This might take a while...How Iran Won the Iraq War

[In this since 2004]

How Iran Won the Iraq War

 

Iranian soldiers march during the annual military parade marking the anniversary of the outbreak of the devastating 1980-1988 war with Saddam Hussein's Iraq, in the capital Tehran on September 22, 2022.

 

AFP-Getty Images

 

BY FRANK SOBCHAK AND MATTHEW ZAIS

 

MARCH 22, 2023 1:44 PM EDT

Sobchak is a retired Army Special Forces Colonel; Zais is a retired Infantry Colonel. Both are West Point graduates and authors of the Army’s History of the Iraq War.

As we observe the twentieth anniversary of the Iraq War, which claimed more than 4,600 American lives and countless Iraqis, we must make an honest assessment of the war. The war cost the U.S. trillions, upended Middle East stability, and ultimately benefited Iran’s aggressive and expansionist agenda by capturing much of the political and military institutions in Baghdad and Damascus. Despite its tremendous cost, the war weakened America’s geostrategic position and damaged our national credibility.

What can be learned from this calamity? As authors of the U.S. government’s definitive study on the Iraq War, two somewhat conflicting central points stand out. First, the war should never have occurred. Second, once the war began, it should not have been abandoned without leaving behind a stable Iraq, even if that meant staying for years.

 

Invading Iraq in 2003 was strategic folly and one of the worst foreign policy decisions in the history of the Republic. Tainted and inaccurate intelligence provided justification for disarming Saddam Hussein of weapons of mass destruction that didn’t exist. Pretending that Iraq could be the hearth for democracy in the Middle East or that it was abetting Al Qaeda terrorists were similar delusions. But the decision to invade defied an even larger truth, one that was clear even before the war. Iraq provided a physical and practical buffer to Iran, a country that few disputed had an active weapons of mass destruction program in 2003 and which has consistently demonstrated the intent to use such a capability alongside its terrorist objectives.

Iran, which regularly calls for the destruction of the U.S. and actively supports our enemies, was the larger and clearer threat to our interests both then and now. Regime change in Iraq destroyed a status quo that, by extension, benefitted the U.S. In essence, Iraq’s geostrategic position in 2003 helped regional security by focusing Iran’s attention and resources next door. In addition to this geopolitical damage, the preemptive invasion, conducted without U.N. Security Council authorization and on the basis of dubious intelligence, squandered our international standing and goodwill, which was abundant in the wake of 9/11.

 

Once the invasion occurred and Iraq’s security forces evaporated those same considerations should have driven U.S. policy to restore the country’s stability, vis-à-vis Iran. The region represents a vital strategic interest for the U.S., as does blocking the expansion of Iranian influence. Unfortunately, the U.S. chose to ignore this reality and when politically expedient, withdrew from Iraq and hoped for the best. Beyond the error of the initial invasion, withdrawing was nearly as significant a strategic error, placing Iraq’s future into the hands of a corrupt and sectarian Prime Minister who was intent to establish Shia domination and Iranian alignment. While Iraq’s condition had improved significantly since 2003, sufficient signs existed in 2011 that progress was fragile. Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki’s sectarianism and authoritarianism, toxic components that would lead to further destruction of Iraq, had been on full display and reported to Washington. Iraq, shattered by decades of war, sanctions, and corruption, needed longer to heal and needed American help to prevent an Iranian takeover.

Although we had decided that we were done with Iraq and all its associated challenges, Iraq wasn’t done with us. American strategic myopia enabled Maliki’s government to kill or disenfranchise Sunnis and financially isolate the Kurds, paving the way for the rise of ISIS and a return of U.S. forces. We are still in Iraq today, and still without a status of forces agreement that was used for political cover to end our military presence in 2011. But today’s Iraq looks very different. Iranian-backed militias, on the Iraqi payroll, now outnumber the Iraqi Army. The Ministry of Defense now includes officers and generals who are designated terrorists. Iranian aligned militias have captured state resources through political representation in Parliament and by controlling key posts in lucrative ministries. Iran’s influence now waxes in an uninterrupted arc from Tehran to the Mediterranean, traipsing across Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon.

Retaining U.S. forces in Iraq would have been a difficult decision for a war weary America. But a residual force that was closely tied to key political objectives and aimed at reducing Iranian influence could have prevented the treacherous strategic situation we face today: Iraq as a broken and devastated nation, serving as a base and transit point for Iranian forces. Luckily, the U.S. retains some tools to steer Iraq to a more constructive and stable future. The U.S. can impose high economic costs on the Iraqi military and government to remove Iran-backed terrorists from its payroll, withhold U.S. banknote transfers that inexplicably continue despite their laundering by Iran, and remove sanctions waivers so Iraq can free itself from an artificial energy dependence on Iran. And perhaps most importantly, the U.S. must militarily deter Iran so that it retracts rather than expands its regional aggression. Only these measures are likely to reverse the tailspin of Iraq’s perilous future, a future that we set in motion twenty years ago.

 

https://time.com/6265077/how-iran-won-the-iraq-war/

[horsesoldier]

" This might take a while " Naw, what could possibly go wrong, it's only been 20 years.

We're all young, right ? We could do another 20 years standing on our heads.

Ridiculousness & Idiocracy is alive & well in Iraq.

Y'all can forget any chance of a RI/RV during Ramadan...after that, well sand bagging & foot dragging is an art form over there.

Go ahead,bash away. They did a bang up job of stalling this far.

[keylime]

1 hour ago, horsesoldier said:

" This might take a while " Naw, what could possibly go wrong, it's only been 20 years.

We're all young, right ? We could do another 20 years standing on our heads.

Ridiculousness & Idiocracy is alive & well in Iraq.

Y'all can forget any chance of a RI/RV during Ramadan...after that, well sand bagging & foot dragging is an art form over there.

Go ahead,bash away. They did a bang up job of stalling this far.

Well...you never know...miracles happen everyday and Iraq is overdue for one.

[horsesoldier]

What's tragic here is yet again it would appear a golden opportunity squandered to do what's right & that magic carpet ride for the citizens has been YANKED out from underneath... again.

This hold on to your Dinars it will have real value is more like not this day or the next, but the PM's custom made Magic 8 Ball says try again NEXT year.

I hope I'm wrong.

[Officiallytook]

You and me both fam

[southbeach]

So you all throwing in the towel over someone’s opinion?

[3n1]

whats another decade or two among friends lol .... by that time i should be on the streets of gold anyways .. cheers dv

[danielchu]

2 hours ago, horsesoldier said:

" This might take a while " Naw, what could possibly go wrong, it's only been 20 years.

We're all young, right ? We could do another 20 years standing on our heads.

Ridiculousness & Idiocracy is alive & well in Iraq.

Y'all can forget any chance of a RI/RV during Ramadan...after that, well sand bagging & foot dragging is an art form over there.

Go ahead,bash away. They did a bang up job of stalling this far.

What does not eating or drinking exept small drinks of water during the day have to do with the dinar?

[Laid Back]

it is a good quality to be able to tolerate something that takes a long time.
 

Go Stronger Dinar $1+

[keylime]

2 hours ago, Laid Back said:

it is a good quality to be able to tolerate something that takes a long time.
 

Go Stronger Dinar $1+

Yes. Like dying of old age.

[blackrobes]

Iran is a major problem but only one of a number that beset Iraq. Corruption is everywhere ( I have this on good authority from Iraqi owners of a currency trading firm in my country.)

 

The major pastime of some politicians, public servants and military personnel in Iraq is the age old game of kicking the can down the road.

 

Countless drop dead dates from pundits like Frank26 and others have continuously come and gone.

 

And of course they are yet again training bank staff and the public to recognize lower denomination notes and coins. The people of Iraq are the most heavily educated citizens on monetary matters on planet Earth while having nothing meaningful to show for it. 

[yota691]

'strategic folly'

An American magazine presents proposals to restore Iraq from the grip of Iran after America lost the war

2023.03.24 - 14:04

 

Baghdad - people  

While Americans remember the twentieth anniversary of the Iraq war, which claimed the lives of more than 4,600 Americans and countless Iraqis, Time magazine presented an assessment of the war, stressing that it led to "destabilizing the Middle East, and ultimately benefited from Iran's aggressive and expansionist agenda by seizing on many political and military institutions in Baghdad and Damascus," stressing that the 2003 war weakened America's geostrategic position.  

  

 

  

The report of the famous American magazine, which was followed by "NAS", (March 24, 2023), cited the final study of the US government on the Iraq war, in which two central points emerge: First, the war should never have happened. Second, once the war began, it should not have been abandoned without leaving a stable Iraq, even if it meant staying for years.  

  

The magazine emphasized that the invasion of Iraq in 2003 was a strategic folly and one of the worst foreign policy decisions in the history of the republic. The tainted and inaccurate intelligence provided a justification for disarming Saddam Hussein of weapons of mass destruction that did not exist.  

  

He pointed out: Pretending that Iraq could be a site of democracy in the Middle East or that it was inciting al-Qaeda terrorists were similar delusions. But the decision to invade challenged a larger reality, evident even before the war. Iraq provided a physical and practical barrier to Iran, a country with an active weapons of mass destruction program, in 2003.  

  

Iran, which regularly calls for the destruction of the United States and actively supports our enemies, was the biggest and most obvious threat to our interests then and now. Regime change in Iraq has devastated the situation.  

  

He added: Iraq's strategic geographic location in 2003 helped regional security by focusing Iran's attention and resources on the neighborhood. In addition to this geopolitical damage, the preemptive invasion, carried out without UN Security Council authorization and on the basis of questionable intelligence, squandered our international prestige and goodwill, which were abundant in the aftermath of 9/11.  

  

According to the report, the region represents a vital strategic interest for the United States, as does preventing the expansion of Iranian influence. Unfortunately, the United States chose to ignore this reality and when it was politically expedient, withdraw from Iraq and hope for the best. Besides the mistake of the initial invasion, the withdrawal was almost a major strategic mistake, "placing the future of Iraq in the hands of a corrupt and sectarian prime minister bent on solidifying Shiite dominance and Iranian alignment."  

  

The report emphasized: While the situation in Iraq has improved significantly since 2003, sufficient indications emerged in 2011 that progress was fragile. It was "Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki's sectarianism and tyranny, which would lead to more destruction in Iraq," had been fully exposed and reported to Washington. Torn by decades of war, sanctions and corruption, Iraq needed longer to recover and needed US help to prevent an Iranian takeover, according to the magazine.  

  

However, the American report added that although we decided that we are done with Iraq and all the challenges associated with it, Iraq is not finished with us. "The American strategic shortsightedness enabled the Maliki government to kill Sunnis or deprive them of their rights and isolate the Kurds financially, which paved the way for the rise of ISIS and the return of American forces."  

  

According to the magazine's assessment, Iraq today looks completely different, describing the current situation as follows: Iranian-backed militias that receive Iraqi salaries now outnumber the Iraqi army. The Department of Defense now includes officers and generals who have been designated as terrorists. Pro-Iranian militias appropriated state resources through political representation in parliament and control of key positions in lucrative ministries. Iran's influence is now waning in an unbroken arc from Tehran to the Mediterranean, and stretching through Iraq, Syria and Lebanon.  

  

According to Time, it would have been to keep US forces in Iraq a difficult decision for America, exhausted from the war. But a residual force that was intimately linked to key political goals and aimed at limiting Iranian influence could have prevented the treacherous strategic situation we face today: Iraq as a broken and devastated country, serving as a base and transit point for Iranian forces.  

  

At the end of the report, Time mentions that America retains some tools to guide Iraq towards a more constructive and stable future. “The United States can impose massive economic costs on the Iraqi military and government to pull Iranian-backed terrorists from their payroll, stop transfers of US banknotes that inexplicably continue despite being laundered by Iran, and remove sanctions waivers.”  

  

The magazine suggests Iraq free itself from dependence on Iran's artificial energy. Perhaps most importantly, "the United States must deter Iran militarily so that it reverses rather than expands its regional aggression." Only these measures are likely to reverse the sharp turn in Iraq's perilous future, a future that we began twenty years ago.  

[blackrobes]

yota,

 

I have often thought about Iraq's abundant natural gas resources and how relatively simple it would be to process the gas and use it to fire gas turbine generators. The German company Siemens is the latest manufacturer to offer their services to set Iraq up to do this.

 

So what is the problem? It is very obviously Iran. Should Iraq gain energy independence, then Iran both loses a significant source on ongoing income and their grip on Iraqi politics is weakened. In my view, they will fight this occurring to the bitter end.

 

The pity being that Iraq's people are living in primitive conditions for the most part and being held as unwilling pawns in Washington's seeming endless tussle with Tehran.

[southbeach]

1 hour ago, blackrobes said:

yota,

 

I have often thought about Iraq's abundant natural gas resources and how relatively simple it would be to process the gas and use it to fire gas turbine generators. The German company Siemens is the latest manufacturer to offer their services to set Iraq up to do this.

 

So what is the problem? It is very obviously Iran. Should Iraq gain energy independence, then Iran both loses a significant source on ongoing income and their grip on Iraqi politics is weakened. In my view, they will fight this occurring to the bitter end.

 

The pity being that Iraq's people are living in primitive conditions for the most part and being held as unwilling pawns in Washington's seeming endless tussle with Tehran.

I for one see right through you and your fake self righteous spirit of deception.  You’re a deceiver,  whatever your response.

[yota691]

On the 20th anniversary of the war

An American report answers... How did Iran-backed groups take over Iraq?

2023.03.25 - 14:56

 

Baghdad - people  

The slow process of regime change has focused on taking over US-backed institutions in order to counter American interests, highlighting the threat that zealous and well-funded groups pose to developing democracies.  

  

 

  

  

The report, which was followed by "NAS", (March 25, 2023), indicated that the invasion and occupation of Iraq led by the United States in 2003 led to a painful and gradual transition from dictatorship to parliamentary democracy full of impurities. This story is now well known. But two decades later, a new process of regime change is underway, backed by Iran, and using a completely different model, timeframe, and toolkit to support a local Iraqi partner force, calling itself the "Islamic Resistance in Iraq" or "resistance."  

  

Below is the text of the report:  

  

Despite severe setbacks in 2020 and 2021 that nearly caused the group's defeat, today the "resistance" controls the Iraqi state. Through "soft warfare" and the use (and misuse) of the legal system and courts, the militia coalition has achieved a successful combination that uses largely non-kinetic tools to build a tripartite power that includes the judiciary, the civil and military sides of the executive, and the legislature as well. Thus, the losers in the 2021 Iraqi elections were crowned as winners in the process of forming his government a year after those elections, i.e. in October 2022. This is the story of the latest processes of change affecting the regime in Iraq.  

  

Actors of Change: The Iraqi "Resistance".  

  

The post-2003 history of Iraq is subject to the hegemony of Iran and the changing fortunes of the "resistance". This alternative coalition arrived shortly after the arrival of the US forces, and worked from the start to ensure that Iraq did not turn into a secular democracy. Instead, he sought to build what he called the "Shiite project," with Iraq being the first country in the Arab world to be dominated by Shiites, with the aim of preventing the re-emergence of a Sunni power base from Iraq.  

  

And the "resistance" is a group of mostly Shiite militias, and since its inception it has received the support of the "Quds Force" of the Iranian "Islamic Revolutionary Guard". Its most widespread militias include Kataib Hezbollah, Asaib Ahl al-Haq, and Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba, all of which are designated foreign terrorist organizations and sanctioned by the US government. These groups and other smaller militias form the nucleus of the "resistance," but they often compete internally. Kataib Hezbollah and Asaib Ahl al-Haq are also openly involved in Iraqi politics through their two affiliated political parties, the Rights Movement and the Sadiqoon Bloc, respectively, and through membership in the Shiite Coordination Framework, i.e. The bloc that brings together the Shiite parties.  

  

These militias and their predecessors long opposed the United States and its partners during the post-2003 occupation. They also participated actively and enthusiastically in the sectarian civil war in Iraq. Although the Iraqi constitution bans these militias as non-state militias under Article 9(b), they were allowed to gain prominence between 2011 and 2014 under then-Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, who questioned the loyalty of the official Iraqi army. . With the rise of the Islamic State in 2014, the militias became essential reinforcements in the international campaign to defeat the caliphate. In this regard, al-Maliki used executive orders that were later followed - in 2016 - by a law allowing militias to bear arms and receive support and funding from the government as a new branch of the Iraqi military forces known as the "Popular Mobilization Forces".  

  

With the decline of the Islamic State by 2018, the "resistance" shifted its focus to driving the United States out of Iraq and securing control of the Iraqi state. The commander of the Quds Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Qassem Soleimani, supported Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, the de facto leader of the Popular Mobilization Forces and a veteran of Kataib Hezbollah, in order to implement an opportunistic plan to seize the Iraqi state by military means. political and legal. But this plan was thwarted in 2019, first by the emergence of an Iraqi popular protest movement (the "Tishreen Movement"), and then by a series of escalations against US forces that led to the Trump administration's controversial (and likely illegal) decision to kill Soleimani and Muhandis in January. January 2020, by a drone strike at Baghdad Airport.  

  

The "resistance" was surprised by the protests and strikes that were carried out at the leadership level, and it temporarily lost momentum. Prime Minister Adel Abdul-Mahdi, who was controlled by the "resistance", resigned, and was replaced in May 2020 by Prime Minister Mustafa Al-Kazemi, who began a campaign of investigations, arrests and torture that, according to reports, targeted "resistance" militiamen involved in crimes, including the killing of activists and journalists. , carrying out attacks on the United States, and corruption.  

  

By 2021, the militias are exhausted. US forces remained in Iraq, and militia-backed candidates failed in the October 2021 national elections, adding to the humiliation of the "resistance". Together with the "Shiite coordination framework", it tried to overthrow the election results several times, first through legal means, then by launching paramilitary attacks on government areas in Baghdad, and finally by attempting to assassinate Al-Kazemi in November 2021. These efforts failed and the "resistance" came close to On defeat. Then everything changed.  

  

Regime change through legal warfare  

  

At the end of 2022, the "resistance" abandoned direct objection to the election results and came up with a new and more successful strategy centered around the "Supreme Judicial Council" in Iraq and its president, Judge Faeq Zaidan. In a series of legal rulings issued between January and February 2022, the Council changed the rules of the game regarding government formation, making it almost impossible to form a government without a supermajority that includes militias and the Shiite coordination framework. In a key ruling issued in February 2022, the Council effectively raised the required quorum in the House of Representatives to vote to choose a president and form a cabinet, by reinterpreting Article 70 of the Iraqi constitution, which was previously understood to require the presence of a majority of two-thirds of the deputies. To vote (the requirement for a quorum for the House of Representatives is a simple majority of the total members). This gave the "Shia coordinating framework" and followers "  

  

Subsequently, the "resistance" factions split the majority coalition that opposed them: first, the "resistance" terrorized other political opponents such as the Kurds through legal attacks (including influencing the Supreme Court to dust off a ten-year-old legal case that was not debated After that, I ruled that the Kurdish government in Erbil hand over all the Kurdish region’s oil to the Baghdad government. This coincided with the bombing of missiles, missiles and drones belonging to Iran and the "resistance". Subsequently, the militias used the blocking third to impatience with their main Shiite opponent, the populist cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, who withdrew his deputies from Parliament, which led to a redistribution of their seats in favor of candidates aligned with the militias in the first place. Then the redistribution process allowed the "Shia coordinating framework"  

  

The law and the courts played a major role in the emergence and fall of the "resistance", and then its emergence again. This cannot be explained without understanding the militias' obsession with soft warfare and legal warfare. While kinetic attacks by missiles, drones, and improvised explosive devices against US forces receive the most Western attention, the use and abuse of law and the courts are a key strategy pursued by the militias, and they have played a crucial role in the efforts to take over the state over the past five years.  

  

Together with our colleague Hamdi Malik, we shed light on this use of legal warfare two years ago, pointing to the time and effort devoted by the "resistance" in order to announce its interest in the law and its role as its defender. This stems from the militias' awareness of the possibilities of using local and international legal institutions to constrain and discredit their most powerful opponents militarily. In 2021, we indicated that:  

  

The legitimacy of the “resistance” extends beyond mere topics of discussion, but has become an essential part of the groups’ strategy to achieve its goals. Legal conferences are organized in Iraq to raise awareness about the legal positions and ideology of the “resistance.” Today, it constantly threatens its opponents with legal action. Legal arguments form part of it. increasing information and propaganda operations of the militias.  

  

Soft warfare has proven to be far more successful than kinetic efforts. By seizing the courts, then the legislative authority, and finally the prime minister's office, the "resistance" returned to power without getting close to obtaining the elected majority. The militias are now rewriting the law to ensure their continued hold on power.  

  

Fostering State Capture: The Struggle for Legitimacy  

  

The "resistance" and its affiliated political movements are explicit about their influence in the new Iraqi administration led by Prime Minister Muhammad Shi'a al-Sudani. In December, Qais Khazali (leader of Asaib Ahl al-Haq, which the United States classifies as a terrorist organization) described the Sudanese prime minister as a "director general," adding that "a distinction has been made between state decisions and government administration... He should not monopolize The prime minister is the state’s decisions, but [he] has to refer to the “coordinating framework” [allied with the militias]...to take strategic decisions, whether political, economic or security.”  

  

Meanwhile, in January, MP Ali Turki of Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq described al-Sudani's government as a "government of resistance," adding that "the 'resistance' has come to represent Iraq's official viewpoint, and it is the one running the wheel today." No government official has corrected his statements. In fact, Al-Sudani appointed a member of Asaib Ahl al-Haq as the director of his media office. Therefore, it becomes clear that the "resistance" believes that its word has become decisive in the decision-making process in the Iraqi government, a situation completely opposite to what prevailed only twelve months ago when its influence was diminishing.  

  

Having taken over the state, the militias are now seeking to consolidate their gains, but that will require them to overcome an acute lack of legitimacy. The "resistance" has realized (first through the "October" protests in 2019 and then from the clashes with the Sadrist movement until 2022) that it does not have majority support even among Iraqi Shiites. I also realized under Al-Kazemi's administration that the state and its laws could be used against the "resistance" project. Today, it cannot point to electoral victory as a source of its legitimacy. As a result, the militias are using their new powers to review laws and re-staff agencies to silence critics, reduce the risks posed by democratic elections, and strengthen the "resistance"'s parallel security services and give them full legal status.  

  

Addressing the problem of legitimacy of the "popular crowd"  

  

Questions have been raised about the legal status enjoyed by the “Popular Mobilization Forces” since its establishment in 2014 when calling for arms to resist the “Islamic State” organization. These questions included whether a militia outside the control of the Iraqi armed forces was legal under the constitution, and partial answers were provided with the adoption of Law No. 40 of 2016: the Popular Mobilization Authority Law. Specifically, the government has been unable to control these armed units, which are most likely subservient to Iran or internationally sanctioned militias such as Kataib Hezbollah, but not to the Iraqi government. This led to regular rumors, particularly among the militias themselves, about the government's intention to reform or even disband the PMF.  

  

Today, the opposite is true. As Iran wanted, the PMF increasingly resembled the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. In one of its first actions, Sudani's new government granted the PMF the right to form a contracting company called "The Engineer," after the slain terrorist leader. Both former Iraqi prime ministers have previously confronted this company, which clearly resembles the construction company Khatam al-Anbiya (which is subject to United Nations, United States, and European Union sanctions) and is affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.  

  

Today, the Popular Mobilization Forces can even deploy in Syria as part of relief efforts after the earthquake that struck the country. Al-Hashd units have previously deployed in Syria in support of the "resistance" and Iranian efforts without obtaining permission from the official Iraqi chain of command. In February, the “Popular Mobilization Forces” received legal orders to enter Syria along with its two highest-ranking commanders, namely its president, Faleh al-Fayyad, who is classified on the American list of human rights violations, and its chief of staff, Abdel Aziz al-Muhammadawi (Abu Fadak), who is classified on the American terrorist list. Formalizing the PMF's extraterritorial reach will almost certainly improve its cross-border coordination with the Syrian Assad government, Lebanese Hezbollah, and Iranian facilitation networks.  

  

Silencing the critics  

  

Iraqi government agencies are now also being used to silence critics. In 2022, Asaib Ahl al-Haq and other militias put pressure on the Communications and Media Commission, effectively controlling its six-member board of directors. Since then, the CMC has increasingly tried to silence opponents of the "resistance" by imposing restrictions and other controls on media channels and their presenters.  

  

The "resistance" is increasingly resorting to techniques of legal warfare, in particular defamation lawsuits. In December, a lawyer linked to the "resistance" filed a lawsuit in an Iraqi court against a TV presenter known for covering taboo topics on his talk show, asking the judiciary to ban him from entering the country. The same lawyer, together with one of the "resistance" officials, filed a joint lawsuit against Ahmed al-Bashir, a political critic known as "Iraq's Jon Stewart" who often takes on Iraqi political extremists.  

  

Perhaps the most ambitious way in which the "resistance" seeks to silence its critics is to nullify as many of their voices as possible. The October 2021 elections were a humiliating blow for many militias. Candidates backed by Asaib Ahl al-Haq and Kataib Hezbollah performed poorly, exhausting the Iran-aligned bloc in Parliament. Only the intervention of the Supreme Judicial Council saved the militias from remaining completely outside the government. In order to improve the performance of the "Shia coordination framework" in future elections, this framework introduced legislation designed to amend the Iraqi election law. This amendment passed its first parliamentary reading in February and, if enacted, would re-adopt the Saint-Légue electoral method of allocating seats between political parties based on a party-list proportional representation system. Existing parties, such as the parties of  

  

The current electoral system in Iraq that rejected the St. Legau method was adopted in response to the October protests in 2019 and was designed to encourage independents and small parties in an effort to improve voting rights and political expression in the country. It is almost certain that attempts to amend this law aim to consolidate the control of the "coordinating framework" on power, while Al-Sudani promises to hold early elections as soon as the election law is approved.  

  

expel the occupiers?  

  

Since the founding of the Iraqi "resistance", its main stated goal has been the expulsion of US forces from Iraq. Although the United States returned to Iraq in 2014 to help fight the Islamic State, American forces have been involved in the gray zone conflict with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and "resistance" forces in Iraq and Syria since at least 2018. The legal status that Washington enjoys in Iraq is based mainly on the approval of the Iraqi government. In 2021, the Kadhimi administration agreed to "transition to the role of training, mentoring, assistance, and intelligence sharing, [with] no US forces in a combat role in Iraq by December 31, 2021."  

  

Currently, in the presence of a prime minister friendly to the "coordinating framework" and the militias, that is, al-Sudani, both may finally have the ability to withdraw approval, as well as the legal basis for the continuation of any American presence, which is what the militias have called for since the killing of Soleimani and the engineer in January 2020. For now, Al-Sudani has signaled his willingness to maintain the status quo, a position that political parties affiliated with the militias have cautiously supported. But even short of a complete expulsion, the United States' freedom of action inside the country is almost certainly restricted.  

  

Lessons learned for the future  

  

Twenty years ago, the United States and its allies overthrew the ruling Baath Party. Since then, Tehran and its proxies have worked to usurp the flawed democracy that replaced Saddam Hussein's regime. Despite two decades of Western investment and training, Iranian-backed Iraqi militias succeeded in taking over the country.  

  

This new change in the system shows that regimes can be usurped through the careful exploitation of the legal and political institutions that the United States helped develop after 2003. In other words, the institutions that the United States supported such as the judiciary and anti-corruption bodies were taken over after 2003 and come into conflict with American interests.  

  

At the same time, the demonstrated ability of the "resistance" and the IRGC's ability to engage in irregular, unconventional warfare demonstrates the power of cleverly applied non-kinetic and non-conventional effects. The intention of the "resistance" for years was to seize the Iraqi state through concerted military, social and political means. Setbacks notwithstanding, achieving this goal highlights the threat posed by overzealous, nimble, and politically disruptive groups within fragile or developing democracies. After tasting success, the militias will likely continue to leverage the judicial and political systems to increasingly consolidate their power.  

  

The success of the militias poses a threat to Iraq's nascent and flawed democracy, as well as to US interests in the region. In the future, Washington will have the difficult task of balancing confronting this threat with respecting Iraqi sovereignty. To this end, the United States should take the following steps:  

  

Maintaining the flow of information. In order to help Iraqi democrats move forward again, the United States first needs to maintain clarity of vision in Iraq. As was shown in 2003, faulty intelligence can lead to ill-founded policymaking. In order to maintain the flow of accurate information, the United States must continue to apply pressure on Iraq to ensure that journalists and investigative officials are protected from groups now in power that previously targeted those who expose militia corruption or wrongdoing. Washington should also fund, train, and support these journalists and investigators where possible, since it is their efforts that will now provide much of the information Iraqis need to hold their government (and militias) to account.  

  

Understanding the state takeover effort. The United States should also tailor its collection of open-source and classified intelligence in Iraq—which remains critical—to an understanding of the militia's methods of taking over the country. This means tracking efforts to gain control of specific, sector-specific government departments, as well as activities that include taking over the judiciary, designing legislative reforms, and efforts to rehabilitate convicted criminals or sanctioned individuals and organizations.  

  

Resist rehabilitation of rights violators. It is especially necessary to resist such rehabilitation efforts in the absence of a genuine commitment to democratic processes and the rule of law. Limits must be set to what the United States will accept: most of the sanctioned individuals have been punished for having committed gross human rights abuses or killed US personnel. Their actions should not be overlooked, as this will likely only increase their power and influence, and the victims will be humiliated in this case, while the deterrent effect of sanctions will weaken.  

  

Monitor a potential legal war closely. Finally, judicial rulings and proposed legislation should be scrutinized with particular care whenever opportunity allows, and specialized programs should receive US support to monitor Iraq's corrupt judiciary. Efforts to entrench militia power, or otherwise harm democratic institutions in Iraq, should be widely publicized to prevent the current minority-led regime from permanently establishing its grip on Iraqi life.  

  

Crispin Smith is a researcher focusing on Iraqi security and the law of armed conflict. And any opinions expressed are private only to him. Michael Knights is the Bernstein Fellow at The Washington Institute and co-founder of the Institute's Militia Spotlight platform.  

[ronscarpa]

Iraq is not perfect: an American call to support the Iraqis through 3 steps

Reports And AnalyticsBreakingProtests In IraqThe International CommunityPolitical Process

 

2023-03-31 - 13:31

 

Shafaq News/ The American "Foreign Policy" magazine considered that although the ideal vision that was expected for Iraq after 2003 was not achieved as expected, this should not be the only perspective from which this country is viewed, calling on the international community to support Iraq through 3 steps to ensure a better future for Iraqis and their involvement in the political process. 

 

The American report, translated by Shafaq News Agency, explained; Analyzes about Iraq usually focus either on past US failures or on how the "new Iraq" has turned into Iran's sphere of influence, and that because of this reductive vision on the part of the West, Iraq is viewed through two simplified lenses: its ability to be a reliable partner In the war on terrorism, and his willingness to confront Iran.

The report pointed out that much of the Western analysis on Iraq ignores the democratic capabilities of Iraq, where there is a diverse society that increasingly asserts itself through its defiant stances towards its rulers, and seeks peacefully to search for means to reform the broken system, without necessarily realizing how and where to start. that. 

 

And after the report considered that a large part of society is currently undergoing a slow process of political maturity and is benefiting in a way from a number of democratic aspects that became possible after the fall of the regime of former President Saddam Hussein, it said, however, that "the ideal vision of Iraq after 2003 was not achieved as expected." He added, "This should not be the only phenomenon through which we judge Iraq now or make policy calculations about it in the future based on it." 

 

The report enumerated a set of democratic manifestations and features that exist now, the relative freedom of expression that Iraqis practiced and defended against all odds, enabling them to criticize governments and parties. But he also pointed to popular discontent, which was represented in the low turnout at the polls. He also pointed to the large population growth, so that for the majority of Iraqis, Saddam Hussein represents a distant memory and is not associated with them, as many of them will not grow up under his tyranny. As he discovered, many Iraqis under the age of 25, who make up about 60% of the population, met each other and the world through social media platforms. 

 

The report indicated that these young people want what their peers everywhere want: a decent education, reliable services, job opportunities, and the right to express their opinions and live the life they want.

 

And the report continued; The Tishreen movement, although violently suppressed and politically demonized by the ruling elite and allied militias (with Iranian support), is slowly organizing itself through political parties to participate in future elections. 

 

The report concluded by saying that Iraq is in a state of flux where an internal battle is taking place over the future of the nation, its political identity and the official arrangements for power in it, and it is a struggle between liberal and conservative forces. That is why the report called on the international community, specifically the United Nations Mission in Iraq, the United States and European countries, not to stand idly by and watch this battle only and cling to the past.

 

On the other hand, it is imperative that these parties, according to "Foreign Policy", instead try to encourage Iraqis who feel generally disillusioned, to engage in electoral politics, through three means: 

 

First, by continuing to invest in Iraq through international institutions and donor programs and by continuing to engage with young entrepreneurs and leaders who are forcing change despite difficult political circumstances.

 

Secondly, it is imperative for the international community not to ignore the behavior of the state and the pro-Iranian militias against the October demonstrators, adding that despite the many official promises from the Iraqi government to hold accountable those responsible for suppressing the demonstrators and killing hundreds of them, no one has been brought to trial. The report considered that officials should not feel immune from the legal and political consequences of repression, adding that this issue is important in order to maintain peaceful dialogue, warning that responding to peaceful protests through violence will gradually isolate angry demonstrators and push them to search for violent solutions outside the system.

 

Third, the report calls on the international community to work to ensure that the rules of the electoral game are observed and respected, recalling what happened during the last elections, when the majority was prevented from forming a government. 

 

"Foreign Policy" concluded its report by saying that it is easy to see Iraq as a story of failure as it appeared in the Western media on the occasion of the commemoration of the 2003 invasion, but the international community must do more than just reformulate what happened 20 years ago. Iraqis are seen struggling to build democracy. The report stressed the importance of investing in the future of Iraq, especially in the young generation, which demands representative governance, services and employment, while protecting pluralism. He concluded by saying that Iraqi society has changed dramatically since 2003, but it now depends on whether its political institutions are able to keep up with it.

 

Translation: Shafak News Agency

 

https://shafaq.com/ar/تقارير-وتحليلات/العراق-ليس-مثاليا-دعوة-مريكية-لدعم-العراقيين-من-خلال-3-خطوات