IMF Staff Completes 2019 Article IV Mission on Iraq.

[danielchu]

YES these sunnis suck!!!

[zul]

On 7/30/2019 at 7:00 PM, yota691 said:

International Monetary Fund warns Iraq

Editorial date:: 2019/7/30 13:53 • 50 times read

{International: Al Furat News} The International Spotting Fund warned of Iraq's continued over-spending.

The IMF said in a report on Tuesday that Iraq's budget for the current year, "if the current spending continues as it is, it will eliminate any progress achieved by Iraq economically during the past years." 
He pointed out that "the projections indicate an increase in Iraqi spending by 25% per year, unless the authorities amend their financial laws and balance sheet items." 
The report noted that Iraq's economic situation "faces serious challenges, social conditions in the low and still severe."

 

Contrary to IMF warnings/suggestions (re: Iraq's budget-deficit spendings), we know government deficits are often necessary to boost private sector.

 

I think I can see where Iraq is going with these spendings..esp. with their reconstructions coming up, their private sectors ~ crawling, their unemployment rates ~ high.

 

As a matter of arithmetic, the Govt has to run deficits if it wants to help the private sector to grow...

 

When government spends, it simply means another segment of the economy will be getting the money. So i think 70 billion dollar deficits (Iraq 2020 budget) is a good amount to kickstart their private sectors.

Their (new and young) economy could absorb these amount without causing much shocks or inflations AND they already have their new fiscal policy (FML) to keep them in check as to where their money is going.

 

Bear in mind, sharp, severe economic downturns happens NOT when govt fiscals are in surpluses but when  private sectors are in large deficits.

The private (domestic) sector needs to be in surpluses to keep the growth going.

 

 

[Laid Back]

Totally agree Zul, They are Reallocating Public Expenditure to Promote Inclusive Growth. 

 

Go RV 

Go $1:1

[zul]

1 hour ago, Laid Back said:

Totally agree Zul, They are Reallocating Public Expenditure to Promote Inclusive Growth. 

 

Go RV 

Go $1:1

 

[Theos]

You guys are wicked smart!!

[Carrello]

Zul and Laid Back, thank you for your sharing your knowledge.I always learn something from your comments.

 

Zul, I want to get you a Mai Tai too. Do I need to get you a hammock as well?

 

Thanks, Guys!

[zul]

3 hours ago, Carrello said:

Zul and Laid Back, thank you for your sharing your knowledge.I always learn something from your comments.

 

Zul, I want to get you a Mai Tai too. Do I need to get you a hammock as well?

 

Thanks, Guys!

 

TQ Carello, u'r a good friend. 

Sure...why not, i could use a hammock....

[Carrello]

Zul, I'll throw in two palm trees too!

[Jjonesmx]

On 7/29/2019 at 4:43 PM, Jjonesmx said:

IMF. 2019 article IV consultation

 

Some notes of mine

 

I made it easy to follow along imo 

 

🤓

 

 

Avail.....verb
LITERARY
help or benefit


Iraq continues to avail itself of the transitional arrangements under Article XIV, Section 2 but no longer maintains any exchange restrictions or multiple currency practices subject to Article XIV, Section 2, and currently maintains one multiple currency practice (MCP) subject to Fund approval under Article VIII, Section 3. (30)

(Sub note: 30)

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
The authorities have imposed a requirement that, to access the CBI foreign exchange window, a purchaser must have at least one bank account that has been opened for a minimum of six months. This requirement does not apply for access to foreign exchange from other sources, including purchases of foreign exchange from commercial banks’ own resources. Staff will monitor the implementation of this requirement to ascertain whether any undue burdens on access to foreign exchange for current international transactions emerge from its application in practice.
Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx


The MCP arises from the lack of a mechanism to ensure that the exchange rate at the CBI foreign exchange window and the market rates (retail exchange rates of commercial banks and exchange bureaus for the sale of foreign currency from sources other than the CBI foreign exchange window) do not deviate from each other by more than 2 percent.

A previously identified exchange restriction arising from an Iraqi balance owed to Jordan under an inoperative bilateral payment agreement has been eliminated.
---------------‐
Article XIV
 

😁

 

 

The MCP policy is a cornerstone of the legal and policy framework for the Fund’s
jurisdiction over exchange rates.

 

 

WHY DOES THE FUND NEED AN MCP POLICY?

 

13. The prohibition of MCPs was part of a larger effort by the Fund to eliminate
restrictions on current international payments and transfers after the destructive trade wars of the 1930s.10 During this period, which saw a variety of distortive trade barriers followed by waves of retaliatory tariffs, countries frequently established different rates of exchange for selectedcommodities to stimulate exports and suppress imports. To preserve scarce supplies of FX, countries also concluded BPAs with each other using exchange rates that did not reflect market conditions.

These measures disrupted trade, increased economic difficulties, and stimulated destructive spillovers and retaliatory measures between countries.

14. MCPs have historically been used for two main purposes. First, as an attempt to mitigate
BOP pressures. Second, to achieve non-BOP objectives—such as revenue mobilization or allocation of resources to specific entities or sectors—without having to resort to more direct methods of
taxation or subsidies.

As MCPs can, in some cases, be adopted by executive order or central bank
regulation, they have often been used instead of other measures that require legislation.

 

Snip/s...

 

 

MCP policy is a cornerstone

 

. The MCP policy is a cornerstone of the legal and policy framework for the Fund’s
jurisdiction over exchange rates. The term “multiple currency practice” is a misnomer. It is not concerned with the maintenance of more than one currency on a member’s territory, but with the maintenance of multiple exchange rates on a member’s territory.

The obligation of member countries
to refrain from engaging in MCPs is an original provision of the Articles. It has promoted the objective of maintaining orderly exchange arrangements and unified exchange rates.

 

WHAT IS AN MCP?

6. The Fund’s Articles prohibit members from engaging in MCPs in certain circumstances but do not define the term.

1 They allow the Executive Board, through interpretation and by decision, to give content to the term through the MCP policy.

2 While the content of the policy can be modified to reflect changing realities, the Fund cannot decide not to apply it. Given that the Articles prohibit members from engaging in MCPs, unless otherwise authorized therein, the Fund must apply this provision and enforce compliance with this obligation by its members.

 

Snip...

 

Second, while the 1981 Decision underlying the current policy defines MCPs as exchange rate spreads that actually exceed the applicable thresholds, over time application of the policy has evolved to include official action that could potentially give rise to such spreads, even if they have not emerged in practice (i.e., “potentiality”), unless there is a mechanism in place to keep the spread within the permissible range.

5
Box 1 provides examples of
exchange measures that typically give rise to an MCP.


Box 1.

 

 

 

Exchange Measures that Give Rise to MCPs
While not exhaustive, the list below describes measures that are typically considered to give rise to MCPs under the current policy.

Different rates for different transactions. The authorities set different exchange rates for different categories of transactions which result in spreads of more than two percent between these rates, or against market rates.


This will occur, for example, when the authorities set an official exchange rate for
governmental transactions (e.g., servicing external debt, other government operations) which differs by more than two percent from prevailing market rates or other official rates.

An MCP will also arise when members impose surrender requirements, whereby certain market participants (e.g., exporters) must sell their FX proceeds at a special rate which differs by more than two percent from the market rate or other
official rates.

Dual or multiple FX markets. The authorities establish separate exchange markets and the rates at which exchange transactions are conducted by participants in the two markets exceed the permissible
spreads.

Exchange taxes. A tax payable on exchange transactions is closely enough related to the exchange of currencies to be considered part of the effective exchange rate by increasing the cost of the exchange
transaction.

1 If such costs imposed by the authorities exceed two percent, an MCP will arise.

Bilateral payments agreements (BPAs). The authorities have an agreement under which two central banks settle current transactions (e.g., imports and exports) between the two countries on pre-defined
dates at specific exchange rates, and the exchange rates used in the agreement differ by more than two percent from those prevailing in the FX markets.

Exchange guarantee schemes. The authorities put in place a scheme to cover exchange risks of certain market participants (e.g., exporters). Depending on the features of the scheme, the compensation for exchange losses is considered to be part of the effective exchange rate that can give rise to an MCP.

2 FX auctions. The authorities allocate FX outside the auction at a different exchange rate than the auction rate, or the auction rate differs from the market exchange rate, and these rates differ by more than two percent. In addition, a multi-price auction also gives rise to an MCP if the rates at which successful bidders are sold FX at the same auction differ by more than two percent.

Import deposit requirements. The authorities require an import deposit to be made before a letter of credit is opened or FX purchased. If the interest rate on the deposits is lower than the prevailing market interest rate, this is considered an additional cost of the FX transaction that can give rise to an MCP.

 

 

Snip...

 

Multiple Currency Practices and Surveillance

29. Article VIII, Section 3 and Article IV are also closely related. Under Article IV, Fund
members undertake to collaborate with the Fund and other members to assure orderly exchange arrangements and to promote a stable system of exchange rates, and to observe several, specific obligations with respect to its domestic economic, financial and exchange rate policies.

29
For its part, the Fund is required to exercise surveillance over each member’s policies. Article VIII, Section 3 is designed to help further that goal. To assist surveillance, both the Integrated Surveillance Decision (“ISD”) and its predecessors have recognized several indicators which may suggest the need for additional consultations between the Fund and a member in order to ensure that the
member is in compliance with its Article IV obligations. While the obligations under Article VIII, Section 3 are “in addition” to members’ obligations under Article IV, both provisions deal with members’ exchange rate policies. The Second Amendment eliminated the explicit link between the
two articles with respect to permissible spreads (see above) but close links remain. In particular:

• While members have the freedom to determine their exchange rate arrangements, this does not permit members to engage in MCPs.



• If substantial spreads arise in the market but do not give rise to MCPs (e.g., because they do not arise as a result of official action), the Fund may call on a member to consult with it under the obligation to collaborate with the Fund under Article IV.31

• MCPs may be considered in assessing indicators that may signal the need for additional discussion of compliance with the Principles for the Guidance of Members’ Policies under the
ISD.

• The approval criteria for MCPs echo the provision of Article IV, Section 1(iii) that prohibits members from manipulating exchange rates to gain an unfair competitive advantage over other members.


29 Under Article IV, Section 1, Fund members shall (i) endeavor to direct its economic and financial policies toward
the objective of fostering orderly economic growth with reasonable price stability, with due regard to its
circumstances; (ii) seek to promote stability by fostering orderly underlying economic and financial conditions and a
monetary system that does not tend to produce erratic disruptions; (iii) avoid manipulating exchange rates or the
international monetary system in order to prevent effective balance of payments adjustment or to gain an unfair
competitive advantage over other members; and (iv) follow exchange policies compatible with the undertakings
under Article IV.

30 The Legal Aspects Paper, p. 26.
31 Before the Second Amendment, on several occasions the Fund relied on the members’ obligation to collaborate
set forth in Article IV to either call on or recommend to members that they take certain actions or refrain from taking
actions in order to achieve the objectives set forth in this provision. See Article IV of the Fund’s Articles of Agreement –
An Overview of the Legal Framework, June 28, 2006, pp. 9-11.


30. In principle, both MCPs and exchange restrictions must be covered in Article IV consultations.

32 In light of the importance of MCPs and exchange restrictions for surveillance, as
part of the Article IV consultation staff must determine whether a member has introduced or continues to maintain MCPs or exchange restrictions that require Fund approval or under Article XIV.

MCPs and exchange restrictions are required to be identified in the staff report, and the staff appraisal should make a recommendation concerning Board approval. Staff should inform members
that failure to notify and seek Fund approval would be a breach of their obligation under the Articles.



Box 4. Consultations Under Article IV, Article VIII, and Article XIVConsultations under Articles IV, VIII and XIV:
Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx


The Integrated Surveillance Decision (ISD) provides that, in principle, consultations under Article IV shall include the regular consultations under Article VIII and Article XIV, and shall take place annually.

1 During an Article VIII consultation, the Fund assesses any measures (i.e., exchange restrictions and MCPs) maintained by the member which are subject to IMF approval under Article
👉VIII, Sections 2 and 3, and may decide to approve such measures. Under Article XIV, members are required to consult annually as to the further retention of any measures maintained under this article (i.e., those restrictions or MCPs that were in effect on the date it became a member of the Fund). This requirement ceases once the member no longer maintains such measures.👈

The modalities for concluding these consultations differ, as follows:

• Article IV: Article IV consultations are typically concluded by way of a summing up, rather than a formal Board decision.

• Article VIII: Where approval of an exchange restriction or MCP is not being sought, no formal Board decision is taken. The Board makes a finding of an exchange restriction or MCP in the summing up when it endorses the conclusions of staff set forth in the staff appraisal. Where staff recommends approval of measures subject to Article VIII, and the Board agrees, a formal Board decision is taken.

• Article XIV: A formal Board decision is required to conclude the consultation.
_________________________________

 

Snip/s...

 

 

IMPLICATIONS OF IMPOSITION OF MCPs

 

33. An unapproved MCP is a breach of a member’s obligations under the Articles and
therefore could lead to the imposition of sanctions under Article XXVI, Section 2(a), which
sets out possible the legal consequences of a breach of obligation (i.e., ultimately, compulsory

withdrawal). In practice, many Fund members have maintained MCPs which would have required

approval by the Fund, and have either not requested temporary approval for such MCPs, or the
Fund has not approved their maintenance. This places them in breach of their obligations under the
Articles. While it would be possible for the Fund to establish a policy framework under which
members in breach of their obligations respecting MCPs (or exchange restrictions) would be subject
to escalating remedial measures such as a declaration of censure or noncooperation (similar to the
procedure for breaches of obligation under Article VIII, Section 5),38 to date the Fund has opted for a
collaborative approach and has refrained from applying the sanctions available under Article XXVI,
Section 2(a) in such cases.39 Indeed, Management has not to date issued a “complaint” to the
Executive Board, the first step in applying sanctions under Article XXVI, Section 2(a), alleging that a

member has breached its obligations in respect to Article VIII, Section 3.

All found here in THE IMF  June update PDF 

 

https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&url=https://www.imf.org/~/media/Files/Publications/PP/2019/PPEA2019015.ashx&ved=2ahUKEwjGnp_bs-LjAhVK7J4KHcsmCPIQFjADegQIBxAB&usg=AOvVaw0jCLOA6RRNM0OmVP6mHNah

[Laid Back]

13 hours ago, Carrello said:

Zul and Laid Back, thank you for your sharing your knowledge.I always learn something from your comments.

 

Zul, I want to get you a Mai Tai too. Do I need to get you a hammock as well?

 

Thanks, Guys!

Carrello is always a pleasure..... I keep thinking on the Mai Tai with some beautiful Hawaiian music enjoying the sunset.

 

Go RVasap

[mr.unlikely]

• العربية

IMF Executive Board Concludes 2019 Article IV Consultation with Iraq

July 26, 2019

On July 19, 2019, the Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) concluded the Article IV consultation [1] with Iraq.

An improved security situation and the recovery in oil prices have improved near-term vulnerabilities. Large fiscal and current account surpluses—around 8 and 6 percent of GDP, respectively—were recorded in 2018, allowing the government to retire domestic debt and accumulate fiscal buffers. Gross international reserves reached $65 billion by end-2018.

However, post-war reconstruction and economic recovery have been slow. Non-oil GDP rose by only 0.8 percent year-on-year in 2018 in a context of weak execution of reconstruction and other public investment. Overall GDP contracted by around 0.6 percent as oil production was cut to comply with the OPEC+ agreement.

The 2019 budget implies a sizable fiscal loosening that will reverse the recent reduction in vulnerabilities. Current spending is expected to increase by 27 percent year-on-year, in part due to a higher public sector wage bill, while revenues will be dampened by the abolition of non-oil taxes. As a result, the budget is projected to shift to a deficit of 4 percent of GDP in 2019, and reserves are projected to decline.

The fiscal and external positions are expected to continue to deteriorate over the medium term absent policy changes—with reserves falling below adequate levels and fiscal buffers eroded. Although the level of public debt will remain sustainable, gross fiscal financing needs will increase. Non-oil GDP growth is projected to reach 5½ in 2019 but subside over the medium term.

In a context of highly volatile oil prices, the major risk to the outlook is a fall in oil prices which would lower exports and budgetary revenues, leading to an even sharper decline in reserves or higher public debt. Geopolitical tensions, the potential for social unrest in a context of weak public services and lack of progress in combatting corruption pose further risks.

Executive Board Assessment [2]

Executive Directors agreed with the thrust of the staff appraisal. They were encouraged by the recent strengthening of Iraq’s economy but recognized that the country continues to face daunting challenges. Social conditions remain harsh, post-war reconstruction progress is slow, development needs are large, and institutional weaknesses are significant. Volatile oil prices and a difficult regional and geopolitical environment pose additional difficulties. Directors encouraged the authorities to seize the opportunity presented by the improved security situation and higher oil prices to implement policies and structural reforms aimed at ensuring macroeconomic and financial stability, tackling long-standing social problems, and promoting sustainable and inclusive growth.

Directors emphasized that building a robust fiscal framework is essential to maintain fiscal and macroeconomic stability and strengthen buffers. They encouraged the authorities to adopt a risk‑ and rules-based approach to fiscal policy as part of broader reforms to manage oil revenue more effectively, reduce tendencies for procyclicality, and shift to a more growth-friendly composition of expenditure. Directors supported scaling up reconstruction and development expenditure gradually in line with improving absorptive capacity. They underscored the need to strengthen public financial management to ensure public spending is appropriately monitored and to reduce vulnerabilities to corruption. In this context, Directors welcomed the newly adopted General Financial Management Law and encouraged its full implementation.

Directors emphasized that gradual fiscal adjustment, including containing current primary spending and boosting non-oil revenues is essential for maintaining fiscal and debt sustainability. They recommended that spending measures should give priority to containing the growth in wage bill and lowering subsidies to the electricity sector. Directors emphasized that the poorest and the most vulnerable must be protected from the adjustment process.

Directors underscored that an overhaul of the banking sector is necessary to maintain financial stability. They encouraged the authorities to restructure the large state-owned banks, enhance their supervision, and implement other reforms to increase financial intermediation. Directors highlighted the benefits of increasing financial inclusion, especially for the SME sector, which has a large potential to absorb entrants to the labor market.

Directors agreed that building public institutions and enhancing governance is key for success, and highlighted the scope for Fund capacity development to support these efforts. They welcomed progress in developing an anti-corruption framework and called for further modifications to the legal regime for combatting corruption coupled with stronger coordination between the relevant government agencies, while continuing to strengthen the framework for Anti-money laundering and combatting the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT). Directors also recommended strengthening Public Investment Management framework to ensure that spending is well directed and that donor funds targeting reconstruction are put to the most efficient use.

Directors looked forward to continued close engagement between the authorities and the Fund in the context of post program monitoring.

 

Iraq: Selected Economic and Financial Indicators, 2015–24 (Percent of GDP, except were indicated)
											Projections
					2015		2016		2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
Economic growth and prices
Real GDP (percentage change)					2.5		15.2		-2.5	-0.6	4.6	5.3	2.6	2.3	2.1	2.1
Non-oil real GDP (percentage change)					-14.4		1.3		-0.6	0.8	5.4	5.0	4.1	3.4	2.7	2.7
GDP deflator (percentage change)					-26.1		-13.4		14.6	15.4	-4.5	2.3	2.6	2.8	3.1	3.3
GDP per capita (US$)					5,047		4,843		5,263	5,882	5,728	6,017	6,172	6,326	6,486	6,666
GDP (in ID trillion)					207.2		206.7		231.0	265.0	264.8	285.4	300.4	315.9	332.3	350.4
Non-oil GDP (in ID trillion)					137.3		138.3		140.8	145.6	158.1	173.2	188.1	202.8	217.1	232.6
GDP (in US$ billion)					177.7		175.2		195.5	224.2	224.1	241.5	254.1	267.3	281.1	296.5
Oil production (mbpd)					3.72		4.63		4.47	4.41	4.59	4.84	4.93	5.01	5.10	5.18
Oil exports (mbpd)					3.35		3.79		3.80	3.86	4.03	4.25	4.33	4.40	4.47	4.55
Iraq oil export prices (US$ pb) 1/					45.9		35.6		48.7	65.2	56.0	55.8	54.9	54.4	54.4	54.8
Consumer price inflation (percentage change; end of period)					2.3		-1.5		0.2	-0.1	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0
Consumer price inflation (percentage change; average)					1.4		0.5		0.1	0.4	0.8	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0
National Accounts
Gross domestic investment					24.9		20.8		16.7	12.9	18.8	16.7	16.0	15.6	15.6	15.4
Of which: public					15.6		11.5		8.3	5.3	10.6	8.4	7.5	7.0	6.8	6.6
Gross domestic consumption					81.2		87.0		80.8	79.1	84.5	85.4	86.8	87.9	88.6	89.6
Of which: public					22.6		22.6		21.8	21.2	26.5	26.3	26.4	26.2	26.2	26.3
Gross national savings					18.4		12.5		18.6	19.8	13.6	12.5	11.7	11.1	10.3	9.4
Of which: public					3.1		-2.0		7.0	13.4	6.5	5.2	4.1	3.2	1.8	0.8
Saving - Investment balance					-6.5		-8.3		1.8	6.9	-5.2	-4.2	-4.3	-4.6	-5.3	-6.0
Public Finance
Government revenue and grants					30.6		26.8		33.0	39.8	40.5	39.6	37.9	36.5	35.5	34.6
Government oil revenue					27.8		22.9		28.9	36.7	37.2	36.3	34.5	33.1	32.0	31.0
Government non-oil revenue					2.8		4.0		4.2	3.1	3.3	3.3	3.4	3.4	3.5	3.5
Expenditure, of which:					43.4		40.7		34.6	32.0	44.6	43.1	41.2	40.5	40.5	40.5
Current expenditure					27.8		29.3		26.4	26.7	33.9	34.7	33.6	33.5	33.7	33.9
Capital expenditure					15.6		11.5		8.3	5.3	10.6	8.4	7.5	7.0	6.8	6.6
Overall fiscal balance (including grants)					-12.8		-13.9		-1.6	7.9	-4.1	-3.5	-3.3	-4.0	-5.0	-5.9
Non-oil primary fiscal balance, accrual basis (percent of non-oil GDP)					-46.5		-43.3		-39.4	-42.4	-56.9	-52.1	-49.2	-47.1	-46.2	-45.3
Adjusted Non-oil primary fiscal balance, accrual basis (excl. KRG, percent of non-oil GDP) 2/					-44.7		-43.3		-39.4	-40.5	-50.1	-46.0	-43.6	-41.8	-41.0	-40.2
Adjusted non-oil primary expenditure (excl. KRG, percent of non-oil GDP) 3/					48.9		49.2		46.3	46.2	55.6	51.5	49.1	47.2	46.3	45.5
Adjusted non-oil primary expenditure (excl. KRG, annual real growth, percent) 3/					-24.7		0.9		-4.5	2.8	29.9	-0.6	1.4	1.6	3.1	3.2
Memorandum items
Total government debt (in percent of GDP) 4/					56.2		64.2		58.9	49.3	51.4	50.5	50.6	51.5	53.6	56.4
Total government debt (in US$ billion) 4/					99.9		112.5		115.2	110.4	115.3	121.9	128.5	137.5	150.7	167.3
External government debt (in percent of GDP)					37.2		37.1		35.6	30.6	32.2	31.5	30.5	28.4	26.8	24.9
External government debt (in US$ billion)					66.1		65.0		69.5	68.7	72.2	76.2	77.6	75.8	75.3	73.8
Monetary indicators
Growth in reserve money					-12.0		9.2		-4.4	6.7	2.5	5.4	4.7	4.9	5.1	4.6
Growth in broad money					-9.1		7.1		2.6	2.7	2.5	6.2	5.4	6.0	5.9	5.3
External sector
Current account					-6.5		-8.3		1.8	6.9	-5.2	-4.2	-4.3	-4.6	-5.3	-6.0
Trade balance					-0.1		-1.7		7.6	13.4	3.5	4.1	3.2	2.0	1.3	0.5
Exports of goods					31.8		28.6		34.8	41.2	37.0	36.2	34.4	33.1	32.0	31.2
Imports of goods					-31.9		-30.3		-27.1	-27.8	-33.5	-32.0	-31.2	-31.1	-30.8	-30.7
Overall external balance					-6.7		-3.7		2.5	6.3	-2.5	-1.1	-1.6	-3.5	-3.8	-4.7
Gross reserves (in US$ billion)					54.1		45.5		49.4	64.7	57.2	53.5	48.5	38.8	28.2	14.3
Total GIR (in months of imports of goods and services)					9.3		7.8		7.3	8.0	6.8	6.2	5.5	4.2	2.9	1.4
Exchange rate (dinar per US$; period average)					1,166		1,180		1,182	1,182	1,182	1,182	1,182	1,182	1,182	1,182
Real effective exchange rate (percent change, end of period) 5/					6.5		1.8		-5.1	4.9	…	…	…	…	…	…
Sources: Iraqi authorities; and Fund staff estimates and projections. 1/ Negative price differential of about $3.6 per barrel compared to the average petroleum spot price (average of Brent, West Texas and Dubai oil prices) in 2018-23. 2/ Adjusted to exclude (i) full year estimates of federal government transfers to the Kurdistan Regional Government, and (ii) non-oil tax revenues from the KRG to the federal government. In 2014 and 2015, actual transfers were made for only 2 and 5 months, respectively. 3/ Adjusted to exclude full year estimate of federal government transfers to the Kurdistan Regional Government. In 2014 and 2015, actual transfers were made for only 2 and 5 months, respectively. 4/ Includes arrears. The debt stock includes legacy arrears to non-Paris Club creditors on which the authorities have requested (but not yet obtained) Paris-Club comparable relief. Implementing comparable terms will substantially reduce debt (e.g. by 15 percent of GDP in 2017). 5/ Positive means appreciation.

 

---

[1] Under Article IV of the IMF's Articles of Agreement, the IMF holds bilateral discussions with members, usually every year. A staff team visits the country, collects economic and financial information, and discusses with officials the country's economic developments and policies. On return to headquarters, the staff prepares a report, which forms the basis for discussion by the Executive Board.

[2] At the conclusion of the discussion, the Managing Director, as Chairman of the Board, summarizes the views of Executive Directors, and this summary is transmitted to the country's authorities. An explanation of any qualifiers used in summings up can be found here:http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/misc/qualifiers.htm .

IMF Communications Department

MEDIA RELATIONS

PRESS OFFICER: WAFA AMR

PHONE: +1 202 623-7100EMAIL: MEDIA@IMF.ORG

@IMFSpokesperson

[mr.unlikely]

If posted already please delete.

cheers DV.