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SULAYMANIYAH, Northern Iraq – The bald eagle, Old Glory and the almighty dollar are king in this portion of Iraq, where ethnic Kurds don’t hide their affection for the U.S. Shops peddle American flags, U.S. military gear is prized and the locals speak glowingly of the nation they credit with removing Saddam Hussein, the dictator whose heavy hand so often came down on the minority clustered in Iraq’s northern regions. "Imagine if America didn't exist,” said Kurdo Amin Agha, an accountant whose home is adorned with Israeli, American and Kurdistan flags, and who wears a U.S. Army shirt and Navy SEAL watch. “Without America, the world would be run by China or Iran. "America represents freedom," he added. "Our dream is to be eternally allied to America." Throughout the region, a U.S. passport gets its bearer waved through security checkpoints, ushered through ministry doors and tea served with a broad smile of the manager when dining out. "America represents freedom. Our dream is to be eternally allied to America." - Kurdo Amin Agha, Kurdish accountant The autonomous Kurdish region, run by the independent Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) and its President Masoud Barzani, as opposed to being under the complete thumb of the Iraqi Central Government, is home to around 6 million ethnic Kurds. It has long been marketed to the world as the "other Iraq" – a relatively safe and economically sound slice of the country which welcomes Westerners with open arms. Everywhere you go a hint of red, white and blue can be bought and sold. One store tucked away in a local bazaar in this city, owned by a middle-aged man by the name of Zawzad, sells only pro-American merchandise and U.S. military-inspired clothing. “It's just beautiful," Zawzad says softly, as he reverently unfolds a giant flag, holding it up with great respect. Taxis are routinely adorned with seat covers starring the iconic bald eagle pattern, an array of household, electronic and fashion items from screwdrivers and pots and pans to guitars, phone covers, hats, shirts, shoes and bags are widely available in stars and stripes patterns. Local police and military forces proudly sport American brand 5.11 Tactical gear and clothing – which can be found in both real and counterfeit varieties in scores of stores. An American flag patch is often sewn on. It's not uncommon to have your drink served with a U.S. flag etched on the side of the glass, or to see American presidential memorabilia behind the workplace desk of a local Kurd. A significant number of official rooms display some sort of official certificate showing a connection between the Kurdish territory and the United States. "Students used to have to learn Kurdish and Arabic," one local doctor explained. "Now they just want to learn Kurdish and English.” Related ImageExpand / Contract From military gear to tote bags, all things American are popular in this part of Iraq. Kurdo Amin Agar, (l.), sports a US military shirt, while unidentified Erbil merchant holds up wares. (FoxNews.com) Bordering Iran, Turkey, Syria and the Arab-dominated Republic of Iraq, the Kurdish-run region's resoluteness is embodied by its prominent military, the Peshmerga, which translates to "those who face death." The rugged army, battle-hardened from years of clashing with Hussein’s forces, has proven to be an able force in countering Islamic State. Kurdish fighters clash continuously with Islamic State throughout northern Iraq and Syria, though the fiercest fighting takes place outside the territory under Kurdish control. Just 60 miles west of the region's capital, Erbil, an ancient city which was protected by American no-fly zones during Operation Iraqi Freedom, sits Mosul -- the country's second-largest city and now under ISIS control. The roots of the Kurdish affection for America lie in the U.S.-led operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. While the first, under President George H.W. Bush, did not topple the hated Hussein, it served notice that America was his enemy. U.S. military forces ousted Hussein in 2003 and brought him to ultimate justice in 2006, when he was executed on orders of an Iraqi tribunal. Tens of thousands of Kurds were murdered, many with chemical weapons, on orders of the former Baath Party leader. Once Hussein was gone, the oil-rich Kurdish region began to prosper. Kurds openly express their hope that the United States will help them become a completely independent country. When the U.S.-led airstrikes to hamper ISIS were launched in August, entire Kurdish neighborhoods could be seen waving American flags in the streets, with many even marking American Veterans Day this past November. "We follow American news," Agha said. "Like shootings and hurricanes. We care about what happens to the people of the United States." Most Kurds show great respect for President Obama, but it’s the name Bush that generates a larger salute. Some are even preparing to get behind possible candidate Jeb Bush in the 2016 presidential elections. "The first Bush made no secret that he hated Saddam, the second Bush finished him off," Agha added. "And the third will be the one to give Kurdistan its independence." The very concept of an independent Kurdistan is extremely controversial. With an ethnic population spread across the territory of three other nations outside of Iraq – Turkey, Syria and Iran – the prospect of redrawing the borders of all four countries to create a new state seems to some an impossibly destabilizing idea. Even the notion of independence for just the Kurdish-administered area of Northern Iraq is opposed not just by neighboring countries but by the international community, including the Obama administration. Nonetheless, many Kurds remain steadfastly pro-American. One local even noted Kurdish authorities "get scared" when they see an American passport. "Nobody wants to upset an American," the local explained. "They worry they might have said or done something wrong." Kurds, who as a group are overwhelmingly Muslim, also portray themselves as more religiously tolerant. "Right now I am working with Muslims, Yazidi, Christians -- we're all working together,” said one high-ranking KRG official. “They celebrate occasions together. It is something very beautiful. I have friends who pray and friends who don't, that is not my problem. That is their choice. That is how Kurdish people think about religion." On the morning of Dec. 1, many Kurds were busy setting up and decorating Christmas trees. Whether it was the secular embrace of a foreign religious rite or simply done to make guests more comfortable wasn’t clear. "We're still new to this," a Kurdish hotel employee said with a smile, amid bickering with a co-worker on how to decorate it. "But we love it." http://www.foxnews.com/world/2014/12/17/love-american-style-iraq-kurds-fans-all-things-us-bush/?intcmp=latestnews

View photo Iraqi Tycoon Builds White House Replica (ABC News) It's not on 1600 Pennyslvania Avenue, but a to-scale replica of the White House under construction in northern Iraq is "close enough." "It's outrageous, really fancy, and well-built," Tony Hozeph, general manager of Dream City, told ABC News. Dream City is a ritzy community in the Kurdish capital of Erbil. Hozeph would not identify the owner other than to say it was a prominent Kurdish businessman. A buyer offered to purchase the replica for $17 million, but the current owner refused, according to Hozeph. "It's not finished yet completely, there's no furniture and the interior construction still needs to be done," Hozeph said. Dream City is one of Iraq's most expensive communities with mansions that would not look out of place in Beverly Hills. Vacant land in the area has a starting value of $250 per square foot. And a house sells for four times that, at $1,000 per square foot, Hozeph said. Planned communities like Dream City are emerging on the heels of a real estate boom that began in 2003. They're home to wealthy Iraqis and Kurds who made their fortunes in oil and other businesses, Hozeph said. Security remains a concern for the enclave, especially with the presence of the militant force ISIs which recently threatened Erbil until the U.S. air force intervened. A fortified fence surrounds the development. "High tech companies and government agencies provide security," Hozeph explained. https://gma.yahoo.com/iraqi-tycoon-builds-white-house-replica-171400945--abc-news-topstories.html

Baghdad (AFP) - As Iraqi forces struggle to pin back the Islamic State group on the ground, Baghdad is taking its war against the jihadists to the airwaves with a television comedy series. The usually elusive Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi features prominently in the show, whose promoters argue that ridiculing the jihadist supremo can help dent his aura of almost supernatural villainy. The fear factor -- fed by online videos of mass executions, beheadings and abductions -- has been a key aspect of IS strategy, often handing it victory before the battle had even started. The goal of the show is "to remove this phobia that has taken root in a lot of people's minds", chief supervisor Thaer Jiyad told AFP on the set between two scenes. But if the show is Baghdad's new weapon in the war against IS, then its very first shots were a friendly fire blunder that sparked controversy even as the series premiered on Saturday. The trailer that Iraqiya state TV had been showing several times a day for weeks plays on a belief widely held in Iraq that IS was created by the CIA, Israel and Gulf monarchies to sow chaos. View gallery An image uploaded on the jihadist website Welayat Salahuddin allegedly shows militants of the Islami … With the United States now leading an aerial bombing campaign which also involves several Gulf countries against IS in Iraq and Syria, the Iraqi Media Network production company had to order a last-minute reshoot. The first version of the trailer, which is still widely available on the Internet, opens with a cartoon-like devil character brandishing a fork leading a column of jihadist fighters through the desert. He is met with open arms by an ostensibly American character in full cowboy attire who leads him into a tent for an arranged marriage. - 'State of Superstition' - The bride is a Jewish princess -- a large star of David hangs around her neck to make that clear -- who is escorted to her nuptial nest by a woman whose sunglasses and bright green pantsuit are an unmistakeable reference to Qatar's first lady Sheikha Mozah. View gallery An image grab taken from a propaganda video released on July 5, 2014 by al-Furqan Media allegedly sh … She and the cowboy were dropped from the new version of the opening clip for the series, whose title loosely translates as "State of Superstition" and is a play on the Arabic word for caliphate. The Joker of Batman fame, Dracula and a dwarf are among the random mix of characters in the background, all dancing to the series' catchy theme song, a parody of a known IS anthem. The next scene shows the result of the union between the Jewish bride and the devil. "The egg hatched, a little IS-ling emerged," the song goes. The Baghdadi figure that grows out of the shell then leads a choir of officers from Saddam Hussein's ex-ruling Baath party into reciting his programme of blood-letting for Iraq with the refrain: "O beheader, where are you?" In a Pulp Fiction-style slow-motion finale, the "caliph" ends up shooting all the Baathists one by one, a not-so-subtle Faustian warning that he who bargains with the devil chooses his own demise. "Ultimately, with fundamentalist organisations, the only solution is to confront them, and that starts with the leaders," said Jiyad. The show's first episode is lighter on satire and relates the day jihadists march into a model Iraqi town, with its candy-coloured buildings and honest denizens. Despite the show's declared goal of encouraging Iraqis to overcome their fear, the thought of possible retribution for mocking the jihadists caused a collective bout of stage fright among the cast. "We encountered many difficulties, notably when some of the artists were too afraid to take part in the shooting out of security concerns," director Ali al-Qassem said. But those who stuck with the project feel they are participating in the war effort, he said. "We all have a duty to defend this country. We are not good at using weapons but we can also help defeat IS through our work."

http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2014/apr/15/iraq-road-chaos/?insrc=wblu Baghdad’s version of Tahrir Square is far shabbier than Cairo’s. It consists of a yellowed park, frequented by vagrants, and sits next to a crowded market, where second-hand appliances, sex videos, and penis enlargement pumps are sold. It was here that Iraq experienced its own Arab Spring in the first half of 2011. Almost every Friday, a few thousand people gathered at Baghdad’s Tahrir and in other public squares around the country, from the Shiite-dominated south to the Sunni regions of the north and west. Like their counterparts in Cairo, Tunis, Tripoli, and Damascus, the demonstrators had grievances about the existing political order—complaints about human rights abuses, corruption, and the misuse of oil wealth; but also the lack of jobs, reliable electricity, clean water, and adequate healthcare. Yet in another respect, the very fact that these peaceful protests were taking place seemed to show how much progress Baghdad had made since the end of the violent civil war in 2008; the protesters included both Shiites and Sunnis, and they were facing off against Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, who, though a former political exile with a long history of involvement in Shiite political parties, had sought to appear as a non-sectarian figure running a new national government. Now, as Iraq prepares for its first national election in four years on April 30, it is hard to imagine democracy activists rallying weekly in Iraqi streets. For months, suicide bombers have been dynamiting themselves in crowded Shiite markets, coffee shops, and funeral tents, while Shiite militias and government security forces have terrorized Sunni communities. The Iraqi state is breaking apart again: from the west in Anbar province, where after weeks of anarchic violence more than 380,000 people have fled their homes; to the east in Diyala province, where ***-for-tat sectarian killings are rampant; to the north in Mosul, where al-Qaeda-linked militants control large swathes of territory; to the south in Basra, home to Iraq’s oil riches, where Shiite militias are once more ascendant; to Iraq’s Kurds, who warn that the country is disintegrating and contemplate full independence from Baghdad. More than 2,500 Iraqis have been killed since the start of the year, including nearly three hundred in the first ten days of April; in the capital itself, which has become a showcase for the country’s multiplying conflicts and uncontrolled violence, there have been several brazen attacks on government buildings, and a terrifying string of car bombings, including eight on April 9 alone. In theory, this month’s parliamentary elections, which are being contested by parties from across the political spectrum, will allow voters to take a stand against extremism. While many Iraqis say they are disillusioned with their current leaders, however, few think their vote is likely to produce major changes: Most of the candidates play to the fears of their own sects, or seem too weak to change the currently hateful mood. Across Iraq, people seek diversions through a trip to a mall or coffee shop, half-expecting a fatal explosion, or they lock themselves away at home losing themselves in American movies and video games. Others seek solace in the sectarian fantasies now promoted by the elite political parties: the stories told by many Sunnis of Iran’s domination of Iraq through militias and political figures, and by the Shiite religious parties of a plot hatched in Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States, and Turkey to destroy the Shia communities in Syria and Iraq. On the surface, the speed with which Iraq’s new political order has fallen apart is a puzzle. Although bombings never stopped, there had been relative stability since the spring of 2008, when Maliki, emboldened by the successful US-backed Sunni revolt against al-Qaeda, known as the Awakening, set out to disband the Shiite militias endangering law and order in Basra and Baghdad. The campaign, supported by the Americans, produced a surge of patriotism among both Shiites and Sunnis. By 2010, when the country was preparing to stage its second national elections for a four-year government, Iraq seemed poised to cast off its divisions. Maliki, running for reelection, had learned to present himself as both staunchly Shiite and a leader for all Iraqis. Resisting pressure from other Shiite religious parties and Iran, he ran his own list of candidates, including Sunni tribesmen and secular politicians. His main competition was the Iraqiya bloc, headed by Ayad Allawi, a secular Shiite who had briefly served as prime minister of Iraq’s interim government in 2004–2005; it was supported by many Sunnis and included the most popular Sunni political leaders. Yet Maliki and his Shiite Islamist supporters were unable to shed their deep mistrust of those they believed had fought them in the past. Rather than being integrated into the political system, several dozen leaders of the Awakening ended up dead or in jail, or forced into exile. Take Mohamed Husayn Jasim, a former Sunni insurgent who joined the movement against al-Qaeda and then became the deputy governor of Diyala province, to the east of Baghdad. His reward was to be arrested on terrorism charges and sentenced to death. (He was released in 2013 when, in a final appeal, a judge found the charges were without merit.) After the Awakening, al-Qaeda fighters had been forced to retreat to remote rural areas and were in disarray. But the arrest of Awakening leaders like Jasim created a security vacuum that extremist groups were quick to exploit. On a visit I made in the fall of 2010 to Jufr Sakr, a farm community south of Baghdad, residents said they did not dare turn in Sunni militant cells in their area because they did not trust the army and had no one from their own community who could protect them. Meanwhile, instead of producing a decisive outcome, the 2010 election left the country deeply divided. The vote was a near draw between Maliki and Allawi’s Iraqiya bloc, and it took nine months of negotiation and heavy involvement from both the Americans and Iranians to forge a new “national unity” government. According to the compromise reached, it was to be headed by Maliki with important cabinet positions allocated to Iraqiya, including the vice presidency and the ministries of finance and defense. Allawi himself would head a new military and political council, a step the US had strongly pushed for. But as soon as the new government was seated, Maliki refused to relinquish control of the defense and interior ministries, and thwarted the establishment of Allawi’s council. He eventually chased his Sunni vice president and finance minister away with the threat of arrest warrants. As Maliki saw it, his political survival depended in part on ruthlessly limiting his opponents’ power, and he could not leave himself exposed to enemies, whether Shiite Islamist rivals or members of the Sunni opposition. Maya Alleruzzo/AP Photo A poster of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki in Tahrir Square, Baghdad, Iraq, March, 2013 In the early months of 2011, as popular uprisings raised hopes for democracy around the Middle East, Iraqis were inspired to make their own call for a more democratic government and for a time, it seemed possible that they might induce significant reforms. On February 25, 2011, when thousands of young Iraqis took to the streets in Baghdad’s Tahrir Square and more than a dozen other cities, several local officials, including the governors of two Shiite provinces, were forced to resign. A few days later, Maliki, unnerved by the toppling of dictators in Egypt and Tunisia, announced a hundred-day deadline for the government to weed out corruption and improve the delivery of services. Maliki’s Sunni and Shiite critics seized upon the protests. Rather than come together to fix Iraq’s myriad problems, however, each political party saw the demonstrations as a way to pressure its rivals. It was a pattern that would repeat again and again over the next four years as politicians bullied and embarrassed one another at the country’s expense. That summer, the prime minister responded with authoritarian tactics. During the second Friday protest in Baghdad that June, Maliki supporters and plainclothes security agents descended upon the protesters and attacked them with clubs and knives. These roving bands of pro-Maliki men, who identified themselves as victims of terrorism, waved pictures of Allawi with a giant red X slashed across his face, while shouting “death to Baathists.” Iraqi soldiers stood by and officials from Maliki’s office toured the square in praise of their armed supporters, ignoring the violence. Maliki understood that the Americans were getting ready to leave and that the American-sponsored rules that had been imposed after 2003 were temporary. Vice President Biden, who traveled to Iraq four times between January 2010 and January 2011 to promote a successful democratic transition, had stopped coming as the American military prepared for its final withdrawal. And during the June crackdown, the US embassy—which is right across the river from Baghdad’s Tahrir Square—remained silent. By the fall, Maliki’s office was insinuating that his own Sunni-vice president, Tareq Hashimi, was running death squads, and stories were circulating that Hashimi and his fellow Sunni politicians, including finance minister Rafaa Issawi and Parliament speaker Usama Nujafi, were conspiring with Turkey and the Gulf states to bring down the new Shiite-led order. Upon his return from a triumphant visit to the White House that December to mark the formal US withdrawal, Maliki sent security forces to arrest Hashimi, who fled to Turkey, and to surround the homes of prominent Sunni officials inside the Green Zone. Maliki’s popularity surged with Iraq’s Shiite majority, but he underestimated how much he had alienated mainstream Sunnis. Many Sunni leaders were embittered by their lack of voice after an election they believed they had won, and the uprising in neighboring Syria, which increasingly pitted Syria’s Sunni majority against its minority Alawite leadership, seemed to offer a more radical approach to change. Sunni politicians spoke in private of the creation of a “Sunni crescent “ on Iraq’s Western flank if Syria fell. They believed it would deter Maliki from carrying out raids in their communities. At the same time, they were aware that a Sunni-ruled Syria meant more oppressive policies from Baghdad and the Shiites, who feared international plots by Sunni Islamist groups to topple them. In February 2013 I traveled to Anbar to spend a week with Sheikh Ali Hatem Sulaiman, the crown prince of Anbar’s largest tribal confederation. A hero of the Awakening, he had been one of the first to rise up against al-Qaeda in 2006, and had once posed for pictures with President Bush and then-Senator Obama. Now, however, he was throwing himself behind huge anti-government protests, which had erupted six weeks earlier after Maliki sent troops to arrest the bodyguards of the Sunni finance minister Issawi. Sheikh Ali drove his own jeep from meeting to meeting with tribal figures, a small silver machine gun strapped to his side, enlisting support for the protesters’ demands to free tens of thousands of Sunni detainees and to end discrimination against his sect. During my visit, he also invited Shiite tribal leaders to the demonstrations, hoping to find common cause with them over such grievances as government corruption and abuses by the security forces. Erin Kirk Barack Obama and Sheikh Ali Hatem Suleiman, Ramadi, Iraq, July 22, 2008 But the government was in no mood to negotiate with Sunni leaders like Sheikh Ali and the demonstrations were quickly exploited by hardliners. In April 2013, after the shooting of an Iraqi soldier near a protest camp in Hawija, a town in the north close to Iraq’s traditional border with Iraqi Kurdistan, elite security units attached to the prime minister’s military office opened fire on the camp, killing fifty-one people, including old men and children. A Western diplomat described the event to me as “carnage” and “a vendetta out of all proportions.” Veteran Iraqi jihadists, many of whom had gone to Syria to fight against Assad, used the Hawija killings to recruit more fighters. The shootings came just two weeks after al-Qaeda-linked militants renamed themselves the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and, while taking over significant areas of northern Syria, began to stage raids in Iraq itself, including a prison break at Abu Ghraib to free more than 500 Sunni militants. In late December 2013, ISIS fighters ambushed and killed an Iraqi general and seventeen officers in the Anbar desert. Maliki responded by ordering the arrest of a senior Sunni lawmaker and by clearing out the main Sunni protest camp in Ramadi, Anbar’s capital, where Sheikh Ali had been active. Maliki said his actions were necessary to stop al-Qaeda, but the brutal crackdown provoked mainstream Sunni tribes into a general armed uprising and forced hundreds of thousands of Iraqis to flee their homes. Sheikh Ali was now roaming the Anbar countryside, trying to wage a guerrilla campaign against Maliki’s elite counter-terrorism forces and juggling an uneasy co-existence with ISIS. “I will die a victor or a martyr,” he told his brother in a phone call from the battlefield. In interviews, US officials portrayed the fight in Anbar as a battle between Baghdad and al-Qaeda, and sent hellfire missiles for Maliki to use, regardless of the consequences and of the lack of a clearly defined objective. As my Reuters colleagues and I have documented, in recent weeks Iraqi Special Forces soldiers have bragged of executing suspected militants in Anbar. They describe it as revenge for what ISIS did to them. On Facebook community pages, Iraqi soldiers post pictures of ISIS fighters they have killed, depicting the executions as part of a regional war against Sunni extremists that spans from Iraq to Syria to Lebanon. Despite such boasts, control of the province’s main cities, Fallujah and Ramadi, is now divided among the Iraqi security forces, tribal leaders, ISIS, and other Sunni insurgents. ISIS has even seized a dam near Fallujah and flooded land to prevent the military from approaching its strongholds. But Iraq’s extremist violence is no longer limited to Qaeda militants, as Shiite militias, emboldened by the security forces’ conflict with Sunnis over the last year, have steadily regrouped. In the center of Baghdad, Shiite militias display pictures of fighters slain in Syria where they have gone to defend a sacred Shiite shrine against Sunni militants. It is a powerful recruiting tool for the groups and testament to their newfound sway in the capital. Shiite eyewitnesses and tribal figures describe Sunnis displaced or executed by militia groups. In Basra, the Shiite-dominated southern city where in 2008 Maliki stood up to the militias, the new radicalism is even more pronounced. The city is once again infested by such groups, some of them, like Asaib Ahl al Haq, enjoying close ties to the government. Asaib is headed by Qais Khazali, a one-time aid to radical Shiite cleric Muqtada al Sadr who the US military believes masterminded the kidnapping and execution of five US soldiers in January 2007. Jailed soon after, Khazali was released by US forces two years later under pressure from Maliki. But Khazali promptly reconstituted Asaib, which many Iraqis say has since carried out racketeering, kidnapping, and executions. Asaib and other Shiite militias have been suspected of a wave of killings in Basra that are reminiscent of the darkest days in Iraq’s civil war. At least seventeen Sunnis were assassinated, with some estimates putting the number as high as fifty between September and December. Letters were left on the doors of families from Basra’s main Sunni tribe, the Sadouns, warning the “killers of Hussein” to leave. The UN estimates at least fifty-nine families left Basra and its neighboring province Nasiriya for the north. In December, I travelled to Basra, where I met Sheik Jamal Sadoun, the head of the Sadoun clan. A policeman watched from the door during our meeting; posters of dead Asaib fighters in Syria papered a nearby wall. Sheik Jamal called the killings and threats a “sectarian campaign” but swore he had never been bothered by Asaib or Kitab Hezbollah, another powerful Shiite militia. Echoing comments by Maliki, he nervously claimed that al-Qaeda must be responsible for the violence. “No one can protect you but the state,” he said. Those not under the watch of the government, however, were far more alarmist. A family from the Sadoun tribe refused to rule out the government or the militias as responsible: “We don’t feel safe. You can’t recognize your enemy. You don’t know who he is.” The ambiguity between regular security forces and militia groups evokes memories of 2005 and 2006, when many police units often doubled as sectarian death squads. Many Asaib militants carry badges from the prime minister’s office that allow them through checkpoints to conduct operations against their enemies. A Shiite politician, with links to Asaib, said the group has assassinated Sunnis, but that those killed were definitely terrorists. The question is: Are Asaib members carrying out gangland-style hits of Sunnis or Sadrists on behalf of Maliki, or are they free agents the prime minister cannot afford to alienate? One Western diplomat, who defended Maliki, suggested that Asaib bought their badges by bribing officials around the prime minister’s office. Throughout the country, pervasive corruption has weakened the chain of command of the army and police. Security officers regularly detain people and then offer to free them for thousands of dollars in ransom; they take bribes at checkpoints, and run rackets based on inflating company rosters with names of soldiers who don’t exist. Actual battle commands are now for sale to the highest bidder, according to senior government officials. The more the chaos, the greater the opportunities for criminals and extremists to take advantage of an increasingly weakened state, as was the case during Iraq’s last round of civil war. With elections now two weeks away the prime minister appears confident. One way his Shiite political opponents might challenge his bid to continue in office would be to form a ruling coalition with Sunnis and Kurds after the election. But despite their shared wish to replace Maliki, the competition among his Shiite opponents to claim his position, and the most lucrative governmental posts, may prevent them from coming together. Sunni political figures are in a similar battle for preeminence within their own community. Sunni candidates also face threats from members of ISIS, the Qaeda-linked group, who consider any participation in the election as traitorous. Deteriorating security conditions in the north and west are likely to limit Sunni voter turnout, and the electoral commission has already announced that some areas in western Anbar will not be able to cast ballots. In any case, a lengthy negotiation period will likely be required after the election to form a new government, during which Maliki, by virtue of his office, will continue to exercise the most power in the land. Though less popular than in 2010, Maliki believes he will benefit from the fear and chaos, presenting himself as the only one capable of guarding his community and saving Iraq. Sectarian conflict becomes another way of waging politics and outlasting competitors. One evening in December, I visited a former commander of a Shiite militia who had become a politician. He eyed news of a bombing in Baghdad and said, “See, fifteen of our people died today.” As we talked, a dozen military-age men arrived at his house, some wearing green military pants and vests. The politician called the men to a separate room and terminated our meeting. He ordered no one to disturb them: suddenly, he had become his former self, a militia commander who defended Shiite areas against suspected terrorists during the heights of sectarian violence in 2005 and 2006. It was time for the next battle.

BAGHDAD (AP) — Iraqi election officials began handing out new, computerized voter identification cards Saturday across the capital as the country prepares for its first nationwide election since the withdrawal of U.S. troops. Related Stories Iraqi authorities distribute cards for electionsAssociated Press Militants kill at least 9 troops in eastern IraqAssociated Press Sunni militants overtake part of Iraqi townAssociated Press Iraq turns to Sunni tribes, but distrust remainsAssociated Press Car bombings kill at least 33 people in IraqAssociated Press But the more than $100 million push to modernize voting comes as officials can't distribute cards in embattled Anbar province, where al-Qaida fighters seized control of parts of two cities, and as militant attacks rage on unabated, killing at least 14 people alone Saturday and wounding nearly two dozen. The new voter cards, which include a computer chip, will allow election officials to check a voter's identity and try to halt fraud. Several Iraqi political blocs alleged that some people voted multiple times in the last vote in 2010, although the results of the election were not widely disputed. In previous elections, voters had to go through lists glued outside balloting centers to find their names before going inside. Spanish technology firm Indra signed a five-year deal with Iraq to supply the new system and train election officials. Nearly 22 million Iraqis are eligible to cast their ballots in coming April 30 parliamentary elections. Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki is eying a third term in office despite objections from political rivals who accuse him of marginalizing partners and seizing control of state institutions to consolidate power. In a televised speech Wednesday, al-Maliki reiterated a pledge to not delay elections because of the violence, calling on people to overcome any reluctance to pick up cards "because their vote will be decisive this time." View gallery Election officials prepare to distribute voter ID cards to Iraqi citizens in Baghdad, Iraq, Saturday … Voters in 13 of Iraq's 18 provinces began to receive cards three weeks ago, Independent High Electoral Commission official Aziz al-Kheikani said. Distribution began Saturday in four new provinces, including the capital, Baghdad, he said. Saddam Raheem Jassim, a resident of Baghdad, received his card Saturday and praised the effort. "This identity chip for voters, looking at its form and shape, is good," Jassim said. "It looks like they made big effort for it, for the sake of Iraqi people. This will ensure our rights and prevent any means of forgery in the election." Meanwhile Saturday, two bombs targeted a four-vehicle patrol in the town of al-Saadiyah, 140 kilometers (90 miles) northeast of Baghdad, a police officer said. Militants opened fire on the troops after the bombing in an attack that killed nine and wounded four, he said. The attack came hours after three car bombs exploded in the city of Tikrit, some 130 kilometers (80 miles) north of Baghdad, another police officer said. The officer said the blasts near the homes of local security and civilian officials killed five people and wounded 18. View gallery Election officials prepare to distribute voter ID cards to Iraqi citizens in Baghdad, Iraq, Saturday … Two medical officials confirmed figures. All officials spoke on condition of anonymity as they were not authorized to release information to journalists. Fierce clashes pitting government security forces and allied Sunni tribal militias against a coalition of insurgents also have been raging in western Iraq's Anbar province since late December. An al-Qaida offshoot and other insurgent groups have taken control of the city of Fallujah and parts of the provincial capital, Ramadi. Thousands have fled the violence. On Saturday, al-Maliki announced a three-day halt of military operations in Fallujah as a "goodwill" gesture. In a statement read on state television, al-Maliki said the halt began Friday and will last through Monday after requests from clerics and tribal sheiks to halt the bloodletting. Al-Maliki's statement did not say whether military operations would resume after the halt. Government officials could not be immediately reached for comment. http://news.yahoo.com/iraq-hands-election-ids-unrest-rages-145851913.html