A quiet plan to disrupt al-Zaydi's actions... and fears of "political revenge" govern closed-door meetings!

[RJG]

A quiet plan to disrupt al-Zaydi's actions... and fears of "political revenge" govern closed-door meetings!

Investigation committees and objections to tanks and raids

 

Published on: July 8, 2026 at 12:46 AM

Baghdad / Tamim Al-Hassan

A "secret" plan is underway to thwart Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi's measures, both those related to the state's monopoly on weapons and the fight against corruption.
According to informed political sources, this plan is not being publicly announced but rather implemented gradually and cautiously, without stirring up controversy or provoking public unrest.
It operates through investigative committees, legal challenges, and political leaks, attempting to shift the focus of the campaign from pursuing the accused to targeting those leading it.
The real battle likely began when the campaign approached traditional centers of power, prompting the issuance of a "belated warning."
Those voices supporting al-Zaidi's measures thus far are, according to the same sources, motivated by "political revenge."
The silent trap... Following in the footsteps of "Abu Ragheef,"
on June 28th, al-Zaidi caused an unprecedented political and military shock when he deployed tanks in the Green Zone to pursue officials and members of parliament accused of corruption in what became known as "Operation Dawn."
Sources told Al-Mada that there are persistent attempts to lure the current prime minister into the same trap that led to the collapse of the "Abu Ragheef" committee during Mustafa Al-Kadhimi's government. That committee was besieged by accusations of torturing detainees, ultimately resulting in its demise.
The alternative strategy being implemented today against Al-Zaidi relies on "quiet questioning" and launching "counter-investigations" to avoid direct confrontation with public opinion, which supports the campaign.
Therefore, it was no surprise that parliamentary demands began to emerge for the formation of investigative committees into the performance of the forces carrying out the raids and arrests.
MP Samia Ghallab, a member of the "Progress" party, announced that Parliament Speaker Haibat Al-Halbousi had directed the formation of a committee to investigate the mechanism for executing arrest warrants against MPs, in addition to another committee to review the confessions of Oil Ministry Undersecretary Adnan Al-Jumaili and to visit the detained MPs.
In a television interview, Ghallab described the scenes of the campaign as resembling a "Hollywood action movie," considering what happened an "insult" to the parliament and the method of execution "wrong and unacceptable."
On the other side, Haider al-Mulla, a leader in the Azm Alliance, adopted a more diplomatic tone in defending his detained bloc leader, Muthanna al-Samarrai.
He confirmed that the alliance had reservations about the manner of the arrest, preferring to raise them with the relevant authorities away from the media, emphasizing that "not a single penny was found in al-Samarrai's house."
After two tumultuous weeks since al-Zaidi launched his dual campaign to disarm the factions and pursue their allies in corruption networks, the campaign has slowed somewhat compared to its initial momentum. No public surrender of weapons has been recorded by the major factions, with the exception of elements within the Sadr Movement.
Two weeks ago, an unidentified drone flew over the Green Zone, in what analysts considered the first harsh warning against al-Zaidi's measures.
To date, the largest factions, believed to have ideological and logistical ties to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, categorically refuse to surrender their weapons under any circumstances.
What is happening within the Shia political establishment?
So far, no party within the "coordination framework" has come forward to declare its explicit opposition to Ali al-Zaidi's actions.On the contrary, official statements of support have been repeated, the latest of which was the meeting held at Hadi al-Amiri’s house.
However, according to political sources, what is said behind closed doors differs from official statements.
Researcher and academic Mohammed Naanaa told Al-Mada that the coordinating framework "cannot directly reject the measures because public sentiment supports combating corruption and restricting weapons," adding that any public objection would be interpreted as defending the corrupt or armed groups, a political price no one wants to pay.
Therefore, the discussion shifted from rejecting the campaign to discussing its details: Who is being arrested? How are the raids being carried out? Are targets being chosen according to judicial criteria or political considerations? Amid this scene, the position of the Sadrist movement leader, Muqtada al
-
Sadr, appeared the most noteworthy.
While most leaders within the framework adhered to the language of traditional statements, al-Sadr chose the language of direct warning, speaking of the possibility of an assassination attempt against al-Zaidi and calling for him to be left unharmed.
The message was not directed at the government alone, but also at political forces. He implied that the danger was no longer limited to thwarting the measures, but could extend to targeting al-Zaidi himself if he crossed red lines within the system of influence.
Al-Sadr did not stop at issuing warnings; he also mobilized his supporters to organize unified public demonstrations in Baghdad and the provinces in support of what he called "the soldier of reform," Ali al-Zaidi, emphasizing the necessity of continuing the raids that, in his words, "terrified many at home and abroad."
Politicians believe that al-Sadr's return to the forefront was not solely a result of these developments.
Political sources confirm that communication channels between him and al-Zaidi began before the formation of the government, and that this rapprochement is causing concern within the Coordination Framework, which fears it could evolve into a political understanding granting al-Sadr indirect influence within the government, without his official participation.
On
the other side, Nouri al-Maliki appeared more enthusiastic than many in defending "Operation Dawn."
He not only endorsed the measures but also defended their most controversial details, most notably the use of tanks inside the Green Zone, a scene that evoked memories of military coups for Shiite leaders.
In a televised interview, Maliki stated that the deployment of tanks "was not preparation for battle, but rather a serious message and a show of readiness, which is what is required."
According to political circles, this stance reveals a different interpretation of the campaign.
Maliki seems convinced that the show of force was necessary to demonstrate the state's authority, while his opponents believe the message carried more political risks than security benefits.
In contrast, Ammar al-Hakim chose to direct his criticism at the means, not the ends.
He explicitly rejected the use of tanks to execute arrest warrants, arguing that the state does not need military vehicles to arrest any political figure, as the law presumes the accused innocent until proven guilty in court.
An old war in a new guise
, but behind all these positions, the rivalry between Nouri al-Maliki and Mohammed Shia al-Sudani is clearly present.
In the recent interview, Maliki stated that corruption today has become "outright plunder" and exploded dangerously in the previous government, the government of Mohammed Shia al-Sudani.
Political analysts confirm that Maliki's fierce support for the campaign stems from its direct impact on the core of former Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani's team.
This is evident in the erosion of al-Sudani's parliamentary bloc, with MPs defecting from the coalition, reducing its size from 50 to just 23.
The list of 15 detainees in "Operation Dawn" includes nine officials from al-Sudani's coalition.
These events are seen as a new chapter in the long-standing "settling of scores" between Maliki and his former protégé, al-Sudani—a rivalry that began when the latter reluctantly assumed power in 2022, and intensified with al-Sudani's "rebellion" to form an independent political alliance and contest the elections.
Meanwhile
, al-Sudani's team refuses to back down, with its MPs demanding the opening of all corruption files dating back to 2003, a clear jab at Maliki's two previous administrations.
Khaled Walid, a member of the Reconstruction and Development bloc led by al-Sudani, says that what is happening "is not yet considered a political targeting," but he reveals that representatives of the coalition have demanded that the campaign be expanded to include all successive governments from 2003 to 2026, and not be limited to a specific period or political group.
He adds to Al-Mada that any campaign that excludes one period over another will lose some of its credibility, because corruption, as he puts it, was not exclusive to one government, but rather accumulated over many years, even if its scale and responsibilities varied.
Al-Sudani's supporters maintain that his government, despite the political pressures it faced, took steps to curb corruption, including referring senior officials to the Integrity Commission, dismissing a number of high-ranking officials after reviewing their performance, as well as implementing a project to automate the financial system and tightening controls on foreign transfers—measures they say have contributed to reducing currency and money smuggling abroad.
They also point out that during his time as prime minister, al-Sudani encountered resistance from political forces who refused to replace certain ministers suspected of corruption, and that going further risked a political crisis that threatened the government's very survival.
These are alarming figures from the legacy of the past.
Nouri al-Maliki rejects the suggestion that the absence of prominent figures from his party in the arrest campaign is evidence of political protection, arguing that it simply reflects their lack of involvement in the corruption cases currently under investigation.
However, this interpretation is not universally accepted within political and academic circles.
Ghazi Faisal, head of the Iraqi Center for Strategic Studies, told Al-Mada that any serious campaign to recover looted funds cannot extend beyond al-Maliki's years in power, given the scale of the money spent during that period and the unresolved questions surrounding it.
Faisal cites statements by former MP Adel Nouri, who spoke on more than one occasion about the disappearance of approximately $600 billion during Maliki's first and second terms in office, as well as reports published in 2012 by former Central Bank Governor Sinan al-Shabibi and his public statements regarding financial waste—figures that international oversight bodies said warranted a thorough investigation.
He adds that the issue is not just about the figures themselves, but about the fate of these funds.Where did it go? How was it spent? What amount of it was converted into investments inside or outside Iraq? Did any of it leak into financial networks or companies linked to influential forces inside and outside the country?
These questions, according to Faisal, remain part of the true test of any project that claims to be fighting corruption.
Estimates of the amount of money Iraq lost due to corruption during al-Maliki's two governments range from approximately $360 billion to over $600 billion, resulting from corruption, mismanagement, money laundering, and the absence of final accounts for many years.

https://almadapaper.net/442558/

[BETTYBOOP]

Malaki is up to his neck in it . He knows it and so does everyone else, inside and outside iraq. 

[Bama Girl]

On 7/8/2026 at 5:03 PM, RJG said:

A "secret" plan is underway to thwart Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi's measures, both those related to the state's monopoly on weapons and the fight against corruption.

Huh, guess it’s not such a secret anymore since it’s published new! 😎😊