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CBI Daily Currency Auction - Saturday, 26 October 2013


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Currency Auctions

Announcement No. (2513)

The latest daily currency auction was held in the Central Bank of Iraq on Saturday, the 26-Oct-2013 . The results were as follows:

DETAILS ----------------- & ---------------------- NOTES

Number of banks -------------------------------- 19

Auction price selling dinar / US$ ------------ 1166

Auction price buying dinar / US$ ------------ -----

Amount sold at auction price (US$) -------- 179,013,000

Amount purchased at Auction price (US$) -----

Total offers for buying (US$) ----------------- 179,013,000

Total offers for selling (US$) ----------------- -----

Exchange rates

Dollar's exchange rates / in Baghdad markets

And the auctions resume...! We continue to wait for the implementation of the conditions of the Erbil agreement, and the passing of specific required laws like the Tax & Tariff, Amnesty, banking resolution...but we are close...!

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Another 200 billion dinar scarfed up out of private sector and leaving 179 million dollars in the private sector

They pump around a billion dollars to the private sector each week

We know the auctions Are not selling dinar to the govt so it only leaves the private sector

Now the govt will put those dinar back into circulation thru govt payroll and they will have the 179 ion dollars plus the 200 billion dinars circulating

Tommarro they will pump another 180 million into the private sector then recycle those dinar again

The whole time the amount of dollars circulating in the private sector continues to grow

I wish we had those figures to show how many remain in Iraq and how many are used to import

We can only speculate using trade balance figures

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The CBI is not pumping or scooping IQD or USD. The daily auctions are oil sales to local countries. That is their primary industry. I also saw a post this week from Adam that the auctions mean nothing. I agree!

I am ready for an RV.

D.B. they still show the current CBI rate in a transactional status, so the the statement that they mean nothing is clearly incorrect and misleading. For most of the past ten years it was a source of revenue to the CBI, as well as maintaining a viable market rate, and peg to the USD. The arbitrary statement that the auctions mean nothing is simply an opinion based on current times and actions - and not a statement of fact - regardless of who's opinion it is. Let's be realistic and acknowledge all Shabibi did with the daily auctions...!

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Where do people get off saying the daily foreign currency auctions the CBI does in part electronic remittances (for oil sales) and part cash exchange transactions aren't relevant?

Each day the auctions are held at least some cash dollars are sold to banks in Iraq in exchange for cash dinars. This is actually happening. How else would the Iraqis get US cash?

It's not sales of oil to neighboring countries. These are currency auctions, including a portion that is physical cash. It says so on the CBI website and countless articles announcing and explaining the daily auctions.

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Local country's lol

We know oil is sold in dollars and they are converted into dinars

This is the process

Currency auctions

Not oil auctions

Currency auctions

That's why they are called "currency auctions"

Not oil sales

Keep saying it

Currency auctions

I know this is not the first time you made this statement

Maybe you have a link we can read that explains why you say this

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