the nomination, threatening to cut Washington's support for Baghdad if al-Maliki returned to power. The American position hardened further when US Envoy Tom Barrack visited Baghdad and conveyed the objection through diplomatic channels directly to Iraqi political leaders. Al-Maliki did not withdraw. His camp argued that the nomination was a collective CF decision rather than a personal ambition, and that any change of course must come from within the Framework itself. That framing —institutional loyalty as a shield against external pressure — has held his position in place even as the internal balance has shifted steadily against him. The seat count tells the story with unusual clarity. Al-Maliki's committed coalition spans three communities but remains numerically modest: his own State of Law with 29 seats, Al-Azm alliance leader Muthanna al-Samarrai's Sunni bloc with 15, and the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Masoud Barzani with 26. The KDP welcomed his nomination publicly and concluded a reciprocal arrangement, even if not publicly, under which al-Maliki's forces would back the KDP's presidential candidate, Foreign Minister Fouad Hussein. That arrangement collapsed on April 11 when parliament elected the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan's candidate Nizar Amedi as president, leaving the KDP without its side of the bargain and al-Maliki without his most significant non-Shiite backer. The forces aligned against al-Maliki's personal bid command significantly greater parliamentary weight, even if they do not always agree on an alternative. Al-Sudani's Reconstruction and Development coalition holds 46 seats. The Sadiqoon movement of Qais al-Khazali and the Al-Hikma Alliance of Ammar al-Hakim, whose positions have converged around resistance to al-Maliki specifically, together contribute 45. Mohammed al-Halbousi's Taqadum party, the largest Sunni force with 33 seats, had already rejected al-Maliki's nomination before Trump's statement, grounding its opposition in domestic political rivalry rather than American pressure. The PUK's 15 seats, anchored by its April 11 presidential victory, sit firmly in the anti-al-Maliki camp. Badr Organization leader Hadi al-Amiri's 21 seats remain formally neutral —the most consequential undeclared position in the entire negotiation. The combined weight of forces either opposed to al-Maliki or uncommitted to him exceeds 160 seats across all communities. His committed base sits at roughly 70. The gap between those two figures is a structural verdict. What has kept al-Maliki's position alive is not numbers but leverage: his ability to deny the CF the internal consensus it needs to formally displace him, and the absence of a challenger whom all opposing factions can agree to support. That absence has produced the current impasse. The Framework scheduled a decisive meeting for last Saturday, postponed it to Monday, and watched Monday's session end without resolution. Wednesday's attempt was similarly postponed to Friday, and April 26 is now four days away. Read more: Iraq Government Formation: The Constitution that cannot enforce its own deadlines The Mechanism Debate Inside the failed sessions, two voting proposals have emerged as the Framework's attempt to break its own impasse, according to sources who spoke to Shafaq News. The first would require any nominee to secure an absolute majority of CF members —a threshold of roughly 82 of 162 seats. Neither al-Maliki nor al-Sudani reaches that figure from his own bloc alone, making the outcome dependent on which man can pull Badr, Hoqooq, Khadamat, and the smaller parties into his column. The second proposal links the selection to the parliamentary weight of blocs backing each contender, with the winning candidate required to surpass a two-thirds threshold within the Framework's leadership structure, equivalent to approximately 10 leadership votes. This shifts the contest from seat counts to institutional seniority, a terrain where al-Maliki's longer roots inside the CF machinery could offset his numerical disadvantage. Both leaders have reportedly agreed that one of these mechanisms should govern the outcome. The agreement on process, however, masks a disagreement on proxy candidates that may prove equally difficult to resolve. Al-Maliki's camp has advanced Bassem al-Badri, chair of the Accountability and Justice Commission, as a compromise figure. Al-Sudani's coalition has put forward Ihsan al-Awadi, director of the caretaker prime minister's office. Thirty lawmakers from al-Sudani's own bloc have threatened to withdraw their support if al-Awadi is nominated —a signal of the factional tension running even within what should be the Framework's dominant force. Sources within the Framework told Shafaq News that if divisions persist, discussions may shift toward a third figure with political and administrative experience capable of addressing security, economic, and governance challenges while maintaining international acceptance. Caretaker Health Minister Saleh al-Hasnawi has been floated as one such name. The PMF's institutional status has emerged as a parallel sticking point in the cabinet portfolio negotiations. Armed-wing blocs are demanding that the PMF's designation as an independent body be preserved in any government formation agreement, a condition that directly shapes Washington's assessment of the next prime minister's willingness to constrain Iranian-aligned forces. The External Ceiling What the internal CF sessions have not fully absorbed is that the room where the designation is nominally being made is not the only room where it is actually being decided. The commander of Iran's Quds Force, Esmail Qaani, completed a covert multi-day visit to Baghdad —his presence, as is customary, unannounced until after the fact. He departed, leaving his deputy behind to monitor two parallel files: the status of Iraqi armed groups in the event of an Iran-US agreement, and the government formation process itself. The dual mandate of that deputy's presence reflects Tehran's consistent position: the PM selection and the broader regional negotiation are not separate files. In a message issued after his departure, Qaani stated that forming a government is "a purely Iraqi right," adding that "Iraq is too great for others to interfere in its affairs" —a formulation that pointedly referenced what he described as "perpetrators of crimes against humanity," understood as a reference to the United States. The statement publicly disavowed the very influence his presence was understood to be exercising. Most political observers in Baghdad read the visit itself as the signal, and the departing words as its diplomatic cover. The consequences of that visit became visible shortly after. The CF was on the verge of naming al-Badri on Friday evening, with a Saturday session expected to confirm the choice. Subsequent developments —never formally identified by any party— unraveled an agreement that had appeared settled, sending the nine-candidate contest back to its starting point. Washington's move is expected next. US Envoy Tom Barrack is anticipated to visit Baghdad imminently. The two visits —Qaani's concluded and Barrack's forthcoming— are the decisive external inputs that will shape Iraq's next political phase. What The Numbers Cannot Resolve The trajectory of the current negotiation points toward one of four outcomes, each carrying distinct consequences for Iraq's political architecture. The first is an al-Maliki premiership. It remains constitutionally possible since he holds the CF's formal nomination, commands a committed cross-community coalition of roughly 70 seats, and has not withdrawn despite sustained internal and external pressure. His camp's strategy is not to win the internal CF numbers —he cannot— but to outlast the opposition's ability to coalesce around a single alternative. Behind that strategy sits an implicit endorsement from Tehran, whose preference for al-Maliki as a known and institutionally reliable quantity has been visible throughout the formation process. However, what al-Maliki cannot overcome is the American, and the parliamentary confidence vote that follows any CF designation would require cross-community support that his current coalition cannot deliver. His 70-seat committed base falls critically short of the majority he would need, particularly given the public distance maintained by Sunni and Kurdish blocs that have either explicitly rejected his return or quietly withheld their backing. The second is a second term for Al-Sudani, secured through the internal CF voting mechanism once al-Maliki's bid is formally exhausted. This is the outcome the seat distribution most clearly supports. Al-Sudani commands the largest single bloc, enjoys tacit backing from al-Hakim and al-Khazali, faces no American veto, and demonstrated through his caretaker tenure a capacity to manage the competing pressures of Washington and Tehran without forcing either into open confrontation. He also carries the cross-community support that a confidence vote requires —the April 11 presidential session demonstrated that the coalition holds under pressure. A second Al-Sudani term would represent continuity dressed as resolution, the CF's nominal nominee displaced by its numerical reality. The third is a compromise figure —al-Badri, al-Awadi, al-Hasnawi, or another name whose primary qualification is the absence of committed enemies. This outcome would resolve the immediate impasse while deferring its underlying causes. A prime minister without a political base of his own would govern through negotiated dependency on the blocs that installed him, meaning the CF's internal fracture would be managed rather than resolved. External pressure shapes this scenario as directly as it does the others. Any compromise figure must clear two external thresholds simultaneously: Washington's acceptance, which rules out anyone perceived as an Iranian instrument, and Tehran's tolerance, which rules out anyone perceived as a reformist threat to PMF institutional autonomy. The fourth, and constitutionally most precarious, outcome is a failure to meet the April 26 limit, forcing a legal and political reckoning over what happens when Iraq's largest bloc cannot exercise the designation it claims. The Federal Supreme Court's 2010 ruling on the largest bloc created the legal ground within which this contest is being fought. Whether that architecture contains a mechanism for resolving a CF impasse that crosses the constitutional threshold is a matter Iraqi legal scholars have not been required to address until now. A bloc that cannot agree on a candidate across multiple failed sessions is not simply experiencing political friction. It is revealing, in real time, the limits of a power-sharing system designed to distribute influence rather than concentrate it, and that has never developed a mechanism for resolving the conflicts that distribution inevitably produces. Read more: Iraq's Presidential vote:a rehearsal for premiership Written and edited by Shafaq News staff. https://shafaq.com/en/Report/The-Shiite-Coordination-Framework-Can-govern-Iraq-but-cannot-agree-on-a-prime-minister

Iran’s Power Shift: From Political Balancing to Military Control By Jazeh Miller - 29th March 2026 Iran’s Power Shift: From Political Balancing to Military Control The appointment of Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr signals the full consolidation of power by the IRGC’s hardline core amid escalating internal and external crises The appointment of Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr as Secretary of Iran regime’s Supreme National Security Council is not a routine bureaucratic reshuffle—it is a structural turning point. Following the killing of Ali Larijani, a figure long associated with political mediation and crisis management, this decision lays bare a deeper reality: the Iranian regime has abandoned even the pretense of political balancing and is consolidating authority within its most hardline security apparatus. This is not merely a change in personnel; it is a shift in doctrine. The regime is signaling that, in the face of mounting existential threats, it no longer trusts political actors or institutional mechanisms. Instead, it is handing over national security decision-making entirely to the entrenched core of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Zolghadr is not a politician in any conventional sense. His career has been forged within the security and intelligence machinery of the state, placing him at the center of some of the regime’s most controversial and coercive operations. Unlike his predecessor, whose influence derived from parliamentary and diplomatic experience, Zolghadr represents the institutional DNA of repression. From his early involvement in intelligence structures to his role in shaping extraterritorial operations and proxy warfare, his trajectory reflects the regime’s reliance on force rather than legitimacy. His reported role in establishing operational frameworks such as the Ramadan Headquarters in the 1980s helped lay the groundwork for Iran’s long-term regional strategy—one rooted in asymmetric warfare and proxy networks. Domestically, his association with internal security measures, including oversight roles during periods marked by political repression, underscores his function as a guarantor of regime survival during internal crises. What makes this appointment particularly significant is its institutional implication. The Supreme National Security Council, constitutionally chaired by the regime’s president, once served—at least nominally—as a space for negotiation between elected officials and the regime’s unelected power centers. That fragile equilibrium has now collapsed. Under Zolghadr, the council is poised to transform from a deliberative body into an execution arm of the regime’s security core. The current president is likely to be reduced to a procedural figurehead, while real authority shifts to a secretariat aligned directly with the Supreme Leader and IRGC command structures. Decision-making will no longer be shaped by competing institutional interests but dictated by a unified security doctrine. Zolghadr’s past involvement in what has been described as “security-engineered political outcomes,” including his role in shaping electoral dynamics in the mid-2000s, further illustrates his expertise in controlling both political space and public outcomes. His presence effectively places the current administration under a form of internal surveillance and constraint, limiting any potential for independent policymaking—particularly in sensitive areas such as negotiations or crisis response. The timing of this shift is equally revealing. Coming in the aftermath of a short but consequential military confrontation and the loss of key regime figures, the leadership appears to have entered a phase best described as “survival mode.” In this context, Zolghadr’s appointment carries three clear strategic signals. First, it reflects the full militarization of foreign policy. By entrusting national security coordination to a figure deeply embedded in proxy warfare strategy, the regime is aligning diplomacy entirely with battlefield priorities. Second, it indicates preparation for intensified domestic repression. Zolghadr’s background across judicial, intelligence, and internal security institutions positions him as a specialist in containment—what could be termed the architecture of suppression. His appointment is a preemptive response to the regime’s fear of renewed uprisings. Third, it reveals an increasing homogenization within the ruling elite. Figures with political nuance or independent influence are being replaced by loyal security insiders. In moments of acute vulnerability, the Supreme Leader appears to rely exclusively on a closed circle of military-aligned loyalists. The broader conclusion is difficult to ignore. The Iranian regime is moving away from even symbolic forms of republican governance toward a model centered entirely on security preservation. The Supreme National Security Council no longer functions as a national institution—it is evolving into a command hub for the regime’s hardline core. This transformation marks the end of any lingering illusion that internal reform or moderate governance can influence the system’s trajectory. The regime is preparing for its most challenging scenarios, whether external conflict or internal upheaval. In this recalibrated power structure, public representation—already limited—has been further marginalized, replaced by an overriding imperative: survival at any cost. https://irannewsupdate.com/news/infightings/irans-power-shift-from-political-balancing-to-military-control/

Faiq Zaidan warns: War decisions made outside the constitution threaten Iraq's sovereignty and expose it to international sanctions latest news Friday, March 27, 2026 Home / Latest News / Faiq Zaidan warns: War decisions outside the constitution threaten Iraq's sovereignty and expose it to international sanctions Baghdad – One News 3/27/2026 The head of Iraq’s Supreme Judicial Council, Judge Faiq Zaidan, warned on Friday of the serious repercussions of some armed factions unilaterally making decisions on war and peace, stressing that these actions represent a clear violation of the constitution and could subject the country to international sanctions. Zaidan explained in an article that Article (61/Ninth) of the Iraqi Constitution limits the declaration of a state of war to a precise legal mechanism, which includes a joint request from the Presidency of the Republic and the Council of Ministers, and the approval of two-thirds of the members of the House of Representatives, stressing that any move outside this framework is considered a threat to the democratic system and an undermining of the rule of law. He pointed out that attempts by some armed factions to unilaterally make decisions regarding war and peace pose a direct threat to state sovereignty and societal stability, and open the door to legal and security chaos. He explained that these factions' engagement in activities of a military nature constitutes a de facto declaration of war outside constitutional frameworks, which is a clear violation, as this right is reserved for legitimate constitutional institutions that express the will of the people and operate according to the law. He added that making such decisions unilaterally weakens the prestige of the state and undermines the principle of the rule of law. On the security front, he explained that the multiplicity of military decision-making centers leads to a state of chaos and instability, and may drag the country into internal or regional conflicts without national consensus, while warning that the spread of weapons outside the framework of the state increases the likelihood of armed clashes within society. Politically, Zaidan stressed that this behavior threatens the democratic system by bypassing elected institutions and marginalizing their role, which may lead to a decline in citizens’ trust in the state. He also warned that unofficial decisions related to the war may expose Iraq to international isolation or sanctions as a result of actions that are not based on a legal framework. Socially, he pointed out that these conditions negatively affect the lives of citizens, as a state of anxiety and uncertainty prevails, and public services and the economy are affected due to the continued security tensions. Zidan concluded by emphasizing that the unilateral declaration of war by some armed factions poses a grave danger to the state and society, as it threatens national sovereignty and undermines the legal system. He stressed the need to confine weapons to the state and strengthen the role of constitutional institutions to ensure security and stability, and to build a state based on law and legitimacy. https://1news-iq.net/فائق-زيدان-يحذر-قرارات-الحرب-خارج-الدس/

Iran’s denial vs. proxy escalation: Iraq caught between diplomacy and battlefield reality In-DepthiraqbreakingKurdistaniranIsraelUSA 2026-03-12 / 05:38 Shafaq News As the war between the United States and Israel on one side and Iran on the other entered its thirteenth day, Iraq has become the clearest example of the contradiction between Iran’s diplomatic messaging and the operational reality of its allied factions: while Tehran’s diplomats insist Iran has not directly targeted Iraqi territory “so far,” waves of drone and missile attacks attributed to Iran-aligned factions continue to strike sites across the country, particularly in the Kurdistan Region. The contradiction between diplomatic messaging and battlefield reality has become increasingly visible. Iran’s consul in Basra, Ali Abedi, told Shafaq News earlier that Tehran was exercising restraint and had not targeted US bases in Iraq “so far,” as long as those bases were not used to launch attacks against Iran. Yet during the same period, the Iran-aligned Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI) announced hundreds of operations against American interests and facilities it claims are linked to the US presence in the country. According to statements issued by the factions, 291 operations were carried out over 12 days targeting US sites in Iraq and the region. The groups also claimed they had killed 13 Americans and wounded dozens more. The US-led coalition, however, said it intercepted many of the attacks and has not announced any confirmed American casualties. The scale of the attacks has been most visible in the Kurdistan Region. Erbil Governor Omed Khoshnaw said the city had faced 176 aerial attacks in just ten days, most of them involving drones or rockets targeting military sites hosting coalition forces, including Harir Air Base and the vicinity of Erbil International Airport. Similar incidents have also been reported near Baghdad airport, where facilities linked to US logistical support are located. Since the outbreak of the US-Israeli strikes on Iran on February 28, regions across Iraq and the Kurdistan Region have been hit by repeated drone and missile attacks attributed to Iran-aligned factions. According to a tally cited by Reuters, at least 16 people have been killed in Iraq since the escalation began, including a commander from the Islamic Resistance in Iraq who died in an airstrike on his vehicle earlier this month. Baghdad Seeks Distance From The War Caught between regional escalation and internal security pressures, the Iraqi government has tried to distance the country from the widening conflict. Caretaker Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani said during a phone call with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian that Iraq rejects the war targeting Iran and will not allow its territory to be used as a launch point for attacks, while warning that attacks targeting Iraqi territory represent a violation of Iraq’s sovereignty and undermine efforts to contain the conflict and restore diplomatic dialogue. Pezeshkian praised Iraq’s efforts to maintain regional stability and reaffirmed Iran’s respect for the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, remarks that came even as attacks attributed to Tehran-aligned factions continued across Iraq. Iraq’s Foreign Ministry also condemned incidents targeting diplomatic and consular missions in Baghdad and the Kurdistan Region amid the rising tensions, reaffirming the government’s responsibility to protect foreign facilities operating in the country. At the same time, Baghdad has begun preparing for a new phase of security threats linked to drone warfare. The government approved the purchase of counter-unmanned aircraft systems (C-UAS) designed to intercept hostile drones after attacks struck several provinces, including Erbil, Babil, and al-Anbar. Strategy Of “Expanding The Fire” For some analysts, the intensifying attacks inside Iraq reflect a broader Iranian strategy rather than spontaneous factional actions. Ahmed al-Yasiri, head of the Arab Australian Center for Strategic Studies, told Shafaq News that the pattern of operations suggests the presence of a coordinated regional approach often described as a strategy of “expanding the fire.” “Iran’s defensive doctrine relies on what could be described as ‘distraction fronts,’” al-Yasiri said. “These factions operate as pressure tools within a wider regional strategy, similar to how Hezbollah has been activated in Lebanon during periods of escalation.” According to al-Yasiri, the Iraqi arena represents an important front in that strategy because it hosts American military facilities and economic interests while remaining politically sensitive for Tehran. “The Iraqi front is a front of pressure against the Americans,” he explained. “These factions are not acting randomly; they are linked to the broader framework set by the Revolutionary Guard and ideologically connected to the concept of Wilayat al-Faqih.” However, al-Yasiri warned that the most dangerous aspect of the escalation may not be the attacks on foreign targets, but strikes that affect Iraqi infrastructure, which could be “the worst scenario. Iran still considers Iraq a friendly arena, but factions may exploit the war to impose a new political and security reality on the Iraqi state and society.” Read more: US expert: Kurdish forces alone cannot defeat Iran’s IRGC Tehran’s Perspective A different interpretation comes from observers closer to Tehran’s political thinking. Saleh al-Qazwini, a writer and researcher specializing in Iranian affairs, said Iran generally views attacks on US bases and interests as a legitimate response to what it considers hostile activities in the region. “Iran sees the presence of American bases as harmful to the countries that host them,” al-Qazwini told Shafaq News. “From Tehran’s perspective, these bases function as centers of intelligence activity and political influence aimed at destabilizing the region.” He argued that US diplomatic and military institutions in Iraq play a role in shaping Iraqi decision-making and security dynamics. “The United States does not spend billions of dollars in the region without objectives,” he said. “Therefore, targeting these interests is seen by Iran as contributing to regional security.” Why Kurdistan Became The Primary Arena The contradiction between Iran’s diplomatic posture and the operational activity of its allied factions is most visible in the Kurdistan Region, which has become the primary arena for drone and missile attacks. Iranian affairs expert Mahdi Azizi told Shafaq News that the entry of Iraqi factions into the confrontation happened gradually before reaching its current intensity. “The coordination within what is known as the Axis of Resistance under the principle of ‘unity of arenas’ has reached advanced stages,” Azizi said. He noted that despite political assurances from Kurdish leaders, Tehran still perceives the Kurdistan Region as a potential security threat. “In Iran’s strategic perception, Iraqi Kurdistan remains sensitive because of what it believes is the presence of foreign intelligence networks and Kurdish opposition groups [such as Komala, PJAK, and KDPI],” he explained. Reports by CNN indicated that the United States, through the Central Intelligence Agency, has explored plans to arm Iranian Kurdish opposition groups in an effort to spark unrest inside Iran and potentially support ground operations in western parts of the country. The armed Iranian Kurdish groups, whose fighters are largely stationed along the Iraq–Iran border inside the Kurdistan Region, are estimated to number between 5,000 and 6,000 combatants. Several of these factions have issued statements since the start of the war suggesting possible movements against Iranian forces. Kurdish officials in Iraq, however, have downplayed such scenarios. In an interview with Fox News, Patriotic Union of Kurdistan leader Bafel Talabani denied reports that Iranian Kurdish fighters had crossed into Iran from Iraqi territory, warning that external involvement in Iran’s internal conflict could provoke nationalist backlash and ultimately strengthen support for the Iranian state rather than weaken it. Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) leader Masoud Barzani said the region is not part of the war and remains committed to stability and dialogue. Despite those assurances, Erbil has increasingly become the main arena for drone and missile activity linked to the wider regional escalation. Iran’s Dual Strategy in Iraq For Iraqi politician Mithal al-Alusi, the contradiction between Iranian diplomatic statements and factional actions reflects a deeper structural reality within Iran’s political system. “The Iranian regime has two faces,” al-Alusi told Shafaq News. “One is the government and foreign ministry, which present a diplomatic image to the world. The other is the real power structure represented by the Supreme Leader and the Revolutionary Guard, which manages the files of militias and the export of the revolution.” According to al-Alusi, Iran has built extensive political and security influence in Iraq, allowing it to use the American presence as a bargaining tool in regional politics. He described attacks on the Kurdistan Region and economic and military facilities as part of a broader attempt to entrench Iranian leverage within Iraq’s political system while pressuring Washington. A Fragile Balance The growing wave of drone and missile attacks illustrates how Iraq has become one of the most active arenas in the broader confrontation between Iran and its adversaries. Tehran’s official rhetoric emphasizes restraint and respect for Iraqi sovereignty; however, the operational landscape inside the country tells a more complicated story shaped by armed factions, strategic rivalries, and regional power competition. The war continues, and Iraq also continues to face a difficult balancing act: preserving its sovereignty and internal stability while navigating a regional conflict in which key actors inside its borders are deeply connected to the wider geopolitical struggle. Read more: Caught between war and neutrality: Kurdistan navigates escalating US-Iran confrontation Written and edited by Shafaq News staff. https://www.shafaq.com/en/Report/Iran-s-denial-vs-proxy-escalation-Iraq-caught-between-diplomacy-and-battlefield-reality

https://www.givehim15.com/post/july-14-2025 July 14, 2025 These States Get It! The states of Tennessee and Louisiana have both declared July as months of prayer and fasting. Texas recently declared a day of prayer regarding the floods that have occurred there. Intercessors For America reports regarding these proclamations: “Both Tennessee and Louisiana have decided to dedicate this month to prayer. Louisiana Governor Jeff Landry announced this for his state at the beginning of July, issuing a proclamation. In this proclamation, he called ‘upon the people of Louisiana to come together during the month of July in a season of prayer and fasting, seeking God’s blessing, protection, and wisdom for our state and our nation.’ “Tennessee State Representatives Mark Pody and Monty Fritts introduced House Joint Resolution 51 earlier this year. The bill, signed into law by Governor Bill Lee in early May, establishes July as a month of prayer and fasting that will be celebrated annually. This comes after Tennessee also dedicated July, 2024 to prayer and fasting. “These are not, however, the only states honoring the Lord in prayer. Texas also recently declared July 6 as a Day of Prayer. Governor Greg Abbott issued the proclamation in response to the devastating Independence Day floods, writing, ‘I urge Texans of all faiths and religious traditions and backgrounds to offer prayers on that day for the healing of individuals, safety of our first responders and public safety officers, rebuilding of communities, and restoration of the region struck by this disaster.’”(1) Why This Is Significant From a biblical and spiritual perspective, these proclamations are more than symbolic—they are strategic acts, rooted in the biblical truth that “the fervent prayer of a righteous person avails much” (James 5:16). These God-honoring proclamations serve several critical purposes: 1. Aligning the Heart of the State with God’s Heart When a group of people declares a period of prayer and fasting, it signals a collective recognition that human efforts alone are insufficient to address the complex issues facing society—moral decline, economic uncertainty, racial division, and spiritual apathy. It’s an act of humility, acknowledging that divine guidance and intervention are paramount. True change begins in the spiritual realm. Prayer and fasting are not just rituals but strategic tools for shifting atmospheres—breaking spiritual strongholds, awakening the church, and preparing the ground for divine breakthroughs. 2. Invoking God’s Favor and Intervention Throughout Scripture, fasting and prayer are associated with seeking God’s favor during pivotal moments—such as Israel’s national fasts, Solomon’s dedication of the temple, and Nehemiah’s rebuilding efforts. Declarations today echo these biblical precedents, expressing dependence on God’s mercy. By dedicating a time for collective fasting and prayer, states are asking God to intervene in their affairs—protecting communities, restoring morals, healing divisions, and revitalizing faith. 3. Fostering Spiritual Revival and Awakening Obviously, all of America needs spiritual awakening, and this starts with God’s people humbling themselves and seeking His face. These declarations serve as catalysts by igniting hearts and mobilizing their states toward renewed faith and purpose. They are also a call to the church to rise up, pray fervently, and become the moral and spiritual backbone of society. When churches unite in prayer, it creates a powerful spiritual synergy that can influence the entire region. 4. Breaking Strongholds and Overcoming Darkness We know that cities, states and nations can be under the influence of principalities and powers—forces of darkness that seek to hinder God’s plans. Prayer and fasting weaken these forces. Scripture teaches that some spiritual battles require fasting to break certain strongholds (Mark 9:29). They are not just spiritual disciplines, but weapons in the believer’s arsenal. Declaring these months of prayer and fasting can lead to the breaking of strongholds, corruption, and deception. 5. Promoting Unity and Corporate Repentance Such declarations create unity among churches, denominations, and citizens. When people come together in a common purpose, it fosters reconciliation and healing—both vertically (with God) and horizontally (with one another). These proclamations call for repentance of sin, and as 2 Chronicles 7:14 teaches us, repentance is one of the prerequisites for corporate healing. (2 Chronicles 7:14) 6. Preparing for Spiritual and Societal Transformation Finally, proclamations such as these position the states for transformation spiritually, socially, and morally. They lay the groundwork for policies and cultural shifts rooted in biblical principles, influencing education, government, and our communities. Conclusion In essence, proclamations of prayer and fasting by states like Tennessee and Louisiana are more than ceremonial gestures—they are strategic, biblical acts that acknowledge the spiritual roots of our societal problems. They call God’s people to humble themselves, seek His face, and declare His redemption over their land. These declarations are crucial steps in the process of awakening and revival. They remind us that change begins with prayer—fervent, persistent, and united prayer. They are acts of hope, faith, and obedience, trusting that God is willing and able to bring about the transformation our states and nation desperately need. May these months of prayer and fasting in Tennessee and Louisianna, and the day of prayer in Texas, serve as a rallying cry for the church to rise up, to intercede, and to believe that a spiritual awakening is not only possible but inevitable—when God’s people pray with faith and humility. May Texas find healing and recovery. Pray with me: Heavenly Father, We come before You humbly and boldly, lifting up our nation in prayer. Lord, we have acknowledged many times that we are in desperate need of Your intervention, and we do so again. We ask for Your forgiveness for the sins that have tainted our land—disobedience, rebellion, corruption, division, and neglect of Your truth. Wash us clean by the blood of Jesus, and renew a right spirit within us. Father, we pray for a spiritual awakening across our nation. Stir hearts to seek You earnestly, to turn away from darkness, and to embrace the light of Christ. We thank You for states like Tennessee and Louisiana that would take the bold step of proclaiming entire months as periods of prayer and fasting. Raise up more states to be so bold, becoming beacons for our nation. Pour out Your Spirit in revival, transforming lives, families, communities, and leaders. We pray for moral integrity to rise again in our society. Instill values rooted in Your Word—truth, justice, mercy, and humility. Heal the wounds of division and strife, bringing reconciliation and unity. Remove the blindness that blinds our leaders and citizens alike, opening eyes to Your truth and guiding us in righteousness. Lord, we trust You fully, and believe that You are turning this nation around. We declare Your Kingdom come, Your will be done on earth as it is in heaven. We thank You for Your faithfulness and for the hope we have in Christ Jesus. May Your glory fill our land once more. In Jesus’ name, we pray. Amen. Our decree: We declare that the redemptive mercies of King Jesus are being released over America to heal our land. **************************** Click on the link below to watch the full video. ------------------------------------------------ https://ifapray.org/blog/states-dedicate-july-to-prayer-and-fasting/