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The government is making progress in the budget battle after resolving the political debate


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Economist: Amending the budget items related to the region will complicate the relationship with the government

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Economist Nabilal-Marsoumi said that the Parliamentary Finance Committee's vote to amend the paragraphs on the Kurdistan region will complicate the relationship between the region and the center. The decree said in a post followed by /
/: "The Finance Committee amended (Article 13 / II / a), which stipulates under the government version sent to oblige the region to export at least 400 thousand barrels," noting that "the text of the article after the amendment is the region committed to deliver crude oil produced in its fields at a rate of not less than 400 thousand barrels per day to the Ministry of Oil for export through Sumo or use locally in Iraqi refineries.
The amendment added a kind of complexity in the relationship between the center and the region due to the technical difficulties related to the delivery of the region's oil to the center on the one hand, and because of the stripping of the region of the authority to export oil on the other hand," he added. The decree pointed out that "paragraph C of the same article was also amended, after it stipulated the commitment of the Ministry of Finance to pay the region's dues monthly and make accounting adjustments on a quarterly basis, meaning that the region was receiving its dues in the 2023 budget," noting that "the new amendment obligated the region to pay its oil and non-oil revenues before receiving its share of the budget."

He added that "Article 14 has also been amended after it was stipulated to deposit the total revenues of the region's oil in one bank account, now obliges the region to deposit oil revenues in a bank account opened in the Central Bank of Iraq while the region was seeking to open the account in Citibank."
He stressed that "the region has prevented the extraction of oil from the Kirkuk and Nineveh fields currently under its control, which currently accounts for more than a third of the region's crude oil production."
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The Rise and Fall of Kurdish Power in Iraq. By Bilal Wahab*

April 30, 20230
If the 1991 Gulf War led to the birth of the Kurdistan Regional Government, the US invasion in 2003 propelled it into the future.

 

At the start of the invasion, Iraqi Kurdistan served as the northern front of the war, elevating the status of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). The destruction of President Saddam Hussein’s Baathist regime buttressed Kurdish rights and enabled their political and economic power to grow. Compared to the violence and sectarian strife that befell the rest of the country under the US-led occupation, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq was held up by the US pundit class as a “safe haven” and “island of decency”—a narrative the KRG encouraged with a public relations campaign describing Kurdistan as “the Other Iraq.” [1]

2003 brought with it a unity of purpose among Iraq’s Kurdish parties. They capitalized on their longstanding relationship with the United States and Britain, the primary enforcers of the no-fly zone following the first Gulf War and the two major proponents of regime change in 2003. Although differences persisted, Kurdish parties spoke in unison in Baghdad, particularly in the early years following the invasion. They worked to enshrine their new powers and rights into Iraq’s 2005 constitution, which recognized Kurdistan as an official region and granted the KRG power to govern largely independently of Baghdad. Kurdish parties also fully supported the 2005 parliamentary elections. As a result of these efforts, they gained a significant influence within the Iraqi state. Kurdish members of parliament form a significant block that often makes or breaks governments and legislations. In the muhassasa system— the informal but persistent practice of ethno-sectarian division of top jobs—Iraq has only had Kurdish presidents since 2006. Ethnic Kurds have on occasion served as deputy parliament speakers and led key ministries such as finance and foreign affairs.

But working within the state apparatus has confused the Kurdish role in Baghdad. On the one hand, the KRG has sought the greatest possible share of the state’s powers and revenues. On the other, given historical Kurdish fears of a strong central government, they have also invested in their ability to secede, exemplified by the referendum for independence in 2017.  Today, Iraqi Kurdistan faces external challenges, most notably a legal and financial squeeze by Baghdad’s federal government and threats of Iranian and Turkish attacks. The real threat to the KRG is not external, however. Thirty years after its founding and 20 years on from the US invasion, the KRG—as if going through a mid-life crisis—lacks a clear vision for its future. Amid the threat of losing relevance, it stares at implosion due to economic uncertainties, chronic internal divisions and weak institutions.

 

Finding Wealth

 

Kurds in Iraq have long based their struggle for self-rule on their grievances as a persecuted ethnic minority. Kurdish rulers gained legitimacy by standing up for Kurdish rights. Following the first Gulf War and the 1992 elections, however, such revolutionary credit gave way to democratic legitimacy. The elections gave birth to the KRG and brought two parties, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), to formal political power. Since then, each of the two major Kurdish parties have remained inextricably associated with a family—the Talabani family lead the PUK, and the Barzani family the KDP (their second and third generations, respectively, are currently at the helm of power).

Also Read: “The Elusive Quest for a Kurdish State,” in MER issue 295.

The civil war in Iraqi Kurdistan between 1994 and 1998 discredited both parties, dividing the region into two single-party fiefdoms that persist until today. Meanwhile, over the course of the past two decades, as a new generation of each ruling family took on the mantle of leadership, their legitimacy has lacked both revolutionary and democratic standing. Economic development emerged as an alternative.

Indeed, between 2004 and 2014, the KRG translated post-invasion opportunities into an economic boom. A construction frenzy in this period caused the capital city of Erbil to more than double in size. The KRG says it has rebuilt 65 percent of rural Kurdistan that was destroyed during the Anfal campaign of ethnic cleansing in 1988. Two of Iraq’s three national cell phone companies are headquartered in Kurdistan, and the region is also home to a slew of hotels, gated communities and private schools, including two American-style universities.

By 2005, the KRG had built two international airports, in Sulaymaniyah and Erbil, unshackling the landlocked region. Foreign visitors could obtain visas upon arrival, a policy that the Iraqi government did not adopt until 2021. Mass public hiring decreased unemployment, although foreign laborers filled much of the skills gap. Furthermore, a 2006 investment law, which offered investors perks such as land ownership, tax holidays and profit repatriation, helped the KRG attract significant local and foreign capital. Today, there are over 3,000 foreign companies registered in the region. On the diplomatic front, the KRG hosts 42 consulates and maintains 14 representation offices around the world.

Making the most of its geographic location and security, Iraqi Kurdistan has become an important regional trade route and destination. Turkey, whose only land border with Iraq goes through the Kurdistan region, is the KRG’s largest trading partner. In 2017, the volume of trade between Turkey and Iraqi Kurdistan was $2.5 billion, representing nearly one third of Ankara’s overall trade with Iraq.[2] Similarly, one third of Iraq’s imports from Iran—an estimated $2.4 billion a year—are to Iraqi Kurdistan.[3] Moreover, 50 percent of Iran’s exports to Iraq pass through border crossings controlled by the KRG.

 

From Foreign Aid to Oil Federalism

 

The federal system proposed in the 2005 constitution granted the KRG a significant role in managing the oil and gas resources of the region. These provisions served as a safeguard: Should the new Iraq fail, it would be possible for an economically independent Kurdistan to take the next step toward statehood, the penultimate nationalist dream.

The constitution envisioned a system of petro-federalism, in which the federal Iraqi government and the KRG would share responsibility over oil policy and revenue. But in the years since its ratification, the Iraqi parliament has consistently failed to pass a national hydrocarbon law that would regulate the energy sector and define these joint roles.

Acting proactively, the Kurdish parliament passed its own natural resources law in 2007 and started inking some 55 contracts with international oil companies. While the federal government maintained that this law was unconstitutional and the oil contracts illegal, the KRG pushed ahead. It adopted production-sharing contracts, an industry favorite, which allowed international oil companies a stake in the region’s petroleum assets. This “smaller, faster, lighter” approach, as Deputy Prime Minister Qubad Talabani put it, helped jumpstart the Kurdish energy industry.[4] Small firms, or wildcatters, came first, but Big Oil soon followed. In 2011 and 2012 ExxonMobil and Chevron each signed exploration contracts with the KRG, materially boosting the legal standing of its energy industry.

The KRG asked for neither permission nor forgiveness from Baghdad, an approach that in many ways paid off. By mid-2022, the KRG was producing nearly 450,000 barrels of oil per day, most of it exported via the region’s independent pipeline through Turkey. In the second quarter of 2022 alone, Iraqi Kurdistan’s oil sales earned $3.77 billion in gross revenues. While only 41 percent of these revenues made it into KRG coffers (the rest was dedicated to paying the oil sector’s costs as well as servicing its debts) the KRG still reaped $1.57 billion. As for natural gas, the KRG’s marketed natural gas production stood at about 5.3 billion cubic meters per year in 2021.[5]

Intent on more independence from Baghdad, the KRG has grown dependent on other entities and factors beyond its control, including global oil prices, the dollar-dinar exchange rate and Turkey, through which its pipeline passes.

The payoffs, however, have come with a cost. The federal government’s claim on Kurdish oil has forced the KRG to sell at a political risk discount. Furthermore, disputes between Erbil and Baghdad over oil and customs revenues boiled over in 2014, leading Baghdad to cut off the KRG’s share of the national budget. In 2022, the Iraqi Federal Supreme Court formally ruled that the KRG’s natural resource law was unconstitutional and its oil contracts and exports illegal. The Iraqi government had also sued Turkey in international arbitration courts over allowing the KRG to use the Iraq-Turkey pipeline without Baghdad’s approval. At the time of writing, the court favored Iraq’s position, compelling Turkey to halt the KRG’s oil exports. The future of the KRG’s independent energy industry remains uncertain.

Intent on more independence from Baghdad, the KRG has grown dependent on other entities and factors beyond its control, including global oil prices, the dollar-dinar exchange rate and Turkey, through which its pipeline passes. The vulnerabilities of this system started to show in 2014, when the expansion of ISIS caused international oil companies to either withdraw or suspend planned developments. The KRG made up for the losses by taking over Kirkuk’s oil fields following the Iraqi army’s retreat, which doubled the KRG’s crude exports to 550,000 barrels per day. But these gains were hampered by falling oil prices. Per barrel, oil prices fell from a peak of $115 in June 2014 to $70 in December and to $35 by February 2016. Deputy Prime Minister Qubad Talabani described the KRG’s dire financial situation at the time as an “economic tsunami.”[6] A telling manifestation of lost confidence in the KRG has been a renewed wave of migration to Europe. As a result of these factors, among others, by 2021 the KRG faced a debt of $31.6 billion.

 

Internal Divisions and Institutional Weakness

 

In recent years, fissures have cropped up among Iraqi Kurdistan’s ruling families, who have grown in prominence as the region’s political parties have weakened. After PUK founder Jalal Talabani passed away in 2017 his eldest son and nephew together took the reins of the party as co-presidents. In 2021, a feud broke out between the cousins, Bafel and Lahur Talabni, and the former ousted the latter. Meanwhile, on the Barzani side a power struggle is brewing between two Barzani cousins, which has the potential to disrupt not only the cohesion of the KDP but the entire regional government. These internecine struggles reflect broader institutional weaknesses and democratic regression in the Kurdistan region.

KRG institutions were brittle and completely unprepared to weather the “economic tsunami” that began in 2014.

As an example, KRG institutions were brittle and completely unprepared to weather the “economic tsunami” that began in 2014. The last time the KRG parliament had passed a budget was in 2012. The public sector had swelled uncontrollably, crowding out private sector jobs. By 2017, the KRG was the largest employer in Kurdistan, employing half of the labor force, roughly 1.4 million people, to the tune of $750 million a month.[7] Corruption and inefficiency have marred public sector employment, with thousands of ghost employees, double dippers and undeserved pensioners, while the budding private sector owes its existence to holding companies owned or controlled by members of Kurdistan’s ruling families. To avoid showing its hand to Baghdad, the KRG energy industry has become increasingly opaque and unaccountable.

The Peshmerga enjoy influence and prestige and have continued to garner significant public and political support, especially during their partnership with the US-led anti-ISIS coalition, but the cavernous political rift between the PUK and KDP has decreased the Kurdistan region’s value to the United States as a partner and diminished Kurdish leverage in Baghdad. There is no accurate accounting available, but the number of Peshmerga fighters is estimated to range between 160,000 to double that number. Prime Minister Masrour Barzani admitted that the Peshmerga forces have more generals among their ranks than either the US or Chinese military. Ever since the war against ISIS, the United States has provided stipends and training to Peshmerga units in exchange for the promise that the Peshmerga will be unified under the command of the KRG rather than its ruling parties. But the KDP and PUK refuse to surrender control of their respective units—a stance that Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces have cited in their own snubbing of national authority.

Overall, the KRG’s reputation for valuing democracy and human rights has eroded in the years since 2003. Due to civil war and internal divisions in the 1990s, the region’s second parliamentary elections were not held until 2005, 13 years after the first election. Subsequent elections have taken place only following significant delays. Electoral victory and power are increasingly out of sync in the region. When the unarmed opposition party, Gorran, came in second in the 2009 elections, ahead of the PUK, the two ruling parties did not allow Gorran to share in power. Although President Masoud Barzani’s term ended in 2015, he only left office in 2017, effectively shutting down the Kurdish parliament for two years in order to extend his tenure. No wonder turnout has been steadily declining at Kurdish elections.

 

The KRG’s Future

 

Despite a persistent narrative of grievances and victimhood, Iraqi Kurds have exercised significant power and agency during the past three decades. KRG leaders continue to seek more power and autonomy, but to what end? Although they rebounded after decades of war, genocide and neglect, post-invasion Kurdish politics has not managed to shake off chronic internal divisions. The region’s most advanced institutions that could potentially support an independent Kurdistan remain its economy and Peshmerga forces.

 

While the KRG has wielded economic policy to shift toward political independence, they have yet to produce a viable economic model. Indeed, despite 30 years of successfully managing a regional economy, the endless quest for economic independence has only ended up shifting dependency from Iraq to Turkey or from foreign aid to oil revenues. The ad hoc economic policy that has slowly emerged, like a Polaroid photo, over the past two decades displays traits of socialism, free markets and kleptocracy. Access to power and wealth, meanwhile, remains anchored to politics not to economic activity.

The 2017 independence referendum, called for by then-President Barzani, tested the Kurdistan region’s military and economic assets. Neither the international community nor the KRG’s neighbors could stomach redrawing the borders of the Middle East, and the KRG was not ready to withstand the economic and political costs of its push to secede from Iraq. The referendum and its aftermath cost the KRG the gains it had made following the ISIS invasion of 2014, including Kirkuk and its oilfields, which were reclaimed by Iraqi military and Popular Mobilization Forces after an armed encounter with the Peshmerga. Most damaging, however, was the clarity it bestowed on a hitherto ambiguous question: Can the KRG become an independent state?

As Kurdish divisions deepen and security in the rest of Iraq improves, the balance of power that once favored the KRG is shifting in Baghdad’s favor. Since the referendum, KRG leaders disagree on visions for their position within Iraq and on plans to save their embattled energy sector. Should the Kurdish economy remain hinged on foreign aid, oil and budget transfers from Baghdad, or can it build a robust economy through reform and diversification? These are among the questions raised over the past 20 years. Whether and how they are answered will determine the Kurdistan Region’s future.

 

Endnotes

 

[1] Thomas L. Friedman, “Opinion | The Kurdish Secret,” The New York Times, September 2, 2007.

[2] Serkan Demirtaş, “Turkey’s Trade with KRG ‘Business as Usual’ despite Referendum, Says Economy Minister,” Hürriyet Daily News, September 27, 2017.

[3] Michael Georgy, “Defiant Kurds Shrug off Risk of Trade War after Independence Vote,” Reuters, October 18, 2017.

[4] Author interview, 2012.

[5]  “Opportunities to Strengthen the Natural Gas Sector in the Iraq Kurdistan Region,” Qamar Energy Report, September 2021, p. 5.

[6] Isabel Coles, “Economic ‘tsunami’ undermines war against Islamic State in Iraq-Kurdish deputy PM,” Reuters, January 16, 2016.

[7] “Biometric Payroll System Unveils Widespread Fraud in Iraqi Kurdistan,” Ekurd Daily, February 1, 2017.

How to cite this article:

Bilal Wahab “The Rise and Fall of Kurdish Power in Iraq,” Middle East Report 306 (Spring 2023).

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3 hours ago, horsesoldier said:

You have to pass it to find out what's in it...I've heard that refrain somewheres before... hmmm, but where ??? 😆

They need to elect Al Pelosi to rush it thru.

 

3 hours ago, horsesoldier said:

You have to pass it to find out what's in it...I've heard that refrain somewheres before... hmmm, but where ??? 😆

They need to find a good dishonest leader like Al Pelosi

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The Prime Minister of the Kurdistan Regional Government, Masrour Barzani, confirmed, on Friday, that members of the Finance Committee violated the agreement of the central government and the region regarding the federal budget.

Barzani said in a tweet on Twitter, followed by Alsumaria News: "A group in the Finance Committee of the Iraqi Parliament made changes to the draft federal budget, violating a prior agreement we concluded with Prime Minister Muhammad Shia'a al-Sudani and his government."
 

He added, "The agreement is the cornerstone of cooperation between Erbil and Baghdad, and all parties must respect its provisions."
 
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follow-up |..

The head of the Kurdistan Regional Government accused a group in the Parliamentary Finance Committee of violating the financial agreement with the Sudanese government.

And Barzani stated in a tweet followed by “Jarida”:

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Earth News / The head of the Kurdistan Regional Government, Masrour Barzani, criticized the Parliamentary Finance Committee and accused him of violating the agreement with Baghdad regarding the budget.  

Barzani said in a tweet to him on Twitter, followed by "Earth News", that "members of the Finance Committee in the Iraqi Parliament made changes to the draft budget, violating the agreement with the cabinet headed by Al-Sudani."

He added, "The agreement is the cornerstone of cooperation between Erbil and Baghdad, and all parties must adhere to it."

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Amendments to the region's share in the budget bring the differences back to square one

May 26, 2023

Baghdad / Obelisk Al-Hadath: The Kurdistan Regional Government announced, on Friday, its rejection of the Parliamentary Finance Committee's amendments to its share of the budget.

The government said in a statement, “The changes made by some members of the Finance Committee in the Iraqi Parliament, on 5/25/2023, are against the Kurdistan region, on the draft budget law, which is unconstitutional and contrary to the agreement between the Kurdistan Regional Government and the federal government, which is the program of the voting cabinet.” it in Parliament.”

A member of the State of Law Coalition, Representative Duha al-Qusayr, said in a statement on the screens, “The representatives of the law will boycott the voting session on the budget if the allocations for the poor governorates in the south are not raised.”

Al-Qusayr considered that the number of employees in the Kurdistan region needs a “fact-finding committee.”

The disputes between the federal government in Iraq and the Kurdistan region over the file of the region's employees are long-term and include multiple axes related to salaries, appointments, budgets and legislation for employees in the areas under the control of the Kurdistan region. These differences have caused tensions between the federal government and the Kurdistan region over the years.

According to the available information, there is no clear and reliable number of employees in the Kurdistan region of Iraq that Baghdad provides. However, some available reports provide approximate numbers.

According to the International Labor Organization report for the year 2020, the total number of workers in the Kurdistan region is estimated at about 1.5 million people, with the public sector making up about 28% of this number.
In 2022, statistics were published that the number of employees in the public sector in the Kurdistan region may reach 500,000 employees.
In the year 2021, the number of employees in the Ministry of Interior in the Kurdistan Region is estimated at about 40,000 employees.

And Baghdad and Erbil have not reached over the years a permanent agreement on the laws for the distribution of oil and financial revenues between them.

Under the Iraqi constitution, oil revenues are distributed between the federal government and the regions in specific proportions, but there are disagreements regarding the specific proportions and how to distribute them.

It is known about Iraq in general and Kurdistan, the existence of fictitious employees, who are people who claim to be official employees and receive salaries or benefits without actually performing any work or carrying out any task.

 

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Contacts between Baghdad and Erbil to solve the budget obstacles..and reveal the Sudanese position
  
{Politics: Al Furat News} A member of the Kurdistan Democratic Party revealed that contacts are taking place between the federal governments and the Kurdistan region regarding resolving obstacles around the region's share in the financial budget.

"Contacts are now taking place between the prime minister and the regional government to resolve the issue and file of Kurdistan's share in the budget," Wafaa Muhammad Karim told {Euphrates News} agency.
He stressed that "the position of Prime Minister Muhammad Shia' al-Sudani is very positive towards the region, and there is no blame or negligence, but there are political parties trying to obstruct the matter, and it still has a sectarian spirit," as he put it.
It is noteworthy that the House of Representatives is scheduled to hold a session tomorrow, Saturday, to vote on the financial budget, but the amendment of the Parliamentary Finance Committee for Articles 13 and 14 concerning the share of the Kurdistan region, and the latter’s objection to the amendment may postpone the session to another date.
Today, Friday, the Kurdistan Regional Government announced its rejection of the amendments introduced by the Finance Committee and said in a statement that: “The changes are against the Kurdistan Region, which are unconstitutional and clearly inconsistent with the agreement signed between the regional government and the federal government, as well as constitute a violation of the principles of the agreement of the government of state administration and contradict with The essence of the ministerial platform that the House of Representatives voted on.”
She indicated, "We, in the regional government, will not accept this injustice and violation of the rights of the people of Kurdistan at all, and we will not abide by any other decision outside the scope of the agreement signed with the government of Muhammad Shia'a al-Sudani."

Raghad Daham

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Kurdistan government: Changes in the budget are against the region, and we will not accept them at all
  
{Politics: Al Furat News} The Kurdistan Regional Government announced its rejection of the amendments made by the Parliamentary Finance Committee to Articles 13 and 14 of the region in the draft federal budget law.

And she said in a statement, which {Euphrates News} received a copy of, that: “The changes introduced by some members of the Finance Committee in the Iraqi Parliament in the draft general budget law on 5/25/2023 against the Kurdistan Region are unconstitutional changes and clearly contradict the agreement signed between the regional government.” And the federal government, as well as a violation of the principles of the state management government agreement and contradicts the essence of the ministerial platform that the House of Representatives voted on.
He pointed out, "We, in the regional government, will not accept at all this injustice and violation of the rights of the people of Kurdistan, and we will not abide by any other decision outside the scope of the agreement signed with the government of Muhammad Shiaa al-Sudani."

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The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has said that the changes made by some members of the Finance Committee of the Iraqi House of Representatives are "unconstitutional and against the agreement between the Kurdistan Regional Government and the federal government . The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) said in a statement Friday that the changes made by some

members of the Finance Committee of the Iraqi House of Representatives on May 25, 2023 against the Kurdistan Region, on the budget bill are unconstitutional It is against the principles of the government agreement and the program of the cabinet voted on in the House of Representatives.” 

We will not accept this oppression and violation of the rights of the Kurdish people

"We will not accept this oppression and violation of the rights of the Kurdish people and we will not abide by any other decision except the agreement reached with the Sudanese government," he said.

Articles 13 and 14 of the 2023, 2024 and 2025 budget bills approved by the Finance Committee of the Iraqi Parliament last night, caused a lot of controversy and representatives of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and the Islamic Union withdrew from the committee.

 The accounts between the Kurdistan Region and Baghdad must be cleared between 2004 and

According to Article 13 of the budget bill, the accounts between the Kurdistan Region and Baghdad must be cleared between 2004 and 2022, and the Kurdistan Regional Government must export 400,000 barrels of oil per day through SOMO, the revenue will return directly to the treasury non-oil to the federal government, in exchange for which financial entitlements will be sent to it.

The oil revenues of the Kurdistan Region are deposited in a bank account with the Central Bank without any deductions

According to Article 14 of the budget bill, the oil revenues of the Kurdistan Region will be deposited in a bank account with the central bank without any deductions It will liaise with the Central Ministry of Oil and the Ministry of Natural Resources, and then the cleanup of the previous periods will be carried out by a joint agreement approved by both sides.

In case of any dispute between the central government and the KRG on the rights and obligations, or non-compliance, a period of 15 days will be determined to resolve the issue and then the financial entitlements of the region will be cut The Center shall provide information on employees (civil and military) to the Federal Ministry of Finance.

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