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One of them is the assassination..A European report lays out three scenarios behind al-Sadr's withdrawal 2022-07-05 10:11 Shafaq News/ The "GIS Reports" website, which is based in the Principality of Liechtenstein, considered that the exit of Sadrist leader Muqtada al-Sadr from the political game, a decision that was motivated by fear of being assassinated, and that the withdrawal of his deputies from Parliament constitutes a victory for Iran's attempts to restore control of Iraqi politics. The European report, which was translated by Shafak News Agency, explained; In Iraq, Iran is trying to do what it did after the recent elections in Lebanon, as despite the fact that its Iraqi allies lost control of the parliament after the October 2021 elections, it is trying to control the parliament as a necessary move in order to impose its hegemony on the government in Baghdad. The report drew; In both countries, Lebanon and Iraq, Iran is trying to achieve a comeback after the elections, by interfering in the two countries, considering that its campaign to extend its influence is achieving greater success in Iraq. The report pointed out that unlike the Lebanese case, where the Shiites remained united, Sadr's hatred of former Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki and his sharp reservations about Iranian influence, caused severing the ranks of the Shiite camp, adding that when Iran failed to reunite the Shiite camp, it paralyzed Parliament, Then I devised a way to turn the tables on Al-Sadr without having to go to new elections again. After referring to al-Sadr's success in forming the tripartite alliance with the Sunnis and Kurds, the report considered that "Tehran felt angry," and a decision was issued to freeze parliament, as it decided that the parliamentary majority was not enough to elect a new president, as it is now imperative that two-thirds of the parliament attend, adding that although al-Sadr was able to Recruiting more than 165 deputies required in his coalition to obtain a majority, but he now needs to convince an additional 53 deputies from outside his coalition to participate in the voting session, which al-Sadr was unable to secure. The report then reviewed the pressure campaigns exerted against the Kurdistan Democratic Party, including the missile bombing of the house of an oil businessman close to the party on March 13, and the setting fire to the party’s headquarters in Baghdad on March 28, which prompted the party to Suspending its activities and attendance in the federal capital, but the party refused to budge on its position of belonging to the Triple Alliance. The report added that Iran sent additional messages by bombing an oil refinery near Erbil at the beginning of May, and then by two missile attacks on energy facilities owned by the "Car Group" of the same businessman. Nevertheless, the party remained committed to the Triple Alliance. He added that the attacks continued on June 22, 24 and 25, bombing the Khor Mor gas field, the largest in the Kurdistan Region, recalling that the field is considered important for the party's plans to export gas to Europe and Turkey. After referring to the resignation of al-Sadr’s deputies from parliament, and then their replacement on June 23 by other deputies who took the oath, Ahmed al-Rubaie, who belongs to the Iran-backed bloc, was quoted as saying that his parliamentary alliance now enjoys about 130 seats, which is the main force in the parliament. of 329 seats. However, the Iran-backed coalition did not achieve a majority of the 165 seats. Sadr's resignation: Fear! The report then questioned what prompted al-Sadr to these resignations, which the European report described as a "dramatic, courageous, desperate or cowardly step." The report considered that "there are three logical explanations" for these resignations, one of which is that al-Sadr considered that the political crisis could not be resolved, and that is why he preferred Iran to achieve its hegemony and exploitation, over chaos. He added that the second explanation is that al-Sadr "wants chaos", as he believes that his move will either encourage others to resign and thus force new elections, or that the youth of the Shiite generation will demonstrate again, especially if he orders his supporters to do so. As for the third, more likely explanation, it is "fear," recalling the assassination of prominent security researcher Hisham al-Hashemi two years ago, and the attempt to target al-Kazemi himself in November 2021, adding that al-Sadr can expect the same with him. Scenarios The report concluded by saying that al-Sadr's role in the next stage is still unclear, but his current is likely to remain a "strong force within society." from time. However, the report considered that "the most likely scenario is Iran's success in forming a majority coalition that supports it, with the additional number of deputies required for a two-thirds quorum." He also indicated the possibility that a President of the Republic would be elected, who would be Barham Salih, who would appoint a prime minister from the Iranian option, and if the choice was Al-Kazemi, he would be more captive than it is now. He added that Iraq will sink further into official corruption and the Iranian quicksand, while Sadr will take revenge by not granting legitimacy to any government. The least likely scenario, according to the European report, is holding new elections, but this is without many complications. The report also concluded by saying that in the upcoming elections, Iran will make every effort to ensure the victory of its supporters. That is why the report called for “intense protection from the United Nations and Arab and Western countries,” because otherwise, the Iraqi elections will not be democratic, as Iran, through its militias, will turn Iraq’s elections into “a nightmare of murder, kidnapping, threats and bribery,” adding that if support is provided It will be a battle between courage and terrorism, but unfortunately in Iraq, terrorism is the one that wins every time. Translation: Shafak News Agency

ENERGY JUNE 14, 2022 Iraq at a crossroads: Kurdish energy competition with Iran AMATZIA BARAM A startling missile attack on Erbil underlines Tehran’s view that Kurdish energy is a threat. The Kar refinery in Erbil, Iraq, run by a Kurdish oil magnate who has been targeted by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps. © Getty Images In a nutshell Israeli-Kurdish cooperation gives Iran a useful narrative Erbil has seized on its supply of natural gas Kurdish exports will threaten Tehran’s oil revenues In an unprecedented attack on Mach 13, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) lobbed 12 missiles at a private villa belonging to oil mogul Baz Karim Barzanji in Erbil, the capital of Iraq’s Kurdish autonomous region. The attack was puzzling for a few reasons. The target was located in the city, not in Iraq’s military camps hosting American forces; and the missiles were launched from Iranian, not Iraqi, territory. Instead of some unknown Shia militia, this time Iran’s pride and joy, the IRGC, assumed responsibility. More, the villa was described as “the Zionists’ strategic center of plotting and evil” in Iraqi Kurdistan. Tehran offered the rationale that the assault had come in response to “recent crimes” of the “Zionist entity,” namely Israel. This was particularly baffling; if Iran wanted to punish Israel, why bomb the Kurds? Iran’s message was then repeated: with three rockets on April 6 and six rockets on May 1 striking Erbil, this time coming from within Iraq. They caused serious damage to the largest oil refinery in Kurdistan, the 136,000 barrel-per-day refinery at Kawigosk, run by Barzanji’s company Kar Group. In fact, the March 13 attack had three motives. Officially, and explicitly, Tehran was aiming at alleged anti-Iranian intelligence and military collaboration between Israel and the Kurds. Implicitly, it sought to terrorize the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) into joining a pro-Iranian coalition in the Iraqi parliament. And Iran likely had a third goal: sabotaging a project designed to provide Baghdad and Ankara with Kurdish natural gas. Israel ties While the existence of a so-called Mossad “center” in Erbil is in doubt, and may have simply been invoked as an Iranian excuse to pummel the Kurdish capital, there indeed exists some Israeli-Kurdish cooperation on oil. The linchpin of this activity is believed to be the man whose private villa was the only target successfully hit by the 12 Iranian missiles – Baz Karim Barzanji, one of the richest businessmen in Kurdistan. By describing the private home of the biggest Kurdish oil magnate – who is also closely associated with the KDP – as a nest of Israeli machinations, Tehran created a linkage between Israel and the Kurdish energy industry. Although the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) denies having any ties to Israel, rumors abound that Mr. Barzanji is connected to Kurdish-Turkish gas initiatives, and that he has hosted American and Israeli businessmen in his villa. If the Iranians were looking for a supposed “Israeli” target to sabotage the Kurdish gas project, these rumors, whether true or false, were heaven-sent. While Mr. Barzanji’s connection with the gas initiative is not clear, his connection to the Kurdish oil business is well known. In 2003, Mr. Barzanji established an oil company that developed the Kurdish Khurmala oil field. Today, he owns between a third and 40 percent of the active oil pipeline from Kurdistan to Turkey, with the rest owned by Rosneft. His revenues from the pipeline are close to $1 million per day. He was also involved in a few oil shipments from Kurdistan through Turkey to Israel. While the Iranians never explicitly mentioned an Israeli connection to the Kurdish oil or gas industry, the choice of Mr. Barzanji’s villa as a target speaks for itself. Through him, Iran aims to taint the entire Kurdish energy industry as a nefarious Israeli plot. Trade dynamics Iraq has been importing Iranian gas under two supply agreements signed in 2013 and 2015. Strangely, neither agreement includes a penalty clause for supply arrears. Either someone in Baghdad was negligent or, perhaps, was at the receiving end of Iranian largesse. The gas exports to Iraq increased substantially after the trade contracts were fully implemented in mid-2017. Today, Iran is wary that realizing potential gas exports from the KRG to Baghdad will be detrimental to its economy. Spoiling that prospect is a priority, but Tehran cannot simply call a spade a spade. After all, explicitly warning a sovereign country against developing its own natural resources is an international taboo. On February 15, 2022, after years of postponement, the Iraqi Federal Supreme Court ruled that the 2007 Kurdish oil law is unconstitutional, making all KRG oil development, exports, and significant contracts with international oil companies illegal. The KRG claims that the court ruling goes contrary to the constitution’s principle of oil federalism – a good case, but it has no higher court to appeal to. In practice, an oil and gas agreement between the KRG and Baghdad is made more difficult, because the court’s new ruling ties the hands even of a conciliatory Iraqi government. Facts & figures Iraqi Kurdistan Tehran has been a top supplier of oil and gas to Turkey, making Kurdish efforts to grow exports there a direct threat to Iran's energy revenues. © macpixxel for GIS It is not clear who asked the Supreme Court to give the ruling; there is no apparent evidence of Iranian involvement, and yet Tehran is the only party that will benefit from an energy war between Erbil and Baghdad. Iran now provides 30 to 35 percent of Iraq’s gas needs, almost all for electricity production. Any Kurdish gas flowing to Baghdad will cut into Iran’s huge profits. Iran is also a massive natural gas exporter to Turkey, and the KRG is set to compete with Tehran there, too. In 2020, Iraq and Turkey accounted for 64 percent and 33 percent, respectively, of Iran’s natural gas exports. In other words, practically all Iranian gas exports are going to Iraq and Turkey. From Tehran’s point of view, the Kurds are not at all welcome there. The Iraqi Supreme Court ruling took place at a critical moment: four months after the elections that made Muqtada al-Sadr kingmaker, and while he was trying to establish a majority coalition that would exclude Iran’s champion, Nouri al-Maliki. The KDP, which supports Mr. al-Sadr in parliament, is also most deeply involved in the successful Kurdish oil and gas industry that competes with Iran’s. By declaring this industry illegal, the court provided Tehran with a crucial service. Gas prospects By the end of 2021, the KRG Ministry of Natural Resources estimated the Kurdish region’s reserves at 45 billion barrels of oil and at 25 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of proven gas reserves, around 25 percent of Iraq’s total. It also has up to 198 Tcf of unproven gas. However, the manner in which the Kurdish and federal governments have treated their huge gas fortune could not be more different. Baghdad is flaring most of its natural gas, which is a byproduct of oil extraction (described as “wet” gas) and is tapping very little of its “dry” gas fields. This is why it depends on Iran for some 30 to 35 percent of the gas it needs for electric power. Since 2018, Iran stopped the flow of gas to Iraq several times, for a few weeks each time, due to payments arrears and severe production difficulties in Iran. Production problems also led Turkey to suffer from long periods of unplanned reduction of Iranian gas supplies. Whenever Iran stopped its gas supply, millions of Iraqis were left without electricity – meaning no light, no safe drinking water, and no air conditioning in the sweltering Iraqi summers. This led to mass anti-Iranian demonstrations. By comparison, the Kurds have made excellent use of their natural gas. Beginning in 2007, two international companies, Crescent Petroleum and Dana Gas, started developing two of the largest gas fields in Iraq, both in Kurdistan, Khor Mor and Chemchemal. In a mere 15 months, the project was online. By then, Kurdistan could produce 80 percent of all the electricity it needed from gas (the rest is still derived from diesel). The gas was provided at a very affordable price, and Kurdistan Iraq became completely energy independent. By the end of 2021, production levels reached 452 million standard cubic feet per day of natural gas liquids (NGL) and liquified petroleum gas (LPG). The advantages for Kurdistan from this effective use of their gas are tremendous. First, unlike the intermittent gas coming from Iran, the gas supply in Kurdistan is highly reliable, a crucial feature for economic development and public health. Second, environmentally, it is a better solution than diesel. Third, it guarantees relatively cheap energy. Fourth, in 2022, more than 80 percent of the workforce involved is local, and within two years almost all of it will be local. Finally, the producing companies are urging the KRG to quickly sign export agreements with Turkey and Baghdad. As Patrick Allman-Ward, CEO of Dana Gas, told reporters in February, “We have flagged to the federal [Iraqi] government and the ministry of oil that we have spare capacity available from our Khor Mor field to potentially supply the federal government through the Jambur pipeline.” This pipeline was originally purposed for condensate export, but it can be repurposed for gas export. Kurdish gas will be cheaper than Iranian gas, and far more reliable. Alternatively, the Kurdish autonomous region can export a great deal of surplus electricity. As Allman-Ward explained, “The KRG has got a total installed [electricity] generation capacity to absorb the amount of [spare] gas but would [then] generate far too much for its requirements. If they take all the gas for power generation then they will need to export electricity to markets in the area or export the gas directly.” Scenarios Talks between Erbil and Baghdad have begun, but gas-starved Baghdad is procrastinating. The only reason this author can suggest is Iranian intervention. Kurdish gas and electricity can relieve most, if not all, of Iraq’s dependence on Iran for gas-for-electricity, and for at least 5 percent (or as much as 15 percent) of its direct electricity consumption. The Kurdish gas alternative will be more stable, and very likely also cheaper; the same is true when it comes to Kurdish gas to Turkey. In 2021, Iran alone provided 16 percent of Turkey’s natural gas needs. Kurdish gas supply to Turkey, too, is therefore seen by Tehran as worrisome competition. Kurdistan and Iraq are competing with Iran also in terms of oil exports to Turkey. Together with Iran, Russia and Saudi Arabia, Iraq (mainly Kurdistan) has been one of Ankara’s top suppliers of crude in recent years. Any further development of Kurdish crude exports represents a threat to Tehran’s oil revenues.