The Parliamentary Speaker Calls On The Parliament To Include The Laws That The Kurds Have Forbidden To Pass !

[WheresmyRV?]

14 minutes ago, DoD said:

 

I think this is the perfect time for the Kurds to push the article 140 issue with the GOI. In my opinion right now they are on the outside looking in an if they can get some type of agreement with Kirkuk an article 140 they could maybe slip in the HCL somehow. I know, wishful thinking...

Wishful thinking yes but meh who knows, they might surprise us.  This would be the perfect time though.

[DinarThug]

2 hours ago, DoD said:

they could maybe slip in the HCL somehow.

 

Just Have Bill Cosby Buy Them A Drink And 'Slip' It In !  

 

     

[MyLadiesDaddy]

I am postulating that this posturing will lift the price of oil to $70+ dollars a barrel, 

and that in the short duration we will see with the absence of the Kurds from Parliament those all important laws being passed under the muddy waters of imminent war with the Kurds.

What do you think all those meetings between Baghdad and the Kurds were all about?

http://dinarvets.com/forums/index.php?/topic/244471-iraq-escalates-dispute-with-kurds-threatening-military-action/&

 

Far be it from me to say, I told ya so, but I TOLD YA SO

 

 

[King Bean]

19 hours ago, Miamiheatnic said:

I’m so ready for this to happen. I’m about to move to a Phoenix this week. I could really use this! 

 

                    Enjoy !! 

 

[nannab]

 

7 minutes ago, King Bean said:

 

                    Enjoy !! 

 

 

Yummy are they done yet?

[Officiallytook]

Timing...

[King Bean]

6 minutes ago, nannab said:

Yummy are they done yet?

 

           Ooops. Forgot to roll the window down a bit. The dog will eat em' though.

[sandfly]

thanks clown

[Big_J]

[10 YEARS LATER]

Wonder how long THIS CALL will take ?

[DropItLikeItsHot]

Thanks Clown!

That article put a new meaning on the word "SOON" for Iraq... 2 days from now they meet in Paris... mind blowing!

[soccercrazy]

Why kurds do not want to pass hcl??? 

[Spider]

37 minutes ago, soccercrazy said:

Why kurds do not want to pass hcl??? 

 

Because oil revenue from disputed area in Article 140 are not included in Kurdistan portion. They want GOI reactivated Article 140, then they agree to vote for HCL.

 

By the way, actually they can vote all laws and win by majority vote since Kurdistan seat in HOR are 55 out of 325 seat in HOR.

 

But, if HOR want to make consensus with all component in the HOR, that's another story.

Edited October 3, 2017 by Spider

[DinarThug]

4 hours ago, DropItLikeItsHot said:

Thanks Clown!

That article put a new meaning on the word "SOON" for Iraq... 2 days from now they meet in Paris... mind blowing!

 

 

 

     

[10 YEARS LATER]

Would be great if they would pass more than just gas.

[DinarThug]

This Is A Long But EXTREMELY Inciteful Article From 2 Years Ago !  

 

 

If U Take The Time To Read It U'll Be Glad U Did ...

 

     

 

 

Be Very Worried About Barzani Family Power Struggle

 MICHAEL RUBIN / JAN. 18, 2015

 

American officials tend to lionize Iraqi Kurdistan, and not without reason. Iraqi Kurdistan has, for more than two decades, been stable and relatively secure. And while its claims to be democratic are a bit exaggerated, its transformation in a relatively short period of time is astounding.

That said, the region was never democratic—the freest and fairest election it had was in 1992—and then the leaders simply massaged the process in order to maintain their hold. Regional President Masud Barzani, for example, is officially limited to two terms by the constitution, but got around the problem by extending his second term extra-legally. Simply put, today, Iraqi Kurdistan is a dictatorship.

The two ruling families dominate politics and society. Masud Barzani is president and lives in a palace complex in a resort inherited from Saddam Hussein. His nephew, Nechirvan Barzani, is prime minister. His uncle, Hoshyar Zebari, was Iraq’s foreign minister and is now finance minister. Masud’s eldest son, Masrour Barzani, leads the intelligence service; and his second son Mansour is a general, as is Masud’s brother Wajy. Barzani’s nephew Sirwan owns the regional cell phone company which, while purchased with public money, remains a private holding. Barzani’s sons are frequently in Washington D.C. They have their wives give birth in Sibley Hospital in order to ensure the next generation has American citizenship, and Masrour Barzani acquired an $11 million mansion in McLean, Virginia. Hanging out in Tyson’s Corner, Virginia, some of Masoud Barzani’s daughters-in-law have, according to Kurdish circles, been known to introduce themselves as “Princesses of Kurdistan” as they visit high-end shops accompanied by their own rather unnecessary (while in the United States) security details.

(Barzani isn’t the only family dynasty, just the most important one. Former Iraqi President Jalal Talabani’s wife Hero Ibrahim Ahmad runs a number of media outlets, “non-governmental organizations,” and maintains a stranglehold over the finances of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, the political party Talabani founded. She calls the shots for her son Qubad, whom she maneuvered into the deputy premiership. Lahur Talabani, the former president’s nephew, is head of his party’s counter-terrorism unit. President Talabani, when deciding who from his party should join him in Baghdad, appointed his brother-in-law Latif Rashid to be a minister.)

Family means everything in Kurdistan. When Masud Barzani met with President Obama several years ago at the White House, he brought with him Masrour and nephew Nechirvan even though the latter at the time was out of office and without any governmental role. Barham Salih, the serving prime minister, stayed home. Barham simply didn’t come from the right family. The Barzani Charity Foundation has “urged” other non-governmental organizations not to compete in certain sectors, or face the consequences. Meanwhile, its funds—Kurdish NGO workers and journalist say—go as much toward private jets and six-figure salaries as they do to assistance.

Masud Barzani is a dictator. As Islamist terrorists rage over the Charlie Hebdocartoons, Barzani remains calm to that supposed provocation. But when Sardasht Osman, a young Kurdish journalist, penned a relatively innocent poem highlighting how his life and fortunes would change if he married Barzani’s daughter—a subtle and sophisticated poke at the region’s nepotism and corruption—Barzani’s security service led by son Masrour apparently kidnapped and executed him. Family trumps everything.

For policymakers and businessmen in the United States or Europe who seek only stability and do not prioritize democracy, that may be fine. After all, aside from Israel and perhaps now Tunisia, the Middle East isn’t known for democracy. That stability, however, is on the verge of breaking down and, ironically, the reason is family.

Masud Barzani is nearing 70 years old. Like many Middle Eastern potentates, he is carefully considering his succession. While many in the West assume that Nechirvan Barzani, on paper the second-most powerful Kurdish figure, would be next in line, Masud has apparently decided to cast his lot with son Masrour. There have been subtle personnel changes and alterations in portfolios in recent years as Masrour has consolidated power. Take the case of Karim Sinjari: In theory the interior minister answering to Nechirvan Barzani, Sinjari has seen Masrour encroach on his power and portfolio in recent years. Whereas Sinjari once was responsible for the region’s impressive security, today Sinjari’s title may be the same but he holds sway over little more than local and traffic police forces.

The result of the power struggle matters. Both Nechirvan and Masrour Barzani would be corrupt by any American standard. Certainly, that’s a more difficult call by Iraqi and Kurdish law which doesn’t define business and political conflicts of interest in the same way. Still, both the Barzanis (and Talabanis) confuse personal, party, and public funds. That said, while Nechirvan Barzani may be corrupt, it is in the Tammany Hall sense: his machine may be shady at times, but it delivers not only to his immediate inner circle but to the public at large. Nechirvan is skilled, works with both supporters and opposition, and is generally popular. He does not exaggerate his academic or military prowess; he is self-confident enough to know that he need not bother, and that the general public sees through and privately jokes about embellishments. Nechirvan also knows that it is far better to co-opt or ignore opponents than use force to imprison or kill them.

Masrour is not so nuanced. Most of the crises which soiled the Barzani name over the past decade—the imprisonment of political critics, the attacks on critics in Virginia and Vienna, and the murder of journalists seem to rest at Masrour’s feet.

The problem may be generational: The Barzanis are much like the Saudis. Both Masud Barzani’s father Mullah Mustafa Barzani and Ibn Saud, the founder of Saudi Arabia, were tribal leaders. Even at the height of their power, they remained close to the people. With every generation, however, the Saudis and Barzanis grew more isolated. Masud understands why his father was popular and may genuinely desire to be the same sort of leader, but he has allowed a huge distance—both literal and figurative—to develop between himself and the people he supposedly represents. He does not mix and mingle. The newest generation, however, has no real memory of their grandfather, and so has a very limited sense of the responsibility they inherit. They were born to power and see it as an entitlement. If Masoud Barzani’s grandsons enter the Erbil airport or any other government complex, scores of servants will bow and genuflect toward them. Grow up with endless servants and grown men singing your praises, little discipline and a sense that rules and the law are beneath you, and the same sort of perverse morality and mindset that afflicted Saddam Hussein’s sons and Muammar Gaddafi’s children can take root. Whereas Nechirvan uses power with nuance and still seeks to deliver, Masrour can simply be cruel. Human-rights monitors say that businessmen who do not pay him kickbacks are imprisoned, and journalists who write critically of him or his father disappear. He is quick to threaten, and seldom delivers. Nechirvan is smart; Masrour is not. Prior to the Islamic State’s seizure of Mosul, for example, Nechirvan understood the danger they posed; Masrour was too clever by half and apparently thought he could use them against political enemies.

Various people have tried to warn Masud about his sons’ behavior. In the past, Barzani supporters would say that Masud was simply unaware of their antics. Seldom does anyone hear such excuses anymore. Kurdish officials—and even Barzani family members—whisper that, like Saddam Hussein, Barzani is aware of the excesses and behavior of his sons but simply does not care. Family trumps Kurdistan, let alone democracy.

What does this mean for the United States? Privately, both diplomats and intelligence circles seem to understand the dynamics of the Masrour-Nechirvan split and, if it is not too strong a term, the psychopathic trends within Masrour’s behavior. They have expressed their displeasure by withdrawing diplomatic etiquette and searching Masrour and his delegation at Dulles airport, but there is a limit to what American officials are willing to do. That said, post-Masud Kurdistan—and potentially U.S.-Kurdish relations—will be far different with Masrour predominant than with Nechirvan in charge. The question for U.S. policymakers and perhaps the intelligence community as well is whether they are content to watch a slow-motion train wreck or whether leverage exists to prevent worst-case scenarios from developing. What they should under no circumstances take for granted is security in Kurdistan. Leadership matters.

link

article from a couple years ago ......

[lupine49]

On 10/1/2017 at 6:22 AM, Hikmah said:

There are two versions of the HCL. The first was created and put together in 2007, the US helped craft legislation that allowed the provinces to choose who they worked with, where the oil was drilled for and full transparency including revenue sharing for all the citizens of Iraq. Then Maliki became PM. His team took the original HCL apart and centralized everything, the GOI worked with the oil companies, told them where to drill and offered no transparency. This is the version the Kurd's, Christians, Turkmen and Sunni don't want to pass, they want choices when oil is drilled in their backyards.

 

If the HCL gets passed anytime soon, it will be Maliki's Shia version that benefits very few people in Iraq, unless you're part of the government and the Shia religion. 

May the flies of a thousand camels inhabit their tents.

[DropItLikeItsHot]

WOW!! That's a lot of Poop about the Barzani Family.....

Even though the article is a couple years old it puts a lot of light on why they are holding up the important laws.

Damn corrupt bastards.

[SnowGlobe7]

Thug...this was very enlightening...defiantly a great read. I can see after reading this the road will ultimately be the same as Saddam. His kids were a huge part of his downfall.

[Flamtap]

9 minutes ago, SnowGlobe7 said:

Thug...this was very enlightening...defiantly a great read. I can see after reading this the road will ultimately be the same as Saddam. His kids were a huge part of his downfall.

I totally agree with you Snowglobe7. Hopefully, we will see it a lot sooner than later.

 

Thanks Thug. 

[SnowGlobe7]

Any chance...

 

( I know here I go again)

 

that Abadi will not push for a HCL with the Kurds because he is waiting for Barzani to go bye bye and MAYBE there is a post Barzani plan?

 

thank goodness I am not a conspiracy theorist..could you imagine me then??? he hee heeeeee)

[Half Crazy Runner]

Thanks so much Thug, that was a very interesting & educational article to say the least! 

[3n1]

48 minutes ago, lupine49 said:

There are two versions of the HCL. The first was created and put together in 2007, the US helped craft legislation that allowed the provinces to choose who they worked with, where the oil was drilled for and full transparency including revenue sharing for all the citizens of Iraq. Then Maliki became PM. His team took the original HCL apart and centralized everything, the GOI worked with the oil companies, told them where to drill and offered no transparency. This is the version the Kurd's, Christians, Turkmen and Sunni don't want to pass, they want choices when oil is drilled in their backyards.

 

If the HCL gets passed anytime soon, it will be Maliki's Shia version that benefits very few people in Iraq, unless you're part of the government and the Shia religion. 

 

You are correct lupine49 , and right on the money the title to this thread is kinda misleading " the kurds forbid to vote " they kept walking out because 140 had been altered by screwball maliki and his band of thieves so they could steal and plunder all of Iraq the kurds were having none of it , Iraq could have been way past all this if maliki would have got shut down long ago can't figure why he is still in power the man has never wanted democracy for iraq even a iraqi version of democracy would have been much better than another dictator ... lets go abadi   

[10 YEARS LATER]

Makes no difference-nothing will be done. The poop 💩 on Maliki's misdeeds are as high as a Camels 🐫 eye and this fool is still causing hate and discontent wherever he goes.

[DinarThug]

This Is A Long But EXTREMELY Inciteful Article From 2 Years Ago !  

 

 

If U Take The Time To Read It U'll Be Glad U Did ...

 

     

 

 

Be Very Worried About Barzani Family Power Struggle

 MICHAEL RUBIN / JAN. 18, 2015

 

American officials tend to lionize Iraqi Kurdistan, and not without reason. Iraqi Kurdistan has, for more than two decades, been stable and relatively secure. And while its claims to be democratic are a bit exaggerated, its transformation in a relatively short period of time is astounding.

That said, the region was never democratic—the freest and fairest election it had was in 1992—and then the leaders simply massaged the process in order to maintain their hold. Regional President Masud Barzani, for example, is officially limited to two terms by the constitution, but got around the problem by extending his second term extra-legally. Simply put, today, Iraqi Kurdistan is a dictatorship.

The two ruling families dominate politics and society. Masud Barzani is president and lives in a palace complex in a resort inherited from Saddam Hussein. His nephew, Nechirvan Barzani, is prime minister. His uncle, Hoshyar Zebari, was Iraq’s foreign minister and is now finance minister. Masud’s eldest son, Masrour Barzani, leads the intelligence service; and his second son Mansour is a general, as is Masud’s brother Wajy. Barzani’s nephew Sirwan owns the regional cell phone company which, while purchased with public money, remains a private holding. Barzani’s sons are frequently in Washington D.C. They have their wives give birth in Sibley Hospital in order to ensure the next generation has American citizenship, and Masrour Barzani acquired an $11 million mansion in McLean, Virginia. Hanging out in Tyson’s Corner, Virginia, some of Masoud Barzani’s daughters-in-law have, according to Kurdish circles, been known to introduce themselves as “Princesses of Kurdistan” as they visit high-end shops accompanied by their own rather unnecessary (while in the United States) security details.

(Barzani isn’t the only family dynasty, just the most important one. Former Iraqi President Jalal Talabani’s wife Hero Ibrahim Ahmad runs a number of media outlets, “non-governmental organizations,” and maintains a stranglehold over the finances of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, the political party Talabani founded. She calls the shots for her son Qubad, whom she maneuvered into the deputy premiership. Lahur Talabani, the former president’s nephew, is head of his party’s counter-terrorism unit. President Talabani, when deciding who from his party should join him in Baghdad, appointed his brother-in-law Latif Rashid to be a minister.)

Family means everything in Kurdistan. When Masud Barzani met with President Obama several years ago at the White House, he brought with him Masrour and nephew Nechirvan even though the latter at the time was out of office and without any governmental role. Barham Salih, the serving prime minister, stayed home. Barham simply didn’t come from the right family. The Barzani Charity Foundation has “urged” other non-governmental organizations not to compete in certain sectors, or face the consequences. Meanwhile, its funds—Kurdish NGO workers and journalist say—go as much toward private jets and six-figure salaries as they do to assistance.

Masud Barzani is a dictator. As Islamist terrorists rage over the Charlie Hebdocartoons, Barzani remains calm to that supposed provocation. But when Sardasht Osman, a young Kurdish journalist, penned a relatively innocent poem highlighting how his life and fortunes would change if he married Barzani’s daughter—a subtle and sophisticated poke at the region’s nepotism and corruption—Barzani’s security service led by son Masrour apparently kidnapped and executed him. Family trumps everything.

For policymakers and businessmen in the United States or Europe who seek only stability and do not prioritize democracy, that may be fine. After all, aside from Israel and perhaps now Tunisia, the Middle East isn’t known for democracy. That stability, however, is on the verge of breaking down and, ironically, the reason is family.

Masud Barzani is nearing 70 years old. Like many Middle Eastern potentates, he is carefully considering his succession. While many in the West assume that Nechirvan Barzani, on paper the second-most powerful Kurdish figure, would be next in line, Masud has apparently decided to cast his lot with son Masrour. There have been subtle personnel changes and alterations in portfolios in recent years as Masrour has consolidated power. Take the case of Karim Sinjari: In theory the interior minister answering to Nechirvan Barzani, Sinjari has seen Masrour encroach on his power and portfolio in recent years. Whereas Sinjari once was responsible for the region’s impressive security, today Sinjari’s title may be the same but he holds sway over little more than local and traffic police forces.

The result of the power struggle matters. Both Nechirvan and Masrour Barzani would be corrupt by any American standard. Certainly, that’s a more difficult call by Iraqi and Kurdish law which doesn’t define business and political conflicts of interest in the same way. Still, both the Barzanis (and Talabanis) confuse personal, party, and public funds. That said, while Nechirvan Barzani may be corrupt, it is in the Tammany Hall sense: his machine may be shady at times, but it delivers not only to his immediate inner circle but to the public at large. Nechirvan is skilled, works with both supporters and opposition, and is generally popular. He does not exaggerate his academic or military prowess; he is self-confident enough to know that he need not bother, and that the general public sees through and privately jokes about embellishments. Nechirvan also knows that it is far better to co-opt or ignore opponents than use force to imprison or kill them.

Masrour is not so nuanced. Most of the crises which soiled the Barzani name over the past decade—the imprisonment of political critics, the attacks on critics in Virginia and Vienna, and the murder of journalists seem to rest at Masrour’s feet.

The problem may be generational: The Barzanis are much like the Saudis. Both Masud Barzani’s father Mullah Mustafa Barzani and Ibn Saud, the founder of Saudi Arabia, were tribal leaders. Even at the height of their power, they remained close to the people. With every generation, however, the Saudis and Barzanis grew more isolated. Masud understands why his father was popular and may genuinely desire to be the same sort of leader, but he has allowed a huge distance—both literal and figurative—to develop between himself and the people he supposedly represents. He does not mix and mingle. The newest generation, however, has no real memory of their grandfather, and so has a very limited sense of the responsibility they inherit. They were born to power and see it as an entitlement. If Masoud Barzani’s grandsons enter the Erbil airport or any other government complex, scores of servants will bow and genuflect toward them. Grow up with endless servants and grown men singing your praises, little discipline and a sense that rules and the law are beneath you, and the same sort of perverse morality and mindset that afflicted Saddam Hussein’s sons and Muammar Gaddafi’s children can take root. Whereas Nechirvan uses power with nuance and still seeks to deliver, Masrour can simply be cruel. Human-rights monitors say that businessmen who do not pay him kickbacks are imprisoned, and journalists who write critically of him or his father disappear. He is quick to threaten, and seldom delivers. Nechirvan is smart; Masrour is not. Prior to the Islamic State’s seizure of Mosul, for example, Nechirvan understood the danger they posed; Masrour was too clever by half and apparently thought he could use them against political enemies.

Various people have tried to warn Masud about his sons’ behavior. In the past, Barzani supporters would say that Masud was simply unaware of their antics. Seldom does anyone hear such excuses anymore. Kurdish officials—and even Barzani family members—whisper that, like Saddam Hussein, Barzani is aware of the excesses and behavior of his sons but simply does not care. Family trumps Kurdistan, let alone democracy.

What does this mean for the United States? Privately, both diplomats and intelligence circles seem to understand the dynamics of the Masrour-Nechirvan split and, if it is not too strong a term, the psychopathic trends within Masrour’s behavior. They have expressed their displeasure by withdrawing diplomatic etiquette and searching Masrour and his delegation at Dulles airport, but there is a limit to what American officials are willing to do. That said, post-Masud Kurdistan—and potentially U.S.-Kurdish relations—will be far different with Masrour predominant than with Nechirvan in charge. The question for U.S. policymakers and perhaps the intelligence community as well is whether they are content to watch a slow-motion train wreck or whether leverage exists to prevent worst-case scenarios from developing. What they should under no circumstances take for granted is security in Kurdistan. Leadership matters.

link

article from a couple years ago ......

 

26 minutes ago, Half Crazy Runner said:

Thanks so much Thug, that was a very interesting & educational article to say the least! 

 

59 minutes ago, SnowGlobe7 said:

Thug...this was very enlightening...defiantly a great read. I can see after reading this the road will ultimately be the same as Saddam. His kids were a huge part of his downfall.

 

1 hour ago, DropItLikeItsHot said:

WOW!! That's a lot of Poop about the Barzani Family.....

Even though the article is a couple years old it puts a lot of light on why they are holding up the important laws.

Damn corrupt bastards.

 

True Dat !