The United States and Iraq: Between the Absence of Strategy and the Opportunity

[yota691]

The United States and Iraq: Between the Absence of Strategy and the Opportunity

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The echoes of the United States ’warning to close its embassy in Baghdad have subsided, and it seems that political efforts and security measures have succeeded in establishing a kind of temporary truce, but the issue of the presence of armed forces that operate independently of the Iraqi government and its will, the latter’s failure to protect diplomatic missions, and the difficult options that Facing the American presence in Iraq, it embodied the fragility of the United States' ability to protect its interests, and the reality of the situation in which it finds itself.

During the past months, the American forces left most of their bases in Iraq, to avoid the continuation of missile attacks, and settled in limited and fortified bases in western Iraq, at Baghdad airport, and also in Erbil, but the attacks, which are mostly primitive in nature, continued against the embassy headquarters, and supply convoys. The logistical services provided by Iraqi contractors, in civilian cars. Some of the attacks caused deaths among Iraqi civilians and military personnel, but did not cause losses among the Americans, and yet it made the United States feel embarrassed and anxious about continuing to target them, and the possibility that American soldiers were exposed to danger, which could cause serious damage to the image of President Donald Trump, who is In the midst of the presidential election season.

The American threat to close the embassy caused great concern to the Iraqi government, due to its political and economic repercussions, and announced that measures would be taken to prevent the continued attacks. Whether due to these measures, or for reasons related to political mediation, the attacks against the embassy stopped, but they continued in a limited way against other targets, and at the same time the high tone of the so-called (state militias) close to Iran continued against the United States, and its demand to withdraw all its forces from Iraq, a goal that Iran considers essential, and has not stopped reminding the Baghdad government of the need to achieve it, since a US drone aircraft assassinated the Iranian Quds Force commander, Qassem Soleimani, and the deputy head of the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces, Abu Mahdi Al-Muhandis, in Baghdad at the beginning of this year.

The attacks against the embassy decreased, the intensity of the attacks against it subsided, the debate about its closure and the potential repercussions that could raise, but this calm did not end the questions about the situation that the United States has actually reached in Iraq after more than 17 years of the invasion, and more losses Of 4,400 dead and about 32,000 wounded soldiers (1), and about $ 2 trillion spent (2). After all that, the United States appears to be an incapacitated party, shaken, ready to close its largest embassies in the world, to protect its employees, and to avoid bombing with primitive weapons, and it has only limited options that are not guaranteed results, and all have difficult repercussions, while the Iraqi government that was born from Rahim, the political process he created after 2003 suffers from the same embarrassment and weakness.

In principle, this result cannot be explained, except that it is a clear loss for the US strategy in Iraq, and a waste of all human losses and material expenditures, and even the traditional position of the United States in the region. This conclusion may be harsh, and perhaps incomprehensible, given the American capabilities that are still theoretically able to make a real difference in the power equations in Iraq, not to mention the region, but the facts of power in themselves are not a permanent criterion for victory without there being a strategy to benefit from them. Its most prominent features in the case of Iraq - according to the American perception - is the building of a democratic, non-sectarian political system that respects human rights, is an ally of the United States, and is able to deal with its neighbors in equilibrium and equilibrium, and to be as important as Iraq’s geostrategic importance.

This result seems far from being achieved, and it also cannot be expected to happen in the foreseeable future, and what is more, that the United States has reached almost certain convictions that its difficult experience in Iraq must end, and it is remarkable that this happened in a way that was not the most anticipated Pessimistically, through Washington hinting at a political exit and closing the US embassy, which means leaving Iraq completely, and severing the remaining ties that maintain an American presence even if it is a moral one.

Perhaps such a scenario, which may actually materialize, can be described as a strategic defeat for the United States in Iraq. Before that, the American experience there had suffered major setbacks, although it appeared to be a great victory, and in fact Washington since 2003 has transformed "two apparent victories." Into real defeats, ”according to the American researcher specializing in Iraqi and regional affairs, Anthony Cordesman, and it is now in the context of transforming (victory) over ISIS into a third defeat, which may be final this time. The crux of the failure appears to be that the United States has never had a viable grand strategy in Iraq or any consistent plans and actions that go beyond dealing with current events (3).

In fact, this conclusion seems shocking. It is true that Iraq is a complex country, but the American confusion in it, along three administrations, was evident, especially with the approaches to building power in Iraq after the occupation, seeking the help of Iran or the forces allied with it, and granting it opportunities for strength and ability, and overlooked For the widespread violations committed by those forces, with the presence of US forces before or after the withdrawal at the end of 2011, which the United States was considered participating in.

The issue is not only related to the mistakes that accompanied the establishment of political and governmental structures in the first year after the invasion, which carried with it the signs of subsequent failure and the grave problems that accompanied successive Iraqi governments, including the phenomenon of corruption, but the real problem was the inability to recognize these mistakes and try to reduce Dangerous, although the United States could.

Empowering Iran in Iraq
In early June 2004, the US Governor of Iraq, Paul Bremer, issued Order 91, which includes the integration of the Shiite militias that were affiliated with the opposition forces before the invasion into the army and police forces, and these were given different ranks without professional military preparation. . The largest number of beneficiaries of this decision were members of the Badr Corps, a militia of thousands of people that Iran established inside its territory in the early 1980s from Iraqi dissidents, and its members fought alongside Iranian forces against their country, Iraq in the first Gulf War, and they also carried out assassinations and armed attacks Inside Iraq. This action created the practical basis for the militias linked to Iran to control field commanders in the army and security forces, and many violations were later attributed to them.

Bremer's decision was just a model for Iran's empowerment mechanisms in Iraq. At the political level, the leaders of Shiite religious parties close to Iran were placed at the forefront of the scene, and members of these parties and their loyalists were granted positions in the new government apparatus, at the expense of thousands of professional administrators who They were removed from their jobs, under the pretext of de-Baathification. This not only caused the building of Iranian influence in the heart of the administrative, military and political apparatus of the state, but it also provided a direct message to the Iraqi population, according to which, loyalty to Iran and working in its favor may be two reasons for political prominence, or obtaining a government job in light of the economic recession after the invasion. Although this message was clear and contradicted the unfriendly US official rhetoric toward Iran, the United States has since made no serious attempt to change that reality or present a different impression to the population, when it was able to.

It is not known the truth of US intentions behind this policy, but information provided by the former US ambassador to Iraq, Zalmay Khalilzad, in his book (The Envoy), which was published in 2016, may provide some assistance to understand what happened. The former US official, who assumed coordination with the (Iraqi opposition) before 2003, said that he met in Geneva prior to the US invasion with the Iranian ambassador to the United Nations at the time, Muhammad Javad Zarif (the current foreign minister). Al-Abyadh, coordinated with Zarif to avoid the American planes that will participate in the bombing of Iraq exposed to fire in the event that they entered Iranian territory, and he assured him that the American forces would not pose a threat to Iran, and called on him to urge (the Shiites) to participate in the formation of a new Iraqi government.

It is remarkable in that interview, as Khalilzad recounts, that Zarif indicated to him the necessity that the handover of power (after the invasion) be done quickly to Iraqi politicians living in exile, and the rebuilding of Iraqi security institutions from scratch, and he also called for the purification of the state from the elements of the Baath Party. The New York Times commented on Zarif's requests saying that this opinion “seemed to be formulated to amplify Iranian influence inside Iraq, and it was fundamentally different from Khalilzad’s plan to form a transitional Iraqi government that would include Iraqis who remained in the country during Saddam Hussein’s rule, and is not limited to leaders in exile. “(5).

The strange thing about this information is that Zarif’s vision overshadowed the positions and actions of the occupation authorities, and surpassed its counterpart Khalil Zad, despite the fact that the latter was one of the most prominent officials in charge of the Iraq file in the Bush administration, and he worked as his country's ambassador in Baghdad from 2005 to 2007. However, he did not take clear measures to modify the approaches that took place since the invasion to suit his vision, and instead took place during his time in Iraq serious sectarian fighting events that strengthened Iran's position and the political and armed forces loyal to it.

Perhaps the control of the Iranian approach can be explained by the challenges and armed resistance faced by the occupation forces in the Sunni areas, which made it biased de facto to its allies (Shiites and Kurds). Tens of thousands of employees, in addition to the procedures and positions that have restored the Sunni community in Iraq since the beginning of the invasion, and made sectarian and ethnic stereotyping, and that was among the reasons for the involvement of thousands of professional soldiers from the former Iraqi army in the armed factions opposed to the American forces, and that was in itself, Another pattern is the absence of a clear strategy that contributed to producing the first "defeat" for the Americans in Iraq, from what was considered a clear and swift "victory" for the invasion forces to control the country and topple the former regime in just three weeks (6).

Between ignorance and lack of vision,
it is unlikely that there will be an intentional and planned collusion between Washington and Tehran in Iraq, as such appears outside the American calculations in general, but the context of the American intervention in Iraq indicates an early failure in Iraq that prompted the Bush administration to search for any approaches that could It provides her a safe stay in what appeared to be a swamp that brings back the nightmare of the Vietnam War. That administration was struggling to prove that it did not lie to the American people when it became clear that all the justifications for the invasion were not credible, but at the same time it had to explain the secret of the huge number of casualties among its soldiers, while it was presenting a different narrative of the invasion, this time about spreading democracy and Iraqis celebrating With the forces that saved them from a "dictatorial regime."

The coffins of the American soldiers returning to the country contradicted that narrative, and here it seems that the Bush administration chose to carry out a kind of (collusion) with Iran, which President Bush considered one of the sides of (the triangle of evil) before his administration was forced to use Tehran's influence to establish a political process that would accept it. Part of the Iraqis, even if it is not perfect.

After the invasion, the United States felt the problems of the occupation that it had not reckoned with, as it found itself in a complex country, from which it did not understand anything, and was not prepared to administer it as an occupying power. In 2006, there were 1,000 American officials at the Baghdad embassy, but only 33 of them spoke Arabic and only six spoke fluently, and Americans often did not understand the local geography, religions, traditions, ethnic politics, or languages (7), but immediate retreat was impossible. A victory had to be built, providing credibility to the official narrative, and here Iran took advantage of the opportunity and offered its allies to grant Washington (its victory) in exchange for empowering them in political, security and governmental institutions, and behind them, of course, Iran, a context that continued later during the Obama administration Its manifestations were getting stronger every day until Washington became interested in a safe exit only, and leaving Iraq to what it turned out to be, which happened at the end of 2011.

The US invasion and its aftermath provided Iran with an important and dangerous strategic advantage in the region. Perhaps Washington did not mean this result, but that is what happened, and Tehran had the time, opportunities and absolute preference to provide suitable conditions to achieve this, which gave it the comfort to begin since 2007 to talk about the “American predicament” in Iraq, and the “collapse of power” Occupiers, ”before its then president, Ahmadinejad, announced his country's readiness to fill the void that the Americans would leave behind in Iraq (8).

These statements were issued at the height of the American presence in Iraq with more than 150,000 soldiers, and Washington did not issue a response, except for the continued accusations that Tehran sent weapons to militias in Iraq that kill American soldiers. However, after a few months, Ahmadinejad visited Baghdad and conducted a parade of the honor guard in the middle of the Green Zone, which was completely under the control of the American forces, and from there he issued new statements against the Americans and considered that they were defeated and demanded their withdrawal (9).

From confrontation to confrontation
After withdrawing its forces in December 2011, the United States returned militarily to Iraq in 2014, with a formal request from the government of Nuri al-Maliki to help stop the advance of ISIS, which had controlled the city of Mosul and about a third of Iraqi territory, and began to threaten Baghdad. The American intervention, especially the air support, contributed effectively to confronting the organization, and then to the operations to recover lands, a mission that was completed before the end of 2017.

The American participation was considered effective and essential, and the military coordination imposed the necessity of continuous consultation between the American officers and the Iraqi ground forces, which included militia members linked to Iran and who became part of the new formation called the Popular Mobilization Forces, as well as the Iranian advisors who participated with the Iraqi ground forces, most notably Qassem Soleimani, who used to take pictures of him while he was inside Iraq, was leading Iraqi officers in some battles, and had air support that was most likely American.

Most of the fighting against ISIS took place during President Obama's term, and good relations with Tehran, especially after the signing of the nuclear agreement in 2015, provided a suitable atmosphere for such coordination, which did not change visibly at least after the president, Trump, and the start of the dispute with Iran.

The collapse of ISIS in Iraq and Syria coincided with the emergence of the US-Iranian dispute, and an escalation with the exit of the United States from the nuclear agreement in May 2018, and the Trump administration’s start to impose what was called a policy of (maximum pressure) on Tehran. Since that time, the policy of (conflict) in Iraq has practically stopped and the relatively long truce between the two parties has become de facto.

The escalation approach adopted by the Trump administration was understandable in the context of the view of Iranian policies in the regional files in general, as well as due to the increase of coarse friction between Tehran and the Arab capitals allied to Washington, but the American escalation immediately faced the dilemma of the weak US influence that the Trump administration inherited in Iraq in comparison to With Iranian influence. Throughout the years since 2003, the United States has ignored, or has not taken sufficiently seriously, the imbalance of influence in favor of Iran, and this has been a direct reason for the transformation of Iraq into a (hostile) arena, even if Washington believes otherwise.

Iran has always considered Iraq to be the best arena for conveying its soft or rough messages to the United States, and when the late Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani, when he was head of the Expediency Council shortly after the invasion of Iraq, was asked about the US military blockade of Iran from the east in Afghanistan and from the west In Iraq, he answered: “Who is besieging whom?” Cordesman comments on this vision by saying: “Mr. Rafsanjani wanted to say: The presence of about 140,000 American soldiers in Iraq makes these soldiers a (hostage project) for Iran, which is now able to use them. Soldiers as a pressure card on Washington ”(10).

Investing the window of opportunity
, Iran had a clear strategy to make the most of the US invasion of Iraq, which was matched by successive American mistakes, which brought the situation to the status quo, where US interests in the Middle East are under serious threat, with possible options, but difficult and may not be certain success.

But Iran's continued (success) in Iraq is also no longer certain. Rather, it has become the subject of realistic doubts, with the serious challenges it faces there. This new situation has been established since the start of the popular protests more than a year ago in what was known as the (October Uprising). These protests were concentrated in Baghdad and the regions of the Shiite-majority south, which is the supposed incubator environment for political forces and the armed factions backed by Iran.

The protests that are still continuing raised slogans against Iran and its allies in Iraq, and among the protesters hundreds were killed and tens of thousands of wounded, in clashes with security forces and sniping operations, and planned assassinations targeting the leaders of the protests, and as a result of street pressure, the government of Adel Abdul Mahdi has fallen. It was distinguished by its proximity to Tehran, and the head of intelligence, Mustafa Al-Kazemi, assumed the presidency of a new government. During the past five months since his assignment, Al-Kazemi made the impression that he is more independent from Iran, and more inclined to challenge Iran's traditional arms in Iraq, most notably political parties, militias, and deep state forces fed by the country's rampant corruption machine. Al-Kazemi may be an opportunity to build a new approach to governance in Iraq that is more balanced and independent, or at least to start with it. Therefore, he considered Washington's threat to close its embassy in Baghdad, a direct threat to the fall of this government, and a kind of squandering of an opportunity that may be the last, to avoid losing Iraq completely.

Despite this situation threatening Iranian influence, it still appears at this stage to be more concerned with escalation in order to (expel) US forces than its preoccupation with controlling the emerging challenges that they are facing in Iraq. Tehran is still haunted by the desire to avenge the killing of Soleimani and the engineer, and among what it is seeking is to interfere in the American election season, to influence President Trump's chances of staying in the White House, which is what is happening in Iraq, through armed attacks.

Of course, it is not certain that the Democratic candidate, Joe Biden, will become a friend of Iran, but his history as former Vice President Obama, and his electoral promises, make him closer to adopting a softer policy with Iran, including the possibility of his country returning to the nuclear agreement, easing the blockade, and adopting different approaches. With the allies in the Arab Gulf, and if that happens, Tehran might think that it will be more able to face the political and popular challenges it is facing in Iraq.

However, the American elections and their results are more complex than being affected by the pressure of the pro-Iranian militias in Iraq, and therefore it is not likely that the attacks on American interests will have an impact on the decisions of the American voters, but on the other hand, and whatever the identity of the White House winner, it reassesses the overall results of the invasion of Iraq, And its devastating effects, whether for Iraq, the Middle East, or the United States itself.

Regardless of the identity of the next US administration, (correcting) many years of mistakes in Iraq requires a constructive approach that will not include costly and potentially destructive military solutions, nor long-term economic pressures that are mostly ineffective, and not of course leaving Iraq entirely. The most effective realistic approach is to help the Iraqi people produce new power in fair, fair and credible elections. It will be extremely important to support the young forces in Iraq, in order to be an acceptable national alternative to corrupt and incompetent political forces dependent on various foreign powers. It will be necessary to call on the international community to closely monitor what is happening in Iraq to prevent the use of repression and armed force by militias against the protesters, and to expose any attempts by traditional parties and their armed wings to rig the early elections scheduled for next June (2021).

America's direct intervention in Iraqi affairs will not be beneficial to anyone, and it has proven in all previous cases its ill effects, but any American effort to urge the international community to support the popular will, support the government's efforts to fight corruption, disarm militias, and completely abandon dealing with Iraqis by dividing them. To sects and ethnicities, that would be a fundamental step, to build a successful approach, and to stop reproducing failure.

Meet Mackie

Al Jazeera Center for Studies

[Donziman]

In other words...The US has made many mistakes,has no over all plan

and made a mess of the whole thing. What cracks me up,is the fact we go around the world trying to inflict democracy on other countries and our own country is barely

holding together and some would say really not working as it has in the past. This

whole thing is a failure just like Viet Nam. A giant waste of money and effort.  imho.

[Longtimelurker]

7 minutes ago, Donziman said:

In other words...The US has made many mistakes,has no over all plan

and made a mess of the whole thing. What cracks me up,is the fact we go around the world trying to inflict democracy on other countries and our own country is barely

holding together and some would say really not working as it has in the past. This

whole thing is a failure just like Viet Nam. A giant waste of money and effort.  imho.

Until the last four years the plan has not been for anyone's benefit other than our politicians. Now, we're seeing great progress with middle east peace plans, central banks losing their grip over govts etc. People across the globe see what's going on and appreciate the usa again. We have to let this war between good and evil playout by exposing the evil before we see the world in a better light. I think we're close to better times. IMHO

[yota691]

Al-Kazemi's spokesman: Washington has “frozen” the decision to close its embassy in Baghdad, after government steps

 

 

984 Policy 2020/10/23 10:56 am

Baghdad today - follow up Today, Friday (October 23, 2020), Ahmed Mulla Talal, spokesman for Prime Minister Mustafa Al-Kazemi, revealed the goals of Al-Kazemi's visit and his accompanying delegation to Britain, while he spoke about the decision to close the US embassy and its implications and repercussions on Iraq. "The visit to Britain is historic, important, and pivotal, and it came to revive the close relationship with the United Kingdom of Britain," Mulla Talal said in a televised interview that she followed (Baghdad Today), noting that "the challenges facing the government are very great, and it inherited a heavy legacy at the security and political level." And the rest of the levels, but she accepted the mission. " He pointed out that "the visit to Britain came to an agreement for strategic, economic and military cooperation, and Britain is a key partner in the fight against ISIS." Regarding America's decision to close the embassy in Baghdad, he stressed, "The government has made great efforts, both internally and externally, to dissuade the United States from the decision to close its embassy in Baghdad, and these efforts resulted in freezing this decision, but the decision is there and the date of its adoption has not been determined until the situation is assessed. ". He pointed out that "the government has taken many steps to protect the security of diplomats, and out of its duty and implementation of its government program, and not dictated by external bodies." He explained that " the closure of the US embassy will have significant security, political and economic influences, political forces felt the seriousness of the matter and the fear and panic from the responses of other acts may be carried out by the United States", "adding:" We hope the United States to reconsider the decision to close the embassy. " Between that “The loss of Iraq will be great with the withdrawal of the US embassy, and the United States is a friendly country and we are seeking very great economic and cultural cooperation, and we hope that it will back down from this decision and not just freeze it.” He stressed, “The government does not intend to clash with those who have established their positions inside Iraq, nor to confront them. With weapons, rather by law, and through strengthening the Iraqi apparatus, "indicating that" Britain and other friendly countries will help Iraq to train Iraqi forces. "